Interesting Ian

What you're denying here is libertarian free will which basically revolves around the idea of mental causality. To deny libertarian free will you will typically hold the world is physically closed. This simply means you believe that all change in the Universe is wholly caused by prior physical events. In particular, all our behaviour is simply the result of our environment and processes within the brain. There is no non-physical mind which initiates events.

So the question I would ask you is why you believe the world is physically closed?

Interesting Ian

I'm just reading through this thread now. Anyway I agree with your sentiment expressed to John.

To address your other point. No, determinism doesn't exclude free will. But I think you would need to hold that the physical laws of nature describe change in the world rather than dictate. By dictate I mean a fundamnetal generative power in nature. I think this would entail an unacceptable tension with our immediate experience of our own free will.

BTW, although a type of free will is compatible with determinism, I believes it is an impoverished form of free will.

John Page

Please differentiate between them - would you say they are uncaused and caused forms of free will respectively?

Cheers, John

Treacle Worshipper

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
What you're denying here is libertarian free will which basically revolves around the idea of mental causality. To deny libertarian free will you will typically hold the world is physically closed. This simply means you believe that all change in the Universe is wholly caused by prior physical events. In particular, all our behaviour is simply the result of our environment and processes within the brain. There is no non-physical mind which initiates events.

That would be a fair summary, I think.

So the question I would ask you is why you believe the world is physically closed?

Actually, because I've never come across the idea that it could be otherwise. (At least, not stated in these terms.) I would be very interested if you could elaborate on the concept. I started this thread in order to discover what differing points of view had to say, and this is one I haven't come across yet.
TW

John Page

Isn't this a red herring? Taking the view that the world is physically "open" does not prove that "libertarian free will" exists. So, in turn, I would ask what you think are the preconditions necessary for libertarian free will to be exercised?

A free spirit is independent, but not independent of itself!

Cheers, John

Interesting Ian

John,

If the world is physically open this at least allows for the possibility of libertarian free will.

Now it seems to me that the only area where change in the Universe could not be wholly accounted for by physical cause and effect would be in our behavior. If our behavor cannot be wholly accounted for by physical cause and effect, and at least some of our actions appear to be determined by our conscious will, then the most straightforward interpretation would be that it is our free will which is responsible for some of our actions.

Interesting Ian

The idea that the physical world is closed would tend to be an assumption of science. In other words there is a presumption that all change in the Universe can be accounted for by physical cause and effect; this includes our behaviour.

On the other hand it at least seems that we have libertarian free will. Thus it seems that I had a genuine choice whether or not I should go out for a drink tonight. I have chosen not to, but there at least seems to be the possibility that I could have chosen otherwise. However this is inconsistent with the idea that the world is physically closed.

We can get around this by hypothesising the self or mind is non-physical. That is to say consciousness is not identical or reducible to physical processes in the brain (like water is reducible to H2O or heat is reducible to the motion of molecules). So the mind might actually be able to initiate activity within the brain. We might refer to this as mental causality. Not only will this allow libertarian free will, but also leaves the possibility open for a "life after death".

John Page

I have to respond by saying that any imaginary cause can substitute in cases where we don't understand what's going on - that's one of the useful things about "God knows!" phrase.

That you put forward a nonsensical thing a libertarian free will as an "uncaused cause" (nonsensical because it is self-contradicting) and claim it is responsible for our actions is quite beyond me.

Here's my question again from a few posts back w.r.t. free will and libertarian free will as defined by you: "Please differentiate between them - would you say they are uncaused and caused forms of free will respectively? "

Cheers, John

Treacle Worshipper

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
The idea that the physical world is closed would tend to be an assumption of science. In other words there is a presumption that all change in the Universe can be accounted for by physical cause and effect; this includes our behaviour.

Yes, this essentially describes my position. I do not think that there is currently a better way of finding out about the universe than science.

On the other hand it at least seems that we have libertarian free will. Thus it seems that I had a genuine choice whether or not I should go out for a drink tonight. I have chosen not to, but there at least seems to be the possibility that I could have chosen otherwise. However this is inconsistent with the idea that the world is physically closed.

I follow you. This is more-or-less the root of my confusion. It seems that we have free will, but science says that will is ultimately caused & therefore unfree.

We can get around this by hypothesising the self or mind is non-physical. That is to say consciousness is not identical or reducible to physical processes in the brain (like water is reducible to H2O or heat is reducible to the motion of molecules). So the mind might actually be able to initiate activity within the brain. We might refer to this as mental causality. Not only will this allow libertarian free will, but also leaves the possibility open for a "life after death".

I agree that that is a way of getting round the inconsistency, but it raises other questions. There is currently no evidence of the mind being separate from the brain. There is in fact evidence to the contrary - a lack of an important brain chemical or a brain injury or illness can change the personality beyond recognition.

You seem to be proposing to the idea that we have a non-physical part, which is outside the physical universe. Being outside, it is able to make decisions free from the influence of the physical. However, it is somehow still capable of influencing the physical (us, our bodies to walk to the pub or not).

If this is what you're suggesting, I am not aware of anything other than subjective experience which supports the idea. I think subjective experience is valid in some areas, but it can be misleading. If we rely on our subjective experience, the sun travels across the sky every day.
TW

Interesting Ian

Think of it this way. Something like your pain, anguish, hope, love or any other experiences are irreducibly private. People can infer such mental states from your bodily behaviour, but they cannot literally partake in your emotions. This is quite unlike the neural activity correlated with, for example, pain, which is potentially publicly observable and can in principle be perceived by anyone. Bearing this in mind there seems a certain degree of implausibilty in supposing conscious states are identical to, or reducible to the neural correlates of these states.

But a more interesting question is whether consciousness could exist without a brain. Now I agree that the fact that mental states are only realised through certain brain states might be taken to be strongly suggestive that the brain is the source of consciousness ie the brain creates consciousness.

But this need not be so. Imagine someone wholly unfamiliar with Television sets. After examining it, and noticing the correlation between the picture quality displayed and the various states of the TV sets internal components, he might conclude that the picture, together with the storylines of the various programmes, have their origin solely within these internal components. But he would be wrong. Indeed it is actaully quite implausible to suppose this because there is nothing about the internal components which could remotely create the storylines of the programmes.

Likewise it is possible that someone could argue that it is implausible that the lump of matter called the brain could produce our rich mental lives. Perhaps the self is not physical, and indeed perhaps it merely operates through the brain to produce our minds. This hypothesis has the advantage of explaining the correlations between mental states and physical states of the brain, allows for the possibility of libertarian free will, and renders the notion of an afterlife a highly likely one.