hedonologist

If you know of a better label I would rather use that.
This is very interesting. Do you see how this relates to ethics? The Earth self doesn't mind that he would die, because the other "self" lives. Could this be a form of altruism?

Can this be related to a comfort that comes from knowing your family would be taken care of, or that your work would be continued?

For the "you" who would be on Earth, what is it about that other self existing that makes dieing seem not so bad?

This hypothetical shows a link between a "materialist's" desire to survive, and a "higher purpose/desire/value"-- a purpose that will outlive you. So living for the survival of the self becomes living for the survival of all similar selves.

Would it be somewhat of a comfort in the same way, to know that a friend who was like you, would outlive you?

tronvillain

You've ignored my main point: I have to look at it in terms of the "I" who makes the decision and is copied - from his perspective, both the "original" and the "copy" are his future selves. In other words, he lives if either of them live.

I would still mind dying, but as I said dying a painless death isn't so bad, and the fact that I continue to exist is of some comfort. This is unrelated to my family being taken care of or my work being continued, though those would also be of comfort. It would be of comfort to know that my friends and family would outlive me, regardless of whether or not they were similar to me.

I have never claimed that I live solely for the survival of the self, and I certainly do not life for the survival of all similar selves. I do not think that I really live "for" anything, and I would probably be willing to sacrifice thousands of similar selves so that I might survive. My Earth self would probably happily switch minds with my Mars self.

hedonologist

I'm not sure why you are saying I ignored it. I don't mind trying to discuss what is interesting to you, but I don't know what you were "expecting" me to say about that point.

When I made this thread I was intending to disprove materialism, but now it seems the distinctions between materialist and dualist are becoming more difficult to find. Now I am more trying to understand what you are saying and it's implications, than to prove anything.
When you say "I" there, you are speaking from the perspective of before there are two of you made, correct?
Interesting. You seem to be thinking of "similar selves" as selves that are alive at the same time, correct?

But when you imagine these two "future selves", you think of them both as "yourself". Why not think of a future self as merely a "self" who is similar to who you are now?

One of your intentions seems to be to survive. So isn't survival one thing you live FOR, although other things may preclude it?
I gonna add to the hypothetical: You have some other options now. After the copy is made on Mars your Earth self could sell some of your/his/her possessions and make enough money for the operation. Would he/she do this?

If you answer "yes" to that last question, would your current self still choose to go through with the copy?
OK. I just don't see what a future self is if not a "similar self".

Someone7

I haven't read every post in this thread, but being a Star Trek geek, I must stress what Franc28 said. Transporters in ST work by taking all the atoms in your body apart, storing them somehow, memorizing their proper arrangement, and then literally sending your atoms (at the speed of light, no less) along a beam to another location, and then rearranging them back in their proper places. How they are able to beam you anywhere that isn’t set up to receive the atoms and properly arrange them back together, is beyond me…check your handy Star Trek Encyclopedia for some bullshit excuse for this little plot-hole…

Theoretically in the ST universe, it would be possible to travel anywhere without a ship by just transporting your atoms and the information for their proper rearrangement along a beam through subspace. In fact, it would be even faster than travel with a starship, since subspace communications travel about warp 9.99999 (you could cross the galaxy at that speed in 10 years, so sayith the Star Trek Encyclopedia).

Just thought you guys should know…

I myself don't see any problem with it. Don't see how 'I' would cease to exist in anyway.

tronvillain

You started this thread to disprove materialism? I don't see how you could possibly have hoped to accomplish that by investigating people's intuitions about this thought experiment. It might have illustrated the dualism of folk psychology, but like folk physics, that is a very limited approximation of reality.

I think of future selves as myself because I will become them, as my past selves have become me. Being similar to my present self is not a requirement to be either a past self or a future self. As a result, I do not think of a future self as merely a "self" who is similar to who I am now.

If after the copy is made on Mars my Earth self could sell some of some of his possessions and make enough money for the operation he would probably do so. I don't see this as a significant modification to the hypothetical scenario, so I would still choose to be copied.

1sec

Cloning yourself and sending the puppet away to Mars. This is weird. Eerie...

What are you guys talking about? Is it an issue about identity, or the real self? Is it philosophical at all?

[editting for the last paragraph]

[ February 20, 2002: Message edited by: 1sec ]</p>

tronvillain

Puppet?

Devilnaut

some of this terminology is confusing, and I'm not sure that this example is as useful as the teleporter one (seems less interesting..).


Tronvillain, apologies if you've answered something similar before, but would you use a teleporter that functioned by destroying your body and recreating you in the specified location (identical to your original self of course).. ?

I don't think I would, personally..


devilnaut

tronvillain

I said I would in my first post to this thread.

Devilnaut

Apologies tron, I think I got my threads confused . Anyway, as to the teleporter choice:

I agree with Franc.. Wouldn't you basically be wandering in to your death? How would the fact that an identical copy was made, change the fact that you (as in the body+brain reading this message) would be dead? Would you not agree that your current self would essentially step in to the teleporter and then cease to exist?

I find the question pretty intriguing, to be honest..


I posted earlier about modifications during the copying process, consider the following scenario:

Let's say you tell the scientists in charge of the copying process that you would like to color your hair blond, and your eyes green. You also would like to have a bigger build. Also, slightly higher intelligence. You also suggest to them that you would like certain painful memories removed, and also a memory of a wonderful trip to hawaii that never took place, implanted (for the sake of argument).

Now let's suggest that in the future when this is all possible, of the billions and billions more humans that make up our new interplanetary civilization, there is someone who happens to be identical to your hypothetical new copy in every way, and he has even just arrived on Mars via spacecraft. Let's call him Joe (i suppose you can assume that your hypothetical name is also Joe ). The scientists decide to simply remove the memories of the ship travel from Joe's mind, and implant memories of teleportation.

The scientists tell you that instead of going to the expense of creating a whole new copy of you, they will simply have joe step out of the teleporter once you are destroyed.

Would you agree to this treatment?

[ February 21, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]</p>