Freethought & Rationalism Archive

excreationist · 07-10-2002, 06:30 AM

DRFseven:
I think I remember you saying that sometimes people who have a damaged limbic system can sense something when something painful is going on, but it doesn't feel painful at all... could you tell me what you know about that thanks?

DRFseven · 07-10-2002, 09:54 AM

Quote:

ex: I think I remember you saying that sometimes people who have a damaged limbic system can sense something when something painful is going on, but it doesn't feel painful at all... could you tell me what you know about that thanks?

Sure. You're referring to something I referenced once from neurologist, Richard Restak's Mysteries of the Mind, in which Restak reports on the experience of a patient seen by Damasio:

Quote:

Brain-imaging studies suggest that the prefrontal cortices, especially the left, inhibit activity in the emotion-mediating amygdala.

Balance between the prefrontal cortex and the amygdala is an important aspect of mental health. Patients with damage to either structure -- or to the pathways connecting them -- fail to experience normal emotions. If the damage concerns their prefrontal lobes, the fail to become anxious under circumstances when anxiety would be appropriate. For instance, we all become anxious at the prospect of experiencing pain. But if our prefrontal cortices are no longer working normally, pain may occur without any accompanying anxiety and suffering.

Neurologist Antonio Damasio first observed this type of absence of anxiety in a patient who underwent an operation that involved cutting the prefrontal fibers in order to relieve severe facial pain. Prior to the operartion the man "crouched in profound suffering, almost immobile, and afraid of triggering further pain in his face." Two days later, he was a different person: The doctors found him absorbed in a game of cards and asked his condition. "Oh, the pains are the same, but I feel fine now, thank you," he responded. Concluded Damasio, "Clearly, what the operation seemed to have done, then, was to abolish the emotional reaction that is part of what we call pain."

Here's a good site that includes information about the <a href="http://lifesci.rutgers.edu/~auerbach/BMLEC17.pdf" target="_blank"> emotional expression of pain</a>.

[ July 10, 2002: Message edited by: DRFseven ]</p>

Mr. Sammi · 07-10-2002, 02:15 PM

DRFseven , I am waiting for your reply, to the answer I submitted due to your request.

Sammi Na Boodie ()

DRFseven · 07-10-2002, 04:10 PM

Quote:

Sammi: Topological operators which can be created, updated, modified, and so on, exist in "the mind" as part of ThinkingBeing. Some operators will be shared so to speak by being genetically stamped an unalterable part of the body VS. menetic operators which can be altered or recreated but has access to the same information set as the genetic topological operators. This I consider the John Page border. Is this adequate or are there more questions?

From this it sounds as if you are in basic agreement with my statement below from a July 9 statement to owleye:

"An essential part of this modification involves modulation of memory function because of its role as intrinsic stimulator in the process of neuromodulation.

The borders of our bodies intermingle with our environments, I think, with the mind. "

In other words, the environment changes the body, which changes the mind, which changes body, which changes the environment, which..(repeats).

But then you completely throw me when you say

Quote:

As an amateur philosopher I am not actually concerned at this moment about physical processes, if this means anything.

How can you talk about a mind/body border without taking the physical into account?

crocodile deathroll · 07-10-2002, 09:33 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by John Page:

Yes, but are all proteins involved in a conscious process? Is all DNA incorporated in conscious beings? I readily admit that without knowing how the phenomenon of consciousness comes about I'm fumbling in the dark here but is milk conscious because it contains proteins, is DNA itself conscious?

Oh hell no, I would not say DNA itself is conscious, but there are certain critical level of protein configurations that is predetermined by DNA that is. The same as every single atom in your brain, when observed in isolation, is not the slightest bit conscious. They surely have a little bit of mass and we now the sum total of all those atoms are around 1.4 kilos, but that does not mean consciousness weighs 1.4 kilos.
I am of the view that it is the configuring of matter and not the matter itself that generates consciousness.
I do acknowledge that most proteins however that have nothing to do with consciousness at all, they may be good for other survival characteristics like the morphology insect wings or growing a thick woolly coat., etc
Other's, although they have nothing to do with consciousness per se, they may well be necessary stepping stones, for the emergence of human consciousness like the apposable thumb and binocular vision.

Quote:

Originally posted by John Page:

I concur with the emergent property viewpoint but am less troubled by the improbability of human existence. That the universe seems very large admits statistically that improbable things can happen. If only we could find a non-carbon based lifeform to chew this one over...

Yes I fully endorse that and the inflationary cosmos theory that was formulated by Alan Guth and Andre Linde would even make unimaginably improbable things ........happen.

Ierrellus · 07-12-2002, 04:54 AM

John,

IMO, language defines the mind/body border. As I mentioned elsewhere, vervet monkies have a different alarm cry for each of their three preditors--snake, leopard, eagle. The monkies will not scream "eagle" alarm when a snake is present. The monkies will not cry "horny" noises if they mean there is an eagle nearby. They will not make the alarm sound if there is no preditor around; but they will respond to the sound if a human or recorder makes it.

The language of the vervet monkey, then, is present tense immediacy. What the monkies mean by their sounds can be objectively interpreted by humans. IMO, the vervet sound for "snake" is translatable more or less as "snaking", signifying active presence of the threat.

The old English word milk (milc, miolc) is a noun/verb. I believe language began as present tense, noun/verbs and elaborated into subject, object,being,action,modifiers and substitutes.

Why should the monkey care if his group knows there is a snake around? Does the monkey know the difference between itself and the snake? As a language, Vervet is clear, concise, cogent, concrete--did human language evolve from immediacy to speculation?

Ierrellus
PAX

[ July 12, 2002: Message edited by: Ierrellus ]</p>

John Page · 07-12-2002, 10:27 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Ierrellus:
<strong>IMO, language defines the mind/body border...... </strong>

Ierr:

Within a "Spartan" or functional definition of language I'd agree with you. How about this as a first attempt: "Language (as an action) occurs whenever information about some phenomenon is transmitted in a contextual form through another phenomenon for interpretation by a third phenomenon."

The three phenomena referenced above could be body -> signal -> mind, language being the context of the signal that is the border between body and mind.

How about this for fun: "Language (noun) is a word that refers to itself as an instance of iteslf (language as an action) happening." In this way, language is a form of representation that can also be used to represent itself.

Cheers, John

owleye · 07-13-2002, 05:06 PM

DRFseven....

"Yes; a cogntive behaviorist one, as well. Transformation of incoming signals to behavior does not discount mental events in any way. In fact, the majority of our behaviors derive from the process of cognition."

How, in your theory, does behavior derive from cognition? I would gather from the above that mental events causally influence behavior. How does mental activity serve as a cause of physical activity?

owleye

Ierrellus · 07-14-2002, 05:19 AM

John,
Yep, and meaning of meaning is a meaning.

Definitions rely on words; and words are slippery critters to hold down because they are organic in a sense that they have etymologies;
their "meanings" are restricted by the facts that they rely on contexts of usage and they have substitutes both in one language and in another; and they are not universal but are localized as communication symbols for particular social groups.

Confusing enough?

If all meanings of a word could be reduced to a single meaning agreed upon by a single social group, the meaning chosen would still not be adequate to explain why the members of the group agree to agree. That last meaning suggests an innate tendency to agree. Since genetic information is geared toward producing a viable organism given changing environments, genetic data consists of drives, traits, dispositions. These have a heritage of contexts and evoltionary successes or failures; but their contributions to meaning cannot be neglected.

Ierrellus
PAX

owleye · 07-14-2002, 07:02 AM

John....

"Pretty much agreed, although I consider the "picking out" as part of the generalized process of perception."

I don't know where you got the idea that I indicated that "picking out" is not part of perception. Note that if a concept is required prior to being able to pick out an object in perception, this would imply that our mind is constructed with primitive concepts or categories in order to be able to perceive objects in the first place and that these concepts are used along with another ability we have to form concepts by making certain distinguishing characteristics important to us. It is through language that we learn new concepts from old ones, just to be able to perceive new objects that fit those concepts.

"This does not necessarily describe conscious perception, however, where the conscious mind seems to have the ability to select what it focuses on (i.e. a sophisiticated picking process). I believe we are perceiving and thinking whether we our consciousness apprehends or not - I think this is supported by much split brain experimentation."

What the split brain experiments show is that we take in information from the environment through our senses without our being aware of it. This doesn't support the idea that we think and perceive unconsciously. However, since your interpretation of perception and thinking has it that they are brain activity that occurs whether we are conscious of it or not, I will no longer discuss thinking and perceiving as part of the difficult problem that is being sought here. What I will now focus on is what constitutes consciousness, such that we can be aware of and attend to our thoughts and perceptions. I would hope you have given this problem some thought, because this is the only serious problem that philosophers are concerned with.

"While I am not a strict physicalist, I do believe existential evidence requires empirical space/time data."

From this I would conclude that consciousness does not exist, since it cannot be perceived.

"Maybe I'm a functionalist but I don't require everythng to be defined in terms of its function/purpose. IMO, while hypotheses are useful in projecting possible explanations, objective proofs cannot be obtained without relating theory back to real testable examples. This final step is the one that separates the pink unicorns from the girls, so to speak."

I do not take this thread to be a discussion of the philosophy of science, but if you wish to get into it, I guess I don't mind. In any case, the language you use above contains a number of confusions that need sorting out. What I find most interesting about it, however, is that science has severe limitations when it comes to investigating the mind (consciousness).

"How else but through a comparison can we arrive at the differences and similarities between things? Admitted, there are many ways to compare the qualities of things - height, depth, distance, smell, distribution over time, relationship to other objects etc."

We certainly can compare or contrast two objects we perceive. This was not the question being asked. It was not about similarities and differences between objects. It was about perception of objects themselves and why a comparison is needed. What makes you think that perception itself requires a comparison?

"Surely there are instances of concepts that have location. These are what I am refering to. Here's an example. You have a concept of a zebra in your brain, I have a concept of a zebra in my mind. They are different IMO, there is no great zebra in the sky that we are jointly perceiving. The concept of the zebra may be treated like any other sense or sense derived impression."

If I assume that what you mean by concept is some brain state, then I can imagine its having some location. However, the (conscious) mental state that represents a concept is what I would be asking about. (Note that this is similar to the question about the location of genes. Physically, they have a location -- where DNA is located --. Ideally, however, they may not.) If mental states are located in minds that exist at some location, then there is a problem about how these minds share concepts. What would make this possible?

"The concept of a zebra is retained in your brain through some process of learning/memorization. The concept of zebra is used in testing (comparing) incoming sense impressions to detect the presence of a zebra in the reality external to the mind.
Under this model, there is no need for any locationless concepts. However, the model could be flawed and if you have any evidence supporting the existence of the latter I'd be very interested to learn about it."

In the above model, what would make it possible for two separate minds to acquire the same concept of a zebra? Would they not have to be programmed in the same way?

"Not only do I propose to specify, I have specified. Here's a very brief summary. Truth exists only in the mind. A value "true" results from the comparison of two sets of information and the resulting assumption that they are identical."

Do you really intend "assumption" here or are you mispeaking and intend something like "determination?" In any case, I'm not entirely sure what you mean by "truth" such that it only occurs in the mind. This would tend to imply that there is no truth or that it is entirely a construction of the mind. You would then be what is called an anti-realist with respect to whatever it is that you think truth applies to. More interestingly, though, is that you apparently think all the truths of logic and mathematics can be derived from the law of identity. This is rather a sweeping generalization and I would hope that you can provide some support for this.

(Note that as of yet you have not indicated how mathematical truths are physically true.)

"Consider the Law of Identity, if you apply this strictly how can anything be anything else? This explains why truth is only provisional, if entities were perfect copies of each other you wouldn't be able to tell the difference."

There seems to be a contradiction here. Are you thinking that the law of identity is only provisionally true? If so, what would make it turn out to be false?

"None, as far as I know! I am not proposing that the laws of logic are physical laws, just that they depend upon physical substrate for their operation. Contradictions are created through inconsistent interpretations of information about reality."

The last sentence doesn't say anything, since "inconsistency" says no more than saying a contradiction is included in the interpretation. With respect to the first part, however, in what way do logical laws depend on physical substrates in order for them to operate? Physical substrates may be involved in carrying out a logical process, but the logical process would be understood as having prior existence if the physical substrate failed in some way to carry out that process. That is, if my calculator failed in some way to carry out the addition of two numbers, the failure would be physical not logical. Indeed, this is the only way that the failure could be understood. The addition of two numbers has a timeless quality in that respect.

"Which exemplifies possible inconsistency in the use of the word concrete - which is it? I drew up my reality diagram in an attempt to avoid such ambiguity."

You have a short memory, I'm afraid. You insisted that 'concrete' be physical. I was pointing out that the meaning of 'concrete' does not insist on this.

"Your last sentence is a misconception IMO which you arrive at my assuming that mathematical and logic laws have little or no dependence on the physical universe. On the contrary, they are merely expressions of relationships between things (some of which are abstract and others physical) that our minds have come to know."

This is your thesis. I would have hoped you would be able to respond to the criticism I've given. In twelve pages of this thread, I have yet to see one coherent response. Your thesis may or may not have value (if it were ever clarified by you). Your defense of it, however, is remarkable in that it fails at every level.

"Do you concur the universe existed before humankind invented mathematics? If so, this puts a whole in the "timeless" theory of ideals."

My agreement or disagreement with this is not important. The issues surrounding the philosophical problem of "invention vs. discovery" of mathematics is not answered by your mere assertion that humans invented mathematics. You need to argue for it.

"I would also observe that our "ideals" do vary over time - my concept of a chair today is different than when I first learned the meaning of chair."

This could be interpreted in (at least) three ways: (1) The chair concept you originally had was not that of a chair, but of something else and the concept you have of the chair now may be the correct one; (2) The concept of chair has evolved historically as culture changes and you have picked of these changes in your history; (3) The chair concept you originally had was of a chair, but was from a concept that is no longer in use (or at least in your use), and the new concept you have represents the (or your) current use.

The difficulty I see with (2) is that it begs a question about what culture change is and I think it could be incorporated within (3), giving its meaning an eternal quality (though its use is temporal). In any case, nothing you've said refutes the alternative view.

"Without you providing your view or a hypothetical view for debate I'm finding the dialog difficult."

I'm not here to give you my position on consciousness. I'm here to assist you, through a critical analysis, so that you can properly defend your thesis. Indeed, as I have indicated several times, I don't have any good ideas on what consciousness is.

"The paper contains a generalized example for the operation of set membership ruels and a specific example for membership of the set of 3."

How is set membership physicalized? Indeed, how is a set physicalized?

"Exactly how the brain deals with language rules - I can't offer that and suggest you look to neurological investigations that provide much insight into the physical implementation of perception within the brain."

The reason for choosing the example I did is to give an idea of the difficulty of determining the question from a neurological standpoint. You seem to think that it is just a matter of time before we will be able to do this. However, I think what you've shown is that all that will be determined through neurological studies is what is physically is going on when certain mental activity takes place. Thus, in stroke patients, it may be able to find the site where our speech is corrupted -- i.e., what we are intending to say is not what we actually say -- and as such correct the mis-wiring that caused this, but it will not be able to discern what it was that was intended except through behavioral indicators coupled with our own interpretation of what was intended. It would be like looking at a wiring diagram of a memory circuit and trying to determine whether the logic state represents a 'one' or a 'zero'. And as you know, it is an arbitrary assignment of ours that makes a physical state a 'one' or a 'zero'.

"Not independent. It is the domain/extent to which the truth is applied that is the issue. I guess that's why I'm making such a big deal about the border of the mind, in my perception the stuff outside the mind can be independently verified in a repeatable manner. The stuff of the imagination need not have an external correlate as in the case of Santa Claus (although I did see him last year...) "

In ordinary parlance, what is real is what you refer to as the 'external correlate' of 'the stuff of the imagination'. Presumably, the stuff of the imagination is real also, but only as it is stuff of the imagination. I may surmise from this that your understanding of reality is that it is of two kinds: external and internal, of which what is external may be a correlate of what is internal. If I may project this further, what is internal is real because it is some brain state or activity. Thus, there are two realities -- one that is represented in the brain and the other what such a representation is intended to represent.

"Yes, I think data, belief, opinion, knowledge etc. are all notches on a scale of relative subjectivity. The only way to know objectively where you are is to get more data and analyze it thereby increasing the domain in which the results are valid."

What it sounds like is that the correspondence you wish to maintain between internal reality and external reality improves as more data is analyzed and that we are entitled to go from notch to notch based on having arrived at specific points on this scale. Have you given any thought about the notch criteria you would offer with respect to having a belief (or having knowledge) about something, or is it so loose that we could use knowledge and belief (and opinion) interchangeably?

"This includes gaining an understanding of how we perceive what we perceive, this helping us to be more objective about our first person accounts."

What additional data would we need to respond to the question of what we (consciously) perceive and how should such data be analyzed in order to be more objective about our first person accounts? As I'm watching the letters appearing before me as i type this on my computer keyboard, what additional data would you need to tell me what it is I am seeing?

"History, for example, has a formal system for categorization of knowledge depending upon the record from which it is extracted e.g. eye witness account is a prime record. Then you can move through formal records to sheer myth and fairy tales (I'll leave god out of this)which gives some indication of the reliability of the information. Another aspect is taking into account, where known, the affiliations of the historian to account for possible bias."

I'll try to remember this as your philosophy of history. Though interesting, and not without a myriad of problems, it would take me too far afield to cover it now.

owleye

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07-10-2002, 06:30 AM	#281
excreationist Veteran Member Join Date: Aug 2000 Location: Australia Posts: 4,886	DRFseven: I think I remember you saying that sometimes people who have a damaged limbic system can sense something when something painful is going on, but it doesn't feel painful at all... could you tell me what you know about that thanks?

07-10-2002, 02:15 PM	#283
Mr. Sammi Banned Join Date: Jun 2002 Location: Montr�al Posts: 367	DRFseven , I am waiting for your reply, to the answer I submitted due to your request. Sammi Na Boodie ()

07-12-2002, 04:54 AM	#286
Ierrellus Veteran Member Join Date: Mar 2002 Location: Canton, Ohio Posts: 2,082	John, IMO, language defines the mind/body border. As I mentioned elsewhere, vervet monkies have a different alarm cry for each of their three preditors--snake, leopard, eagle. The monkies will not scream "eagle" alarm when a snake is present. The monkies will not cry "horny" noises if they mean there is an eagle nearby. They will not make the alarm sound if there is no preditor around; but they will respond to the sound if a human or recorder makes it. The language of the vervet monkey, then, is present tense immediacy. What the monkies mean by their sounds can be objectively interpreted by humans. IMO, the vervet sound for "snake" is translatable more or less as "snaking", signifying active presence of the threat. The old English word milk (milc, miolc) is a noun/verb. I believe language began as present tense, noun/verbs and elaborated into subject, object,being,action,modifiers and substitutes. Why should the monkey care if his group knows there is a snake around? Does the monkey know the difference between itself and the snake? As a language, Vervet is clear, concise, cogent, concrete--did human language evolve from immediacy to speculation? Ierrellus PAX [ July 12, 2002: Message edited by: Ierrellus ]</p>

07-13-2002, 05:06 PM	#288
owleye Regular Member Join Date: Feb 2002 Location: Home Posts: 229	DRFseven.... "Yes; a cogntive behaviorist one, as well. Transformation of incoming signals to behavior does not discount mental events in any way. In fact, the majority of our behaviors derive from the process of cognition." How, in your theory, does behavior derive from cognition? I would gather from the above that mental events causally influence behavior. How does mental activity serve as a cause of physical activity? owleye

07-14-2002, 05:19 AM	#289
Ierrellus Veteran Member Join Date: Mar 2002 Location: Canton, Ohio Posts: 2,082	John, Yep, and meaning of meaning is a meaning. Definitions rely on words; and words are slippery critters to hold down because they are organic in a sense that they have etymologies; their "meanings" are restricted by the facts that they rely on contexts of usage and they have substitutes both in one language and in another; and they are not universal but are localized as communication symbols for particular social groups. Confusing enough? If all meanings of a word could be reduced to a single meaning agreed upon by a single social group, the meaning chosen would still not be adequate to explain why the members of the group agree to agree. That last meaning suggests an innate tendency to agree. Since genetic information is geared toward producing a viable organism given changing environments, genetic data consists of drives, traits, dispositions. These have a heritage of contexts and evoltionary successes or failures; but their contributions to meaning cannot be neglected. Ierrellus PAX

07-14-2002, 07:02 AM	#290
owleye Regular Member Join Date: Feb 2002 Location: Home Posts: 229	John.... "Pretty much agreed, although I consider the "picking out" as part of the generalized process of perception." I don't know where you got the idea that I indicated that "picking out" is not part of perception. Note that if a concept is required prior to being able to pick out an object in perception, this would imply that our mind is constructed with primitive concepts or categories in order to be able to perceive objects in the first place and that these concepts are used along with another ability we have to form concepts by making certain distinguishing characteristics important to us. It is through language that we learn new concepts from old ones, just to be able to perceive new objects that fit those concepts. "This does not necessarily describe conscious perception, however, where the conscious mind seems to have the ability to select what it focuses on (i.e. a sophisiticated picking process). I believe we are perceiving and thinking whether we our consciousness apprehends or not - I think this is supported by much split brain experimentation." What the split brain experiments show is that we take in information from the environment through our senses without our being aware of it. This doesn't support the idea that we think and perceive unconsciously. However, since your interpretation of perception and thinking has it that they are brain activity that occurs whether we are conscious of it or not, I will no longer discuss thinking and perceiving as part of the difficult problem that is being sought here. What I will now focus on is what constitutes consciousness, such that we can be aware of and attend to our thoughts and perceptions. I would hope you have given this problem some thought, because this is the only serious problem that philosophers are concerned with. "While I am not a strict physicalist, I do believe existential evidence requires empirical space/time data." From this I would conclude that consciousness does not exist, since it cannot be perceived. "Maybe I'm a functionalist but I don't require everythng to be defined in terms of its function/purpose. IMO, while hypotheses are useful in projecting possible explanations, objective proofs cannot be obtained without relating theory back to real testable examples. This final step is the one that separates the pink unicorns from the girls, so to speak." I do not take this thread to be a discussion of the philosophy of science, but if you wish to get into it, I guess I don't mind. In any case, the language you use above contains a number of confusions that need sorting out. What I find most interesting about it, however, is that science has severe limitations when it comes to investigating the mind (consciousness). "How else but through a comparison can we arrive at the differences and similarities between things? Admitted, there are many ways to compare the qualities of things - height, depth, distance, smell, distribution over time, relationship to other objects etc." We certainly can compare or contrast two objects we perceive. This was not the question being asked. It was not about similarities and differences between objects. It was about perception of objects themselves and why a comparison is needed. What makes you think that perception itself requires a comparison? "Surely there are instances of concepts that have location. These are what I am refering to. Here's an example. You have a concept of a zebra in your brain, I have a concept of a zebra in my mind. They are different IMO, there is no great zebra in the sky that we are jointly perceiving. The concept of the zebra may be treated like any other sense or sense derived impression." If I assume that what you mean by concept is some brain state, then I can imagine its having some location. However, the (conscious) mental state that represents a concept is what I would be asking about. (Note that this is similar to the question about the location of genes. Physically, they have a location -- where DNA is located --. Ideally, however, they may not.) If mental states are located in minds that exist at some location, then there is a problem about how these minds share concepts. What would make this possible? "The concept of a zebra is retained in your brain through some process of learning/memorization. The concept of zebra is used in testing (comparing) incoming sense impressions to detect the presence of a zebra in the reality external to the mind. Under this model, there is no need for any locationless concepts. However, the model could be flawed and if you have any evidence supporting the existence of the latter I'd be very interested to learn about it." In the above model, what would make it possible for two separate minds to acquire the same concept of a zebra? Would they not have to be programmed in the same way? "Not only do I propose to specify, I have specified. Here's a very brief summary. Truth exists only in the mind. A value "true" results from the comparison of two sets of information and the resulting assumption that they are identical." Do you really intend "assumption" here or are you mispeaking and intend something like "determination?" In any case, I'm not entirely sure what you mean by "truth" such that it only occurs in the mind. This would tend to imply that there is no truth or that it is entirely a construction of the mind. You would then be what is called an anti-realist with respect to whatever it is that you think truth applies to. More interestingly, though, is that you apparently think all the truths of logic and mathematics can be derived from the law of identity. This is rather a sweeping generalization and I would hope that you can provide some support for this. (Note that as of yet you have not indicated how mathematical truths are physically true.) "Consider the Law of Identity, if you apply this strictly how can anything be anything else? This explains why truth is only provisional, if entities were perfect copies of each other you wouldn't be able to tell the difference." There seems to be a contradiction here. Are you thinking that the law of identity is only provisionally true? If so, what would make it turn out to be false? "None, as far as I know! I am not proposing that the laws of logic are physical laws, just that they depend upon physical substrate for their operation. Contradictions are created through inconsistent interpretations of information about reality." The last sentence doesn't say anything, since "inconsistency" says no more than saying a contradiction is included in the interpretation. With respect to the first part, however, in what way do logical laws depend on physical substrates in order for them to operate? Physical substrates may be involved in carrying out a logical process, but the logical process would be understood as having prior existence if the physical substrate failed in some way to carry out that process. That is, if my calculator failed in some way to carry out the addition of two numbers, the failure would be physical not logical. Indeed, this is the only way that the failure could be understood. The addition of two numbers has a timeless quality in that respect. "Which exemplifies possible inconsistency in the use of the word concrete - which is it? I drew up my reality diagram in an attempt to avoid such ambiguity." You have a short memory, I'm afraid. You insisted that 'concrete' be physical. I was pointing out that the meaning of 'concrete' does not insist on this. "Your last sentence is a misconception IMO which you arrive at my assuming that mathematical and logic laws have little or no dependence on the physical universe. On the contrary, they are merely expressions of relationships between things (some of which are abstract and others physical) that our minds have come to know." This is your thesis. I would have hoped you would be able to respond to the criticism I've given. In twelve pages of this thread, I have yet to see one coherent response. Your thesis may or may not have value (if it were ever clarified by you). Your defense of it, however, is remarkable in that it fails at every level. "Do you concur the universe existed before humankind invented mathematics? If so, this puts a whole in the "timeless" theory of ideals." My agreement or disagreement with this is not important. The issues surrounding the philosophical problem of "invention vs. discovery" of mathematics is not answered by your mere assertion that humans invented mathematics. You need to argue for it. "I would also observe that our "ideals" do vary over time - my concept of a chair today is different than when I first learned the meaning of chair." This could be interpreted in (at least) three ways: (1) The chair concept you originally had was not that of a chair, but of something else and the concept you have of the chair now may be the correct one; (2) The concept of chair has evolved historically as culture changes and you have picked of these changes in your history; (3) The chair concept you originally had was of a chair, but was from a concept that is no longer in use (or at least in your use), and the new concept you have represents the (or your) current use. The difficulty I see with (2) is that it begs a question about what culture change is and I think it could be incorporated within (3), giving its meaning an eternal quality (though its use is temporal). In any case, nothing you've said refutes the alternative view. "Without you providing your view or a hypothetical view for debate I'm finding the dialog difficult." I'm not here to give you my position on consciousness. I'm here to assist you, through a critical analysis, so that you can properly defend your thesis. Indeed, as I have indicated several times, I don't have any good ideas on what consciousness is. "The paper contains a generalized example for the operation of set membership ruels and a specific example for membership of the set of 3." How is set membership physicalized? Indeed, how is a set physicalized? "Exactly how the brain deals with language rules - I can't offer that and suggest you look to neurological investigations that provide much insight into the physical implementation of perception within the brain." The reason for choosing the example I did is to give an idea of the difficulty of determining the question from a neurological standpoint. You seem to think that it is just a matter of time before we will be able to do this. However, I think what you've shown is that all that will be determined through neurological studies is what is physically is going on when certain mental activity takes place. Thus, in stroke patients, it may be able to find the site where our speech is corrupted -- i.e., what we are intending to say is not what we actually say -- and as such correct the mis-wiring that caused this, but it will not be able to discern what it was that was intended except through behavioral indicators coupled with our own interpretation of what was intended. It would be like looking at a wiring diagram of a memory circuit and trying to determine whether the logic state represents a 'one' or a 'zero'. And as you know, it is an arbitrary assignment of ours that makes a physical state a 'one' or a 'zero'. "Not independent. It is the domain/extent to which the truth is applied that is the issue. I guess that's why I'm making such a big deal about the border of the mind, in my perception the stuff outside the mind can be independently verified in a repeatable manner. The stuff of the imagination need not have an external correlate as in the case of Santa Claus (although I did see him last year...) " In ordinary parlance, what is real is what you refer to as the 'external correlate' of 'the stuff of the imagination'. Presumably, the stuff of the imagination is real also, but only as it is stuff of the imagination. I may surmise from this that your understanding of reality is that it is of two kinds: external and internal, of which what is external may be a correlate of what is internal. If I may project this further, what is internal is real because it is some brain state or activity. Thus, there are two realities -- one that is represented in the brain and the other what such a representation is intended to represent. "Yes, I think data, belief, opinion, knowledge etc. are all notches on a scale of relative subjectivity. The only way to know objectively where you are is to get more data and analyze it thereby increasing the domain in which the results are valid." What it sounds like is that the correspondence you wish to maintain between internal reality and external reality improves as more data is analyzed and that we are entitled to go from notch to notch based on having arrived at specific points on this scale. Have you given any thought about the notch criteria you would offer with respect to having a belief (or having knowledge) about something, or is it so loose that we could use knowledge and belief (and opinion) interchangeably? "This includes gaining an understanding of how we perceive what we perceive, this helping us to be more objective about our first person accounts." What additional data would we need to respond to the question of what we (consciously) perceive and how should such data be analyzed in order to be more objective about our first person accounts? As I'm watching the letters appearing before me as i type this on my computer keyboard, what additional data would you need to tell me what it is I am seeing? "History, for example, has a formal system for categorization of knowledge depending upon the record from which it is extracted e.g. eye witness account is a prime record. Then you can move through formal records to sheer myth and fairy tales (I'll leave god out of this)which gives some indication of the reliability of the information. Another aspect is taking into account, where known, the affiliations of the historian to account for possible bias." I'll try to remember this as your philosophy of history. Though interesting, and not without a myriad of problems, it would take me too far afield to cover it now. owleye

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