Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Jack the Bodiless:

"The God of the apologists has these properties by definition. The God of the Apologists IS responsible for everything, DOES forget nothing, IS eternal, and DOES know himself. Given these premises, Vander's conclusion follows directly."

This is an important distinction. But I think we can even go after the God of the Apologists with this point. My position is that it's impossible for anyone to know she's omniscient. That is, for all x, if x exists, x does not know whether x is omniscient. We can derive via modus tollens that God does not exist.

Fiach

God thought that a pool in Solomons garden could be "perfectly round", 10 cubits in diameter and 30 cubits in circumference. He obviously didn't know of the mathematical constant, Pi. The pool should have been 33.14---- cubits in circmumference.

Fortunately for God, some Greek chap informed him of it later.

Does God know the square root of -1?

Can Jesus beat God the Father in a game of chess? Or Trivial Pursuits?

Fiach

Bumble Bee Tuna

how does God know he knows he is God?

This can go on as long as you'd like, John.

BTW, the circumfrence would be 31.4159 cubits, not 33.14 cubits. Though your estimate is barely more errant than God's...Anyway I don't buy the pi contradiction, the bible uses imperfect units and if you decide a handbreadth is about 4 inches and a cubit 18 inches, it works out. Big IF, but it's at least somewhat believable as opposed to other forms of apologetics.

-B

ELECTROGOD

Q: How does God Know He's Omniscient?

A: I don't know, he won't tell us because he is in hiding.

Douglas J. Bender

How would this apply to the Trinity? Each Person of the Trinity is God individually, correct? And Each Person, being a "person", is distinct as a Person from the Others, correct? So, would this mean that three is more than one "God-like" Being in the Universe, or do those three essentially make up one "Being"? If the latter, in what way do you distinguish "Being" from "Person"? Would it be something like (very crudely) a three-headed animal or something?

In Christ,

Douglas

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Kenny:

Well, this is certainly a possibility, but I can't think of any ontological argument sophisticated and persuasive enough to demonstrate such compellingly. As I see it, you're arguing that there exists some property, pqrs, which is instantiated by all particulars that instantiate "instantiates p, instantiates q, instantiates r, instantiates s." But I wonder what sorts of properties p, q, r, and s could be, such that only one being could possess them.

ELECTROGOD

If god is the essence of existence, omniscient and responsible for everything, is HE able to provide us with proof of his existence? Because religious humans sure can't seem to. Can he conceive that we intelligent humans need some actual proof? And if could, wouldn't he provide it...since, as some believe, he created us that way and we are obivously not omniscient and don't know everything already?
It's neat to be able to conceive of god's conceptions of conceiving conceptions but that's more of an exercise in writing another "holy" book and only shows me that he exists only in some people's minds.

Kenny

Hello Bill,

Well, I think the question *is* strictly about knowledge. If there is a way that God can know that He is omniscient without being able to prove to Himself that He is omniscient (as I suspect there is), then the problem in the OP is resolved. The question of whether God can prove to Himself that He is omniscient is a distinct issue. However, if God can prove conclusively to Himself that He is omniscient, then the problem of the OP is also resolved. As I have pointed out, it is quite plausible on theistic metaphysics that God is aware a proof that He is omniscient via a sound version of the ontological argument (which, it would seem, if God is a necessary being, there must be, even if we cannot give it or even if we cannot comprehend it).

I think God’s omniscience is such that all true statements are warranted for Him directly, immediately, and with certainty, without there being any sort of need to engage in a formal reasoning process. Of course, that doesn’t mean that God isn’t aware of any proofs of some of the true statements He knows, (since many true statements also have proofs associated with them).

With respect to God’s omniscience, then, since it is true that God knows all true statements directly and immediately, it is also true that God knows “God knows all true statements directly and immediately” directly and immediately. So, strictly speaking, the answer to the question “How does God know that He’s omniscient” is that He knows that He is omniscient directly and immediately like He knows everything else.

However, that doesn’t mean that the OP doesn’t pose a serious problem to resolve. I think Thomas’ argument is best formulated by asking whether or not God can verify to Himself that He is omniscient and then arguing that if He cannot, then His lack of ability to do so furnishes God with a epistemic defeater which destroys the initial warrant that His belief in His omniscience has for Him via His immediate perception. However, if God is aware of a proof that necessarily a being exists which is omniscient and if He has some way, independent of His omniscience, to know that He is the being described in that proof, then God does have a way to verify to Himself that He is omniscient which in turn furnishes Him with a counter-defeater for any potential lack-of-verification defeaters with respect to His belief in His own omniscience.

Still, I will admit that it is somewhat uncomfortable for me, as a Christian theist, to think that God’s knowledge of His omniscience depends in some way (even if indirectly via countering a potential epistemic defeater) on a logical proof. I suspect that the proposals of Philp Osborne and Vanderzyden are closer to the mark, though they are more difficult to defend philosophically. Given that God is the ground of all being, I suspect that the depth to His own immediate self knowledge includes an awareness of the nature of being and His own relationship to existence which precludes with certainty the possibility that He could fail to know all that there is to know. However, the proposal I have presented may be related to the proposals of Philip and Vanderzden in some sense. God’s self-understanding in this regard might also contain premises which constitute a sound ontological argument so that the OA would be, for God, a logical formalization of something He already knows on a deeper level.

I don’t see how this follows. There would be no circular reasoning involved in the proposal I have presented in this thread, for instance. And knowing things immediately via self understanding does not mean that one is employing circular reasoning. I know that I am conscious, for instance, without the necessity of being able to provide myself with a formal proof that I am conscious.

Sure he could! I believe it would go something like “If Cornelius Van Til exists, therefore Cornelius Van Til exists. Cornelius Van Til exists. Therefore, Cornelius Van Til exists. Q.E.D.”

God Bless,
Kenny

[ November 08, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p>

Kenny

Thomas Metcalf,

And, as long as my proposal remains an epistemic possibility, the argument you present fails as a definitive demonstration that it is logically contradictory that God could know Himself to be omniscient. Whether or not you or I or anyone else (besides God) can think of such an ontological argument is irrelevant to my proposal’s being a viable possibility. Even if we are incapable of understanding what such an argument might involve, that doesn’t mean that God is incapable of understanding it, and that possibility is sufficient to address the problem of the OP. Unless you can rule out my proposal as an epistemic possibility, your argument must shift from a demonstration that it is logically contradictory for God to know that He is omniscient to an argument that it is implausible for God to know He is omniscient.

In order to make an effective implausibility argument, however, since this argument is an internal critique of theism (one that tries to derive a contradiction from within the beliefs theism takes for granted), you would have to show that my proposal is implausible, not just generally (say if you take theism as a whole to be implausible, for instance), but with respect to the other facets of a theistic metaphysics. However, I think my proposal *is* plausible, with respect to theistic metaphysics; thus my proposal would also counter an implausibility argument.

Within classical theism, God is understood to be a necessary being who holds certain attributes, like being omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, etc., necessarily as part of His essence. If that is the case, then it would seem that there must be at least one sound ontological argument, even if we cannot give it or comprehend it, which demonstrates that God exists in all possible worlds and holds certain essential attributes necessarily. Furthermore, it is also part of classical theism that necessarily there is only one God. Consequently, it must also be logically impossible for more than one being to hold God’s essential attributes, at least in total if not individually with respect to some of those attributes.

Thus, it is at least plausible on theistic metaphysics that God has certain attributes other than His omniscience that it is only possible for God to have, and that God is aware that He has these properties in such a way that doesn’t necessitate Him knowing that He is omniscient. If that is the case, then God has a way of knowing that He is God, the being described in a sound version of the ontological argument, and thus has a way of proving to Himself that He is omniscient.

As I stated, on classical theism, since God is necessarily alone with respect to His being a God-like being, there must be at least one property that God possess, namely His essence, which is such that only one being could posses it. However, there may be other properties included in God’s essence which are also impossible for more than one being to have. In fact, with respect to the beliefs that most theists have about God, it is quite plausible that such is the case. It is difficult to conceive of two omnipotent beings occupying the same possible world, for one possible example. It is traditionally held by theists that only God has the power to create something out of nothing, for another possible example; and, I suspect if you asked most theists if they thought it were only contingently true that only God can create something out of nothing or if it is necessarily true, most would be inclined to the later. There may be properties which are tied in with God’s being the ground of all being which God is capable of knowing He has, via His own self-awareness and not in a way that requires one know one is omniscient to know one has them, that God alone is capable of possessing. It does not really matter, however, whether we are capable of identifying these properties or even conceiving of what such properties might be, for it to be plausible on theistic metaphysics that God posses such properties.

Thus, I think your argument, though stimulating with respect to the questions it raises for philosophical theology, fails to demonstrate either that it is contradictory for God to know that He is omniscient or that it is implausible that God could know that He is omniscient.

God Bless,
Kenny

[ November 09, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p>

Kenny

Douglas J. Bender,

Since the doctrine of the Trinity explicitly affirms that there is only one God, and since the existence of more than one God-like being would entail that there is more than one God, the doctrine of the Trinity affirms that there is only one God-like being (though one that exists as three distinct persons). Whether the doctrine of the Trinity is itself coherent in maintaining that there is only on God while there simultaneously being three distinct persons who are God, is a separate issue, and one too far removed from this thread topic to treat in any detail here. Suffice it to say, for now, that I am a Trinitarian and that I do believe the doctrine to be coherent.

That is what the doctrine of the Trinity affirms. I would point out that the operative word here is that each of the three persons is “distinct” with respect to the others. They are not, however, separate. Each person of the Trinity finds His identity as that person solely by virtue of His relationship to the others in such a way that each of the persons of the Trinity depends upon the others for personal identity. The Father is able to identify Himself as the Father solely by virtue of His being the Father with respect to the Son, and the Son likewise can only identify Himself as the Son by virtue of His being the Son with respect to the Father. Likewise the Holy Spirit is conscious of His personal identity by virtue of His being conscious of His relationship to the Father and the Son, and the relationship between the Father and the Son entails that there be the Holy Spirit. Consequently none of the persons of the Trinity could be separated from the others without all three persons losing their identity. Thus, the three persons of the Trinity inseparably constitute a single divine being.

They make up one being. With respect to the doctrine of the Trinity ‘being’ is distinguished from ‘person’ by virtue of the former being concerned with what God is ‘in Himself’ and the later being concerned with the distinctions involved in the manner in which God relates to Himself (in the state prior to creation) and the distinctions involved with respect to how God relates to Himself and to that which is outside Himself (in the state following creation).

The “three-headed” animal analogy would be a crude analogy indeed for what the doctrine of the Trinity is trying to assert. A three headed animal would have its different heads being distinguished from the others by virtue of what those heads are ‘in themselves.’ One could imagine cutting one of the heads off, for example, and still being able to identify all three of the heads. But, as I have explained, that would not be true with respect to persons of the Trinity. Furthermore, each head of the animal would not partake fully in what it is to be that animal; rather the being of the animal would be divided between the heads. God’s being, however, is fundamentally one and undivided with each person of the Trinity partaking fully in what it is to be God.

But, like I said, this is a rather far digression from the original thread topic.

God Bless,
Kenny

[ November 08, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p>