Wiploc

Norge, I'm in the same position you are. I want someone from the other team to explain how the heck they can have morality. So I'm going to ask you the questions you asked Alonzo:

Given a theistic worldview, give me one good reason to refrain from raping women or torturing children. And don't be using arguments that would work for us atheists; in order to justify your position that theism gives you a leg up on morality, you need a better justification of morality than an atheist can have.

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<snip>Quite apart from the fact that quite clearly morals don't have anything to do with desires, your solution is logically impossible, so let's dispense with that.

Great point! You are going to have to

1. not base your moral system on god's desires,

2. reverse yourself on your above holding, or

3. somehow explain why morals can be based on divine desires but cannot be based on human desires.

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I don't want to be rude, but you spend an awful lot of time trying to work out a description of morality and applying labels etc, but you're still no closer to giving reasons for the imperative nature, the "should" that grounds morality. ie. Why we should act morally. That's why I have asked you the questions above. I look forward to hearing your response.

Excellent, this goes to the core of the issue: a moral system should be oughty, (should have an "imperative nature") and the oughtiness should be logically justified.

I can't wait to see how you do this. In my experience, when a Christian has tried to justify religious morality, he always uses arguments that work exactly as well for atheist morality as for religious morality.

I think it's time the Christians either presented their superior basis for morality or quit pretending that our basis is somehow inferior.

I'm looking forward to your response.
crc

Alonzo Fyfe

First, to prevent the soldier from raping or from torturing children, my first line of defense would be to create a number of internal constraints against this type of act.

I will place the person, as an infant, in a culture which is design with institutions and habits so that the child will acquire an aversion to this type of an act. Faced with an opportunity to torture a child, the agent will be revulsed by the thought and will not perform the act for that reason.

Note: A good person is one with the correct internal constraints that he will always do the right thing. A good person does the right thing because he wants to, and no other reason is necessary.

Should the internal constraints fail, there is no option left but to introduce external constraints -- a system of law enforcement and penalties such that, even if the individual wants to commit rape or torture a child, the person has a reason to think twice about the action.

One problem with external constraints is that they only work to the degree that the individual believes he might actually get caught. Consequently, I may decide to enhance the effect of these external constraints by convincing the person that an all-knowing being is always watching over him and that punishment is guaranteed.

But this is a lie, and suffers from several problems. First, there is a danger of the lie carrying other lies along with it, to the detriment of all. If the lie contains "permissions" for crusades, jihads, inquisitions, slavery, and genocide, that this super-being endorses rather than punishes, then this makes it more -- not less -- likely that the agent will carry out these types of actions.

Second, once the lie is revealed, its effectiveness as a deterrent evaporates completely.

Third, the use of this type of fictitious external constraint may take effort away from implementing the far more effective and far more securely grounded internal constraints presented above as the first line of defense.

Fourth (which is actually a summary of the three points identified above), it is far better to build a system of constraints on truth than on fiction, because the fiction will eventually crumble.

Of course, all of these constraints (internal and external) work causally and are compatible with determinism.

The relevant distinction between my answer and the one offered by DRFseven (as I see it) is that he says we ought to create in our children the same internal constraints that were created within us. Whereas I argue that internal constraints can be argued to be "good" or "bad" on the basis of their compatibility with the fulfillment of desires of all others.

DRFseven's method, for example, says that if we are taught to treat members of another race as mere property and to have no "guilt" over the way we maltreat them, it is then legitimate to pass that same attitude onto our children. Whereas I argue that the merit of having such an internal constraint (or, in this case, the merit of not having a particular internal constraint) should be evaluated according to how compatible the constraint would be to others getting what they want.

Yet, substantially, my answer and the answer offered by DRFseven are not far apart. If we are to assume that the agent has not been raised properly and lacks the internal inhibitions against performing such an act that a properly raised person would have, then the only option left is to do our best to threaten, as much as possible, external constraints to deter him from performing that action.

Now, what it sounds like you really want me to do is to take a person, facing no internal or external constraints on such an action, and convince him through sound reason alone not to perform that action. It can't be done. I can't do it. You can't do it. My inability to do so is no mark against me or any theory I propose, because it applies to everybody no matter what theories they propose. Such an entity simply does not exist. Internal constraints (aversions to the type of action itself) and external constraints (aversions to the consequences that others will impose upon the agent if it discovers that the agent performed the action) are the only types of barriers that exist.

Norge

First, to deal with wiploc's challenge:

I like your style, going on the offensive. Let's look at the challenge. You wish me to show you the superiority of theism as an account for morality vs. atheism. You write:

Well, not quite. First, theists would argue, myself among them, that the idea of morality is based upon the idea that the state of affairs we observe in human society is not the way it should be. It has departed from a standard. This is not something the atheist can offer at all. For the atheist, things just are. There is no "should" that can be justified. We are simply organisms that have evolved. Even survival just is. In the sense that it is better to live than die, that is the only thing that can be presented as being superior, nothing else. There is no intrinsic value to the human any more than the horse, say. Atheists know this, but it is so counterintuitive, that they are forced to do all sorts of mental gymnastics to get out of this.

Take, for example, the difference between a child suffering and a horse. The atheist can only comment that the child is a more advanced organism. And THAT'S IT! There really is nothing further that can be offered in terms of our response to the ways things "should be." Why? Because we're just matter in motion. That's all the universe is. Any objective value is illusory - humans are no more "valuable" than horses - and the only thing proffered is something based on utilitarianism, which is a lost cause. We can discuss this another time.

So, to return to the point at hand, it is theists that can account for the sense that things are not as they ought to be. On this account, then, the theist offers the idea that the grounding for right and wrong are found external to man, in God himself. God himself is the source of "what should be and what should not be." He grounds morality.

Now, at this point, it becomes difficult to speak to atheists, because all sorts of emotional responses are evoked. Atheists, for the most part, are extraordinarily angry at God. No sooner is God mentioned as the grounding for morality than fists are raised in anger, primarily for the suffering in the world etc. Now it is true that the most successful emotional defeater for the idea of God is suffering. On that there can be no question, but it fails philosophically. The reason is ironically because the very response that we have to the idea that "things are not the way they should be" can only be accounted for by something external to us, namely God. And I wouldn't say morality is grounded in God's desires, but in his character as a perfect being. This is why morality within a theistic framework is vastly superior to atheism, because its foundation is found external to humans.

It is no good saying "why do we need something external to ground morality?" at this point. The answer is quite simple. If there is a standard for human behavior, it can't be accounted for by whatever humans happen to think up. It can't be accounted for by evolution, because that is just random change. It doesn't contain values at all. It must therefore be accounted for by something external before whom we are accountable. This is God, whatever emotional reponse you may have to him.

As such, it is an explanation that is far superior because it accounts far better for the idea of actions having consequences. Under the atheistic view, now that persons have worked out that their life is the only one they will ever have, and they are simply organic material that will end at death, there is no reason why life should not be lived immorally, if that is their desire. There will be nothing to pay and indeed, that is exactly what Nazi soliders said to themselves at the death camps. They were right, just as those who commit atrocities are in atheistic systems, because without any consequences, actions simply are. There is no "oughtness" of any objective meaning at all. I think you know this, wiploc.

As for Alonzo, just a couple of points. First, I notice that you are not able to write a short sentence in response to my challenge. Too many words, Alonzo. I'd like to see a sentence in which you speak to a person about to commit an atrocity and you give reasons why he shouldn't do so. You state that it is not possible.

You write as follows:

You are making a mistake in conflating the proposed "success" of such advice with whether it is philosophically convincing. (Eg. If I tell him that he shouldn't act immorally, so what? He won't listen. But that's not the point. The point is whether the advice is grounded in consistent reasoning.)

I am simply asking for you to show the reasons why we should act morally. You haven't given any. You have tried to explain morality, as far as I can tell, but you haven't shown, on an atheistic view, why we "should" act morally. That's what I'm looking for, reasons why we should act morally. The last determinist I debated admitted that there was no "should" that he could muster. He then said that morals were really personal preferences. I would like to know if that is your defense.

It doesn't seem so. From what I can tell, it has to do with the totality of desires being met, (something you think "should" be done) but I have already shown that that is logically impossible. I am awaiting a reply on that point.

What is really remarkable about your response is that you use words like "raised properly" and "right." But you have absolutely no grounding for defending what that means. Who decides what is right? All desires being met? See above for a response to that.

Without realising it, you are assuming some sort of standard that under the atheist view, cannot be defended. Final words. Atheism is just matter in motion. It is better when atheists admit this. A hard lesson, but that's where atheism leads. The fact that atheists can't and don't live in the light of this is simply evidence that such a view is mistaken.

DRFseven

Actually it's based on studies on child development and the acquisition of morals.



If I were on a desert island, obviously, "911" wouldn't be a part of my environment, would it? In that case, I would try some other form of persuasion, up to and including physical force. Surely you can understand that the "911" is not a reason for my aversion to your behavior, but a result of it.

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Second, you have reached your conclusions on the basis of socialization. But this is also a hopeless cause. It grounds the idea of morality in the social framework we inhabit. But what of societies where immorality flourishes? Indeed, it is encouraged. It would seem that if I am from such a society, not only would I most likely act immorally, but on your account, I SHOULD act immorally, for I am more likely to survive and since that was your final comment - survival - I don't see that you have given any reasons for acting morally within a largely immoral society.

Actually, those societies are not "immoral"; they simply have different morals. Some people DO lack moral development, but whole societies don't. In all societies, barring the lack of certain developmental events, children take on the belief systems of their parents/caregivers, and, later, their social groups. This is socialization. Can you name any society you think is immoral?

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The most common example is Nazi Germany, where certainly acting immorally was quite a successful way of surviving. We tend to think of Germany, because it lost the war as an unsuccessful society, but it wasn't. It was very successful and very immoral. It is certainly possible that Germany could have won the war. Europe today could be composed of a dominant and immoral society, based on intransigent racism. Within such a society, immoral behavior would flourish.

Certain societies might have thought of extermination as moral behavior, or at least, not immoral. However, it is clear that in OUR society, it seems immoral to most people, as it did to most people during the reign of Nazi Germany. The fact is, Germany was NOT successful, extermination was a foolish proposition, and so were Hitler's other ideas. He ended up being thought of as deranged and Germany's been taking guff about it ever since.

Yes, they are personal preferences, but not exactly "simply" personal preferences. There is that element of emotional internalization, whereby something FEELS wrong or right, and without which, the preferences are not moral preferences.

Norge

Okay DRF, ( I wish I had a real name for you, it would make this much more personal, but there we go. My name is Richard and you are welcome to use it if you like.)

So you are happy to characterize morals are personal preferences. How interesting. Okay. Just a quick question, then.

There is no real material difference then between saying "I like torture and you don't" and "I like chocolate icecream and you like strawberry." I need to understand you properly here. Is that really what you are saying? Thanks.

Alonzo Fyfe

This is sure an arbitrary criterion for truth as "I have counted the number of words in your argument and it exceeds the number required for a truthful proposition by 6."

I will use as many words as it takes.

You are the one who said that the criteria was that, "You need to speak in a manner to convince them not to go through with their act." That sure sounds to me like you are insisting on "success" to me.


I need to know what you mean by "should act morally."

One option -- the option that you seem to be looking for -- is that I am to demonstrate to you the intrinsic merit (desire-independent reason) of acting morally. If this is what you mean by "should act morally" then neither I nor you nor anybody else can provide such a reason, because no such reason exists.

Another possible definition of "should" is rational (or ego-centric) should such as "why is it in my best interests, no matter what I presently desire, to do this?" Again, the answer may be "no reason" because morality does not necessarily concern "your best interest" but also the best interest of the victim. [Note: This is the view that holds that morality is merely a matter of personal preferences.]

A third possible definition of "should" means "we are going to look at everybody's interests -- including the interets of the victims (regardless of whether you care about the victim or not) and ask what should be done in order to fulfill the best interest all things considered." In which case torture does not qualify as being in everybody's best interest. Yet, it is still the case that the agent might have no reason to do the right thing.


It is only "logically impossible" if you take the fulfillment of a desire as an all-or-nothing sort of thing. Instead, it is a matter of degree. In our personal decision making, we constantly weigh desires against each other and come up with conclusions that are "the best that we can do under the circumstances." The criteria of "the totality of desires" simply does on an interpersonal level what all of us naturally do on an intrapersonal level.


Actually, I do. A person who is "raised properly" is simply a person who is raised in such a way that he has good desires. A good desire is a desire that is compatible with the fulfillment of the totality of desires being met as much as possible.



I have answered this question just a few posts ago, or so it seems.

Who gets to decide that a square has four sides, instead of three? Who gets to decide that an elm tree is not an animal?

This is a malformed question that misunderstands the nature of language. It assumes that we can somehow change what something is by changing what we call it. Sure, we can call a closed figure with three straight sides a "square" rather than a "triangle". But this has no effect on the properties of a closed figure with three straight sides.


And what would that standard be?

This is an assertion on your part caused by reading things into my arguments that are not there. I am not the one providing the "standard". You are providing it, and then accusing me of making a mistake on the grounds that it is present.

For example, you may object to my sentence above that by using the words "raised properly" the way I do in the above paragraph, that I am somehow importing something into the phrase "raised in such a way that he has good desires" that is not literally true of this phrase.

But you are doing the importing, not me. I mean nothing more by "raised properly" than that which is literally true of the phrase "raised in such a way that he has good desires". And I mean nothing by "good desires" than the literal definition of the phrase I used to define it above.

If you want to assert that I must mean "something more" by these terms, and that I am making a mistake on the grounds that this "something more" cannot be justified, I will answer that, yes, I agree that "something more" cannot be justified, but you are wrong in reading this "something more" into these definitions.


Wanting something to be true does not make it true. If the only objection that can be raised against an argument is "But I don't want things to be that way," the objection is too weak for consideration.

My guess is that by the word "just" you mean to say that there is something important missing from "matter in motion." But this "matter in motion" concerns intentional action. Intentional action aims at fulfilling desires (given beliefs). From desires comes value. Value is a part of the real world, and it is what all intentional human action aims for.

Norge

Alonzo,

You wrote:

I think at this point, the discussion is over, though we can continue if you like. In the face of the torture of your loved one, you can provide not one good reason to convince a person performing such an act to stop. There is, as you say, "no such reason."

(Just for the record before you read the rest of this post - and I apologize for that comment about the number of words, by the way - I didn't mean to be disrespectful, Alonzo, I would like you to consider something very important. When a position is very strongly counterintuitive, we need to reconsider our position. I strongly suspect that when a person says there is no reason s/he can give for the wrongness of torture, that person is not really telling the truth. I am not impugning your truthfulness, I am simply asking you to consider how it is you have reached a point where you cannot state that you know that torture is wrong. 99.999% of humans of all cultures and societies know perfectly well that torture is wrong. Even those who do it. They also know.

How is it that a tiny percentage of 21st century atheists don't get this? Perhaps the fear that admitting that objective value really exists forces the next step of trying to account for this and discovering that evolution has nothing to say to this. But when you let go of atheism, there are much better accounts for morality, ones that make much more sense. That's why atheists don't really live consistent with their beliefs, because they generally try to live moral lives in the absence of admitting that objective morality exists, and why whatever constructions are made to account for the imperative force of morality, an atheistic account is not going to work. Now back to the argument . . . )

You are right, that previous sentence looked utilitarian: "You need to speak in a manner to convince them not to go through with their act." ie. the reason is validated by its effectiveness. I didn't mean that and corrected it later.

You belie yourself of course by then going on to talk about desires. You still haven't given any convincing argument how this works. "The sum of all desires being fulfilled" is simply logically impossible as I have already shown, quite apart from the fact that morality doesn't really have to do with fulfilling desires.

Self-sacrifice, which is generally regarded as a moral act, is a clear example of this. We don't sacrifice ourselves to fulfill our desires at all. We do it on account of beliefs regarding the objective virtue of such acts. It is no good saying that our desire to respond self-sacrificially is satisfied in that way, because that's to miss the point. In addition, it simply puts all desires on the same footing. If I desire to act selflessly, I fulfill that and act morally, but if I act immorally, I may also desire to do that but that has nothing to do with acting morally, clearly. The whole paradigm is ill-conceived.

I think the tangle you weave in this next section is indicative of how confused you are:

You wrote:

Later on:

Side question: Does the above statement mean the part about it being in the best interest of everybody? I think it does, but I may be mistaken. In any case . . .

As hard as you try, you always end up using words like "best" and "right" but it is you yourself that has already said that there is no intrinsic meaning to such words. The word "best" and "right" deal with standards, but you negate those as objective entities. The problem is you assume them for your paradigm. What is the "best interest all things considered?" What does that mean? Best for whom? Certainly not for the German soliders keen to torture. They don't think it is best. Pure utilitarianism is ultimately arbitrary because it is not possible to find agreement on what the "best for all" really is without using categories which themselves are arbitrary and simply reflective of the values of those who propose the solution in the first place.

To determine real standards, they must be entities and objective and they must come from outside. This is denied by atheism.
Or if it is accepted by atheism, then it must be accounted for by evolution, and random change has nothing to say about such things as objective value and standards. If there is no God, these are merely human inventions and arbitrary ones at that. Further, matter in motion has no use for such categories, particularly when this is the only life we will ever have. Surely it is then better to follow one's own desires, moral or not. You're right, there is nothing an atheist can say to convince a person not to act immorally.

DRFseven

Hi, Richard; my name's Dee. All our opinions are accrued through learning, but some are learned in connection with an intensity of emotion. The more emotional an experience, the more we form neurological attachments between the memory and the limbic system. This is because the actual neuron changes its potential to reflect incoming information and becomes coded as such; when that neuron refires in response to a memory cue, the emotions come with it. The ones that form our ideas of good and bad, we separate and categorize as moral opinions (others are fear responses, pain responses, sexual or appetitive responses, etc.). When our basic values are acquired, we are very young children lacking the cognitive development needed for reasoning. These feelings are pre-cognitive, and to an extent, even pre-verbal. We cannot remember the internalization of morals process (which is, itself, dependent on parent/child attachment), but it is so named because it feels as if these opinions are a part of ourselves, as indeed they are, forevermore. They form the basis of the moral standards we will follow our whole lives.

Food preferences don't involve the internalization process (though they do involve experience). We don't feel that eating strawberry ice-cream is "wrong" as in immoral. As I explained to someone else, ANYTHING can be presented as moral or immoral behavior and internalized by a child, so it's possible to instill the idea that eating certain things, wearing certain colors, saying certain words, etc., are immoral. But almost always, food preferences are very different than moral feelings due to the way they are acquired and the emotions involved.

Norge

Not sure if you're male or female, Dee, (I remember Dee Murray of Elton John band fame!) but it doesn't matter. Greetings to you.

As for your reponse, well, in all that science I'm not sure I detected an answer to my question. I think what I read was yes, they are the same. What I need, though, is an outright statement of yes, torture preference is the same as ice-cream preference. This is a value statement. I don't think the science is helping here. I'm not looking for how values are acquired, I'm looking for the philosophical justification for behavior.

Now, if your response is a scientific one, ie. we're determined by our environment and genetic make-up, then fine, go with that and I'll deal with that when it comes. But until you do, I'll simply leave it at the point where you need to come out and say torture, ice-cream, it's all just preferences. Is that what you are willing to say?

DRFseven

There is a very definite difference. The difference is physical, and involves the biological phenomenon of internalization. Asking if food and moral preferences are the same is like asking if preferring chocolate over strawberry is like preferring to kiss your lover over kissing a flower pot. The distinguishing feature is the internalization of that feeling. So they are not the same.

Moral acquisition and the development of food preferences are different both physiologically and in the resulting feelings.