Hugo Holbling

I couldn't resist a remark in that direction! Nevertheless, i have something of a minor point. We know that in discussions of relativism a favourite charge is that if all ideas are equally valid, we can't choose between them; on what grounds, then, does the relativist use the stairs instead of jumping out the window? There are of course a number of simple responses: fear, habit, and so on, all of which frustrate the charge.

In the present case, the same applies, i think. Custom and habit are at least as powerful as argument: if speciesism means we cannot differentiate in any meaningful way (excluding your method) between human and animal such that we can eat the latter but not the former, we still are no closer to overcoming custom.

*sigh* I wish i was a mod and my transgressions were overlooked - nay, ignored! - so easily.

Yes, i understood that and would agree, based on your criterion.

When hunger strikes... A fair criticism, but i was speaking generally. *tries to wriggle* The problem is how to deal with those who do eventually fall outside of your demarcation, however considered. To wit:

I'm not saying you should. However, that is what much of the animals rights literature does, so i'm giving you the chance to respond to what i'm supposing they would charge.

It comes across as ad hoc because an uncharitable reading would have you deciding not to eat humans, then ascribing a property to them that justifies the decision. Moreover, and still fighting for the animals, your criteria could be seen as somewhat vague:

Given that you propose to be inclusive and hope to avoid error, how do you determine that a given animal is unable to contemplate its fate? Where doubt exists (and surely a large measure must - how can any experiment be designed to test for this property?) you have to take the entire class off the menu. It would appear (on the surface) similarly difficult to ascertain whether or not an animal desires not be killed: once again, what kind of test would establish this? You need to answer these questions, imo, to avoid your standard becoming (here comes that dreaded and empty word!) a pseudo-standard.

In any case, these are some of the problems that an animals rights advocate may find with your ideas. If you can answer them, everyone reading this thread will benefit.

Pyrrho

My "militant philosophy", as you call it, is simply a desire for people to consistently follow their own principles. When I first came to II, I did not have the slightest intention of posting anything about animals at all. But I observed, in several posts, that people were not being consistent in what they were saying. This bothered me, as, indeed, inconsistency bothers many people. In this thread, I am ONLY interested in getting people to be consistent with THEIR OWN principles.



The reason for the repetition was that I was replying to specific posts. That way, someone could read just my reply to him or her, rather than a lengthy post involving issues that were irrelevant to what they had to say. I am sorry if you do not like that approach.



I disagree. If you are representing the human race, it is entirely inappropriate to discuss only people in the U.S. It is implying that those outside the U.S. are not really important.



You keep making statements to the effect that I have been inconsistent. Yet you still offer no examples of any inconsistency on my part. Are you trying to get people to believe you by simply repeating an accusation without ever providing any evidence?



There are several things to say about this.

First, many people do NOT regard the concept of justice as being relevant to animals, except insofar as they are regarded as property of people. Furthermore, there is another thread in which people are claiming (not unlike Descartes), that animals do not feel pain. If animals do not feel pain, then obviously one need not concern oneself with whether or not one is inflicting pain, as it would be impossible to inflict pain on a thing that cannot feel pain. Of course, this is NOT the way ALL people view these matters.

Indeed, the whole premise of the thought experiment is NOT based on what everyone does, as many people are vegetarians, and, if they were treated as they treat animals, they would not be eaten. But the thought experiment is about what people, collectively, do. It in no way implies that everyone is involved.

Second, your claim about what the laws are is irrelevant to many actions that people do. Furthermore, many laws exist without being properly enforced, which makes them fairly worthless. (I might also add, the existence of such laws is a rather damning indictment against humanity, as obviously the laws were regarded as necessary to stop people from doing things they were doing. It would make no sense to have a law against something that people never wanted to do.) Here is a relevant link:

http://ar.vegnews.org/animal_welfare_act.html

Let me add, at this point, that I do NOT mean to suggest that EVERY experimenter has no regard for any pain that is inflicted, but I do mean to suggest that some have no regard for such things. Do you deny this?

Third, you equating humanity with contemporary Western civilization is not only ridiculous, but is completely insulting to a vast portion of the human population. Even if it were true that contemporary Western civilization treated animals humanely (which is an absurd supposition), it would not matter for the discussion at hand, which is about humanity as a whole.



It is not a non sequitur; it is a fact that creating meat is a business. Of course, you are right that from it being a business, by itself, "it does not necessarily follow that animals will not be treated humanely". It does, however, explain why someone would be interested in doing whatever it takes to maximize profits. It provides a motive for what people do:

http://www.veganoutreach.org/whyvegan/animals.html

http://www.veganoutreach.org/whyvega...terhouses.html

I may as well mention that NOT ALL animals are raised or killed as described at the web sites above; for example, Thalia provided a link that discusses a particular small farm in which the farmer appears to have some concern about the way his animals are treated. But that does not mean that the web sites above are not representative of common current practices in contemporary Western civilization, which you appear to imagine is the pinnacle of humanity.

When many business people do things to harm people for the sake of company profits, why would you imagine that they would concern themselves with whether they harm animals or not?



It is funny that you mention and praise the scientific method, but still fail to give any evidence at all that your claim is true.



I did NOT say that the dog was trying to use human language. And I think most reasonable people would suppose that the barking dog was attempting some form of communication. It is, perhaps, a bit of "simple communication", as you put it, but that does not make it any less communication.



The sounds (I use that term somewhat loosely, as what can be heard by some animals is not the same set of frequencies as those that humans can hear) that animals, such as dolphins make, are many and varied. This is where the term "complex" comes in.

The way we perceive the world is very different from a dolphin, so attempting to understand its "language" is very different from attempting to understand a foreign human language, which, historically, can be extremely time consuming and difficult. For example, you might want to study the history of the attempts to decipher the ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics. If Egyptologists followed your approach, they would have simply assumed that they were simply pictures, and not language at all, because they did not understand them after many years of study.

As for your statement: "...dolphins have utterly failed to teach humans even a single word because… they can’t!"

Because something is not done is no proof that it cannot be done. It also presupposes that they are trying to teach us their "language", which is merely an assumption you make that, interestingly, contradicts your position. They may have no interest in teaching us anything.

The point of the link is that the sounds that many animals make are extremely complex and not understood by humans. And the subtle variations in sounds appears to elicit different responses from other animals of the same species, as well as being made under slightly different circumstances (read again the section on the prairie dogs). The sounds certainly seem very much like a "language", though, of course, it may depend upon precisely what definition one applies to that term. But until it is understood, it cannot be known that it is not a language.



If you believe that, I suggest you reread the posts, without presupposing that I mean things other than what I say. I have not attacked everyone in this thread, nor did I EVER say that everyone, to be consistent, must not have a problem with people eating small children. I said that, with certain claimed criteria, such as what matters is intelligence, THEN, to be consistent with THAT, they must not have a problem with eating children. I NEVER SAID THAT IT WOULD APPLY TO ALL POSSIBLE POSITIONS. I only said that it applied to certain positions that people actually claim, and that their rejection of the idea that it is okay to eat small children shows that they are inconsistent.

Furthermore, I made no comment in this thread about whether I would personally have a problem with eating small children or not; I said:

"At the present moment, I have nothing to say to those who say that it is intelligence that matters, and who eat small children and severely mentally retarded people."

The fact that you equate having nothing to say at the present moment with "...even going so far as to claim that you would not have a problem with anyone honing up to such a heinous act..." demonstrates that you are not responding to what I am actually saying, but to what you are imagining that I am saying. You imagine I say things that I never said, and you imagine many things about the "tone" of my writing. I am not responsible for the inaccuracy of what you imagine to be the case.



Here, again, your imagination is at work. I felt no indignation when I wrote my previous response. I merely expressed the fact that it would be surprising if someone really felt as you claimed to feel. It is not what one would normally expect from people. Wouldn’t you be surprised if someone told you that they would “accept” being tortured their entire life, for no benefit to him or herself? Wouldn’t that be at least a little surprising to you?



Not at all. What I have ruled out is any position that is completely arbitrary (e.g., "don't eat humans", which would be begging the question) and any position in which a person is inconsistent with their own professed principles. The door is open to any other possibility. Indeed, there have been at least three distinct and mutually exclusive types of positions suggested in this thread for which I have “left room”.



You do not seem to follow your own advice.



Here again you insinuate the idea that I have been inconsistent, yet you have failed to provide even one real example of me being inconsistent about anything. When you accuse me of something, please do me the courtesy of providing actual evidence for the accusation. It makes you appear deceitful and dishonest when you make accusations but fail to substantiate them.

Pyrrho

You mean you approve of making accusations without offering any real evidence? And of praising the scientific method, but not bothering with actually providing any evidence for an assertion that is called into question? (If you don't know what I mean with these questions, please see my reply to "theDIGImess".)



You might be interested in taking a look at:

http://ar.vegnews.org/self_aware.html

And for "moral agency":

http://ar.vegnews.org/macaques.html

The book that is quoted can be found at:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg.../-/0345384725/

I suspect that you "see no evidence that any animal other than humans fits into this category" because you have not been looking for it.



I agree, it is a weakness. I think it shows that you are being "speciesist".



If you follow the path of caution, that you seem to suggest that your approach does, you would not eat anything until after you had sufficient evidence that it is not capable of moral agency. The simple fact is that we don't know enough about what is going on with most complex animals to make an absolute determination, so if one truly followed the cautious approach, one would be practically a vegetarian.

Furthermore, there are some people sufficiently brain damaged that we can know with reasonable certainly are less capable than a pig, so they should be eaten before a pig, if we were to follow your approach (sans the "speciesist" addition).

Additionally, we can be reasonably certain that very small children are equally incapable, and therefore would also be preferred over an adult pig, following your stated approach. If you regard "potential" as being important, this will have very serious implications for other matters, such as birth control and abortion. If we take potential future moral agency seriously as a criteria for exclusion from being killed, then, it would seem, to be consistent, we must forbid abortion in all cases, except, perhaps, when the fetus is actually brain dead, or if the life of the woman were in danger. Furthermore, egg cells and sperm cells potentially have future moral agency, and therefore, not only should birth control be prohibited, but also we should actively take steps to bring about as many births as possible.

If you object that the above leads to "ludicrous" conclusions (though please note I am not making that assertion), then I will remind you that it is a result of following your principle about potentiality.



In another post:

This is "speciesism", as you have arbitrarily selected "species" as the "class" that matters. If you were to say that the "class" of animals that matters is those capable of moral agency, that would be following a "non-speciesist" approach, as it in an independent standard.

I think Hugo Holbling is onto something very useful to consider:


I am very interested in knowing how you have made the determination that certain animals are incapable of moral agency. Until that is done, it seems that, following the principle of caution that you have advocated, you should be as completely vegan as possible until a satisfactory determination has been made. Unless, of course, you reject your own stated principle.

Pyrrho

Either ethics is essentially irrational or it is essentially rational. If it is essentially irrational, then, obviously, no rational justification can be made, and you would be right to say that the scenario is absurd for requesting a rational justification. However, if ethics is essentially rational, then it is not an absurd request to ask for a rational justification. The ONLY way it is absurd to ask for a rational justification is if ethics is essentially irrational.

Furthermore, even if you were correct in your objection, it would apply equally to all other ethical discussions that did not begin with establishing a particular system of ethics, which is the vast majority of the threads here. Do you make this same objection in those threads, or are you making a special case here because you don't like the discussion and don't want to take it seriously?

Pyrrho

Cannibals are not stupid. They are fully aware that their food was capable of speaking with them. Being able to communicate with something does not entail not eating it.

What happens with most meat is this: People go to the store and buy it. There is no effort to communicate with it before it is dead, and most spend very little time thinking about what it was or how it got to be in the store.

As for plants "bleeding", that is not a form of communication, it is simply a consequence of the tubes that contain fluid being severed. When you are cut, your bleeding is not communication. If you scream in pain, or say "ow" or some other such thing, that is communication.

And, even if you were right about plants communicating, it would still be better to be a vegan, as it would involve far fewer plants dying than eating meat. What do you think your meat ate? See:

http://ar.vegnews.org/what_if_plants_feel_pain.html

For animal communication, see:

http://ar.vegnews.org/language.html



In the thought experiment, they don't want to eat us if we can come up with a reasonable justification for us to not be eaten. The point of the thought experiment is to get people to THINK about the justification for what they do.

As for why most people are not cannibals, that is probably because most people are raised to believe it is wrong. Those who have been raised to believe that cannibalism is good generally have regarded it as right and proper. The difference is in what people have been told when they were young; for most people, what they eat is a function not of reason but of their socialization.

The AntiChris

I have to say I found Bill Snedden's comment rather odd.

Chris

Bill Snedden

Not at all. However, where did I ever say that I approved of what he wrote? I commended him on a "well-worded and rational response." I never said that I agreed with him, or found his ideas compelling, or even that he provided full evidentiary support for every one of his statements.

I said "well-worded" by which I meant that I appreciated his writing style, and "rational" by which I meant that he didn't lapse into emotive attacks or ad-hominems.

As I noted prior to making that statement, these topics have generally devolved into "flamewars". I was appreciative that his statement, although strong, did not stoop to that level. My statement also provided a segue by which I might present my own thoughts.

I've little doubt that if we were having a verbal discussion, you would not have jumped to the same erroneous conclusion. It's often difficult to convey nuances of meaning via words alone.

"Self-awareness" is not immediately indicative of moral agency. Neither, on their own, are actions that might be construed as "moral" or having moral content. This could be simply an instance of survival conditioning that we see as a demonstration of moral action because we wish to interpret it that way (anthropomorphization). I'm not saying that it is, mind you, merely that it is possible.

Neverthless, if you'll take a look at the discussion between Hugo and I, you'll see that I expressly indicated that I recognize that it is indeed true that some species of animals display actions that are at least indicative of the possibility of moral agency. Humans are one of these species, some other primates (this would include macaques, gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, etc) and mammals like whales and dolphins appear to be as well. Accordingly, I would label them all "inedible."

Your suspicions are unfounded. Especially as I have expressly indicated that I would extend my definition of "inedibility" to include animals other than humans that appear to possess this trait.

I disagree and find it difficult to see how anyone can so dismiss a principle that by its very nature eschews limitation to a particular species as "speciesist". It would seem to twist the definition of the word beyond recognition.

Well, of course if one truly followed the "cautious approach", one would eat nothing at all and die.

The simple fact is that we don't know enough about what's going on in any living thing to make an absolute determination. Do plants feel pain? Are they conscious? I feel reasonably certain that you would agree with me that they do not and are not, but can we say so with absolute certainty? I don't think so.

The point is, that we must eat in order to survive. Biological limitations on our diet are simply to those things that provide the necessary nutrients (we can't survive on rocks and dirt) and have no immediately deleterious effects (like poisons). If we want to further limit our diet, we must find other reasons to do so.

Your line of argument depends upon there being a morally compelling reason not to kill and eat other animals. In order for this to be the case, there must be some underlying value that supports such an approach. I have suggested moral agency as that value. I presume that you have some other one although I don't really know what it is.

And I think that you have the line of inference reversed. The rule isn't and can't be, "don't eat anything until you have sufficient evidence that it's not a moral agent." The rule is, or should be, "don't eat anything if you have sufficient evidence to believe that it is a moral agent." Depending upon the level of evidence one requires, the first principle could result in starvation. The second puts the burden of proof firmly where it belongs: on those making a positive assertion of the existence of moral agency.

Remember, I'm not saying, "Non-human animals are not and cannot be moral agents" (for that would indeed be speciesism). I'm saying "we have no evidence that the majority of non-human animals are moral agents." Remember also that my position is that where some compelling evidence exists, even if ultimately inconclusive, the rule is "don't eat."

This doesn't follow at all. My approach is to add all members of species meeting the principle into the "class" of moral agents. Therefore, whether or not an individual meets that distinction or not is irrelevant. Again, my justification for this is pragmatic and on two levels: I simply don't have time to consider all individuals as potential "edibles" and our lack of a conclusive manner of determining moral agency should lead us to leniency in the case of "problematic" individual issues and the "benefit of the doubt" should apply.

Future, past, potential, are largely, althought not completely, irrelevant. The most salient issue is the overall capacity of the species in question. Human children (and gorilla children, and young dolphins, etc) are de facto members of a species within the class of moral agents because we generally so define children (as members of the species). They are therefore subject to the consistent application of the principle in question.

As far as I'm concerned, "fetuses", regardless of their species, simply do not meet the definition we generally apply when we speak of "individuals" within a species or class. There are other reasons why we generally refrain from eating them, but the question in regard to this principle is moot.

As I said before, this approach would seem to render the meaning of "speciesism" seemingly without content. In addition, if it is the case, then all determinations should be made on a case by case basis and the legs are cut from beneath moral arguments for vegetarianism. In other words, there would be no valid way to say "never eat meat." One would have to say, "never eat other animals that <insert standard here>" One would have to approach each individual and determine whether or not it meets the standard in question before determining whether or not it could be consumed.

Remember, the "class" of which I'm speaking is not single-species specific. The principle itself is not limited to species and the class can include members of any species that to which the principle would apply.

I think that I've answered Hugo, although he is obviously not satisfied. I acknowledge that there is difficulty in making such determinations, however I do think that some broad identifications can be made. We obviously have such abilities in our own species; that leads us to have some ideas of what these abilities might look like in others. Indeed, it appears that we do have some indications that it exists in other primates and a few select mamallian species. However, we have no indication whatsoever that it exists in many, many other animals. Absent evidence to the contrary, I don't see any compelling reason why we can't make the same assumptions we do with plants: no agency.

No. As I've said, I'm not making a determination of the incapability of moral agency, but the reverse. In other words, there must be some evidence shown that the animals in question are capable of moral agency. But when an animal exhibits an indication that such a capability might be present, I suggest that we add it to the class of animals that are "inedible." Until then, the default is, as far as I'm concerned, "edible."

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Hugo Holbling

Wrong! I'm always satisfied to see whatever you post, dear Bill. If only i could find more ways to disagree with you...

filter

Hello all

Thought I would inject my two pennies worth. Moral agency, suffering...some good arguments here. My own contribution (my personal vegetarian rationale) is based upon suffering, necessity and an organisms 'will to live', for want of a better phrase.

It is unnecessary to eat meat. I don't, and manage to function perfectly well as a healthy human ape. (disclaimer* - my aim here is not to preach; I am merely imparting to you all my own particular slant on the topic) With this as a foundation for my actions, we can consider desire. Wanting to do something should not be dismissed as a reason outright, but I found that my desire to eat meat was quickly replaced with a desire to eat mushroom stroganoff and rogan josh curries...mmm

...anyway <ahem> So - desire, in this area at least, is 99% habit, its focus easily shifted, replaced with the minimum of effort. Desire alone does not warrant the eating of meat.

Onto suffering - we do not qualitatively understand the suffering of other organisms (especially non-sentient organisms), and it may be true that even plant species register damage to their structure and that this could be considered a primitive form of 'suffering'. Yet, much in the same way that Bill draws his semi-arbitrary line in the sands of moral agency recognition, I draw mine beneath fish and above plants in the suffering recognition exercise. I admit that this line is arbitrary in the sense that I imagine a fish would feel suffering (pain, fear etc) in a way that a plant would not, but I have no strong evidence to support my intuition. Perhaps if an organism has a nervous system?

Hmmm...but I am no biologist.

Closely linked to suffering is the 'will to live'. Organisms that display this 'will to live', from the tiniest insect to the fish in the stream, share with me an innate determination not to die (yet). I respect this lust for more life, and hence try my best not to kill the beautiful little beasties. This is perhaps the reasoning that intuitively dominates my rationale, hence this is the argument I would offer up to our spacekids.

So that is my story. Fire away, chaps!

Feather

I agree with you completely.

But the scenario isn't asking for a rational justification, it's asking for a rational justification with the implication that any conclusion applies objectively. There's a difference.

Ethics -- like just about any other subject -- can be framed in reason and hence isn't inherently irrational. I wouldn't dispute that, because to do so would obviously be a mistake.