boneyard bill

Adrian Selby writes:

I'm sorry, but I have to admit that I understood the "undergoing of a process" better than I understand your explanation of its usage.


Let me add one more point, however, about my theory of mind. I appears to me, from what little I know of the subject, that the brain receives various inputs. From the information it receives, it reconstructs for us an experience of our environment. This is not terribly remarkable. On a much more primitive scale, the computer aboard a submarine does much the same thing. But the submarine does not experience anything.

This is the great unanswerable question. How does the information we receive get reconstructed as sentient experience? The process appears to be a logical one. On a submarine it is nothing but a logical process of taking in all the inputs categorizing them and filtering out the irrelevant stuff.

But for humans the process is almost super-logical, because the information we get takes the form of qualia. I don't think it will ever be possible to explain this. It just is. It is a rock bottom fundamental feature of nature.

boneyard bill

Adrian Selby writes:

I don't know what the problem is but I've tried all the safe solutions. If overwritten my Windows 98 with Me for example. I've down-loaded and installed Explorer 6 and a few other things. I think I could solve the problem by wiping my disk clean and re-installing Windows. But then I lose software that I don't want to lose. That's why I haven't done that. I'll probably settle for a hardware solution. I have another disk with Windows 98 on it. I can install that and use it as the master and still have my software on the slave disk. But I don't want to go inside my computer until I have lots of time to work on it. I need take that very slowly and deliberately.

boneyard bill

Adrian Selby writes:

quoting BB
Selby adds:
This is not a mischaracterization of what you said because I did not cite you. I cited identity theorists.

It is, in fact, a mischaracterization of what identity theorists say. I incorrectly stated that they use the term "first person report" instead of brain processes. It should have been "third person report" instead of brain processes.

boneyard bill

Spacer1 writes:

And what follows, logically, from that?

boneyard bill

Spacer1 writes:

But why do you believe it? What evidence do you have for it? Don't give the old brain states correlated re-hash. That evidence supports both theories. If you have no evidence, what logical argument do you have in support of it? Or are you going to argue from faith like most of the materialists on this board?

I have no interest in any theory that you may or may not have adopted for unsupported reasons and only due to poor toilet training or some Oedipal complex. If you're going to give me your opinion, I expect you to support it with a logical argument or some evidence.

Please, please, do not come up with one of those arguements I've already dealt with.

boneyard bill

One other note to Spacer1:

If mind is a material process, then that material process is also mind. And in that case, mind is inherent in certain material processes. That is why the identity theory cannot be used to support materialism.

Adrian Selby

A mode of access is not a property and thus identity theory is not a property dualist theory. I have no trouble with it, I'm not trying to deny a feature of the biperspectival identity theory, it simply isn't there. You repeatedly insist that it is there, at least if you're criticising my position. This is because you're working with a different conception of matter, but at this point, its clearly apparent we're talking in circles, so this will be my final post.

I want to get a handle on where we differ, because I think the matter is irreconcilable while we are working with different conceptual models. This post attempts to explain how, and how it generates the difficulties we seem to be having. The key one that recurs seems to be that you are identifying the reports from first and third person perspectives as the processes and that from this you take there to be a dualism of properties, but as outlined below, this is entirely mistaken, and moreover, when properly understood, with reference to the distinction between identity of sense and identity of reference, the problem you're having disintegrates.

I'll take your recent posts and work backwards, kind of.

Spacer1 said that mind is a material process. You responded:


You've offered no theory. You've posited that there is merely a correlation and that is clearly so, though its the nature of the correlation that's at issue, what is correlating with what, explanations or ontologically distinct substances or something else. You've not tried at any point to explain what the correlation is, whether it has any ontological implications etc. In response to my posts you've said that if I was right, I'd have to be dealing with 'mind/matter' not just matter.

Earlier in the thread you gave the example of gravity changing conceptions of what matter is. It's interesting that I concurred that we do in fact have a new understanding of matter that makes it possible to include what we previously thought to be a disembodied mind. You insisted that I could not be talking about matter, yet you are clearly prepared to accept that conceptions of matter can legitimately change.

What I think you're not prepared to accept is that what we once thought of as a disembodied mind is in fact just the brain when its working, in the same way that the universe, when its working, has a property of gravity. You've said only that the brain correlates with sentient experience but cannot be it. You continue to ask for logical argument or evidence. You've not offered a logical argument in support of your view, indeed, you've not defended Cartesian dualism either. I didn't expect you to, but its clear there can be flaws in explanations for the mind body problem. I've talked to you at length about how I'm postulating a model for understanding the problem in a way that appears to solve it. A quote from another thread where I outlined biperspectival theory goes thus:

It's therefore a working theory. As such it makes assumptions, it postulates things, sure it does, like Cartesian Dualism postulates two ontological realms. It's clear that you don't share the postulates from point 1. I've asked out of interest what your postulates are, you've not answered (i), (ii) or (iii) you've merely expressed there to be a correlation. Fine, you don't have a model. However, all models should be testable, and more importantly, open to disproof. I've stated previously that if you find evidence of a mental process where there is not a physical process then this theory breaks down. It can be falsified. Indeed, if mentallings can be shown to be distinct to brain processes then that would also count against it. Unfortunately, your position seems to rest on the fact that we use different concepts and vocabularies when we have experiences and when someone reports events in the brain of the person claiming to have experiences. There equally is no actual evidence that the two are different. First off though, you've said, quite fairly:

This model supports the view that a few others have outlined on this thread that it is POSSIBLE that the two are the same because there are always changes to the first person report and one would infer from this the direct experience of the person when their brain is messed with. I do not see how this does not show an identity to be possible. How does this show an identity not to be possible?

You've said previously:

Which is my point exactly, you're proceeding on the assumption that the identity theory cannot in principle account for why there are mentallings that have a distinction from physical processes, yet you yourself cannot begin to imagine how we'd test Cartesian Dualism. Biperspectival Identity Theory is dissolving the problem, but if you can figure out a way that mentallings can be discovered apart from physical processes do let me know*, and in the meantime, credit identity theorists with a view that at least offers an answer to this phantom conundrum. You've said you didn't expect scientific exactitude, and you've said equally we can't measure what isn't physical, so if mentallings are not physical are you going to offer a framework by which we can establish the materialist proposition as a groundless assumption, or is it rather possible that because we cannot begin to test Cartesial Dualism or any other form of dualism that does not posit mentallings as physical processes the materialist enterprise gets going with some parsimony in virtue of it at least being in principle falsifiable.

Your response is that for my argument to work I must be able to devalue a way of talking that we're all used to. This does not show how identity is not possible, nor subsequently have you shown that identity is not possible. This isn't to say it isn't a worthwhile experiment to translate mental predicates to physical ones, but to demand of the materialist project that it turn language into a focus neutral form of communication doesn't seem to affect one wit the truth of the proposition that the mind is the brain. All that's required is that the materialist be able to sufficiently model any aspect of the self that previously was considered to be the exclusive domain of the mind in neutral physical terms, it doesn't demand that we reduce all talk of love and fear to those terms except if we're trying to explain how these concepts are instantiated.

You've demanded that the reduction to a single vocabulary is a necessary part of the materialist project, and it is, in terms of providing a model that explains what's going on when someone reports they're in love. Yes it presupposes that we should be looking at the brain for this, I don't see anything wrong with that while its open to disproof and falsification, as it clearly is. The fact that you do see something wrong with it suggests to me that we'll always be talking in circles, because the wholesale reconfiguration of once's conceptual model to adapt to a view that one finds does not fit one's current model is indeed an almost impossible task to achieve. IT will persuade gradually if at all, and the only signs will be the dissipation of explanatory coherence in alternative models as the set of pertinent observations grows. As you've not put a model on the table, I can only assume from your statements that you're not attempting to cohere the relevant set of observations from scientific and philosophical fields on the matter in order to find a coherent explanation for the 'how' of the interaction.

Interestingly, the following attributes can sensibly and meaningfully be applied to physical systems:

Memory, intention, goal directedness, prediction, decision making, value structures, learning, problem solving.

And all these with apparatus and simulations hugely short of the full extent of our brains. As I've said, and you've not responded to, are you positing that there is more than a difference in complexity between us and a bee with regard to these so called mental characteristics? If not, are you prepared to say a bee is something more than a physical thing? You've posited that apes can have a mental life, and that there is no grey area for sentience, though what evidence you have for this will need some expression. I wonder what evidence you have for apes having more than just brains driving their behaviour and actions. On what grounds are you ascribing non physical intentionality to apes?

With whatever model you're using, I can see how this can seem like its 'super logical' and could involve the introduction of concepts like qualia. You see a computer that I daresay doesn't even parallel process, much less exhibit any of the functions I've mentioned above. Your analogy is poor because the computer might be better equated with the subsystems of the brain that automatically take care of our endocrinic balances, or inform us of pain, or send signals to produce antibodies. The brain does all this 'non experientially' too, i.e. I don't have an experience of the brain sending signals to create antibodies. If the submarine computer was communicating with the Captain about possible strategies, while directing component parts of the submarine's supersystem to maintain themselves and construct from a list of problem input messages a strategy for dealing with the ones that take priority based on in built rules centred on its survival you can begin to see that it's interaction with its environment becomes sophisticated. If you keep adding parallel processing networks, i.e. simulating thousands of years of evolution, that make it responsible for directing the submarine without the commander's input based on inputs from its environment, i.e. you ramp up its ability to select and predict courses of action and their consequences you begin to have a system that could be considered akin to ourselves. At no point would you need to introduce qualia, unless you are saying that qualia are emergent properties of physical systems. To which I'd respond, why bother with the concept of qualia, this system is to all intents and purposes sentient, yet it is merely huge numbers of circuit boards and sensory input functionally similar but materially different to our own.

I think you're hung up on the fact that the brain organises a model from its inputs, as you indeed concur, and that this somehow is an experience, i.e. you've considered the holistic representation of the environment as something different to me because you presumably can't get over the fact that the system can be self aware, i.e. scan its own states, and that 'experience' is not a priori untranslatable to material terms, indeed, self scanning can be simulated. I think ultimately its the complexity of our brains that you can't get over, you are harbouring doubts about the veracity of the materialist's claims because you can't accept that the explanation that sentience involves a brain's self scanning functions, among others, as as good an explanation as the introduction of 'qualia' as a way of defining experience without having to involve the brain and its processes directly.

That's cool, it just differs from how I see it, and I see no more evidence or logical argument from going down that road and presupposing that than I do materialism (not your conception of materialism, but the conception that identity theory supports, namely, that matter organised exhibits characteristics that aggregates of matter do not.)

Lets look at what you said:

You thought you were repeating the identity theory, but insofar as you're arguing with me, and the biperspectival identity theory, you've got it wrong, because nowhere have I said that the third person reports ARE the brain processes. You've clearly said that brain processes ARE ALSO (not correspond with or expressed by) third person reports. Again, you are muddled, this is simply not true of the identity theory you're arguing about. Thus that particular paragraph does not make for a substantial argument. It's a repeated mistake though, this from page 3 (in my browser's list of the pages of this thread)

No, first person reports are the communications of what is undergone by a physical system (the brain). The report is not inherent, but what the report refers to, i.e. the experience, is.

You may not think so, but reiterating your view brings you closer to mine than otherwise and your lack of clarity here is quite relevant to a discussion where I'm trying to outline a definition of what sentient experience is, to wit:

extended to read subsequently:

However, what I've described in the latter quote is a physical process. You however first disputed the first quote with:

Before going on to say:

I'm confused. However you go on to say that the sense of sight..

and: So if you basically agree with my position that the sense of sight is as I've defined it, and I've defined a physical system, just what is the sense of sight in your view? What is it's ontological status? Why do you think the senses are not physical systems? Is it only because you are presupposing they can't be? Is it not, to refer to an earlier point a logical possibility that the sense of sight as a term refers to a physical process and not to itself as something that is not identified with or the same as the physical process I've described. I appreciate your caution in not stepping forward on this one, but if you don't accept working theories you don't get anywhere As for the latter point, I've offered a working theory for why we experience the collation of inputs, in brain terms as it were, and how it comes about, namely, the functioning of massively parallel neural nets in the brain are the necessary and sufficient explanation for how it comes about, and being the neural nets leads to the reporting of what it is to be the neural nets in terms such as 'experience' 'red', 'yellow'. So by all means keep asking the questions and keep ignoring my answers, they're answers born of the theory I agree with, its open to falsification any time you like.

Was philosophical work required before geocentrism was thrown out in favour of heliocentrism, because if you think that didn't have an effect on the philosophical outlook or theories subsequently developed you are grossly mistaken. All conceptualising, if you take the systems approach, is done through the brain's constructing patterns from experience. All observations inform our philosophical outlook, our skepticism about induction only arises because our observations support but do not confirm induction to be reliable. No debate about the validity of induction gets started without observations, which are the basis of scientific theories after all.

I have explained over and over again that the reports reflect the mode of access to the same event. You agree with this in this quote, but at the end get yourself totally confused, because nobody's claiming the reports are identical, only that they refer to a single process. It's the difference between an identity of sense and of reference. It simply does not follow that if you accept the previous sentence in your quote you accept the last, because saying the brain process and the sentient experience are of the same event is not to say the reports are identical, merely that they're reports of the same event. The reason they differ is because the one report is of a process in an object when seen from external, the other is from the immediate access to the object, namely, it is the object's own description of what it is undergoing. The fact that the terms used follow the vocabulary of 'sentient experience' is entirely moot, for the person, if they knew the vocabulary could say 'my c-firing in the parietal lobe (or whatever)' is occurring. Having concepts that differ from other concepts is only a reflection of historical usage and efficacious interpersonal communication, it is not a priori indicative of a different event or 'goings on.' I've responded to this much earlier in the thread when I said:

Now at that point you responded:

You subsequently justified this by saying:

I'm cool with you waiting until our mental predicates can be completely accounted for in materialist terms, but why you don't consider, until that point, any force to be present in the materialist accounts of what were once considered mental processes (Memory, intention, goal directedness, prediction, decision making, value structures, learning, problem solving) puzzles me. Heck, we don't have a really strong theory of gravity, but what we do have we accept and integrate into our explanations of how things are. What I'm more interested in is how you arrive at the conclusion that the chances are 'just as good' that materialism won't ultimately be the basis for a solution, especially as you can't even conceive of how we can test for mentallings apart from the physical, a solution for which materialism, in particular the biperspectival identity theory provides.

This confusion of sense and reference has lead you to respond to Spacer1 with:

They are not the same as each other, they refer to the same thing, the morning star and evening star are different insofar as one is called morning and experientially appears in the morning, and the latter in the evening, yet we don't conclude from this there are two stars. Historical usage has differentiated them but further observation has identified them, one can and indeed people do still continue to use these terms, but that does not prove that they are not referring to the same thing.

Right, that's me done, for real

Cheers,

Adrian

*how does one discover the mentalling 'yellow' occurring without the physical process, and more, without the physical process occurring during the experience? If you skipped straight here at the sign of the asterisk, I deal with your counter that the concept of yellow does not contain the concept of a brain event in terms of you misplacing the importance of alternative ways of conceiving resulting from the different purposes of vocabularies employed according to their situational requirements.

------------
are you an incorrigible analytic?

Primal

That's a real good argument. The "I have already proven my case" argument. Sorry pal but incredulity, red herring and proof surrogate does not equate to a refutation. Also Bill, maybe you should realize that just because I question your viewpoint or disagree with it, does not mean I "lack an understanding" of it.


BTW a tip for your comp, try instead of posting a whole boat load of separate posts copying and pasting onto a text document. Save regularly, it would save you and others a lot of trouble. Then you could post a big one, instead of lots of little ones. Or combine the small posts into a big one on the text, then copy/paste.

Primal

In other words Bill I want you to answer MY points, not send me on a wild goose chase for points others or you made that may or may not relate to my criticisms/arguments/questions.


I can just see how that would go now. "Well gee Bill I looked and it doesn't seem my arguments were refuted or my questions were answered".

Bill: "sure they are look harder".

Me:*after spending a couple hours looking through Bill's posts* "Well this argument came close but you notice this difference"

Bill: "What statement? Quote it."

Me: *Quotes statement*

Bill: "Wrong one."

Me: "Well then what statements are you talking about?"

Bill: "Look for them."

Me: *quotes another*

Bill: "You misunderstood that"

Me: "How?"

Bill: "Look it up."



Ad naseum. It's so much simpler and more rational if you just answer my actual arguments now, so we don't have to get into a "guess what Bill is saying and where he said it" argument. That's not my job, its your job to back up your arguments not my job to find your arguments for you.

Primal

If dirt is a material entity, then material entity is also dirt. That is why the identity theory of dirt cannot be used to support materialism.....