James Still

<strong>...I don't quite see how we are incapable of erasing our past as a means to redefine who we will become. Indeed, it seems that this is a requirement for redefining who we will become. ...As an existentialist you need all the more support for claiming we should not "erase the past." You are making a moral claim here, not a factual one. It seems to me that an existentialist believes we can "erase" the past. It is your duty to tell us why we shouldn't do this. So far, you haven't done this.</strong>

I think we might have different ideas about existentialism. Just as a practical matter I disagree that you can erase your past. What happened is forever a part of your personal history. The sum total of your past actions made you who you are today. However, if you have free will (and we are both assuming you do) then of course you can choose a different path from now on that will change your identity (your essence) and redefine who you will become. So I do not think I am making a moral claim at all. I am not saying that you ought not to erase your past. I'm saying something much more radical. I'm saying that as a matter of fact you cannot erase your past. But this doesn't mean the past is some sort of lodestone that prevents you from embarking on a wholly different course for the future. But I do believe that the past informs the present to a much greater extent than many of us would like to admit. If I understand you correctly you believe that the past must be erased (how? by psychological denial?) before one can redefine one's essence. I don't agree with that point of view. Given that we cannot erase the actions and inactions that have made us who we are, we might as well embrace them and identify with them. In the proper context they can help us to reevaluate our lives and to make decisions for who we wish to become. I hope I've made my position a little clearer.


<strong>I've detected that you are trying to make a case that religion has value and the rug ought not to be pulled out from under it. I certainly would agree with this, but I think it needs more support than merely saying it is part of who we are ... you don't mean by this that religions should dissolve themselves, since this would suggest they don't have intrinsic value. instead, what you are suggesting is that religions ought to be free to decide for themselves whether it has value. However, to what extent would you support this autonomy? Do you support the establishment clause in the constitution?</strong>

I never meant to say that religion is a monolithic thing with free will (and thus autonomy) that must decide for itself whether to hang around or dissolve. I'm not even sure what that would mean. By religion having value I mean only that the millions of people who incorporate expressions, rituals, and spirituality into their lives do so out of the urge to fill a certain void in their lives with meaning. Religion is human action (a verb) and not an institution (a noun). When you understand what I mean I think you'll agree with me that we must support people who choose to add meaning to their lives by way of religious expression. Someone must decide for himself or herself whether to let go from within but it should never (under any circumstances) be taken away from without. And now I am making a moral claim.

<strong>"Attempts to purge something (such as the attempt to purge religion by the Soviets) will create a backlash that is counterproductive."

This may be a pragmatic reason for not purging religion, but supposing that it can be done without creating a backlash, would it then be permissible?</strong>

Even if it could be done without creating a backlash I wouldn't support it. I think that the individual must be free to choose how to fill the void with meaning. We must certainly give him or her reasons for abandoning superstition, but then it is up to that person to make the decision.


<strong>"Acknowledging this reality [evil] is not the same thing as condoning certain actions. But I think that we must admit that there is evil within ourselves so that it doesn't have inordinate power over us. (Because that's the irony: those who commit the most barbaric acts think that they are doing good.)"

What then do you mean by "embracing" who we are? It seems to me you are embracing evil. The point I'm making is that who we are is changeable. We can become other what who we currently are to make it so that that is who we were, but no longer.</strong>

I completely agree that we can change who we are and cease to commit the sort of barbaric acts that have checkered our collective past. But I would never say that the capacity for evil is gone. In fact, what I am saying is that evil manifests itself most forcefully when we come to believe that we have rid ourselves of it. And of course by "evil" I certainly don't mean a fallen state of grace. I mean actions or inactions that lead to the gross deprivation, suffering, or loss of freedom of another person.

Just as a side note, notice that I do not prepend "knowingly" to that definition. More and more I've come to realize that great evil is committed by our inadvertent actions just as must as by our intentional actions. Suppose a factory manager decides to save money and pours toxic solvents into the ground out in back of his building. By doing so he unknowingly poisons a town's groundwater nearby. Several children die and the cause is never traced to the water supply. Does the manager do evil? I think so. Is he morally culpable? Probably not unless he had made the connection and yet continues to pour solvents into the ground anyway. Not all evil is the result of an act of intentionality. But this is getting off the point.


<strong>"That process is fueled by our knowledge of the void and the need to create meaning. I think that all religion is an attempt to address this existential awareness. And I think that atheists address this void just as meaningfully as any spiritual person. So that's why I say that the impulse is a very naturalistic human desire. If I were to sloganize my thoughts on the matter it might be something like "religion is a humanism." But I'd want to think that one through a bit."

While all this may be significant, it does not support your position. From the above, it is the value you attribute to religion, one that is shared by non-believers, that you wish to promote, not religion itself. If this is all you had in mind, I can readily withdraw my comments.</strong>

Well I hope you don't withdraw your comments since I have benefited from thinking these things through with a critical thinker. But you are correct, all I had in mind was a phenomenon I called the "religious impulse" that is prior to the rites, rituals and superstitions of human experience. First, there is the astonishing recognition of the void (of the fact that we have no purpose that precedes our existence). The impulse is a reaction to the realization of that void. And I'm not being original here by the way -- this is my understanding of Heidegger's Being and Time. All of us seek to fill that void with meaning, I think, we just choose a million different ways to do it.

owleye

James....

"I think we might have different ideas about existentialism. Just as a practical matter I disagree that you can erase your past. What happened is forever a part of your personal history. The sum total of your past actions made you who you are today."

It could be. I'd been thinking that you had in mind the Sartre of Being and Nothingness (which I confess not having read, though it is in my library). The later Sartre, particularly under influence of Marxism, regarded the "situe" with increasing alarm. Despite this, if we restrict ourselves to what the past means to us, one's "personal history" need not be thought of as a situation that burdens us. This redefining feature of existentialism allows us to "erase the past." Speaking from a moral perspective, however, much more is needed, but this would require engaging in a discussion of justice. From a long term historical perspective, contra Marxism, each generation seems to be emphasing their freedom, and throwing off the past (though of course they may trace their own genealogy as a matter of interest). History is dead (or dying). This seems to be the reality. (Except in the Mid-East, of course.)

"However, if you have free will (and we are both assuming you do) then of course you can choose a different path from now on that will change your identity (your essence) and redefine who you will become."

This is the problem I'm having with your language. On the one hand you say we cannot, as a matter of fact, change who we are (viz, change our history, thereby "erasing" our past), but on the other hand we can do this. On the surface this seems rather a contradiction. I'm sure this is not how you wish to portray it, and I'm bringing this up to allow you to tell the story you wish to tell. Said in another way, my reading of what you are saying is that you want to make a case that realistically we cannot change who we are (i.e., our religious nature) and then you want to make a case that we possess the freedom to change who we are (i.e., our religious nature). The first part says we can't, the second part says we can. Something has got to give here.

"So I do not think I am making a moral claim at all. I am not saying that you ought not to erase your past."

It very much seems that way when you complain that people who chase utopian dreams should give it up because they are doomed to failure.

"I'm saying something much more radical. I'm saying that as a matter of fact you cannot erase your past. But this doesn't mean the past is some sort of lodestone that prevents you from embarking on a wholly different course for the future. But I do believe that the past informs the present to a much greater extent than many of us would like to admit "

This may be what you intend by your claim, but for now, all I see is a contradiction.

"If I understand you correctly you believe that the past must be erased (how? by psychological denial?) before one can redefine one's essence. I don't agree with that point of view."

Though I didn't really claim it as something I believe, I think the position is worthy enough to consider, and not just rejected out of hand. Indeed, I think it is at least consistent with what existentialism teaches. Existential psychology, as far as I'm aware of it, has this very feature. (Of course, so does traditional psychoanalytic theory, but using a different theoretical framework.) The prescription goes back to Plato. In its modern form there are four stages to enlightenment, though I normally run them together in the following way: denial, as a form of suspension of judgment, eventually passing through grudging acceptance, to a full embrace.

"Given that we cannot erase the actions and inactions that have made us who we are, we might as well embrace them and identify with them."

This is in fact the path that leads to "erasing the past" according to the theories mentioned above, though they would never characterized it as a "might as well" as if we had nothing to lose by trying it.

"In the proper context they can help us to reevaluate our lives and to make decisions for who we wish to become. I hope I've made my position a little clearer."

I believe you have, but the position described by the language from the original post still haunts it. Until you can clarify your position with respect to what we should do with respect to what we can (have the capacity to) and cannot (do not have the capacity to) do, your position will be muddled and incoherent.

"I never meant to say that religion is a monolithic thing with free will (and thus autonomy) that must decide for itself whether to hang around or dissolve. I'm not even sure what that would mean. By religion having value I mean only that the millions of people who incorporate expressions, rituals, and spirituality into their lives do so out of the urge to fill a certain void in their lives with meaning."

Though very few would doubt this, it is a one-side picture of religion. Religious wars are another side of it. In the name of God, it can be said that much evil is perpetrated.

"Religion is human action (a verb) and not an institution (a noun)."

In that case, I suggest you may have appropriated the ordinary use of the word in order to make some point. Moreover, if so, you didn't even inform us of what you meant while you were making it. indeed, with respect to the point about the banishment of religion in the former Soviet Union, it is difficult to ignore that you meant the banishment of religious institutions. It just didn't occur to me that you meant that only religious rituals were banished by the Soviet Union (assuming these are the actions you are talking about), and not organized religion itself.

"When you understand what I mean I think you'll agree with me that we must support people who choose to add meaning to their lives by way of religious expression."

I assume this is your moral claim, then. The argument runs as follows, I gather:

P1. Religious actions have value to those who practice them.

P2. We should support all actions that have value to those who practice them.

C. We should support religious actions.

What do you mean by "support" and what reasons do I have for believing P2 is true.

"Even if it could be done without creating a backlash I wouldn't support it. I think that the individual must be free to choose how to fill the void with meaning."

I would think that individuals are 'condemned' to be "free to choose how to fill the void with meaning." In any case, I would certainly agree with the above, on the basis of arguments that support political freedoms. However, I also support the establishment clause that prevents religious actions, as you would have them, from becoming political (or state) actions.

"We must certainly give him or her reasons for abandoning superstition, but then it is up to that person to make the decision."

Hmm. Would you then support teaching that certain religious rituals are superstitions? Suppose a religion objected to such teaching. What recourse would you have to continue such teaching.

"I completely agree that we can change who we are and cease to commit the sort of barbaric acts that have checkered our collective past. But I would never say that the capacity for evil is gone. In fact, what I am saying is that evil manifests itself most forcefully when we come to believe that we have rid ourselves of it. And of course by "evil" I certainly don't mean a fallen state of grace. I mean actions or inactions that lead to the gross deprivation, suffering, or loss of freedom of another person."

The capacity for evil remains. Does this imply we can rid ourselves of evil itself, or are we doomed to gross deprivation, suffering or loss of freedom in perpetuity?

In any case, what prevents us from ridding ourselves of the capacity for evil?

Your bringing up the idea of "unintentional evil" prompts me to call attention to the issue of neglect (or negligence). I think it is a huge issue for existentialists, and is in some way part of the problem I believe you are having with your thesis. Whereas Kant, for example, taught that "ought implies can" (i.e., we are not obligated to do what we cannot do), it seems the existentialists (though to some degree Kant has this problem as well) have turned this around, for actions which beneficial, i.e, "can implies ought." That is, if we can help, we should. And this implies that since suffering, etc. exists in world, it is clear we are morally negligent, bankrupt as we are that we are not in the here and now ridding the world of the suffering. The issue that existentialists must deal with is that there are no realistic limits to our obligation.

owleye

joedad

I wasn't trying to distinguish between good works and good, only talking about heaven/paradise in its most basic and recognized usage. You know, lead a "good" life, go to heaven, lead a "bad" life, go to hell. I realize ist's not so simple for all christians.

My point was to suggest a way to make more people, specifically more christians, think about humanity's future beyond their own lifetimes and outside a supernatural context. Honestly, the christians I talk with never think about this at all. I'm sure other religions do, but I'm not familiar enough with their beliefs.

But I don't think religion needs to separate people on this subject of envisioning the future. I'm only suggesting that immortality needn't be either supernatural or personal in order to be useful in getting someone motivated to think about the future of humanity. (Only speaking from personal experience at attempting to discuss this subject with christian theists.)

joe

WJ

Joedad!

I find your thoughts on the subject quite ironic yet very intruguing. You spoke a bit about hedonism, and also about atheist's views:

"Atheists are obviously able to find meaning and purpose in their lives, so I'd say that they definitely experience the "religious impulse." But framing it so makes that very naturalistic impulse appear to be religious by default. It is what it is, and is only referred to religiously because of culture. Calling it the religious impulse or the atheistic impulse does not change it. We could call it many different things but it would not change what it is. This is my view."


My question is what comprises this thing called 'impulse'? Forget about the 'religious' aspect for a moment and consider what it is that makes a person think that there is more to life than life itself. For instance, a starting point could certainly be relative to what you asserted when you said: "Atheists are obviously able to find meaning and purpose in their lives... ."

The question(s) are at least two fold.

1. Why does one feel the need to find purpose when it is thought that there is no purpose.
2. What is it exactly that compels humans to find meaningful existence in the first place.

The answer to #2 may be that it is unknown. But the question/answer to #1 may be an interesting one to explore.

In the meantime, one could argue that we're back to square one. Unless, you view hedonism (as you mentioned at the end of your post) as something to be avoided or non-virtuous, as it were. Could it be that *all* people seek to find pleasurable existence?

Is that you mean when you say you can't change the 'impulse'(the impulse 'to be')? In other words, when you are alone with nothing but your thoughts (stream of consciousness), is there tension from existence? And if there exists such a tension, how does the atheist reconcile the 'feeling'?

Walrus

James Still

<strong>...if we restrict ourselves to what the past means to us, one's "personal history" need not be thought of as a situation that burdens us. This redefining feature of existentialism allows us to "erase the past."</strong>

Ok, I understand what you mean by "erasing the past" now. (That's the problem with a text-based medium; it takes several posts to arrive at understandings that could be achieved in five minutes of talking.) You don't mean literally removing past events from memory but something more like a conscious decision to disassociate them from our present situation in order to more fully realize the wide open horizon of the future. Is that right?

<strong>...each generation seems to be emphasizing their freedom, and throwing off the past.... History is dead...</strong>

My first impulse is to agree with you but then there are a couple of stumbling blocks for me. From a macro view, I take seriously Santayana's dictum that those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it. There are serious consequences for a people who fail to look at important public policy decisions through the context of their own traditions and of history.

<strong>On the one hand you say we cannot, as a matter of fact, change who we are (viz, change our history, thereby "erasing" our past), but on the other hand we can do this. On the surface this seems rather a contradiction. I'm sure this is not how you wish to portray it, and I'm bringing this up to allow you to tell the story you wish to tell. Said in another way, my reading of what you are saying is that you want to make a case that realistically we cannot change who we are (i.e., our religious nature) and then you want to make a case that we possess the freedom to change who we are (i.e., our religious nature). The first part says we can't, the second part says we can. Something has got to give here.</strong>

Let me illustrate what I mean with a thought experiment. Let us suppose that Ted is an accountant, married with kids, and he and his wife Alice live in the suburbs. A typical weekend involves playing bridge with some friends and gardening. Ted was taught by his father that duty and family come first and so he has internalized this teaching and his identity is wrapped up in vague notions of being a "good provider" and working hard on the job. He doesn't exercise much and he's way out of shape. Let us suppose further that it is exactly 5:10 PM on a Friday evening and Ted, having just left work, is now driving home on a crowded freeway. At that exact moment in time (5:10 PM) Ted's identity is the sum total of every action, inaction, event, and circumstance that has affected him (or that he chose freely) from the moment of birth up until this exact moment of time. Let's call him Ted_Snapshot_1.

Just for the sake of morbidity, let's suppose Ted exits the freeway at 5:11 PM on a whim and buys some drugs from a local dealer. Ted decides to party through the weekend with some old college buddies. On Sunday he drags himself home and Alice is seriously upset and worried. They have an argument and Ted leaves her. He consoles himself by hanging out with his good time buddies and frequently shows up for work late. A few months later he and Alice divorce. Ted also blows off his child support payments. Eight months later, Ted is fired from his job and so he runs off to California with a student cosmetologist. Let's call him Ted_Snapshot_2.

Ok, now to my point. Ted_Snapshot_1 has at that moment in time an identity based upon everything up until that point. This past cannot be erased or changed. It is what it is. He couldn't choose his father and he freely chose to adopt his father's strong sense of duty and family. However, Ted has a choice. One possible choice is to embark on a course of action that will create Ted_Snapshot_2 a year later. I find this difficult to believe given that Ted_Snapshot_1 has internalized duty to family, which is why I do not throw the past away so easily, but if we are to take existentialism seriously we must allow that he could suddenly choose a wholly new course for his life no matter what his past. But Ted_Snapshot_2 does not negate or erase the fact that he was once a family man. We must instead say of Ted_Snapshot_2 that he is no longer that man. But we cannot say that he never was that man. The past provides a necessary context for seeing the changes from snapshot to snapshot in our lives. On the other hand, Ted_Snapshot_1 could go home as normal and take up a vigorous exercise regime to get back into shape. One year later he's racing bicycles and he is a new man. He chose a different course of action and through these choices he has changed himself. He once was a corporate creampuff but now he is an Iron Man.

So when I say that we cannot change the past (Ted_Snapshot_1) but can change the future (Ted_Snapshot_2) I mean simply that who we are at any given moment in time is determined largely by the sum total of our actions up until that moment. The beginning point where existence precedes essence (Ted_Snapshot_0) is the void, i.e., the total lack of purpose and direction. During moments of existential awareness we realize that life is not objectively meaningful and our impulse is to fill that void with meaning and purpose. The void--the objective lack of meaning and purpose from without--cannot change. There is no objective purpose to our lives. But we can fill the void with a rich variety of subjective meanings throughout our lives. We are meaning-makers and capable of creating rich meaning in our own lives as well as in the lives of others.

<strong>"If I understand you correctly you believe that the past must be erased (how? by psychological denial?) before one can redefine one's essence. I don't agree with that point of view."

Though I didn't really claim it as something I believe, I think the position is worthy enough to consider, and not just rejected out of hand. Indeed, I think it is at least consistent with what existentialism teaches. Existential psychology, as far as I'm aware of it, has this very feature. (Of course, so does traditional psychoanalytic theory, but using a different theoretical framework.) The prescription goes back to Plato. In its modern form there are four stages to enlightenment, though I normally run them together in the following way: denial, as a form of suspension of judgment, eventually passing through grudging acceptance, to a full embrace.</strong>

Hmmm. I can see this as a great technique for going from snapshot to snapshot without sleepwalking through life but I'm still not convinced it erases the past. Perhaps I shouldn't get hung up on that phrase.

<strong>"Religion is human action (a verb) and not an institution (a noun)."

In that case, I suggest you may have appropriated the ordinary use of the word in order to make some point. Moreover, if so, you didn't even inform us of what you meant while you were making it.</strong>

Well it seems to me that in ordinary language religion is an activity rather than something carved in stone (with apologies to Moses). If I didn't make that clear I apologize but you must realize the limitations of this medium and how I cannot anticipate everything, which is why we're having the exchange of course.

<strong>P1. Religious actions have value to those who practice them.

P2. We should support all actions that have value to those who practice them.

C. We should support religious actions.

What do you mean by "support" and what reasons do I have for believing P2 is true.</strong>

By support I mean tolerance. But not the sort of tolerance where we grudgingly put up with someone else's way of creating meaning for their life even though we disapprove. I'm thinking of a tolerance where we support their effort to find meaning and not judge the means by which they do so. I do not believe that there are one or more gods but a friend of mine does. He probably prays to God and seeks answers for the directions he should take in life. I support that. I don't agree that prayer is particularly efficacious but if it gives his life meaning then I should not seek to deny him that meaning. I can give him reasons for why I don't believe in the existence of God and maybe he too will no longer believe. That is his choice to make of course.

<strong>I would think that individuals are 'condemned' to be "free to choose how to fill the void with meaning."</strong>

Yes, I think this is a good way to put it.

<strong>"We must certainly give him or her reasons for abandoning superstition, but then it is up to that person to make the decision."

Hmm. Would you then support teaching that certain religious rituals are superstitions? Suppose a religion objected to such teaching. What recourse would you have to continue such teaching.</strong>

I would not support the teaching in the public schools that certain religious rituals are superstition. The state has no business weighing in on one side or the other on the issue of religion. But that is a political issues and not one where I'm speaking to someone one-on-one about philosophy.

<strong>The capacity for evil remains. Does this imply we can rid ourselves of evil itself, or are we doomed to gross deprivation, suffering or loss of freedom in perpetuity?</strong>

You're asking the wrong person. I don't think any of us know the answer to that one. I'd like to think we can rid ourselves of evil but I don't think it will happen. As long as there are humans with free will competing for limited resources there will be intentional and unintentional evils committed.

<strong>...it seems the existentialists (though to some degree Kant has this problem as well) have turned this around, for actions which beneficial, i.e, "can implies ought." That is, if we can help, we should. And this implies that since suffering, etc. exists in world, it is clear we are morally negligent, bankrupt as we are that we are not in the here and now ridding the world of the suffering. The issue that existentialists must deal with is that there are no realistic limits to our obligation.</strong>

It is no secret that existentialism's weakness is its lack of a systemized ethics. But at least the movement is honest. Having no system might be better than having one that is contrived and riddled with errors like the Divine Command Theory.

owleye

James....

"You don't mean literally removing past events from memory but something more like a conscious decision to disassociate them from our present situation in order to more fully realize the wide open horizon of the future. Is that right?"

As I recall you felt I was taking you too literally. In any case, when Sartre speaks of creating our own essence, he is speaking about the absolute freedom each of us has to establish meaning to that which we are conscious of. Indeed, we have no choice but to do this. Naturally he recognizes that each of us has a biological, cultural, and linguistic heritage. Additionally, there are a variey of influences that are physical or chemical. These, however, are all subject to some meaning we assign to these influences. He more or less assumes we are already adults or about to enter into the adult world. Consciousness requires that things in the world be "for us." We have an obligation to establish that meaning for ourselves, and not let others define it for us.

"I take seriously Santayana's dictum that those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it. There are serious consequences for a people who fail to look at important public policy decisions through the context of their own traditions and of history."

Sartre's point is that we are not determined by our history. We can unshakle the chains of any given historical influence (by consciously making a decision to change what it means to us).

"I find this [Ted's change] difficult to believe given that Ted_Snapshot_1 has internalized duty to family, which is why I do not throw the past away so easily, but if we are to take existentialism seriously we must allow that he could suddenly choose a wholly new course for his life no matter what his past."

That's right. Though from your perspective that past has not changed (possibly because you weren't the one who went through this transformation), what Ted has done is to erase the influence of the past by altering the meaning it had for him that kept him the way he was.

"But Ted_Snapshot_2 does not negate or erase the fact that he was once a family man. We must instead say of Ted_Snapshot_2 that he is no longer that man."

That's right. Sartre is a follower of Descartes, placing a great deal of emphasis on individual consciousness. Other theories do not have this problem. Indeed, both Descartes and Sartre are heavily criticized by some feminists for overlooking the relationship aspect of humans.

"But we cannot say that he never was that man. The past provides a necessary context for seeing the changes from snapshot to snapshot in our lives."

Very true. Indeed, from my viewpoint, we cannot change except in a social setting that permits it. If we decide to be a different person, others having one or more relationships with us would have to make the same decision, with respect to us, in order that it succeed (imho).

"So when I say that we cannot change the past (Ted_Snapshot_1) but can change the future (Ted_Snapshot_2) I mean simply that who we are at any given moment in time is determined largely by the sum total of our actions up until that moment."

By this, you have resurrected the same problem, I think. What prevents me from saying I could have changed some time in the past, just as I am able to right now. Isn't that the point of free-will? In other words, at no time should be able to say that we cannot change (or could not have changed, or could not in the future change) its meaning to our lives. It is never the case that the past determines the future (for existentialists).

During moments of existential awareness we realize that life is not objectively meaningful and our impulse is to fill that void with meaning and purpose."

While this makes sense, this "void" is not constrained to occur at a particular point in our lives. As far as I'm aware, existentialists think we are absolutely free at any and all times to create or alter our essence.


"The void--the objective lack of meaning and purpose from without--cannot change."

What does this mean? Did my last comment embody it?

"By support I mean tolerance."

I suggest finding a new word. This way of regarding 'support' muddies the water rather than clarifies it.

"But not the sort of tolerance where we grudgingly put up with someone else's way of creating meaning for their life even though we disapprove."

Though there are degrees of reluctance, by excluding it, 'tolerance' has lost its original meaning.

"I'm thinking of a tolerance where we support their effort to find meaning and not judge the means by which they do so."

This abuse of language does not help your cause. I was about to suggest 'acceptance' of the other's religious practices, over the use of 'tolerance' (despite that acceptance is not a form of support either), however, this seems inadequate to what you have in mind. It almost sounds like you are trying to insert yourself into another's religion. In consideration of the number of religions in the world, each of us is going to be very busy supporting all of them.

:I do not believe that there are one or more gods but a friend of mine does. He probably prays to God and seeks answers for the directions he should take in life. I support that. I don't agree that prayer is particularly efficacious but if it gives his life meaning then I should not seek to deny him that meaning. I can give him reasons for why I don't believe in the existence of God and maybe he too will no longer believe. That is his choice to make of course."

Do you think you are "supporting" his religious actions by entering into a discussion about beliefs that are differently held? On the face of it, this sounds like you are trying to persuade him otherwise. More than that, since the kind of belief that religious believers have is based on faith, in what way ought I to be able to alter a person's faith? Do you suppose you can convince someone that what the person has faith in is unworthy of it?

"I would not support the teaching in the public schools that certain religious rituals are superstition. The state has no business weighing in on one side or the other on the issue of religion."

Why not? Obviously you are free to have your own opinion about it, but if I'm correct here, you think that everyone should come to the same opinion on this. If so, I would expect you to provide some support for it, something which would make me accept the merits of it.

"You're asking the wrong person. I don't think any of us know the answer to that one. I'd like to think we can rid ourselves of evil but I don't think it will happen. As long as there are humans with free will competing for limited resources there will be intentional and unintentional evils committed."

The question is important because it weighs on the issue of whether or not we should even try to rid the capacity for evil from the world. One might argue that the capacity for evil is important merely because without it there can be no capacity for good.

"It is no secret that existentialism's weakness is its lack of a systemized ethics. But at least the movement is honest. Having no system might be better than having one that is contrived and riddled with errors like the Divine Command Theory."

This is not the weakness I was referring to. I suspect I was not clear enough. But I'll not press it further. Perhaps, in another context, you may hear about it again. I might hope at that time it would prompt you to actually give it some thought, at least more than how you wrote it off here.

owleye

James Still

Owleye, I'd like to think that we're finally understanding one another and have found that we do in fact agree on a number of things concerning free will and existentialism. I'll leave those points of agreement alone so that I can address some of the rough spots.

Wow, I'm just not making myself understood here. Let me try once more. I agree that nothing prevents you from making new choices at any time. You have free will. My only point is that once those choices are made and you move into the future, there's no going back. I'm not saying that the past determines your future actions, I'm saying that who you are at any given point in time has been determined by your past actions. Free will is not the freedom to change the past. It is the freedom to make decisions in the present. If you want to suggest that we can change the meaning of the past, well that's just fine with me. A man who commits murder may at some point in the future come to see his action in a wholly new way and thus "erase" his past with the new meaning. But I don't think anyone would say that he can ever deny the fact that he took someone's life. His action has effects upon who he is as a person that go way beyond the meanings he personally attaches to it. This is Sartre's "facticity," the steady accumulation of the body of facts that make up our being. Hopefully I've made myself clear at this point. If there is some contradiction or inconsistency in what I've said, please do tell. At this point I will settle for merely being understood.

Yes, the void is not a point in our lives and I totally agree that we are free to alter our essence with the choices we make. What I mean by the "void" is not the same thing as Sartre's "nothingness" but rather the state of the human condition. If God exists and he has a plan for our lives, then this plan (purpose) guides our life. Our essence precedes our existence in the sense that life has objective meaning and purpose. But in the absence of God we are in an embarrassing position: life does not have objective purpose; in fact, it is most subjective, thus it is up to each of us to project meaning and value into our lives and into the world. So while there is an objective lack of meaning and purpose from without (from God) there is a rich set of subjective meanings from within that sustain us through life.


Lewis Carroll: "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—-neither more nor less."

If you prefer "acceptance" over "tolerance" than who am I to argue? I wholeheartedly embrace the word "acceptance" as what I mean to say.


I think that we have every right to advocate our own beliefs and non-beliefs and to encourage others to adopt them as their own. But if they do not, then what harm has come to us or to them? Accept the beliefs of others if they do not change their mind and accept them if they do. Everyone follows their own path and must do what feels comfortable and right for their particular situation.

My position is supported by the establishment clause, which is a political creation that provides a framework in which people choose for themselves what to believe in matters of faith.

I agree that the question is important. But I'm not the Oracle at Delphi and I don't have all of the answers.

You wrote, "it seems the existentialists ... have turned this around, for actions which beneficial, i.e, "can implies ought." If you can turn this into an English sentence then I promise not to write you off.

ohwilleke

[QUOTE]Originally posted by James Still:
<strong>Religion won’t go away. </strong>

Maybe all superstition won't go away. But, certainly there are plenty of examples of particular superstitions reaching vanishingly low levels of belief.

Egyptian gods, Greek and Roman Gods, Celtic Gods, Mayan Gods and similar polytheistic belief systems have all but vanished, even though we still read their myths and stories. Many practices that went with these belief systems (like animal sacrifice and divination practices) are virtually gone as well. Zoroastrianism is also all but dead.

Europe has seen dramatic declines in participation in Christianity over the past couple of generations (with Ireland as a principal exception).

Virtually no one seriously believes most of the more far fetched supernatural explainations of weather, or a flat earth, anymore.

Stalinism was an attempt to place a secular religion into the void of Lenin's atheistic state. We've seen how religion popped up right after the fall of totalitarianism and Communism in the former Soviet Union.

Atheism got caught up in the idealism of communism, but atheism wasn't an important flaw that brought it down in my opinion.

Perhaps there is another way: an attitude in which the atheist is one who embraces a motto such as "this is what we do" or "this is who we are." A new realization in which all human activities -- both sacred and secular -- are worthy of respect and, more importantly, acknowledged to be rich with meaning and something that adds value to the whole tapestry of human life. We will never be able to wipe away religious activities and I think it is foolish to try.

But many nonbelievers hold out hope for a religious-free future. With us still is Star Trek’s powerful metaphor in which everyone is a perfect humanist; . . . Disbelief in God does not mean that one must excise respect or even admiration for the rich tapestry of human life in all of its rituals, observances, and quirks. Far from desiring a soulless existence, atheists should embrace the "religious impulse" and see it for what it is: a very naturalistic human desire to find value and meaning in an uncaring universe.

Star Trek is facinating because it posits the idea that you don't need God to have a "soulful existence", and promotes the notion that other institutions, like the position of Counselor, could be divided to meet human needs. I think that it is right. Maybe superstition and religion can't be "stamped out", but as long as there are institutions that meet human needs that religion meets now, there is no reason why monotheism couldn't go the way that polytheism has everywhere in the world but India.

One of atheism's big philosophical battles is that its roots are in the deconstruction of Christian realities through logic during the "Age of Enlightenment" in the 18th century and it progeny. It's very name shows roots in fighting against theism. As a result of centuries of making the case that logic ought to prevail over emotion, the idea has baggage that wouldn't be present if atheism was simply the default assumption and disproving monotheism wasn't a never ending battle.

Fortunately, atheism gets to ride a trend towards societal secularism that extends far beyond avowed and considered atheists. Ultimately, though, I think our future lies with the unconsidered "no religionists" and not with the thoughtful "atheists".

Religion was a multi-purpose institution. It provided family law, education, health care, welfare, community building, explainations of the metaphysical universe, and moral codes.

Now, the metaphysically explanitory role of religion has become vestigal. It is not longer necessary, it is just there for historical reasons to some extention. New religion-like institutions that develop, may not need this particular piece of the puzzel, even if they provide the other elements.

[ May 01, 2002: Message edited by: ohwilleke ]</p>

owleye

James...

"You have free will. My only point is that once those choices are made and you move into the future, there's no going back. I'm not saying that the past determines your future actions, I'm saying that who you are at any given point in time has been determined by your past actions. Free will is not the freedom to change the past. It is the freedom to make decisions in the present."

I think I see the problem. You apparently are thinking the past does not exist in the present. it is something that is over and done with. If this characterizes what you've been saying, then it is clear that we can't change the past, unless, possibly we had a time machine which made this possible.

However, it was my understanding, and it seems to me that this is the only meaningful understanding of this term, what we presently regard as the past has a current meaning to us. And it is this current meaning that can be changed.

"If you want to suggest that we can change the meaning of the past, well that's just fine with me. A man who commits murder may at some point in the future come to see his action in a wholly new way and thus "erase" his past with the new meaning. But I don't think anyone would say that he can ever deny the fact that he took someone's life."

My understanding of existentialism is that what someone else says is of little consequence to the absolute freedom each of us has to define our own life. With respect to "facts", if the above is one, we may run into the fact/value issue, if we press this too much. In any case, I would agree that facts are not what is being considered for redefinition. It is what the fact means to us that is.

"Lewis Carroll: "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—-neither more nor less."

You bring in this, I'll refer to it as the emperor who has no clothes.

"If you prefer "acceptance" over "tolerance" than who am I to argue? I wholeheartedly embrace the word "acceptance" as what I mean to say."

I think I disavowed its use because of how you subsequently portrayed what you meant by "support." But 'acceptance', though certainly closer than 'tolerance', might entangle you within a sphere of shared belief. But, I gather, you don't mean that you accept the beliefs of another person, rather only the benefits that accrue to that person's holding of these beliefs. And this is narrowly construed to the other person and exclude any consideration that you would not be able to accrue those values by holding the same beliefs.

"I think that we have every right to advocate our own beliefs and non-beliefs and to encourage others to adopt them as their own. But if they do not, then what harm has come to us or to them?"

Minimally, it could harm a relationship. But I'm more troubled by the reference to "right." I would agree that the U.S. Constitution grants this right, but why would you even consider resorting this to it in order to support such advocacy? What I'm looking for is some good reason for such advocacy. That it purportedly does no harm does not give me a good reason for doing it.

"Accept the beliefs of others if they do not change their mind and accept them if they do."

I think all the above is nonsense. It is one thing to believe something and another to have knowledge of it. If you believe something, you are only convinced of it on subjective grounds -- an inner satisfaction. If you know something, you have objective grounds for it and will not be satisfied until the other comes to know it as well. I see no benefit to persuading anyone to your beliefs and there could be some harm that accrues.

"Everyone follows their own path and must do what feels comfortable and right for their particular situation."

Then, why try to interfere with another's path?

"You wrote, "it seems the existentialists ... have turned this around, for actions which beneficial, i.e, "can implies ought." If you can turn this into an English sentence then I promise not to write you off."

If I can alleviate suffering in the world, I ought to alleviate suffering in the world, assuming I believe alleviating suffering in the world is a good thing.

The question relates to whether or not there are any other limits to obligation than one's ability to fulfil it.

owleye

James Still

Yes, you have summarized my position correctly and I agree that the past can be interpreted and given meanings that can change. But to do so is not without its consequences (see below).

We agree that a man is free to attach new meanings to a fact, such as the fact that he took someone's life in the past. But I don't think that this freedom is sufficient to overpower the meanings that others place on these facts such that those other meanings are of little consequence. The man who took someone's life in the past cannot redefine that past in a contextual vacuum. There were facts that occurred both before and after the event. Did the man do it in self defense? Did he premeditate the murder? The man is free to rationalize, justify, explain, and attach whatever meaning he feels appropriate, but if his interpretation is radically different from how most people interpret those facts then this has grave consequences for him.

And I don't mean just the fact that if he is found legally culpable his free will is then reduced to whatever he chooses to do from within a prison cell. I mean also the subjectivity of others regardless of physical confinement. As you well know from reading Sartre the sort of wide-open freedom you describe (the freedom of pure Subject) is routinely diminished by being an object for others. The man may desire to be a pure subject in his own world but the "gaze" of others make him an object in their world. His action has real consequences in that how the others see and define him. Perhaps you would want to say that the man's angst from this objectification requires him (if he wishes to remain authentic) to break away from the others and embrace his own subjectivity once again. Maybe so, but this leads to some peculiar moral ramifications regarding our responsibility to the freedom of others. Also, I'm still not convinced that our past actions do not define who we are in the present, both in the eyes of others as well as in the eyes of ourselves.

I do not mean that our right to hold beliefs is a legal right. I mean that it is an existential right; a right to exercise our free will to attach meanings to our subjective and contingent lives. To be consistent you should probably agree that this is reason enough to agree that we all have the right to fill the void of subjectivity as we see fit.

I'm not following you at all. Subjective religious beliefs (meanings and values) have nothing whatever to do with the knowledge of objective facts. If I know a fact then certainly I will want to advocate it as the truth. But there's not a person on this planet that knows that God either does or does not exist and what his existence (or nonexistence) might mean for our lives. Necessarily the whole endeavor is subjective from the start. I would be nothing more than a crude metaphysical bully if I were not satisfied until everyone else believes as I do. Tolerance is not some politically correct thing I'm throwing out so I can be groovy. It is a requisite attitude to adopt if I am to avoid being an atheistic totalitarian a la the Taliban.

Assuming you are correct in saying that for existentialism "can implies ought" (something with which I do not necessarily agree) then I think there is a limit. I must balance my obligation to alleviate suffering with my ability to do so in a way that does not bring harm to myself or others. For instance, suppose I see a man trapped inside of a burning building and I have both the ability and the desire to go in and save him. Whether I ought to do so is complicated by such factors as whether the building will not collapse at any moment, whether the man wishes me harm, whether my death leaves orphans behind with no support, and so on. So I don't think it can be reduced to something as simple as "can implies ought." Context is important.