Nu

Does anyone here profess to have a complete knowledge of the workings of the human brain?

If not, then is it not best to suspend judgement until such answers are found?

All of you are arguing on assumptions.

rebelnerd

Yes, lumping everything into one category is a simple solution to this dilemma. I have not mentioned free will (with the exception of saying I was side-stepping it) yet in any of my definitions, which I stand by. I have only talked about choice.

Fair enough.

Yes you could say that, maybe the snail did choose. But since I am not privy to a snail's thoughts (if they even have thoughts in the conventional sense,) I don't know. Instinct most likely.

You are correct.

Which is your choice.

Filo

Keith Russell

Kent:

Are you really trying to convince us that we don't have free will?

If you're right, then we have no choice about believing that we have free will.

You might be able to persuade us that you're right--only if you're wrong.

Keith.

Kent Stevens

On examinining the compatibilist position it does not sound like weak free will. It is not some hybrid consisting of a bit of free will and a bit of determinism. In terms of compatibility it is not the compatibility between free will and determinism. Instead compatibilism takes a strong or definite claim for determinism and for responsibility.

Consequently, I am a determinist and a compatibilist, but not a fatalist. A fatalist believing that we do not have influence over things in our lives because it is already predetermined by fate or some other mystical entity. I also believe in "freedom" in that a person acts freely unless they are compeled otherwise. I would not be "free" if I was a slave or if someone was holding a gun to my head. I also believe in causation in that everything has a cause, except perhaps for the original creation of things.

I do not believe in a totally free will because everything has a cause including what I do.

One definition of determinism is as follows:

This definition suggests that determinism means roughly the same thing as causation.

Free will could be thought of as uncaused causation. This would be consistent with the following passage from Steven Pinkers "How the mind works":

The only other time that we come against uncaused causation is supposedly in the creation of the universe. I think that the notion of causation certainly applies to us, but it may be more difficult applying our normal ideas of causation to the begining of the universe.

Free will could also be thought of in terms of choosing. You think that you chose to get up and out of bed and go to work. You chose to eat and drink. However, you are influenced by things like your body running out of nutriment triggering certain responses. Indirectly, the decision to eat or drink or do whatever, can be found to have some cause.

Kent Stevens

I believe that we are a physical system. We are bound by the same physical laws as is any other system. We are bound by gravity and electromagnetic forces. We are bound by the conservation of energy and the inevitable increase in entropy. I do not think that we are any inherently different in that we are unpredictable and hard to explain, as there are other physical systems like this also.

There are certain characteristics that differentiate one physical system from another one. We think, have feelings, and are concerned about morality, wheras a rock does not. But a rock if released will fall at the same rate as a human does, so there is some overlap of features between different physical systems. Another common feature is that all physical systems are caused, everything has a cause as do I. Another common feature of physical systems is of unpredictability. The weather, humans, and quantum mechanics all exhibit forms of unpredictability.

Initially, many unpredictable physical systems were supposed to have someone choosing behind them. The weather, earthquakes, and random systems were supposed to do things because certain gods chose this or that to happen. Previously people might have thought they had a spell of fine weather due to Zeus being pleased with them. Or if there was an earthquake it was because perhaps Ra was upset. If there was a flood maybe it was because Yahweh was punishing humanity. If a group of people drew lots and someone drew the short straw this was due to divine selection. If someone got struck by lightning this could be due to Thor choosing this to happen.

All these unpredictable systems were supposed to be the result of choice. Over the years science has been able to whittle down this domain of choice. The weather and earthquakes are supposed to no longer be due to choice, but be due to physics for example. What I am saying is why not admit that the concept of choice is unnecessary for describing any physical system. I do not need choice to explain what the weather does and I do not need choice to explain what I or anyone else does do.

The word choice is unnecessary. Instead of saying I chose to wrote this I can simply say that I wrote this. We can talk about intending to do something without talking about choosing to do something.

One way of looking at things is think of people as analogous to the weather in terms of unpredictability. Either you buy into this analogy for certain features or you do not. It would seem weird if we said that the weather chose to rain today. The weather is a complicated unpredictable system but most people would not say that it choses to do things. Likewise to be strictly correct it is inaccurate to say that we chose to do things. The most correct way of looking at existence is to say that things just happen. You just got out of bed today just like the weather is just fine or bad.

We can still use the word choice if we want to when alternatives present themselves. There will always be alternatives in any system. It is less strictly correct to use the word choice but often we use expressions that are only approximately true. However, if we do use the word choice we should realise that it can be used over a range of different systems besides ourselves.

The weather is responsible or attributable for it's actions. Consider the predicament of someone who has lost their house in a cyclone. The hurricane might have been initially created or caused over the middle of an ocean. But we do not blame the ocean for the loss of the house. We blame or hold response the direct cause of the hurricane.

A cyclone is not implastic in that it cannot change. A cyclone may head out going in one direction but then change course for perhaps no apparent reason.

A cyclone still has influence on it's surroundings even if it can not chose. A cyclone is not totally passive the way that a tennis ball is passive.

I believe that we are a physical system. In terms of the aspect of unpredictability I think we are not intrinsically different from the weather. The weather does not chose so much as just does. The weather is still attributable, capable of change, and is not passive. Likewise humans simply do things, they are attributable for their actions, capable of change, and are not passive.

[ August 19, 2002: Message edited by: Kent Stevens ]</p>

Kent Stevens

By saying that we do not have free will I am not saying that we are without alternatives. A coin has no free will yet when thrown it comes up with either heads or tails. Free will is distinct from their being no alternative. There would no alternative with the coin throw if both sides of the coin was heads.

SkateRock

If there is no free will and no truly unpredictable systems in the universe then wouldn't the entire destiny of everything be predetermined at the exact moment the universe started?

Bill

The moral facts of "good" and "bad" are human-invented constructs. They have no values (no MEANING, even) outside of what values (meanings) that humans apply to them.

Thus, "right" and "wrong" never exist on a per se basis, but only on some basis set forth by humans. If there are universally "right" or "wrong" ("good" or "evil") moral facts, then those must arise out of universally shared human characteristics. Among the candidates for such characteristics are: <ol type="1">[*]Valuing children over adults;[*]Valuing human life over animal life, plant life, and inanimate objects;[*]Valuing a peaceful and bountiful existence over a sparse and hunted existence;[*]Etc.[/list=a]Anything that we now see as a common human moral value arises from the sorts of characteristics that we share with the rest of humanity. We might disagree about methodology (particularly on something like the question of peace), but we all do agree that at least we would like to live our own lives in peace rather than in a constant state of danger.

From the non-theistic perspective, morality cannot arise from any other source but human experience. As humanity grows and matures, so too do our moral values. Genocide was an entirely acceptable form of warfare until very recently in human history. Genocide is even commanded by God in the Old Testament. But civilized humanity has almost universally renounced genocide as a method of gaining victory over our enemies. (As the old Tom Lehrer song goes, "we'd rather kill them off by peaceful means....")

Accordingly, I'm afraid that I'm mostly with the behaviorists on this question.

== Bill

Bill

No, Kent (and I, too) believes that we can change; but because the universe is deterministic, that change must come due to some cause. Kent can be the CAUSE of your change of mine; and it is predetermined (within the constructs of your mind as it exists when you encounter Kent's arguments) whether or not Kent will succeed.

A deterministic universe DOES NOT imply that change is impossible! It only implies that change must be caused. So, if I desire change, then I must cause the change to happen.

== Bill

Bill

Naaah!

Its no more difficult to apply causation to the "Big Bang" than to anything else. Just read my posts on the threads in here on that topic.

Or are you talking about the ellusive (and probably non-existent) "First Cause" of "the universe" (in the sense of "all that actually exists")? Wittgenstein proved that the "First Cause" was actually an oxymoronic concept because, if we ever did find it, we should then next ask "what caused this 'First Cause' to exist?" And the moment we ask THAT question, we have automatically demoted our candidate for a "First Cause" to be not quite the "First Cause" after all. Thus, the whole "First Cause" business is impossible to reconcile, and the only real answer must lie within the idea of an infinite regress of causes. That, too, is fairly easy to state as a conclusion.

== Bill