rainbow walking

Thomas: Okay. Suppose that there's such a thing as too much intervention. At some point, God would be intervening too much, and that would be bad, for whatever reason. Maybe humans, if they didn't witness lots of accidental scaldings, would start to suspect that God existed, or stop trying to prevent accidental scaldings, or something bad like that. I think you've been holding this position throughout the debate, so I doubt you'll abandon it now. Some amount of intervention is too much intervention, because humans start to lose their abilities or requirements to do x, y, and z.

rw: I only offer these as examples of what could entail in specific cases like the ones you’re proffering. But my major objection, in the over-all general application of my position stays the same. A greater good for man is to obtain his own greatest good. That a god, as you continue to point out, could do X, Y, Z but this would not be a reflection of omni-benevolence in its highest form. It takes greater discipline not to intervene than to jump in, even when you want to with every fiber of your being, and especially when you know you have the power to do so.

Thomas: If it's true that there's such a thing as too much intervention, then there's a point at which God should stop intervening. But that doesn't mean God shouldn't intervene at all.

rw: We haven’t reached a point where god should start intervening yet. Until we do, it isn’t necessary to discuss when he should back off or how.

Thomas: In fact, it seems quite reasonable to me that some intervention more than now wouldn't necessarily be too much intervention.

rw: Yet we haven’t established the necessity of any intervention so far.

Thomas: I agree that if God prevented every accidental scalding, there would be some serious consequences. But it doesn't seem like we're anywhere near that level yet. If God prevented more than he does now, we'd probably get closer to that level.

rw: Did I miss something? When did we ever establish any intervention whatsoever?

Thomas: In fact, there's some level such that God is preventing every accidental scalding he can without precluding the greater good of humans.

rw: There is? Again, I must have missed us establishing such a level. To carry on as if we have reached some sort of agreement here is a bit pretentious, don’t you think?

Thomas: Let's call this level L. I don't think we're at L right now. If you think we are, that's a positive claim.

rw: I don’t think we’re at any level yet so this remains my positive claim.

Thomas: After all, we're at some level of accidental scaldings, but what is the background probability that we're at L? It seems pretty low, objectively. You know, think of all the possible levels of suffering, and only one of them is L.

rw: I disagree that any level L has been established. I continue to hold the position that no interference is the proper level. I think you have taken my previous replies as some sort of tacit agreement that some intervention is now acceptable, based on my rebuttal that any intervention will open up the flood gates of expectation of more and more.

Thomas: That means, we have reason to think God should prevent more scaldings than he does now, unless you can find good reasons to think we're at L right now.

rw: No, I reject any claim for level L if it involves any intervention at all. We have always been at this position where you think god should prevent more…as if he has prevented some, while my position remains steady on a complete non-intervention.

Thomas: Your response that a morally perfect being would have to prevent all suffering doesn't work here, because we both agree (at least for the purposes of debate) that there's some level L that includes some scaldings.

rw: We both agree? When did we reach this agreement? I have always conceded that god could intervene at any level, but to do so would not benefit man in the final analysis. I’ve also submitted several good reasons why intervention at various levels can turn into disaster rather quickly. My concession should not be taken to mean that I now accept some level of intervention.

Thomas: So God obviously wouldn't need to prevent all suffering to be morally perfect. But preventing more than he does now seems like a good thing. To me, at least.

rw: Well, that was a nice try Thomas, but I still retain my original position…intervention in one area of suffering, while neglecting all other areas is immoral. All or nothing.



Thomas:God can give humanity any knowledge it needs.

rw: Remember our discussion about the difference between intellectual knowledge and experiential knowledge? Knowing ones limitations is just such experiential type of knowledge. How does a god give this type of knowledge without the man actually experiencing it?



Thomas: Again, you need to think more carefully about the extent of God's power. Please do so before you offer these possible problems; please think of whether there's a way for God to prevent them. That way, we don't have to keep going through this. My response to this particular point is that God could make the elves invisible and undetectable. My response to the above point was that God can give humans any knowledge they need, and I can't see any obvious problems with that.

rw: Aside from the obvious problem I’ve articulated above, (which you should have thought of, saving me repeating myself as well), I qualified this earlier as a response to your example of these elves. Nowhere in that example did you hint at their being invisible. Is this your new position? A world of invisible, undetectable elves…?



Thomas: Here's a good example of what I was talking about earlier. Limiting himself probably wouldn't be a problem if he limited himself such that L was attained. At that point, if he intervened more, he'd be committing a moral wrong. You just have to make it seem likely that we're currently at L.

rw: Doesn’t work. Intervention at level L doesn’t exonerate him from an imagined being who could intervene at level M without any moral wrong and thereby stand as more moral than god. Besides, I still see no way around all or nothing in this claim.

Alix Nenuphar

rw:

With regard to the PoE, you argument is as follows:

POE:
P1: God is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent
P2: God created the world
P3: the world contains unecessary suffering

C1: one of the postulates must be false

The most common choices are P1 or P2, since the others are considered 'defintional' - they are asserted as axiomatic within the context of the argument. Note, please that P1 and P2 are also what the PoE addresses.

YOUR ARGUMENT
At least in your last post, is that P3 is false: unecessary suffering (pain or evil) does not exist. Occasionally you seem to be arguing that P1 is false: God is not omnipotent, because there is something that God cannot create (a world without suffering).

The following points of your argument still require demonstration:

In short, 'greatest good obtained' (GGO) is better than a 'greatest good by divine fiat' (GGDF) or

V(GGO) > V(GGDF), where V is a value function.

Your argument lacks a definition of V.

You have also claimed (indirectly in this post and directly elsewhere) that this is a false dichotomy because GGDF is logically impossible.

In order to show that GGDF is logically impossible, you must show that it contains a logical contradiction of the form P & ~P.

This you have failed to do.

It is not a complicated argument at all; but it rests on an unsupported assertion - and is not, consequently, convincing.

Alix Nenuphar

rw:

So sorry: I missed this thread.

Again, in what sense? The process of addition (as in 2+2=4) is not conscious in any meaningful sense; certainly not in any sense that we can test for. Are you asserting that logical consequences of the universe are conscious? How would you support such an assertion?

The mechanisms of evolution certainly appear to be as mindless as addition....

Nature doesn't care. Nature is not, so far as we know, conscious. Survival appears to be entirely a question of accident: things which resist accident tend to endure. You seem to be requiring a 'meaning' or 'purpose' for life.


In order: no, no, and I suggest you misunderstand the problem: consciousness arises from unconsciousness continually (unless you are willing to argue that genetic material is conscious).

rainbow walking

alix: With regard to the PoE, you argument is as follows:

POE:
P1: God is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent
P2: God created the world
P3: the world contains unecessary suffering

C1: one of the postulates must be false

The most common choices are P1 or P2, since the others are considered 'defintional' - they are asserted as axiomatic within the context of the argument. Note, please that P1 and P2 are also what the PoE addresses.

YOUR ARGUMENT
At least in your last post, is that P3 is false: unecessary suffering (pain or evil) does not exist.

Occasionally you seem to be arguing that P1 is false: God is not omnipotent, because there is something that God cannot create (a world without suffering).

rw: This response is invoked when someone changes from arguing the CP to arguing the TP, (which is what you were describing in your example of people always choosing the right). In the OP I specifically state that my argument is designed to address the CP, (which is based on a reduction of suffering and not a complete elimination). But I have not been overly concerned about addressing those instances of the TP, (which is based on a complete eradication of all evil and suffering), when someone raised the issue. But my argument was not specifically addressed to the TP. This accounts for the occasional switching of focus from P3 to P1. I argue from P1 against the TP so your observation is correct and I hope any confusion cleared up.

alix: The following points of your argument still require demonstration:

I have used that description to justify this state of affairs along with the possible existence of an omni-max being based on the additional postulate that such a being, if omniscient, would know that a greatest good for man could only be attained by allowing man to willfully participate in its attainment. That any other divinely acquired means would not lead to man's acquisition of his own greatest good and that an omniscient being would know the difference between a greatest good self attained and a greatest good attained by divine fiat and adjudge the self obtained greatest good to be a greater value than the other.



alix: In short, 'greatest good obtained' (GGO) is better than a 'greatest good by divine fiat' (GGDF) or

V(GGO) > V(GGDF), where V is a value function.

Your argument lacks a definition of V.

rw: I thought I defined the value as being obtained in man’s history and science…did I not? That if GGDF occurred man’s history and science would be negated.

alix: You have also claimed (indirectly in this post and directly elsewhere) that this is a false dichotomy because GGDF is logically impossible.

In order to show that GGDF is logically impossible, you must show that it contains a logical contradiction of the form P & ~P.

This you have failed to do.

rw: Not that I’m fluent in this language but I’ll give it my best shot.

‘Greatest good obtainable by man’ (GGOBM)=’greatest obtainable good’ (GOG)

‘Greatest good by divine fiat’ (GGDF)= ‘Penultimate greatest good’ (PGG)

It shouldn’t be difficult to see the logical impossibility in trying to obtain GOG via GGDF. The GGOBM cannot be both GOG and PGG at the same time.


This is not a complicated argument nor that difficult to imagine and is logically possible and accounts for the evidence of evil and suffering.



alix: It is not a complicated argument at all; but it rests on an unsupported assertion - and is not, consequently, convincing.

rw: What assertion might that be? You have quite a number of unsupported assertions hanging...or have you forgotten?

Thomas Metcalf

rainbow walking :

Your position is that no Divine intervention is morally permissible, and that claim will require some serious support. Humans intervene all the time without committing a moral wrong. What's so different about God, especially if he can do it undetectably and provide humans with any knowledge they would have otherwise missed? What is it, specifically, about God's intervention that makes it lead to bad effects that humans' intervention would not?

All knowledge, as far as we know, is contained in the brain somewhere. God can alter people's brains so that they have any knowledge he wants them to have. Sure, it might not have come about by experience, but it can function the same once it's learned.

Sure. Undetectable elves who prevent more scalding than gets prevented now. When are you going to offer a criticism?

I've already answered all of this. L is defined to be the morally best level of intervention, so there couldn't be a being that intervened any more and be more moral than God. The way around all or nothing is that all intervention is too much (we agree there), but you haven't demonstrated that no intervention is enough. There must be some amount in the middle that's the right amount -- I call it L -- and that's the amount God should intervene.

rainbow walking

Thomas: Your position is that no Divine intervention is morally permissible, and that claim will require some serious support.

rw: Which I have provided and you continue to ignore. In the first place I do not assert intervention to be morally impermissible, but morally unjustifiable. Consider the following arguments I’ve submitted to support this postulate:

1. Man’s greatest good is obtained as an earned benefit and not a given.

2. All instances of pain, suffering and evil, no matter how horrid, serve as an impetus to thrust man along towards the acquisition of his own greatest good.

3. Any intervention by DF (divine fiat) will hinder or negate man’s perceptual capabilities to such a degree as to restrict or negate his progressive responsibilities.

Thomas: Humans intervene all the time without committing a moral wrong.

rw: Which is consistent with my argument for man’s earned GG (greater good). Man is not equivalent to an omni-max god. Using a comparative analysis in determining moral justification is analogous to comparing apples to orange.

Thomas: What's so different about God, especially if he can do it undetectably and provide humans with any knowledge they would have otherwise missed?

rw: Immortality, moral perfection, all other omni-max attributes that render him ~man.

Thomas: What is it, specifically, about God's intervention that makes it lead to bad effects that humans' intervention would not?

rw: The negation of man’s acquisition of his GG by his own efforts rendering such attainment the UGG (ultimate greatest good). Negation of science, history and willful participation. Knowledge alone does not ensure willful compliance or response.

rw: How does a god give this type of knowledge without the man actually experiencing it?



Thomas: All knowledge, as far as we know, is contained in the brain somewhere.

rw: How does it get there? That is the what makes your suggestion so problematic. Man is equipped by nature with perceptual abilities, including the ability to experience pain. These experiences enable mortal man to function in an environment that does not give him any natural advantage other than those instinctual desires inherent in his genetics. Tamper with his perceptual abilities or his environment and you change the nature of man. He no longer exists as a willful participant in any state of affairs. Establishing his own limitations allows him to assign value to his environment and social structure that further enables him to willfully participate in his own existence. This requires experiential knowledge. You can tell, teach, instruct, a man till hell freezes over that fire burns. Until man actually experiences this fact, for himself, he will always be susceptible to death by some fire related incident where experiential knowledge would have compelled him to beat a hasty retreat or fight furiously to extinguish the flames. Experiential knowledge is never, ever forgotten. Intellectual knowledge is easily forgotten. It is better to experience the burning sensation that teaches one that hot water scalds than to be told this, never experience burning, and end up in a situation where intellect is insufficient to save one from being trapped and burned to death.

Thomas: God can alter people's brains so that they have any knowledge he wants them to have. Sure, it might not have come about by experience, but it can function the same once it's learned.

rw: How? This is an unsupported assertion. There is a fundamental difference between knowing something because you have been told it is so by others and knowing something because you have experienced it for yourself. You might come to a place where you no longer believe what you have been told. Teenagers come to this place all the time. You might forget what you’ve been told. Experiencing something for yourself eliminates these possibilities. You must appeal to brain alteration which changes the nature of man. Is it better to change the nature of man to reduce suffering than it is to allow man’s brain to function the way it is suppose to and allow man to overcome his limitations by his own willful efforts?

rw: Is this your new position? A world of invisible, undetectable elves…?



thomas: Sure. Undetectable elves who prevent more scalding than gets prevented now. When are you going to offer a criticism?

rw: Parsimony…Occam…need more? Why multiply deities and potential god-like creatures just to spare a few burns?

rw: Intervention at level L doesn’t exonerate him from an imagined being who could intervene at level M without any moral wrong and thereby stand as more moral than god. Besides, I still see no way around all or nothing in this claim.



Thomas: I've already answered all of this.


rw: Not very convincingly.

Thomas: L is defined to be the morally best level of intervention, so there couldn't be a being that intervened any more and be more moral than God.

rw: And still end up with a cart pulling the horse. You have to establish the necessity of intervention first.

Thomas: The way around all or nothing is that all intervention is too much (we agree there), but you haven't demonstrated that no intervention is enough.


rw: No intervention is no intervention…how can it be enough? No intervention as opposed to complete eradication is the problem. If you saw a family trapped in a burning house and decided to attempt a rescue, had the time to rescue the entire family but only made the effort to rescue one or two members, how can this be morally justified?

Thomas: There must be some amount in the middle that's the right amount -- I call it L -- and that's the amount God should intervene.

rw: Sure, rescue the children and let the parents burn. But then, what to do with these orphans…?

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

This is the only one that bears upon Divine intervention, and it's patently false. God can give humans any knowledge (see below) or perceptual capabilities they need.

Show me why it's so important for humans to gain all of this by their willful participation and a lack of Divine intervention but not a lack of human intervention. What is it about God that makes his intervention prevent willful participation but doesn't make humans' intervention prevent willful participation?

Why is humans' willful participation always more important that saving some babies from intense suffering?

And do you realize that your position is inconsistent with monotheistic theology, wherein God intervenes quite a bit? You're not even arguing from the apologist's perspective anymore, so the problem of evil is still a problem to those for whom it's always been a problem. Maybe it's not a problem for your deism, but that's not traditional evangelical monotheism, so the problem of evil is still as pressing as ever.

The former, to some degree. To some degree it's better to alter humans' brains so that they don't allow as much intense suffering. That's why we humans administer psychoactive drugs to help people from suffering so much, or perform brain operations to reduce the instance of epilepsy, or excise tumors.

The Razor is intended to keep theories parsimonious, not to provide a normative reason not to create lots of entities.

rainbow walking

Thomas: This is the only one that bears upon Divine intervention, and it's patently false. God can give humans any knowledge (see below) or perceptual capabilities they need.

rw: Not if man’s GG is to be accomplished by man in lieu of DF.



Thomas: Show me why it's so important for humans to gain all of this by their willful participation and a lack of Divine intervention but not a lack of human intervention.

rw: Human participation, by willful participation, is human intervention, so there is no lacking, except in DF. What do humans gain by DF except a negation of their own GG?

Thomas: What is it about God that makes his intervention prevent willful participation but doesn't make humans' intervention prevent willful participation?

rw: Human intervention is willful participation…unless you want to argue that it isn’t willful.

Thomas: Why is humans' willful participation always more important that saving some babies from intense suffering?

rw: And around and around and around we go. Babies are humans. Humans are morally responsible for the safety of human babies. Negate responsibility and you negate human willful participation and human intervention.

Thomas: And do you realize that your position is inconsistent with monotheistic theology, wherein God intervenes quite a bit?

rw: So? I’m not a theist and have no vested interest in preserving theism.

Thomas: You're not even arguing from the apologist's perspective anymore, so the problem of evil is still a problem to those for whom it's always been a problem.

rw: Including the proponents of PoE who vainly imagine their argument is a logical proof that such a being doesn’t exist.

Thomas: Maybe it's not a problem for your deism, but that's not traditional evangelical monotheism, so the problem of evil is still as pressing as ever.

rw: I’m not a deist either, Thomas. I do, however, think that it is inherently foolish to tarnish the value of the attributes portrayed by a god. Man needs those attributes as ideals to strive towards…but not a god to embody them.



Thomas: The former, to some degree. To some degree it's better to alter humans' brains so that they don't allow as much intense suffering.

rw: Yet you haven’t made a case for this that trumps all the negative consequences that could, and likely would, occur.

Thomas: That's why we humans administer psychoactive drugs to help people from suffering so much, or perform brain operations to reduce the instance of epilepsy, or excise tumors.

rw: Yes…we humans…not a god in the operating room or psycho ward. God is not obligated to do for man what man can do for himself. There is nothing inherent in the problem of evil that negates man’s ability and responsibility to address it himself…nothing.



Thomas: The Razor is intended to keep theories parsimonious, not to provide a normative reason not to create lots of entities.

rw: But stands, nonetheless, awaiting to test such entities as are created…yes?

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

This is pure question-begging. I ask why humans' willful participation and intervention are so important. You say if there isn't any, then there won't be any responsibility, and then there won't be any willful participation and human intervention. Okay, now tell me why humans' willful participation and intervention are so important.

But we're not tarnishing those attributes unwarrantedly, because the God who's our target isn't helped at all by your defense! Do you realize that your entire objection to the evidential argument from evil depends upon abandoning traditional apologetic monotheism? How is that at all a defense against the evidential argument from evil? It's like saying "Well, the evidential argument from evil isn't a problem, because God doesn't exist." Huh?

God can prevent every single negative consequence. I'm getting really tired of having to point this out to you. God can alter our brains to function as if we have the right kind of experiential knowledge.

What does that even mean? Who's trying to explain any phenomenon? Why is the Razor at all applicable anywhere in this thread?

rainbow walking

Thomas: This is pure question-begging. I ask why humans' willful participation and intervention are so important. You say if there isn't any, then there won't be any responsibility, and then there won't be any willful participation and human intervention. Okay, now tell me why humans' willful participation and intervention are so important.

rw: Because man’s GG attained by his own willful participation, (which naturally includes intervention), is a better GG than one attained by divine fiat.

Now, to anticipate your next question ad naseum…Why is it better?

Because of experiential knowledge, science and history.

Those three values would be immediately by-passed were man whisked away to a position of GG by a god. So far, all of your examples have failed to justify why man should sacrifice these values to spare himself the possibility that some careless parents are going to facilitate the scalding of their children.



Thomas: But we're not tarnishing those attributes unwarrantedly, because the God who's our target isn't helped at all by your defense!

rw: Nor has he been denigrated at all by your offense.

Thomas: Do you realize that your entire objection to the evidential argument from evil depends upon abandoning traditional apologetic monotheism?

rw: So traditional apologetic monotheism gets scalded…who cares?

Thomas: How is that at all a defense against the evidential argument from evil?

rw: Is the evidential argument from evil designed as a logical argument against the existence of traditional apologetic monotheism? Are you now arguing that TAM doesn’t exist?

Thomas: It's like saying "Well, the evidential argument from evil isn't a problem, because God doesn't exist." Huh?

rw: And how is it like that again…? I must have missed that lesson as well.

Nowhere in PoE’s definition of this god do I find mention of TAM. If you wish to limit PoE to arguing against this specific religious persuasion then our discussion ends here. My counter-argument is focused on a god with three specific attributes. It demonstrates that such a god, with such attributes, can indeed exist along side evil and suffering in this state of affairs. If you insist on dragging TAM into the discussion to cover the deficiencies in PoE then you have no argument with me. But this doesn’t make my argument disappear.



Thomas: God can prevent every single negative consequence. I'm getting really tired of having to point this out to you. God can alter our brains to function as if we have the right kind of experiential knowledge.

rw: Yes he can, and I’m getting tired of conceding this postulate. Unfortunately for your PoE, you have failed…I repeat failed…to demonstrate that he is either morally obligated to, or that should he do so, a better world would obtain. Period!

Note: A better world is obtainable by man. A better world obtainable by man is better than a better world obtainable by DF. Now, until you prove otherwise, we shall continue to dance this dance.

Further note: A better world obtained by man includes experiential knowledge, science and history. Something logically impossible for a god to create by DF. Now if you wish to argue that omnipotence includes the ability to perform the logically impossible…you must then account for how you intend to arrive at a “logical” conclusion, that he doesn’t exist, by way of the logically impossible.



Thomas: What does that even mean? Who's trying to explain any phenomenon? Why is the Razor at all applicable anywhere in this thread?

rw: Who’s trying to explain any phenomenon? You would be if you persisted in this invisible elves postulate.