Alix Nenuphar

Greetings. Is this thread open simply for discussion of the potential evolutionary development of morality, or does it include dissection of Albert Cipriani's logic? I would like to contribute to both, but I note an increasing tendency for threads to go awry, and would be loathe to think that I contributed to this trend.

LostGirl

. . . because I'm totally studying for this course anyway, and as I was reading this thread I had the pertinent chapter open on my lap, so here's the textbook explanation that's relevant:
from:Freeman, S and Herron, J.C. Evolutionary Analysis 2nd Ed. 2001, Prentice Hall Inc, pp 351.

There's no way I could say it better than that. But Albert this seems to suggest that morals are inherent in the characteristics of our species, and of others. We are highly developed, and so too is our moral sense. It's interesting to note that the tendencies of our society is away from several of the hallmark requirements for the promotion of reciprocal altruism. After a few ten-thousand years, we might have something to worry about . . .

Albert Cipriani

Dear Ipetrich,
Let’s scratch “reciprocal altruism” as Nature’s version of you-scratch-my-back-I’ll-scratch-your-back Consumerism. By definition, “reciprocal altruism” is a contradiction in terms and does not qualify as a selfless act.

On the other hand, kin selection, comes closer to providing an explanation -- in evolutionary terms -- for the development of human morality. You wrote:
So, in layman terms, the first baby boy born with this altruistic mutation wants to do the dishes and take out the trash more than he wants to force his little sister to do those things and be his bitch. Fair enough.

Having cleaner dishes and a less trashy cave provides the mutant’s kin with a competitive advantage over their more slovenly neighbors. Its parents, rocking and rolling around in a less cluttered more hygienic cave, are more likely to produce more mutants. Ergo, the mutant gene gets passed on despite the mutant spending more time in the kitchen than in the bedroom.

I’m with you every step of the way except for the last step. Whatever marginal survival benefit an altruistic child could provide its kin would be more than offset by the unlikelihood of that child reproducing.

Furthermore, your kin selection theory requires that the parents’ genetic lightening strike not once but many times. The likelihood of a mutation being perpetuated by the parents of the mutant and not the mutant itself seem beyond astronomical, that is, impossible. By proposing a surrogate progenitor of the mutation, you are dooming the one-in-a-billion odds to be multiplied by itself again and again.

Seems to me the cogency of evolutionary theory rests upon the assumption that no matter how bad the odds of a good mutation happening, once it has happened, it is assured of being faithfully replicated ad infinitum by the lucky mutant. But this kin selection theory requires that the unlucky mutant’s lucky kin replicate the same unlikely mutation again and again.

The operative part of your statement that I take exception to, that seems to be genetically inoperative is: Have you forgotten that the mutant’s parents are not the fellow possessors of the mutant’s genes? If they are, what is the meaning of “mutation”? A mutation is a unique recombination -- not replication -- of the progenitor’s genes. Ergo, the mutant’s parents are no more likely to produce another altruistic mutant than the slob cavemen next door.

In short, “kin selection” fails to explain the success of altruistic genes on account that it can’t generate more than one mutant from which to select. – Sincerely, Albert the Traditional Catholic

Happy Wonderer

One thing that I wonder about is if we can make any sort of claim that there is a universal morality.

We make the claim that there ought to be such a thing, and philosophers over the aeons have tried to figure out what it would be, but it would be very difficult to claim that in practice there is any such a thing.

Even within a society morality is not monolithic, but we perceive it as such. There are still sections of our society that see interracial dating as extremely immoral -- whereas there are other sections that see even the suggestion that there is something wrong with it as itself immoral. Interestingly, it is likely that there was some time when both sections thought that they were in the strong majority. I can think of dozens of examples (child brides vs child molestation, immorality of lying, sanctity of contracts, homosexuality, stealing, chastity, immodest dress) where morality varies depending upon either time or distance.

There is a strong incentive for an individual to conform to the dominant morality of the society that they live in. Individuals who do not conform face social ostracisim at best and judical punishment or death at worst. I think this is misread by some as some sort of moral programming. It is very easy falsly extrapolate a universal morality, especially when we dismiss a culture with a different morality as abberant or immoral.

Altruism is not universal among humans. It exists, but I do not think it is true that every adult human will jump into the raging river to save a drowning child that is not their own; in fact probably not every human would jump into the raging river to save their own child. Think about it -- we consider mothers who abandon their children in such a situation as extremely immoral. The fact that such people exist argues against universal morality. The fact that there were cultures where intentionally throwing offspring into the raging river isn't even condemned (China and female infants) argues even more strongly against a universal morality.

One may want to believe that even though morality isn't universally agreed upon, there is at least the fact that we are programmed to follow the dominant morality. Doesn't that prove something? However, I consider this to be a part of being a social creature, and possibly even a cause or necessary condition for being social. We can't be a social creature until we have some mechanism that enforces compatible (not necessairly fair or equal) behavior among individuals. Unrestricted group competition would rapidly convert any group into an individual!

A shared morality through a mechanism of social ostracisim is one such way that socialism (to coin a phrase...) in a species can evolve. I would argue that social creatures are not "better" in some universal way than non-social ones (who is better -- a beetle or a honey bee?) just that it is one of the many varied and interesting ways that life can organize itself.

hw

Albert Cipriani

Alix asks: Hell no! Ouch! That would hurt… unless, of course, prior to my brain going under the knife you were willing to ply me with some really good drugs. Then not only would I enjoy whatever you had to say but could also plead diminished capacity in my inability to refute it. It’d be a win win for me and a win for you, too. – Cheers, Albert

Happy Wonderer

More on altruism (sorry for jumping in so to speak)

This may be too simplistic, but a simple reason that an altruistic species outreproduces a non-altruistic one is that there are often situations where "two people are better than one."

This is simply due to laws of physics. Two humans are able to exert more horsepower than one. If one human is pinned under a tree, a good samatarian coming along can save that person at very little cost to themselves. If the humans were apathetic about the plight of another (as many species are) then the pinned person would die. In the case of drowning, the person jumping in to save the other is usually starting from a better position than the victim. What is an insurmontable obstacle to the hypothermic victim may be a short and easy swim for the warm rescurer.

To make a gene argument, it is likely that most people a (non-technological) social species encounters are going to be loosely related. Note one critical thing -- most altruism involves little cost to the giver. Cases of people jumping into raging rivers to save others are rare enough that they get noticed; cases of people helping others who are stuck under a heavy object are commonplace. We have all (if we lead at all adventurous lives) been in a place where a completely apathetic partner could have left us in a situation that would vastly decrease our chances of reproducing.

I don't completely buy gene arguments for behaviors (I come from a psych background) so you can make the same argument for a society -- an apathetic society is less likely to be successful than one with a degree of altruism. If we punished people who were caught helping others, we would eventually be outreproduced by a 'normal' society. Instead, our society rewards altruism and even to an extent punishes apathy. If I stand idly by in my drysuit while a child drowns near me in the ocean, I know I will face opprobation and disdain.

Appropos of nothing, I think some of the more outstanding cases of altruism involve (to some degree) a miscalculation of risks. I do not know of too many people who have twice jumped into raging rivers to save others.

hw

Oolon Colluphid

Also, a miscalculation of relatedness. In the small bands of people we evolved to fit in with, there would be a good chance that we’d be related to anybody we helped. Evolution would prime us to help others, since they’d all have been our relatives.

(Compare this with the lack of interest, mistrust, antipathy and even deliberate attempts to harm, those who are not the same as ‘us’ -- what Desmond Morris (and sociologists in general?) call in-groups and out-groups.)

With kin selection, individuals do not have to calculate actual genetic relatedness: organisms can’t look into another’s cells and compare the other genome to their own! Instead, other simpler cues are used, labels that identify relatives, the group that you belong to. It could be the signiture smell of your pack, those who you grew up with, or those who wear the same football scarf as you . All it needs, normally, is a label announcing ‘we’re the same as you’, because normally in nature, ‘same-as-you’ means a relative.

So, a brain wired to simply ‘help others in the in-group’ would prosper, because it would be helping its relatives.

Nowadays, of course, there’s rather a lot of us humans around, and in many situations we are permanently surrounded by non-relatives. But that’s not a situation we evolved to deal with, and so the cue mechanism easily misfires, like a songbird that feeds a cuckoo chick. Thus, when help is required of another individual, there’s a tendency to try to help them, even though they are -- probably -- not close-ish kin. (As above, compare the notable absence of help offered to ‘enemies’, to those who are ‘not-the-same-as-us’.)

So I’d say that our altruism is a combination of reciprocal altruism, kin selection, and cue misfiring. The first two are why we help anybody, the last is why we help other people as well as those who kin selection predicts we should.

Cheers, DT

Wounded King

I feel this whole thread is getting very reductionist, and I blame you Albert. Insisting on everyone being scientific was just begging to be bombarded with kin selection and Game theory type arguments.

I dont think we really know enough about the human brain to be able to make any hard and fast statements about many of the behaviours it produces. I am quite happy to admit that I feel almost all of my morality is derived from my own wish to feel good about myself. I am quite prepared for other people to have different beliefs about the root of their actions, but I suspect they are deluding themselves.That there is an organic component to most complex behaviours is, I think, not something anyone who has studied neuroscience even cursorily will doubt, but the exact extent and nature of their role is much less clear.

I side with Doglas Adams ruler of the universe on the matter

Non-praying Mantis

Therein is the root of our discussion with Albert. Many of us on this board think that this behavior to do good or feeling that occurs when you do good derives from an evolutionarily derived genetic component. Albert, on the other hand, thinks that the behavior and/or feeling is derived from God.

Personally, I think that evolution is responsible for not only the behavior of altruism, but also the good feelings resulting from such behaviors. This good feeling is caused by chemicals secreted in our brain as a "reward" for our behavior, which reinforces its likelihood of occuring again.

NPM

Majestyk

Objectively, this is an accurate statement. Meaning is subjective. Morality is subjective.

What most people refuse to accept is that they do not have the degree of control over their passions and prejudices that they believe they have. The basis of morality is instinctual. Morality is manifested in the individual and yet still retains a similarity among members of the same species. Free will is an illusion. Morality is objective.

Competing altruistic and selfish instincts evolved over time as we developed from solitary to social animals. Hence, insanity is the natural human condition.