mnkbdky

I was afraid you would think it was ad populam. However, it is not since I don't say it is true because of it. I am merely saying that there are many people who do feel there is evidence and to merely say there is not is to throw the evidences that these people deal with right out the window.

Actually, I went to both a secular school and a religious school. But I don't see how that has any bearing on the topic. Furthermore, my religious school as many philosopher/professors on campus who are materialist. They just happen to be wrong.

Besides who better to philosophize about a topic than those who actually care about it.

As to what you were saying "all the time", well have you even read the title of the post: Materialist are (possibly) Irrational. The whole point was to point out that if you are a materialist then you cannot believe you remain the same person numerically.

What baffles me, is that some can look in to the virtues of truth, that is philosophy and not even be effected by that virtue. That is, it does not appear that your character is virtuous. Plato must have been wrong, someone can study philosophy and not be effected by it virtuous nature. Hmmm..., I always thought he was right on that one. But then, again, I guess neither have I since I am responding to you in much the same manner.

simul iustus et peccator

Bill Snedden

I was going to make this comment earlier, but refrained because there seemed to be an inside joke...

/moderator hat on

To ALL participants: please extend to each other the courtesy you would expect to be extended to yourself. It's perfectly acceptable to denigrate your opponents ideas. It's not at all acceptable to denigrate your opponent.

Play nice!

/moderator hat off

Regards,

Bill Snedden

mnkbdky

Now this is an interesting question, one I have put a tiny amount of thought into. It seems to me to be entirely consistent to say that there is no such thing as the soul per se but that there is some abstract object, call it a proposition, that lists all the things that are me. That is, there could be a Platonic form that corresponds to my indentity. In this case, the material that makes me up is merely a manifestation of that form, which by the way is immutable. Perhaps, if there is no such thing as the soul per se then perhap there is one de dicto. This could be why we have one name that identifies a changing subject. I think it could be argued that my soul is also a manifestation of this as well. So Aristotle distinction b/t de re necessity and de dicto necessity is useful. My soul de dicto does not have consciouness but it does de re and both necessarily.

I guess this could be done with Aristotle's view of abstaction too, but I think Plato was right.

Does the soul need a supernatural origin? I don't think so. I see no reason to say that it is logically impossible for the soul to exist necessarily either de re or de dicto. I think the mere fact that we are not omniscient or at least smarter than we are speaks volumes against this, but I see no reason that it could not be this way.

John Page

[QUOTE]Originally posted by mnkbdky
Chicago Bears fans may care very much, but that makes them less objective and no more right than Steelers fans.

Cheers, John

Clutch

Surely you recognize that my comment about your religious schooling was an aside? It bore remark only because you were mentioning people who (while no doubt very clever and all) are bit players w.r.t. philosophical influence, in the same breath as some of the greatest ever.Yes, it is an interesting further question whether the rest of your argument engages any actual philosophical figures; whether, in other words, there are any materialists of note who hold that selves are strictly identical over time. My suspicion is that you're taking on the null set here. But who gives a shit about the title of your thread? You also wrote the words comprising your Assumption 1. In writing them, you took on a commitment to defend or retract them in the face of countervailing considerations. Getting you to do so was like nailing jelly to the wall, but finally you've admitted -- commendably -- that it was a bad job, that one can rationally decline to believe in diachronic identity. That was my point -- rather transparently -- and for good reason. Namely, the reason sketched above: If it's rationally tenable to decline a doctrine of strict identity, what makes you think there are materialists who hold the doctrine?

Point 'em out to me, and I'll join you in excoriating them for holding an unmotivated and non-explanatory view of diachronic selves.I'm not sure what you mean here. Is it as big and risible a whine as it seemed? In the spirit of Bill's moderatorly remark, I'll take myself to have misunderstood this for now.

mnkbdky

Hey don't be knocking the Bears! But I disagree. I thought the Bears sucked this year and I am a huge fan. Furthermore, I hate the Bucs, but as my friend from Tampa knows, I do give them their due, except Warren Sapp. I really can't say I like him too much. I don't think it makes me less objective. Besides, I am not sure there is a truly object view. But that is another argument for another time, let's not get on that.

John Page

The material of which you comprise is your physical form, which is mutable. The idea that you have of yourself, and that other may have of you, can change at a different rate. As they say, my P-ness is not what it used to be.

Cheers, John

John Page

How about the numerical identity of the score?

mnkbdky

not really,

:boohoo:

mnkbdky

I do not see any other way to say constitutionalism is false, other than to appeal to Leibniz's Law of Indentity. It is just true and thus, constitutionalism is false. It can be no other way. Perhaps, you know of a better argument?

As far as BT is concerned the mere possiblity of fission shows that BT in not possible, so it is necessarily false. Look at the argument again. If there is something you would like to refute about it then let's take a look. And maybe type and token and even supervience theories do not apply to psychological continuity (from here on, PC) but no one, not even the professor at my school who subscribes to that theory has offered me a coherent definition of what they mean by it. It seems entirely possible that there could be a clone made of me and all my thought downloaded into him. He would have the same PC has me, yet I would still be me and he would still be him. To complicate matters further, it seems possible that I could experience every part of my cloning process, then at the very moment the clone became conscious and all my thoughts were tranfered to him, the people that performed the cloning process killed me. Now, the clone since he has all of my thoughts will have an unbroken PC and will think that he is me. But is he? Noway! I just died on the table next to him.

PC sound a lot like the closest continuer theory to me. Perhaps I am wrong, but if so correct me.