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Old 06-10-2003, 02:48 AM   #131
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You mentioned around 5 options?.all military, were there any deliberate peaceful alternatives that were considered ?

Why, yes, Phaedrus. The basic problem, though, is that Japan had rejected all peace offers, including those originating from its own citizens and third countries, and refused to surrender.

V:4) Bomb a city. This position was supported by many scientists. Both sides petitioned the Administration.

P:Umm, which scientists are you talking about? This was one petition that was submitted by the Scientists at the Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory


The scientists involved with or knowing of the project fell into two groups. Some, such as Szilard, did not recommend using the weapon. Others, such as Conant and Bush felt it had to be used to end the war. In fact, those two argued that the weapon had to be demonstrated on a city because its frightful power needed to be made plain so that nations would cede sovereignty to an international group to control nuclear weapons.

And what about the Franck Committee report?

That was a Szilard-led group, Phaedrus, named after its chair. It prompted another look from the Interim Committee, which pointed out that no technical demonstration was likely to bring an end to the war, and saw no alternative to direct military use. The members also noted pointedly that Szilard and the Franck committee had no special competence in solving the military, social, or political problems created by atomic weapons. That's ummm....true. The interim committee itself included an advisory panel of scientists, some of whom supported its use, some of whom did not. Other opinions were heard.

V: 5) Do not use it at all. Rejected as immoral, to have a possible war-winning weapon and not use it would have been grossly immoral.

P: Any recording of such meeting where it was declared immoral?


Did it have to be at a meeting? In point of fact the use of the weapon was embedded in the project from the beginning. In point of fact Truman simply went along with existing plans, which all his advisors supported. The rejection of non-use was implicit in the assumption of both the Targeting Committee and the Interim Committee that its psychological effect would end the war.

Don understand, you say sole objective was to limit US casualties and then also say rationale was To end the war, scare the shit out of the Soviets, annihilate valuable military targets, and test them on a city

Phaedrus, two different questions were considered in this exchange. I meant "sole" only in relation to that question of Japanese casualties that was brought up. I was not reflecting on the use of the bomb as a whole.

Umm…guess you mean the military leadership right? Rational war fighters don't form suicide squads?.if one takes the example of the Palestine chaps or for that matter al queda souls, they do so coz they are out gunned. So why not just nuke the hell out of these chaps also???? Now that you are so derisive of what the Japanese did, what do you think of what the soviets did when the nazis were outside stalingard? They were non-rational fighters? What you think is rational and what is not, could depend on how you have been brought up too, some cultures have a different definition of what patriotism?means. You don't just paint a whole culture as evil or non-rational?coz they employ different types of self-defense. Maybe the Japanese weren't as materialistic in those days as they are now.

Wow! I really pressed your buttons, and got a bunch of knee jerk nonsense. Here's the difference. The Japanese could have ended the war at any time by surrendering, or slowed the killing by inquiring about terms. Which they never did. Is it rational to have young men commit suicide for a cause that is lost? Is it rational to seal young men in bunkers so that all they can do is die hopelessly fighting a battle that is already lost? The war was already known to be lost in military circles by '43. At a higher level, is it rational for a nation with one-tenth the GDP of the US to pursue simultaneous war against the five largest political entities on earth all at the same time? Is it rational for an island nation to have no anti-submarine program (not until the fall of '43 was any dedicated anti-submarine system implemented)? Is it rational to go to war with the interservice rivalry so great that Japanese factories had curtains built to separate Army from Navy production, and forced the Army to build its own Navy because the Navy would not cooperate with it? I could go on and on. WWII was fought by Japan in an almost completely irrational fashion. Not by "my" rationality, but by their own. Do you think only westerners thought such behavior was irrational? Japanese did too. See for example, Saburo Ienaga's The Pacific War, Saburo Sakai's comments on officership in Cook and Cook's Japan at War, etc, etc, etc. Apparently echoing comments made by Japanese is ethnocentric.

BTW, numerous writers have commented on the irrationality of German behavior in WWII. Do you think such writers are being ethnocentric? When the German military author who compiled my reference book on German tanks in WWII writes scathingly of Hitler's nutty decision to favor production of the Pz III over the Pz IV, or to invade Russia with no clear plans, do you think he is judgmental and narrow-minded? Apparently when we apply similar widely-sued military standards to the Japanese, we are being ethnocentric.

In any case, this is all irrelevant.

V:So far you have not exampled even a single instance of any peace initiative coming from the government of Japan. You keep ignoring that simple fact that would blow my case out of the wate 1618 r.

P: You don't define the parameters of the debate my friend and btw it is very easy for me to ask you to give a single instance of any peace initiative coming from the US government through proper channels offered to the Japanese government.


Phaedrus, you are shifting the goalposts. First, you claimed the US had ignored peace initiatives from Japan. When I blew that out of the water (all peace initiatives have now been shown to originate from other sources that the gov't of Japan, and all rejected by it).

But, on the other hand, the US not only was completely up front with public announcements of its policy, but also attempted to open back channels to the Japanese on numerous occasions. I have documented these here. They include:
  • Zacharias Broadcasts -- rejected by the Japanese
  • Offer to fly any ranking Japanese official out to Europe or anywhere else for talks during Fujimura talks (rejected by the Japanese)
  • Standing 24-7 channel in Switzerland for communications used repeatedly by both sides during the war. The Japanese never asked about terms.

Finally, yes, I have to define the parameters of the debate, because you don't seem to understand them. The issue is: did the US have to drop the Bomb? Could the war have ended another way? Further, you made the claim that the US ignored Japanese peace feelers. In order to demonstrate that claim, you would have to give an example of that. Simple logic, Phaedrus. So far you have ducked that responsibility. I have seen not a single argument from you offering concrete examples of possible endings to the war that avoided the use of the A-Bomb, resulted in fewer deaths, ended the war early, and cleared the Pacific and Asian landmass of Japanese troops.

P: The simple fact is that those were trying times and both governments were under pressure not to appear as if losing face or being too lenient.

The simple fact is that you don't understand the issues involved. The US was very clear on its side. The whole world was aware of its unconditional surrender position. Nor could the US adopt any other position, for not getting rid of Japanese militarism would simply cause the problem to arise again. Further, no peace could be made without the Japanese leaving all their overseas possessions. The Japanese did not want to give these up.

The fact is that Japan, and only Japan, could end the fighting. That is the "central reality" of the Pacific war. The other nations would have to go on fighting until the last Japanese had left their soil. Which areas of what nations should have been left under Japanese control in order to end the war? Have you really thought about what a "negotiated peace" meant?

; ) Do I have to answer that? Here is a nation that is getting kicked from all corners and sees some hope on the Russian front?

Phaedrus, you seem to have reversed reality here. First, Japan was not "getting kicked from all corners." Japan is not the victim here. The US, Britain, Russia, China, SE Asia and the Pacific islands are the victims here. Japan initiated this war for its own reasons and own purposes, and met defeat. Let me repeat that: Japan is not the victim here. In fact, Japan was pursuing offensives in China in '45, where 100,000 Chinese died every month, on average, during the war. Japan refused to surrender at any time, and refused even to consider surrender. It rejected all peace initiatives, including those originated by its own people.

Second, it was not "Japan" that saw any hope. Japan's overseas experts and diplomats repeatedly said that the Russia route would be failure and that time was closing in on Japan. The Russia initiative -- which was not a peace initiative, a fact you have failed to face up to -- was a pet project of the Emperor. There was no hope in the Russian initiative, there never was, and Japan's own advisors, intelligence community, and the Soviets themselves all told the Japanese government. They refused to listen to reality (what was that I said about irrationality?)

P:and btw that cable which you had quoted?togo replied to sato saying this which would given an indication of what the Japanese were trying to do through Russians?.
e
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re your telegram No. 1392.
1. In the Present situation, strengthening friendly relations with the Soviet Union and, moreover, effectively utilizing the Soviets to terminate the war is difficult. This was clear from the outset but in view of the demands of the times it is essential to accomplish this boldly. Furthermore, for our side it is even difficult merely to prevent the Soviets from taking part in hostilities against Japan, and we must realize that to have them act to our advantage is a prospect hard to achieve. This is as I indicated in my telegram No. 890, and the negotiations for strengthening friendly relations between Japan and the Soviet Union constitute the basis on which to invite sincere Soviet mediation for terminating the war. Moreover, it is also considered essential in order to strengthen our stand in negotiations against the United States and Great Britain. Besides, we should not limit ourselves to sounding out the attitude of the Soviets concerning the termination of the war but should also endeavor to induce them to mediate in good faith.
2. Not only our High Command but also our Government firmly believes that even now our war potential is still sufficient to deal the enemy a severe blow, but against an enemy who can make repeated attacks we cannot always be completely free from anxiety. In such times, we continue to maintain our war strength; if only the United States and Great Britain would recognize Japan's honor and existence we would terminate the war and would like to save mankind from the ravages of war, but if the enemy insists on unconditional surrender to the very end, then our country and His Majesty would unanimously resolve to fight a war of resistance to the bitter end. Therefore, inviting the Soviet Union to mediate fairly does not include unconditional surrender; please understand this point in particular.
3. The Soviet reply concerning the dispatch of the special envoy should be obtained as soon as possible. It is extremely important to get Soviet approval quickly and I would like you to exert extreme efforts towards this end through Lozovsky.[/b]

Phaedrus, where in this cable does it say Japan has any concrete offer or any plan to end the war? Sato repeatedly cabled Tokyo for such "details." None were forthcoming. Further, the whole thing was a fantasy, since the military would never permit the government to end the war.

As I explained before, under the Constitution, the Army Minister had to be an officer. This was amended at various times from serving to retired and back again, but the main point is that the Army supplied one minister. Since all ministries had to be filled

V: In any case, it is not incumbent on Moscow to make announcements of its intentions (and why should it be believed anyway?)

Finally, why should Moscow warn anybody, and get even more Russian soldiers killed attacking a prepared enemy instead of a suprised one? Your ethical stance is unacceptable.


P: What ethical stance?


Phaedrus, do you think it is ethical do get extra Russian troops killed so that the USSR can announce its invasion intentions beforehand? How many Russian soldiers is that worth?

We are talking here about the possibility of a nation pinning on hopes from Soviet and if they had known that there is no hope on that front, they could have folded?

Phaedrus!!!!!!!!!!! Phaedrus!!!!!! The Japanese government was told again and again and again and again and again by its own people, including intelligence experts, Sato in Moscow, Tojo the former premier, Togo the foreign minister, and other experts and officials, and the Soviets themselves, that this was a hopeless cause. A hopeless cause. No hope. No way. No how. I've said this several times already. Why haven't you listened? The Soviet mediation plan was a fantasy. Togo is going through the motions. Japan at no time had any plan to end the war through Russia. The hope was for a negotiated cease-fire that would leave the troops in place, a position unacceptable to the Allies. That was not a "peace" plan, and in any case no plans were drawn up to carry it out.

V: Also, the language of paragraph 12 was prepared prior to the news about the Trinity Test, on July 2. Trinity news reached Truman at Potsdam on the 16th. So Truman's knowledge of the Bomb did not really influence the Potsdam Declaration's text.

Umm opeake a look at stimson’s memo on July 2 with the draft for the proclamation by the heads of state (http://nuclearfiles.org/redocuments...mson-draft.html)?..and compare that with the final declaration on july26 (http://nuclearfiles.org/redocuments...26-potsdam.html)


The changes were made by Stimson based on a memorandum to the President from the Joint Chiefs. Not by Truman. See Frank Downfall p. 219-220.

So it is very much possible the successful testing of the bomb did change the text to a more belligerent tone.

No, as the notes of the Joint chiefs meeting show, the issue was not the A-bomb but the problem of obtaining the surrender of outlying garrisons. See Frank again, p 222.

V: I read the cables. They are instanced on page 915 and 916 of Toland, where this initiative through Sweden is discussed in detail. The move was initiated by Bernadotte, not the military attache Onodera. See Toland (p915). The Jap 1618 anese government shut down this negotiation in a cable cited in Toland (p.916):

"JAPAN'S POLICY IS TO FIGHT TO THE END, BUT WE HAVE INFORMATION THAT SOMONE IS CONDUCTING A PEACE MOVE IN NORTHERN EUROPE. YOU ARE TO INVESTIGATE THE MATTER AND REPORT YOUR FINDINGS."

This was triggered by the Swedish Foreign Minister's complaint that the diplomatic plan bypassed regular channels. The putz protested to the Japanese Ambassador in Stockholm, which resulted in the cable killing the move. The Japanese routinely killed all peace moves.

Note this line:
JAPAN'S POLICY IS TO FIGHT TO THE END

Now tell me: Is that a clear declaration of policy?



P: Err…how does this indicate that Japanese routinely killed ALL peaceful moves. The above cable doesn’t even conclusively point out a killing of a particular peace imitative. The “end?could mean many things, end of war, cessation of hostilities due to peaceful negotiations.


Phaedrus, for crying out loud! The comment was part of an analysis of the incident! The Japanese routinely killed all peace moves, including this one. Please bring an example of a peace initiative originating from elsewhere that the Japanese government did not kill!

P: Great, how many units were involved in the fight at Okinawa? And how many soldiers were holed up in the caves at Iwo Jima? Both these events which you are talking about?happened after US was occupying these places since 1945? Now how do these events blow apart the survey?

Phaedrus, the Survey done in 1946 had no idea what happened in 1947. Now think about it. If the Japanese are still resisting on Okinawa and Iwo until 1950, how can the conclusion be justified that they would have ceased resistance in 1946 in Japan proper? As I already said.

P Don’t see how the things that you brought up dilute the study except your generic statement “like all governmental studies, they are slanted toward particular conclusions and use evidence in biased ways?which is an argument that could be used against all governments. Going by that logic, one could always say the US government’s decision to nuke japan was slanted and the evidence presented was biased. If the study was biased or doctored to meet the Air Force’s objectives, why did they have to talk about the peace group in japan?

Phaedrus! The Survey was written to justify a postwar role for an independent air force. Of course they mentioned the peace crowd in Japan, it enhances their argument. I provided you the cite for this already.

Have already told what I thought about the study and you opposed it, but haven’t seen any argument based on facts and evidence so far, except quoting skates selectively.

Then you haven't been reading. Fact: The Army Air Force wanted to be an independent service. Fact: The Survey (and other behaviors and reports) were slanted to meet this goal. This is attested to by numerous sources. I reached for Skates because he was an easy one.

And the idea that I would "selectively" quote Skates is absurd. For one thing, I don't operate that way, and for another, I am the only person in this conversation citing any academic work on the Pacific War. You are welcome to produce quotes from Skates showing I have selectively quoted him. Or apologize.

V: once again, speculation is defeated by facts. You want to claim that the Soviet entry into the war would have convinced the Japanese to surrender, and this was known in July. Horseshit. The fact is that the Soviets entered the war, and two A-bombs were dropped, and the government did not surrender. This is a basic historical fact. Quit accusing me of trying to wiggle. You don't even know enough about this topic to detect a wiggle!

P: Umm the tone again, whether one knows enough about a topic is something I dont think you can claim to be in a position to gauge. What sort of argument is that?? How does one use logic to talk about historical events and decisions? We are not talking about post-fact events here, we are talking about what the US leaders had in front of them before coming to the decision to nuke japan, and this particular study doesn’t exactly make a case for nuking japan.


Talk about wiggling! Phaedrus, YOU claimed that Soviet entry into the war convinced Japan to surrender. Therefore -- simple logic -- Japan would have surrendered after Soviet entry. But -- here's a historical fact -- Japan's government DID NOT surrender after Soviet entry. In fact, the Emperor had to order surrender twice over the objections of the government, which voted to continue the war in meetings for a week after Soviet entry. That's the application of logic, Phaedrus.

Now, back to the Survey. The Survey was slanted. That's a known historical fact, referenced by Skates and many others. Frank points out that Japan's true vulnerability to strategic bombing was not understood at all by wartime planners, allowing the Survey to make claims about the possiblity of alternatives. Oh, and one other thing. The Survey had no access to Magic decrpyts, and thus, no information about Japanese intentions. Thus, any conclusions they come to about Japanese intentions are nonsense.

V:[i]Historical fact number 2 (see The Last Great Victory or Miracle of Deliverance.) Hirohito, referencing the A-bomb, told Togo on Aug 7, the day before the Soviet invasion, that he wanted to end the war and to convene the Supreme Council to do so. It did not meet until the 9th. Thus, Hirohito had already decided to end the war prior to Soviet invasion, on the 7th. So, your case is completely and utterly demolished by history

P: Umm, cant you see your predicament?i am talking about why the US couldn't have waited for a week (atleast ) before dropping the bomb and seen the impact of the entry of soviets on Japanese.

For crying out loud! How many more dead do you want? Do you realize how many people were killed by the Russians in Manchuria before the fighting stopped? More than 350,000 in the fighting there. The Russians were scheduled to come aboard Hokkaido (pop. 3 million) at the end of August. How many from that?

You don't wait because it is war! It has to be ended now, not yesterday.

In any case, we know that (1) Soviet entry did not end the war -- the government continued to vote to continue the war and (2) the Emperor ended the war because of the atomic bomb. He said so on Aug. 7. BEFORE SOVIET ENTRY! There's no logical leg for you to stand on. The A-Bomb ended the war.

P: And again the second bomb and it is not as if the surrender was delayed by month inspite of the entry of the soviets and the bomb, its called around a WEEK. !!! And what exactly is my case? I gave you a study that was convinced that soviet entry into war would “would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat? They don’t make such decisions overnight as you have already mentioned and demonstrated. As you yourself have already said, the military still wanted to fight and it had to take the emperor’s final word to end the war, why couldn’t have 1618 he done on 7th itself if he was fully convinced? Utterly demolished I believe, like adjectives a lot?

Utterly and completely demolished. What happened was, as I said several pages ago -- because you will not read the history OR my posts, I constantly have to repeat -- the Emperor called a meeting of the Big Six for the following day. In all probability he would have ended the war, as he did at the next meeting, held the day of the Soviet invasion. However, the military begged off and the meeting was delayed a day, during which the Russians invaded. Clear?

V: One of the most important things you have to realize is that the vast majority of Japanese officials were in favor of continuing the war, and the Suzuki government, for having three officials of the Big Six openly in favor of surrender was quite unusual. So the peace group had to walk softly because they were a tiny and weak minority which could have the rug yanked out from under them at any moment. It is fortunate that the Emperor changed his mind after the A-Bomb and decided to end the war.

In fact, the announcement of surrender caused the government to fall, and the Emperor was forced to appoint a member of the royal family to the Prime Ministership to prevent further disasters.


P: Vork, semantics apart,

...semantics? The facts are that (1) the peace group was way outnumbered (2) its opponents were ready to use violence against it (3) the government depended on the cooperation of military to function. The military could bring down the government any time it wanted simply by having the Army minister resign.

that’s what the line from the quote implies too The Japanese leaders had decided to surrender and were merely looking for sufficient pretext to convince the die-hard Army Group that Japan had lost the war and must capitulate to the Allies

No, the die-hard army group was the majority. Remember? In June the Diet (legislature) nastily rejected Suzuki's mention of ending the war, while the government as whole, including the Cabinet, voted to continue the war even after two a-bombs AND soviet entry. What more evidence do you need? Alperovitz and the Survey are wrong.

Further, Japan was a polity controlled by secret police and open assassination. Anyone who talked peace in that atmosphere would have been either arrested or assassinated. Just getting information to the Cabinet about the true state of the war -- which most in the government did not know -- required the organization of a conspiracy of junior officers inside the military.

And regarding the peace crowd, its not just Aleperovitz, even the survey talks about the peace initiatives.

There were no peace initiatives. For the umpteenth time I will ask you for an example, and you will fail to supply me with one. That's because there never were any.

There were NO JAPANESE PEACE INITIATIVES. Not one. Bring me one!

V: Question: if that is true, then why didn't they surrender when Russia entered the war? I mean, duh!

P: that is pretty naïve, to expect a nation to surrender as soon as one of the hopes they had is quashed. Wouldn't it be plausible to expect lot of confusion over the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and hence the delay in surrender, since they didn't have all the facts in front of them?


Phaedrus, YOU were the one who claimed that Soviet entry was decisive. Now you claim that such an idea is naive.

Once again, your position does not reflect reality. First, it was known to be an a-bomb by the 7th. Many refused to believe it at first, and those of you who want to claim a demonstration would have been successful should listen to the Japanese who denied that the US possessed such a weapon, and then later, conceding to reality, said the US could only possess a few.

[b]V: If the Russian surrender was so decisive, why was the military still rejecting the terms of the surrender

P: Maybe it had an effect on the Emperor's decision? And again I don't know why you take a span of 5 days and talk of it as if it is a LONG period to dismiss the entry of soviets. And what allied terms are you talking about?

Phaedrus! The war was more than 7 years long. The Japanese had had two years to review the destruction of their nation, and five months to watch themselves bombed and starved into submission. And you tell me five days is not enough? How much time should we give them? How many more Chinese, SE Asians, Americans and Brits are you willing to kill? The fact is that five days was enough. More time simply would have allowed the military to re-assert control, as they almost did with the coup.

As for having an effect on the Emperor's decision, why are you participating in a discussion where you haven't done the background reading? As I already told you -- see Miracle of Deliverance, The Last Great Victory or Downfall, the Emperor met with Togo and told him on Aug 7 that the war would have to be ended due to the bomb, and to convene the meeting for the 8th, which never happend. Since this was before the Sov invasion, obviously the soviet invasion had nothing to with the Emperor's decision.

V:In fact, the Russian invasion was so decisive that army officers crowded into General Anami's office to demand that he continue the war. More than a thousand officers committed suicide the day Japan surrendered. Probably they were shocked by Russian entry......

You mean to indicate or imply that because of the soviet entry into the war, all these army officers wanted to continue war? And regarding suicide, do we have to go into this? Cultural gaps ?


It's not a cultural issue. The officers who committed suicide did so to show their displeasure with the decision to end the war. Since you want to claim that the Russian entry was severe psychological shock that induced the end of the war -- a position you also deride as naive elsewhere -- you have to confront the evidence of the officers' suicide that ranking military leaders were not shocked by Russian entry. Indeed, the Japanese forces in Manchuria did not fold from shock, but fought hard and died uselessly. Nowhere did this "shock" you speak of manifest itself. Can you point to some concrete manifestation of "shock" from the Russian invasion?

it comes across as that the study concluded about the impact of soviet entry on Japanese position, which would have rendered the invasion as a remote possibility. Again, one can just say whatever you read is propaganda very easily?don’t indulge in generalizations without evidence.

Said study now turns out to be a six-page hack job. End of discussion.

Are you telling me that the war department study of 1946 was discussed in skates book ?????????????? When you said above that one cant see the text or find the study?? Again which study said about the war ending on feb 15, 1946?

Yes, this study is discussed in Skates, and Frank as well, in detail. It was six pages long, half devoted to the typhoon. It was not an in-depth study and gives little or no reason to support its conclusions. In other words, it is useless to support your position.

In any case, your position calls for the deaths of roughly 600,000 Chinese, not to mention thousnads of others around the Pacific as the war drags on. Can you explain why that is ethically acceptable?

Err. If it’s a Strategic Bombing Survey the air force has to appoint the commissioners and pay for the study right? Who will do it, the NAVY?? ; ) And as I asked, does Skates clearly say that the survey was WRONG?

No, he just says it was slanted. And therefore, not trustworthy. There is no need to say it is "wrong." In any case, as Frank pointed out, it did not have access to the data it needed to make its case. End of that discussion.

What do you mean? The strategic air war was successful in Japan compared to Germany and hence, what they said in both surveys is essentially true?

No, the Survey the survey's numerical claims were excellent in both cases. However, its claims about Japanese intentions were garbage. Big difference.

V:Zacharias was well-known to the Japanese. See, prior to the war, he was one of the few US officers who could speak Japanese, and visited Japan many times. Many Japanese military figures had met him, including Prime Minister Suzuki, and Admiral Yonai. This is the sort of background information that would be useful for you to know. That is why I have begged you to read up on the war. Alperovitz is a propaganda writer, not a scholar. Please read someone more objective.

Please don't try to indulge in what I know and what I don't know, you are not an authority.


Phaedrus, from the questions you ask, and the things you believe are evidence, and the vast ignorance you display on every topic we raise, I am certain that you have read very little on this other than propaganda work.

Why are you telling me what I know and when I have also given you links to articles written by Zach himself on the subject and also the cable examples/text in which Japanese mentioned the broadcasts and their concerns over atlantic charter

Because Phaedrus, you don't seem to know it. For example, you seem unware of the following information:

V:there were only TWO responses. Despite repeated broadcasts, all through June and into July, nothing. Twice, on 27 May, and again on 24 July, he got responses. After that, and through it, only silence. Sydney Mashbir, another well-connected American officer, also tried, and got nothing. Planted editorials in the Washington Post by Zacharias (actually, by his assistant Ladislas Farago) saying that the Japanese need only ask for details -- picked up by Kase in Switzerland and forwarded to Japan, also got no response.

As you can see, it was the Japanese who cut off Zacharias, and who never responded to his initiative with a concrete proposal of their own.

V: The problem was the attitude of the Japanese, who were using unconditional surrender as an excuse. You will note that the cable above was sent on July 25. The context is completely missing, as it usually is in such propaganda presentations. This was an instruction from Togo to Sato, who is not discussing realities but instead is telling Sato what attitude he is to take with the Russians. Togo added at the end of this cable specifically that this was not a 'peace feeler' (exact words) but "obedience to Imperial command." In other words -- and I can't emphasize this enough -- this is an out-of-context quote that actually demonstrates that Japan's stance on unconditional surrender was a negotiating tactic designed to give the military cover to continue the war.

P:What is the context?


Phaed, the POLITICAL CONTEXT. That is what you don't get. See what I mean? The questions you ask indicate that you haven't done the reading. The cable is exactly what I said it is: a demonstration of Togo giving Sato instructions that indicate that the unconditional surrender issue was a pretext by the military to keep the war going. If you want more evidence, go and read Toland's (who is sympathetic to the Japanese and anti-bomb) account of the April meeting where Tojo brought up the unconditional surrender issue. Sato meanwhile understood the political context quite well. He pointedly asked Togo in a cable where the government and the military supported the Soviet initiative, in a cable of July 15. Togo evaded answering him.

Its the context of a message being sent when they knew it was being read by people concerned.

That's right. Togo knew Sato would read that cable, and understand his instructions on how to present that cable to the Japanese.

I still don't understand how you continue to mis-read the text?he actual content is.

The actual content says "this is not a peace feeler." How is it possible to mis-read that?

Togo is telling Sato how to negotiate with the Russians. You will note that he proposes no plan, and has nothing concrete for Sato, nor does he tell him what anyone in Tokyo is thinking.

P: On the other hand, since it is possible that the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States may exercise caution and suspect our dispatch of a special envoy may be a peace plot, we have repeatedly advised that what is described above is not a mere "peace feeler" but is in obedience to the Imperial command. It should very clear to anybody who reads this text that togo is saying that in case the allies think that this is some sort of peace plot or is a mere feeler, confirm that this is in obedience to the imperial command, that means it has the sanction of the emperor or imperial order.

Phaedrus, Togo specifically denies twice that this is a peace feeler. He says that it is in response to Imperial command (in other words, it is not a government initiative and does not have the military's support -- did you catch that nuance there, Phaedrus?). How am I mis-reading it? It clearly says THIS IS NOT A PEACE FEELER. It's an imperial initiative to the Soviets for sending a Konoye later in the year. Sato criticized this as hopeless, saying that they would have to surrender unconditionally before Japan itself was destroyed. Togo ignored him.

V: quit telling me to "read the cables" which you yourself have yanked out of context and obviously do not have a clue about. Go read someone who is a serious scholar and not a propaganda artist! Togo is instructing Sato how to go about negotiating, how to act. This is "not a peace feeler" as TOGO HIMSELF said.

P: Again that tone !!! So all you have to do is get some classes in comprehension and how to read English. Read the ca 1618 bles carefully.


Yes, again the tone. The cable says "this is not a peace feeler." How much more clear does it need to be? And speaking of reading, you should probably do some. It would help clear up your numerous misunderstandings.

Again the usual happens, the same Zach and his broadcasts which you so often mentioned and liked, are now suddenly wrong since he has different views on the subject?

Another evasion of a simple question. I'll ask again. Zach claims we brushed aside peace feelers. Can you give some examples of that? Please do not evade. Give concrete examples of peace feelers brushed off by the US. we are dozens of posts into this thread and so far you have not adduced even one. And I keep asking, too.

Oh, the same Zach who knew how Japanese operate, is now a joker?

Yes, that's right. He believed that the war could be won ended by psychological manuver. As we saw, it could only be ended by the Japanese emperor, in reality.

He was trying to make things right given the limitations he had and the Japanese had responded and as he says, the declaration had sabotaged the whole effort. WRITE ABOUT LEAFLETS

That is Zach's opinion. The fact is that Zach's work was unauthorized and he himself undercut US diplomacy. The reality is the opposite of what he claims.

:P: Remember the cables between Russia and japan and “AS FOR JAPAN, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEPT CONDITIONAL SURRENDER UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT WE SHOULD LIKE TO COMMUNICATE TO THE OTHER PARTY THROUGH APPROPRIATE CHANNELS THAT WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO A PEACE BASED ON THE ATLANTIC CHARTER. THE DIFFICULT POINT IS THE ATTITUDE OF THE ENEMY, WHO CONTINUES TO INSIST ON THE FORMALITY OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN REMAIN INSISTENT ON FORMALITY, THERE IS NO SOLUTION TO THIS SITUATION OTHER THAN FOR US TO HOLD OUT UNTIL COMPLETE COLLAPSE BECAUSE OF THIS ONE POINT ALONE.?

Phaedrus. I've already demonstrated, with actual quotes from real people, that the military was using the unconditional surrender claim as a pretext to continue the war. That cable was dated July 25, 1945. The next paragraph is omitted -- remember what I said about how this issue is constructed by the propaganda writers like Alperovitz? -- because it undercuts their case. In it, Togo says that they want to end hostilities by asking for terms. No terms were ever proposed. Read Sato's reply. He cites the Russian Lozovsky, who he is negotiating with, who asks him for a concrete proposal. Sato cannot give him one. Why? Because there was never a plan to end the war. Of course, US knew this, and also knew the Russians weren't buying (as I told you, referenced in all major works, and known to the Japanese too). So there is no way that you can use this cable to support anything.

[b]V:Because, the bomb had to satisfy several missions. First, it had to end the war, but failing that, it had to have some positive military effect. What if you expend a bomb on a desolate site, and the Japanese do not surrender?? Congrats, you've just wasted an expensive and powerful weapon

Congrats on a nice logic of killing innocents, when you have three bombs like you said above, one bomb is ok naa?

Which innocents? The Chinese and Southeast Asians who would have died while you waited for the Japanese to end the war they didn't end even after two a-bombs and Russian invasion? There were only three, and they might fail. So their use was fraught with what-ifs. And the military had to plan for the failure of Japan to end the war.

And btw why was the first bomb not the type that was successfully tested ?

You mean you don't know?

V:They wanted the USSR to help them negotiate a cease-fire while giving the Bear territorial concessions.

PAs I said earlier if you read the cables it is clear that they were trying to do more than that and how they required clarification on the emperor.


Phaedrus, the discussion of territorial concessions and a ceasefire is in Toland, Frank, and Weintraub. See any standard work. For example:

Toland, p932
"In a week Hirota returned with [an offer] in writing: in return for a new nonaggression treaty and oil, Japan promised to give Manchuria her independence and relinquish her fishing concessions in Soviet waters."

Sato responded with his usual perspecacity:

From Frank p225
"How much of an effect do you expect our statements regarding the nonannexation and non-possession of territories which we have already lost or are about to lose will have on the Soviet authorities?"

As I said, they were offering territorial concessions and fishing rights in exchange for Soviet mediation. That is why Togo ended his cable of July 17 with:

"Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender."

So, in fact, Togo specifically denies that they were doing what you say they were.

V: Yes, morally, militarily, ethically, you name it. It was the right decision, an evil one, but to avert even greater evils. Subsequent events have demonstrated the rightness of that decision.

P: Which events are you talking about?


You asked whether they made the right decision to A-Bomb. The events which confirmed the rightness of that decision include the quick surrender, the coup, the inability of the military to accept an end to the war, etc.

Thou shalt not take the Lord's name in vain Please go back and READ Zach’s article and what he thought of Potsdam and his efforts.

Who gives a shit what he thought!? He was unable to provide any evidence for his views, and nobody else on earth believes his claims. Certainly you have not produced the slightest shred of evidence that we brushed aside peace offers. Sadly, the maverick Zacharias became a right-wing nut and wrote nonsense about the war.

So far you've adduced three articles, only, one by a right wing nut, Zacharias, and another by a left wing propagandist, Alperovitz, and a third from the Institute of Historical Revisionism, a Holocaust denial group. Are you going to give me any serious scholarship someday?

Plus, you've missed the point. I was using the broadcasts made at the time to show that the Japanese government had communications describing the flexibility of unconditional surrender.

[b]VZacharias letter in the Washington Post was forwarded to the Japanese government by the Japanese Ambassador in Switzerland. It said that all the Japanese had to do was ask about terms, and the US was willing to talk. The US negotiated with everyone, and repeatedly asked the Japanese what terms they wanted. The US offered to fly Japanese officials to Europe to negotiate. NONE OF THIS WAS ACCEPTED!!!!!!!

P: Oh, you mean to say that the US government through proper channels approached the Japanese government and asked them about the terms and assured them that the emperor will be retained???? Please provide evidence.

There you go evading again. YOU claimed that we brushed off their peace feelers. I put up evidence showing that we did not brush off their peace feelers. There it is, in black and white. The US offered to listen to any Japanese government offer. None was made. The assurance of retention of the Emperor was made in the Potsdam declaration. Remember? It called only for unconditional surrender of the armed forces, and said Japan could chose its government. There is nothing about retention of the Emperor because in my comment because I was not addressing that issue. In any case, it is incumbent on Japan to offer terms. The US position is plain.

They did respond as you had acknowledged with regard to the Atlantic charter and US should have responded to that instead of Potsdam. Why couldn't the US convey the terms formally through proper channels?

Phaed, a worldwide announcement IS the proper channel. The whole world knew what peace terms were. The US even dropped leaflets on Japan so the people would know. You're just grasping at nothing in desperation.

V :Phaed, the fact is that it was the Japanese who prolonged the war. I know that you will never accept these facts, so I offer them only for interested third parties following this debate. Blaming the US for prolonging the war is exactly the same move as Hitler blaming Poland for his invasion of it: it's the Big Lie.

yes that's the whole point isn't it, to debate and discuss the grey areas that were never probed. Who was blaming the US for prolonging the war, isn't one of the pro-bomb claims that the bomb brought the war to and end.

The position of Alperovitz is that the dastardly US prolonged the war by refusing surrender offers so that it could use the A-bomb. The is apparently the position you have adopted.

The gray areas were probled, Phaedrus, in hundreds of books, exhibitions, and conferences. You seem to be unaware of this voluminous material, however.

ead above with regard to the exact cable when they expressed their concerns

Nope. That cable does not show any willingness to talk to the US or to end the war. Remember? "THIS IS NOT A PEACE FEELER"

P: with regard to the willingness of US to talk to Japan directly, all I have is your words, provide the evidence.

Oh shit. Did you read anything I wrote? The US offer to send a plane is mentioned in Craig, Frank, Weintraub and Toland. See Toland -- sympathetic to Japan, anti A-bomb -- p 918. How many books do I have to cite?

V: Suppporting Sato's contention that Potsdam was the only avenue to peace, and that the Zacharias gloss on its terms was a crucial "divergence" from the utter surrender forced upon Germany, Minister Kase cabled Togo from Bern that he saw real guarantees offered. The "Imperial House" was unmentioned, and thus sanctioned by implication. Further, "a Japanese domain is recognized in which Japanese sovereignty holds sway." ("It seems to me" Kase added in a parenthesis, "that this proclamation provides a basis on which we can carry on our national structure which the Japanese race is now protecting with its life's blood.") As Sato did, Kase also observed that unconditional surrender applied only to the military and not to the government or the people, and he pleaded that it should be understood that the careful language of Potsdam appeared "to have occasioned a great deal of thought" on the part of the signatory governments - "They seem to have taken pains to save face for us on various other points." And he pointed out in particular the promise that the Japanese people would "be given the opportunity to lead a peaceful and productive life."

P: Reference: which day, intercept number..e.tc?? And the above text which is not just the text of a particular cable also talks about sato observing that that unconditional surrender applied only to the military. Which cable is the above analysis talking about?


As I have already said, that cable is dated July 28, from Bern, cable H-199392. Sato's analysis arrived the day before. Additionally, Togo and Suzuki made the same observation. I wrote this many posts ago. I wish you would go out and get some books on the topic.

BTW, the above text IS the text of a cable. Togo dejectedly cabled Sato the same day "No matter how hard I may try to persuade the military to hold direct negotations with the Americans or the British, I have no doubt whatsoever that they will refuse to listen. Therefore we must attempt to negotiate through the Soviet Union because there seems no other way to terminate the war."

Sato cabled back at 3:25 Moscow time reporting no progress on mediation plan, and said that Potsdam terms "may be mollified." Sato informed Togo he was still waiting for a "concrete and definite proposal."

So as you can see, as of July 28, there was no surrender plan, no terms, no proposal....nothing.

V:Sato knew quite well what Potsdam meant. That's from Toland, not Weintraub, BTW. Craig notes that on July 20 he sent a note saying he recommended ¡§Japan¡¦s surrender on any terms

P:That would amount to selective reading?later sato clarifies The so-called unconditional surrender or peace obtained by something close to unconditional surrender referred to in my telegram No. 1392 and other which I sent from time to time, omits the problem of protecting the fundamental character of our nation. It goes without saying that even in conducting negotiations with the Soviets on the subject of your telegram, the absolute desire on the part of 70 million citizens as regards our form of government should be forcefully stressed. Therefore I have already added a statement in the latter portion of my telegram, believing that there should be no fear of misunderstanding arising therefrom on this matter; I mention this only in order to make sure.


Yes, that's right. Sato thought that the Emperor could be preserved. What did he say again?

"If our country truly desires to terminate the war, we have no alternative but to accept unconditional surrender or something very close to it"

...something very close to it. There is selective reading here, but it is on your side, Phaedrus.

If one reads the telegrams, it doesn't come across as if they were certain of what unconditional meant and they also mentioned the broadcasts and Atlantic charter and their willingness but Potsdam happened

Phaedrus, the cables are extremely clear. There was no willingness on the part of the military to surrender. That's why they staged a coup the day before surrender, and that's why more than a thousand officers committed suicide.

The cables clearly show that:
1) the government had no surrender plans
2) it did not want to negotiate with the western allies directly
3) it had no plan to end the war
4) it had no agreement on what terms the USSR was to get.
5) it had no plan for using the USSR to mediate an end to the conflict

The cables + the minutes of meeting + behavior, as I have analyzed to death showed that all understood what unconditional surrender meant. Potsdam indeed ameliorated this, so "but Potsdam happened" is ironically wrong -- it made things better!

Plus you have not addressed the issue of military's use of the unconditional surrender demand to continue the war. Can you use some actual scholarship to discuss this issue?

V: Because Sato was trying to convince his government that the Russia route was a dead end! Remember, Sato is in Moscow, not Tokyo. He is a junior diplomat recieving instructions and conveying information back. He's not in the policymaking apparatus.

Err, the particular cable was sent by Togo.


No kidding. That's what I said! Sato is receiving Togo's instructions. I get the idea you don't really understand who everyone is and where they are.

How does this exactly make a point, “we knew Japanese were trying for peace through Russians,

Whoops! The Japanese weren't trying for "peace" -- and end to war -- but for a termination of hostilities with their troops in place so that they could continue the war after recovery.

P: but since Russians said they don’t give a hoot, we and the Russians were laughing away to glory about the Japanese peace overtures?instead of providing a saving face and going the peace way?

We knew the Russians weren't buying, we knew it would fail.

Also -- and your ethical failing rears its ugly head -- how many Allied troops and civilians are you willing to have killed in continuing fighting while Japan dicks around with Russia. Remember, as Frank, Weintraub, and Toland all point out, there was no plan to use Russia.

[bV: Washington was reading all the cable traffic between Kase and Tokyo! Every last word was on Truman's desk within 24-48 hours. It knew perfectly well what Tokyo was saying to Kase and vice versa!

P Still doesn't answer the question


Unbelievable. Phaedrus, if Washington is reading Kase's cables, of course it knows what orders he has.

P: And again I would like links for your interpretations that Washington [k]new perfectly well that Kase was acting on his own, and against Tokyo's wishes??

Because -- duh -- Washington has no cable with instructions from Tokyo telling Kase to take action, and because no other communication anyway else in the Empire has such a thought, and because Tokyo has no other way to communicate with Kase. Also, the Navy warned Fujimura to take no action on his own in separate cable. Also, Fujimura cabled Tokyo and told them that the Americans approached him. Now, The Americans know they didn't approach Kase and Fujimura, and since Fujimura told them the US initiated it, even the dumbest idiot in the schoolyard can see that Tokyo must not have initiated the Fujimura/Kase initiative. Even though the US knew this, we still offered to send a plane to fly out a rep. That was refused.

End of discussion. I can't believe you are still asking this question.

Now you say there is a cable which is the source for this exact statement. How can a cable that magic intercepted have these words????? ?Washington knew perfectly well that Kase was acting on his own, and against Tokyo's wishes ?That is an interpretation and not the cable message itself, which is what I am asking you to provide

No problem. See above.

Which cable had the exact words “Washington [k]new?.et al?

Fujiumura's which said that Washington had initiated the feeler.

Truman didn¡¦t do it because he felt it was the best way to force the Japanese to surrender.

We will never know will we?


No, we know now. Just some refuse to accept is all, or do the heavy reading necessary to understand. They would rather bleat ignorant nonsense.

As mentioned earlier, does he claim or offer proof that the study was “doctored?on purpose or whether it was “wrong?based on some particular evidence? If not, its merely a view

Don't worry, it's only in about a thousand other scholarly works on the war. The cooking of the Survey. Frank discusses the issue on 353-4. But what does it matter what it is books by scholars?

Do me a favor. Can you reference an actual book by a real scholar that validates the Survey's methodology for coming to its bizarre conclusions on the end of the war?

Zacharias already discussed, where he himself shows how it was not official but was declared official and how Potsdam undid whatever progress was achieved.

NO PROGRESS WAS ACHIEVED!!!!!!! It was all in his head. The Japanese responded TWICE to him, and that was it.

With regard to the helicopter story, some evidence please for that and Japanese rejection of the same.

What helicopter story?

can I ask why you want links and references to basic history? References to these events are numerous. See Weintraub¡¦s The Last Great Victory, Craig¡¦s The Fall of Japan, Toland¡¦s Rise and Fall Vol 2, Miracle of Deliverance, and numerous other works. But since the perfidious US horribly denied the peace-loving Japanese many attempts to make peace, it should be a simple matter for you to find the Japanese -government initiated peace plan that the US rejected so it could nuke Japan. Just bring it on

All books that belong to your camp. Provide me links or exact references.


Phaedrus, how do I know you know nothing about this? Because if you knew anything, you wouldn't lump such disparate authors into a "camp" let alone mine. You've never read any of these books, and you have no idea what they are about. References abound. You just keep refusing to read them. Pick up one, any one. Pick up Toland -- who, along with Skates, is anti-Bomb.

The same zacharias who did the broadcasts is now confused? Why is there lot of invective, coz he thinks US did the wrong thing?

Yes, he thinks the US handled it wrongly. In reality, it was he who did.

Toland, Rise and Fall, p915:
Widar Bagge, the Swedish Minister to Japan, was approached by Mamoru Shigemitsu. Foreign minister in the Koiso cabinet, with a suggestion that Sweden intercede on Japan¡¦s behalf with the United States. It came to nothing because of opposition from Shigemitsu¡¦s successor, Shigenori Togo, who was convinced that a much more influential go-between than Sweden could be found.

Evidence is not what is in a book, evidence is that for the above narrative, what are the documents and evidence on which toland has based this observation on. It does make sense however that USSR is much better go-between than Sweden.


What -- you think I run around with original diplomatic documents in my pocket? Evidence is the cable cited by Toland which I have provided to you several times, in which the Japanese government cut off this initiative.

It did? Then wonder why the Japanese were sending out cables seeking clarification.

No cables were sent out demanding clarification to the western allies or any other power.

And Zacharias who through his broadcasts offered atlantic charter didn’t know what was happening?????

<sigh>Yes, Phaedrus, because he didn't have access to Magic. So he didn't know what was happening.

the rationale for dropping the bomb was for ending the war. That¡¦s what all its supporters intended it to do. But that does not mean that it could not have other effects, nor does it mean that planners could ignore the possibility of failure.

Umm then rationale and objectives can be different? You mean by objectives happy fallouts?


Yes, rationale and objectives can be different. The US hoped the Bomb would end the war. But if it didn't it had to remove a major military target that supported the invasion.

Nagasaki was necessary to show that we had a number of the weapons and would use them. As it was, it was rendered a tragedy by a combination of bad weather and the Japanese military and US weapons deployment procedures.

And peace loving US could not just wait for few more days to see what would Japanese government would have done once they assessed the complete damage of Hiroshima?

I love how you are always willing to spend Allied lives like water to give Japan one more day. How many dead Allies is one more day worth to you?

Do you think their communication facilities were all honky dory?

Yes. They could have surrendered the way they actually did, by broadcasting!

I¡¦ve read this before. Alperovitz is a propagandist, not a serious scholar.

And you are basing this observation on ?? Why not refute his claims/observations objectively?


Are you serious? What do you think I have been doing with discussions of cables, diplomatic and political policies, war aims, geography and history, government structures, individual thoughts and preferences. Like I said, Alperovitz is shit. Why don't you read something more objective, like Toland.

The US was not ¡§calling the shots.¡¨ I think you need to read up on the Occupation as well.

Then who was calling the shots? Maritans?


More ignorance. Please read up on the Occupation of Japan, particularly the famous reverse course. Get back to me when you know something.


And how come USA the world’s richest economy never had a propaganda campaign countering that? Coz they felt guilty or they thought Japanese propaganda served their purpose?


They do!

phaed : Why didn’t other historians respond to it and have a public debate?

vork : Duh. They did

Again, when and where and what was the conclusions of the debate?


Read it for yourself, Phaedrus. Let's suppose I tell you. You will then ask me for references, or claim that it is someone's view. I will supply more mountains of facts and evidence. You will then claim that real evidence is not in scholarly works -- as you said above. Since you claim I slant my presentation, and scholarship is useless, how can I convince you of anything?

he letter states Hiroshima was not a military target, when it most certainly was. Therefore it is a lie. Nagasaki was an industrial city, and therefore a military target. End of discussion

Why and how, any documentation that says it is a military target? Well then all cities could be military targets, just coz they happen to be cities and they have industries like all cities do.


Read, Phaedrus. What army was headquartered in Hiroshima Castle? What was its role in the upcoming invasion of Kyushu? It was the second largest military HQ after Tokyo!

That is precisely the sort of justification bush and his cronies can give after going to war with iraq, we knew iraq had WMD. Knowing the geography seems to indicate their reasons for imparting maximum damage and not wipe out military installations

Unfortunately, the comments in that target committee's report were made before the war. And comparing this to Iraq won't work.

you concede that it has been crafted. Here is the simple fact: 720,000 leaflets were dropped two days prior on Hiroshima warning that the city would be obliterated.

I conceded? If you go through the text, it will become apparent that the historians in the letter were implying that the original text was carefully crafted to imply that the leaflets were dropped on Hiroshima prior to the attack. Where were these leaflets dropped and the documentation of this drop? There has been no evidence in this regard.


Well, here's the problem. I could cite Weintraub or Frank or Skates or Toland or any of a hundred authors on the leaflets. But I will give up, because unfortunately I do not have an original leaflet in my possession, and I was not on the plane when they were dropped.

There is only reference to the two leaflets that were dropped on August 6
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistl.../small/mb09.htm


I see. You don't believe scholars, but you do believe internet links. <sigh>

See Bruce Lee¡¦s [I]Marching Orders. How many times do I have to provide this reference? Is there no library system nea 1615 r you?

Err…in a discussion you don’t ask others to go read, its just one cable?why don’t you provide the contents? What is easier? You who have the book right next to you or have “read?it, providing me with the contents of one cable, right? Maybe the records of “Magic Diplomatic Summaries?would be more helpful and revealing.


Would it matter? You're unwilling either to consider the evidence, or change your mind. Simple fact: the Japanese arranged a campaign to get humanitarians and leftists around the world to believe that the nuke act was unnecessary and Japan would have surrendered without it. The cable in question dates from Sept. 15. I suggest you get on the interlibrary loan and read the book. No matter what information I supply, you will reject it. Genuine interaction with the evidence can only come from you. BTW, it is a great book, showing how Magic also enabled the Russians to counter the Germans at Stalingrad, through data from Japanese cables, and so on. Really wonderful work by a first-rate scholar.

V: You¡¦ve confused ¡§occupation¡¨ with ¡§ruling¡¨. The Americans did not rule Japan. Don¡¦t you know? The Americans did not really de-Nazify Japan like we did Germany. We kept the Facists in power there, starting with Emperor, and ran the show through them. They fed us lies, and controlled us very nicely. The arrangement suited everybody fine.

P: Read carefully my friend, effectively ruling? Americans must be REALLY DUMB to be led by facists and their lies then, and now after SO MANY YEARS.


Phaed, you need to do some reading up on the period during which the facists were rehabilitated. Many former war criminals served in the postwar government. For example, you might enjoy this article on the amazing Col. Tsuji, who singlehandly lost Japan the war, ate US pilot livers, and served in the postwar legislature. Meet Tsuji!

In the meantime, I will not answer any further queries on this thread until you can demonstrate that you have actually read something on this and thought about it, and bring up evidence showing that the US deliberately ignored Japanese peace offers. I suggest you hunt down copies of

Toland Rising Sun Vol 1 and 2
Saburo Ienaga The Pacific War
Frank Downfall
Harper's Miracle of Deliverance
Weintraub's The Last Great Victory
Dower Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II
Craig The Fall of Imperial Japan
Van Wolferen The Enigma of Japanese Power
The Origins of the Modern Japanese State EH Norman's collected writings
Dogs and Demons
The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence
Hall's Cartels of the Mind

and numerous other mainstream works on the war and on Japanese culture. Good luck.

Vorkosigan
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Old 06-11-2003, 01:15 AM   #132
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Vork...

Will respond later...as soon as i get some time....here is briefly going over some "obvious" things since felt the tone was very friendly and since i couldnt ignore the demonic and overwhelming urge to respond, ignoring the bread and butter thingey...

Wow! I really pressed your buttons, and got a bunch of knee jerk nonsense. Here's the difference. The Japanese could have ended the war at any time by surrendering, or slowed the killing by inquiring about terms. Which they never did.

I dont really see any "point" if at all you are making except the usual, i-am-right-you-are-wrong invective/baloney (just reciprocating the tone). You just painted japanese as some "death loving" chaps....and i pointed out that in certain cultures and were people are out-gunned they go about doing "non"-rational things. Be it russians, germans, islamic terrorists/LTTE or japanese, they did what they had done, coz they believed that is the only option they have. You cant sit here today and judge what they have done justifies any act !!

you are shifting the goalposts. First, you claimed the US had ignored peace initiatives from Japan. When I blew that out of the water (all peace initiatives have now been shown to originate from other sources that the gov't of Japan, and all rejected by it).

Shifting goal posts? Nice try, i am just saying ending the war peacefully doesnt have to be initiative of only "one" party, US could have also tried.

Zacharias Broadcasts -- rejected by the Japanese

yawn, seems like you dont comprehend, read above about zacharias and what the man himself said about the broadcasts and the potsdam

Offer to fly any ranking Japanese official out to Europe or anywhere else for talks during Fujimura talks (rejected by the Japanese)

Evidence

Standing 24-7 channel in Switzerland for communications used repeatedly by both sides during the war. The Japanese never asked about terms.

Does this mean that the US sent peace feelers?

Finally, yes, I have to define the parameters of the debate, because you don't seem to understand them.

Yup keepin living in that well

you made the claim that the US ignored Japanese peace feelers. In order to demonstrate that claim, you would have to give an example of that.

The telegrams were ignored, albiet not directly to the US, but all parties invovled were aware of the content

I have seen not a single argument from you offering concrete examples of possible endings to the war that avoided the use of the A-Bomb, resulted in fewer deaths, ended the war early, and cleared the Pacific and Asian landmass of Japanese troops.

Entry of russia alongwith genuine peace feelers from the US side and ending the war early, resulting in fewer deaths...lets see

The simple fact is that you don't understand the issues involved. The US was very clear on its side. The whole world was aware of its unconditional surrender position. Nor could the US adopt any other position, for not getting rid of Japanese militarism would simply cause the problem to arise again. Further, no peace could be made without the Japanese leaving all their overseas possessions. The Japanese did not want to give these up.

Tsk Tsk, again the understand phrase. Then, the whole world and the american citizerns understood why the emperor was retained right? Why didnt they issue an official clarification on the emperor issue through proper channels?

Didnt toland mention this particular issue in the book "I have studied the Allied reply and concluded that it virtually acknowledges the position of our note [requesting the Emperor's retention] sent a few days ago. I find it quite acceptable." (Toland, pg. 936-937). With this reassurance and at the Emperor's "desire", on August 14 the Japanese Cabinet unanimously signed the surrender document, agreeing to Allied terms (Toland, pg. 939)"

First, Japan was not "getting kicked from all corners." Japan is not the victim here. The US, Britain, Russia, China, SE Asia and the Pacific islands are the victims here. Japan initiated this war for its own reasons and own purposes, and met defeat.

You seem to take a very liberal and twisted meanings of the text here.....did i mean japan was a victim here? Stop crying out loud how evil they were....i am not debating that here. The fact is japan was getting its butt kicked on all fronts...period.

You are welcome to produce quotes from Skates showing I have selectively quoted him. Or apologize.

Go really back in the thread, which will show that you have only provided quotes from Skates that suited your purpose and forgot all about what the author said about the nuking et al. Apologize for pointing out a fact?

Talk about wiggling! Phaedrus, YOU claimed that Soviet entry into the war convinced Japan to surrender. Therefore -- simple logic -- Japan would have surrendered after Soviet entry. But -- here's a historical fact -- Japan's government DID NOT surrender after Soviet entry. In fact, the Emperor had to order surrender twice over the objections of the government, which voted to continue the war in meetings for a week after Soviet entry. That's the application of logic, Phaedrus.

Logic and you? Come on.....maybe you didnt understand....let me repeat....when we are talking about the nuking incident...we are talking about what the US leaders had in front of them before chosing to nuke the shit out of people. Comprende? They had to make an objective decision based on what the reports told them...and this particular report told them what the entry of soviets could have done.

Utterly and completely demolished. What happened was, as I said several pages ago -- because you will not read the history OR my posts, I constantly have to repeat -- the Emperor called a meeting of the Big Six for the following day. In all probability he would have ended the war, as he did at the next meeting, held the day of the Soviet invasion. However, the military begged off and the meeting was delayed a day, during which the Russians invaded. Clear?

Look at your illusive logical legs....dont you understand???????? What is the frikking difference between few days and two weeks? Why couldnt they wait?

Phaedrus, YOU were the one who claimed that Soviet entry was decisive. Now you claim that such an idea is naive.

You seriously need to wake up...read my statement again !!!! I said " that is pretty naïve, to expect a nation to surrender as soon as one of the hopes they had is quashed. Wouldn't it be plausible to expect lot of confusion over the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and hence the delay in surrender, since they didn't have all the facts in front of them? "

how in the world were you able to understand that whole statement as me stating that the entry of soviets was a naive idea?

Phaedrus, from the questions you ask, and the things you believe are evidence, and the vast ignorance you display on every topic we raise, I am certain that you have read very little on this other than propaganda work.

What is propaganda and what is not just depends on which side of the bed you wake up right?

Phaedrus, Togo specifically denies twice that this is a peace feeler. He says that it is in response to Imperial command (in other words, it is not a government initiative and does not have the military's support -- did you catch that nuance there, Phaedrus?). How am I mis-reading it? It clearly says THIS IS NOT A PEACE FEELER.

Holy crap....let me provide the text again, which anyone can clearly make out that it says - in case people think this is a "peace plot" we would like to state that this is not a "mere peace feeler", but is "in obedience to the Imperial command"

Quote:
On the other hand, since it is possible that the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States may exercise caution and suspect our dispatch of a special envoy may be a peace plot, we have repeatedly advised that what is described above is not a mere "peace feeler" but is in obedience to the Imperial command.
Yes, again the tone. The cable says "this is not a peace feeler." How much more clear does it need to be?

Apparently a lot to you and certainily those comprehension classes are a must

Oh shit. Did you read anything I wrote? The US offer to send a plane is mentioned in Craig, Frank, Weintraub and Toland. See Toland -- sympathetic to Japan, anti A-bomb -- p 918. How many books do I have to cite?

Are you in habit of ever researching the books you read or a particular view becomes a fact coz it is in a book?

I love how you are always willing to spend Allied lives like water to give Japan one more day. How many dead Allies is one more day worth to you?

Love your logic, allied lives are more important and hence lets use/test a nuclear weapon. Maybe you shoudl read what all those invovled said about using the nuclear weapons

Like I said, Alperovitz is shit. Why don't you read something more objective, like Toland.

Then refute his claims...simple...toland....umm ...objective...ok

Read it for yourself, Phaedrus. Let's suppose I tell you. You will then ask me for references, or claim that it is someone's view. I will supply more mountains of facts and evidence. You will then claim that real evidence is not in scholarly works -- as you said above. Since you claim I slant my presentation, and scholarship is useless, how can I convince you of anything?

yawn, you said other historians had an open debate on the museum and i m erely asked when and where and what were teh conclusions of that particular debate (s)...why wiggling out?

You can convince me by being rational

I see. You don't believe scholars, but you do believe internet links.

Scholars...then they would have given references which can be cross checked? Those internet links you are talking about are to the truman library....if leaflets were dropped, am sure they would have included

Would it matter? You're unwilling either to consider the evidence, or change your mind.......

Yup it will change my mind, if you stop quoting other's works and provide some first hand reference.

In the meantime, I will not answer any further queries on this thread until you can demonstrate that you have actually read something on this and thought about it

Sure its your prerogative to do whatever you deem is the right thing to do.. "actually" read something on this...well as usual you show good comprehension..good luck with your teaching !!

jp
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Old 06-11-2003, 10:17 AM   #133
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This may have been said already (just seen this thread and don’t have time to read it all the way through) but felt it was worth mentioning this point apropos the morality of bombing Germany.

Morality is reversed in war.
It’s normal basis of Do-As-You-Would-Be-Done-By becomes Do-As-You-Wouldn’t-Be-Done-By-And-Do-It-So-They-Can’t-Get-Up-And-Do-It-To-You.

The victor then decides to what extent the vanquished behaved reprehensibly, and punishes him for it.

That’s the way it is.
Pretending anything else is just a pretence.
If the Germans had won, who can doubt that they would not have tried Churchill and “Bomber” Harris et al for war crimes?
(The Japanese, unused to this culture, would simply have enslaved everyone who surrendered to them, regardless of how they had behaved during the conflict.)

Only the very sick can regret that neither they nor the Germans won, because while we pretend to uphold moral and humanitarian values, they scorned them, and their behaviour would have reflected that scorn.
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Old 06-12-2003, 02:07 AM   #134
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Look at your illusive logical legs....dont you understand???????? What is the frikking difference between few days and two weeks? Why couldnt they wait?

See? You don't know anything at all.*

Like I said, Phaedrus, get out and read. Someday, when you have a historically rational position, backed by mainstream sources, we can discuss this issue. In the meantime, I commend you to your Japanese facist political beliefs about the A-Bomb, and then to your nearest local library.

Vorkosigan
*You know, if you had read anything, you'd know the answer to this question.
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Old 06-12-2003, 03:11 AM   #135
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Vork

Like I said, wake up and take some comprehension classes and maybe then we can discuss the topic in a 'rational' way and using logic. Till then i wish you luck with your teaching*

jp


*"Truth is what you want it to be or what is?"
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Old 07-26-2003, 11:00 AM   #136
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Default some late thoughts

First of all, I'm back--for a little bit, anyway. Been absent from the boards for a while.

But I wanted to write to express a few recent thought I've had on the subject.

So, more or less circumventing the entire Vork-Phaedrus debate, I wanted to bring attention back to Germany for a moment.

First, I'd like to say that I'm in general agreement that the concept of bombing Germany, even severely, is not morally wrong, for the various reasons discussed above (they were committing atrocities, had to be stopped, we have a responsibility to save the lives of our own troops, for a while bombing was the only effective offensive weapon we had, etc.)

Even the concept of "terror bombing" seems conceptually acceptible to me.

However, I still maintain that tactical carelessness on the part of Bomber Command led to excesses that place much of the bombing in morally dubious territory. And not for the reasons one might assume.

Because, you see, in the end, it's true that civilian deaths from the bombing are troubling. However, that isn't what troubles me the most.

What troubles me the most is the lengths to which the allies went to destroy the material civilization of Germany. This seems like an incredibly petty concern, even immorally petty, considering what the Nazis were doing to Eastern Europe. However, I think it's quite legitimate.

You see, the material civilization of Germany didn't belong to the Nazis. It belonged to all Germans, of every age, indeed even those who were no longer German (millions of Americans and their ancestors, for example.) Indeed, it belonged to all of the world, just as the cultural accomplishments of every culture do. What I'm trying to say is, the extent of the bombing of Germany didn't just destroy German lives and fortunes; it literally destroyed a good deal of history itself. History is not merely measured in the minds of the currently living; it's measured in what past generations have bequeathed to us, in their art and in the fruits of their labors. What we destroyed in Germany was hundreds of years of culture, that can never be regained, even were the entire county rebuilt as it appeared in 1932 (even if such a thing were possible, which it isn't.)

Granted, some of it survived, and some was rebuilt (to varying degrees of accuracy.) And I don't deny that the Nazis were more than guilty of their own actions in this regard (they more or less leveled Warsaw, which the Soviets rebuilt after the war. Many preservationists find fault with their efforts, though Warsaw does at least look very pretty.)

Again, this complaint does in no way minimize the sufferings of the peoples under the Nazis, which were the true crimes of the war, and for which the Germans were justly punished. But that doesn't mean we can't regret it, and it doesn't mean we can't take responsibility for our part in destroying that past, even if we were motivated by the Germans' own immoral actions. Sure, they brought it upon themselves--but again, we weren't just robbing them of their culture. We were robbing ourselves.

I should add that when I say "German culture", I simply mean the culture which was geographically situated behind the borders of Germany in 1932, which over the centuries had also included Slavic culture and Jewish culture (and which certainly included them in 1932, and later as well), among others.

Now I'm quite aware of previous discussions of bombing technology at the time--how imprecise it was, how city centers were really the only means available at the time for aiming at targets, and so forth.

Granted also that much of Germany's industry, like ours at the time, was situated near old city centers.

But why, for example, didn't we bomb Essen before we bombed Cologne? Harris' actions over Cologne seem to me to smack of publicity-seeking and posturing. Deliberately using 1000 bombers simply for emotional impact, attacking a center of ancient German culture, rather than a more significant (and more recently built) industrial city, seem to me to be the trademarks of psychological warfare, rather than sound strategy.

All I'm saying is, that the air war could have been waged in a manner that met its goals, without doing as much damage to what should be the inheritance of us all--the material accomplishments of "German" (i.e. the peoples living behind the borders of Germany, the HRE, or what have you) labor, and inheritance which in significant ways is lost to us forever. Granted some damage, even a significant amount, was inevitable. But surely not so much. Surely?
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Old 07-26-2003, 11:24 AM   #137
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can a war really be won without this level of devestation? at what point does a defeated people actually accept defeat?
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Old 07-27-2003, 05:00 AM   #138
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Quote:
Originally posted by the_cave
But why, for example, didn't we bomb Essen before we bombed Cologne? Harris' actions over Cologne seem to me to smack of publicity-seeking and posturing.
We DID bomb Essen before we bombed Cologne.

The raid on Cologne was done to demonstrate the awesome power of the new concentrated bomber squadrons. Actually, there were not enough new aircraft, so Harris was forced to use various makeshifts, such as instructors and trainers, that might have devastated the whole program for years to come if spectacular losses had incurred.

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Old 07-27-2003, 03:41 PM   #139
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Quote:
Originally posted by fatherphil
can a war really be won without this level of devestation? at what point does a defeated people actually accept defeat?
Well, I guess that's the great Clausewitzian $60,000 question. I don't think all situations are exactly the same. It's part of why there should be a distinction between the bombings of Germany and the nuking of Japan in that we can never be sure how much effect our razing of Germany had, but we know they surrendered when they were finally overrun. After two nukes, Japan surrendered immediately.

I guess the easy answer is that every situation is too different to say either 'yes' or 'no'.
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Old 07-27-2003, 04:15 PM   #140
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Default Re: Re: some late thoughts

Quote:
Originally posted by Vorkosigan
We DID bomb Essen before we bombed Cologne.
? I can't find a record of a bombing run on Essen before June 1, 1942, which was prior to (edit: oops, I mean AFTER) the run on Cologne on May 30, though it now seems those dates are so close together they might as well be considered part of the same effort.

Quote:
The raid on Cologne was done to demonstrate the awesome power of the new concentrated bomber squadrons. Actually, there were not enough new aircraft, so Harris was forced to use various makeshifts, such as instructors and trainers, that might have devastated the whole program for years to come if spectacular losses had incurred
Well, that certainly doesn't do much to improve my opinion of Harris!

However, to his credit, he did apparently (I guess?) believe that such displays would hasten the end of the war. And it is terribly sad that the Nazis were nevertheless able to wield power for so much longer.

I admit that it might just have been an impossible situation. Cologne was an important railway crossroads, and the best way to disrupt that is to bomb the city center, where the railyards were. Still, it's the use of Cologne as a showpiece for the scale of Harris' ambitions that I find disappointing--he knew, or he must have known, that he was striking a city of significant historical importance. Yes, the Germans had done the same to England, but not on anything like the scale Harris brought into play. I'm sure Coventry was in the minds of the British, but the thing is, they went on to do the same to city after city throughout Germany (even though the concept of the "thousand-bomber raid" was done away with.) The British themselves went after Bremen, another city of great historical importance, immediately after Cologne. Again, I can understand the desire to hopefully (naively?) intimidate the Nazi state into submission. But did the Allies understand the irrevocable nature, and absolutely unprecidented scale, of the historical destruction they were inflicting?

Quote:
Originally posted by fatherphil
can a war really be won without this level of devestation? at what point does a defeated people actually accept defeat?
Thankfully, nowadays it can, yes. I agree with the previous poster that the point of defeat depends upon the situation, but we're able to get to that point with much fewer casualties, both human and material, with contemporary technology and strategies.

The interesting lesson that Iraq has taught us, however, is what lengths a nation's own citizens will go to destroy their country. The Iraqi museum was apparently looted largely by criminals (perhaps set free by Hussein himself) and perhaps even by museum staff themselves, and the burning of the National Library appears to have been performed by arsonists. I argue that we're not responsible for such deeds, but we _do_ have a responsibility to prevent such actions, particularly when they are indirectly caused by the administrative chaos which we _did_ deliberately inflict.
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