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Old 02-15-2002, 12:41 PM   #41
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Tercel:

Before embracing the alleged Jansenist miracles too enthusiastically, you might want to learn a little more about them.

Jansenism, the doctrine propounded by Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638) was a Catholic heresy. It was condemned by the Holy See, and Jansen’s main work advocating it, the “Augustinus”, was placed on the list of prohibited books. The Catholic Encyclopedia describes this doctrine as follows:

Quote:
As a result of Adam's sin, our nature stripped of elements essential to its integrity, is radically corrupt and depraved. Mastered by concupiscence, which in each of us properly constitutes original sin, the will is powerless to resist; it has become purely passive. It cannot escape the attraction of evil except it be aided by a movement of grace superior to and triumphant over the force of concupiscence. Our soul, henceforth obedient to no motive save that of pleasure, is at the mercy of the delectation, earthly or heavenly, which for the time being attracts it with the greatest strength. At once inevitable and irresistible, this delectation, if it come from heaven or from grace, leads man to virtue; if it come from nature or concupiscence, it determines him to sin. In the one case as in the other, the will is fatally swept on by the preponderant impulse. The two delectations says Jansenius, are like the two arms of a balance, of which the one cannot rise unless the other be lowered and vice versa. Thus man irresistibly, although voluntarily, does either good or evil, according as he is dominated by grace or by concupiscence; he never resists either the one or the other. In this system there is evidently no place for purely sufficient grace...
In other words, this is a version of the doctrine of predestination. Since you have made it plain that you do not subscribe to this doctrine, it seems odd that you would accept a claim that God intervened miraculously on behalf of advocates of it.

Now as for the alleged Jansenist miracles, the CE describes this episode as follows:

Quote:
[The Jansenists] then thought to invoke in their behalf the direct testimony of God Himself, namely, miracles. One of their number, an appellant, a rigorist to the point of having once passed two years without communicating, for the rest given to a retired and penitent life, the deacon Francois de Paris had died in 1727. They pretended that at his tomb in the little cemetery of Saint-Médard marvelous cures took place. A case alleged as such was examined by de Vintimille, Archbishop of Paris, who with proofs in hand declared it false and supposititious (1731). But other cures were claimed by the party, and so noised abroad that soon the sick and the curious flocked to the cemetery. The sick experienced strange agitations, nervous commotions, either real or simulated. They fell into violent transports and inveighed against the pope and the bishops, as the convulsionaries of Cévennes had denounced the papacy and the Mass. In the excited crowd women were especially noticeable, screaming, yelling, throwing themselves about, sometimes assuming the most astounding and unseemly postures. To justify these extravagances, complacent admirers had recourse to the theory of "figurism". As in their eyes the fact of the general acceptance of the Bull "Unigenitus" was the apostasy predicted by the Apocalypse, so the ridiculous and revolting scenes enacted by their friends symbolized the state of upheaval which, according to them, involved everything in the Church...

The cemetery of Saint-Médard, having become the scene of exhibitions as tumultuous as they were indecent, was closed by order of the court in 1732. The oeuvre des convulsions, as its partisans called it, was not, however, abandoned. The convulsions reappeared in private houses with the same characteristics, but more glaring. Henceforth with few exceptions they seized only upon young girls, who, it was said, possessed a divine gift of healing. But what was more astonishing was that their bodies, subjected during the crisis to all sorts of painful tests, seemed at once insensible and invulnerable; they were not wounded by the sharpest instruments, or bruised by enormous weights or blows of incredible violence. A convulsionary, nicknamed "la Salamandre", remained suspended for more than nine minutes above a fiery brazier, enveloped only in a sheet, which also remained intact in the midst of the flames. Tests of this sort had received in the language of the sect the denomination of secours... At this point, a wave of defiance and opposition arose among the Jansenists themselves. Thirty appellant doctors openly declared by common consent against the convulsions and the secours. A lively discussion arose between the secouristes and the anti-secouristes. The secouristes in turn were soon divided into discernantes and melangistes, the former distinguishing between the work itself and its grotesque or objectionable features, which they ascribed to the Devil or to human weakness, while the latter regarded the convulsions and the secours as a single work coming from God, in which even the shocking elements had purpose and significance.

... we may ask how we are to judge what took place at the cemetery of Saint-Médard and the matters connected therewith. Whatever may have been said on the subject, there was absolutely no trace of the Divine seal in these happenings. It is needless to recall St. Augustine's principle that all prodigies accomplished outside the Church, especially those against the Church, are by the very fact more than suspicious... Two things only call for remark. Several of the so-called miraculous cures were made the subject of a judicial investigation, and it was proved that they were based only on testimonies which were either false, interested, preconcerted, and more than once retracted, or at least valueless, the echoes of diseased and fanatic imaginations. Moreover, the convulsions and the secours certainly took place under circumstances which mere good taste would reject as unworthy of Divine wisdom and holiness...We are therefore justified in concluding that the finger of God did not appear in the whole or in any of its parts... one thing is certain; the things here related served only to discredit the cause of the party which exploited them. Jansenists themselves came at length to feel ashamed of such practices... this creation of fanaticism succumbed to ridicule and died by its own hand.
The position of the Catholic Church regarding these alleged miracles is that they did not happen, and if any of them did happen, they must have been the work of the Devil rather than God.

Of course you’re free to disagree (and certainly you can find more sympathetic accounts), but this poses two problems:

(1) The evidence for the fundamental Christian miracles such as the Resurrection rests entirely on the Catholic Church. These miracles are reported in what we now call the Gospels and other books of the NT, but these works are part of the NT solely because the Catholic Church vouches for their authenticity and reliability. To reject the authority of the Church regarding miraculous claims is to reject Christianity itself.

(2) You cannot at the same time accept the alleged miracles at Lourdes, for example, and the Jansenist miracles. As Hume points out, the very same authority for the one is an equally good authority against the other. And it just doesn’t make sense that God would favor a heretical sect, preaching doctrines fundamentally at odds with orthodox teachings, with miracles while also favoring orthodox Catholicism with its own miracles. And whichever you choose, by rejecting the other you are admitting that it is entirely possible to have evidence that you consider to be very good for “miracles” that are in reality pious frauds or mass hysteria or something of the sort. This suggests strongly that it is you who needs to “raise the bar” in terms of the evidence that you require before accepting miraculous claims. It seems that the skeptics have a point in demanding very strong evidence indeed before accepting such claims.
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Old 02-16-2002, 07:42 AM   #42
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Tercel:

A while back David Gould said:

Quote:
My personal opinion is that a miracle without a mythological context is no evidence for anything ...
You replied:

Quote:
I agree, a miracle requires a religious context as well as an unlikely/unbelievable event.
Already we have a problem. A miracle is not merely an “unlikely” or “unbelievable” event. If, for example, I were to persuade you to become an atheist, that would be an unlikely, unbelievable event, but it would not be a miracle. A miracle is an event that unambiguously violates the laws of nature.

But otherwise this seems innocuous enough. If one believes that a miracle has occurred, it is difficult to see how one can make anything of it without a religious or mythological context (although I find it interesting that you equate “religious” with “mythological”).

However, in your reply to HRGruemm you said:

Quote:
However, when there is a religious context, there becomes a possibility of a miracle.
This is a horse of a different color. David’s statement had to do with interpreting a miracle that was presumed to have actually occurred, whereas yours deals with the evidentiary requirement (the burden of proof, if you will) that must be met to justify rational belief that a miracle has occurred in the first place. While David’s statement is quite correct, yours is completely wrongheaded.

The existence of a “religious context” does not increase the likelihood that a miracle has actually occurred in the slightest. In most cases it makes it less likely. For example, suppose that a group of true believers gathers at a spot that they consider sacred expecting to see a holy man levitate; in fact, their faith requires that the holy man must levitate at that place and time. Now suppose that later many of them report that the holy man did indeed levitate. Does the fact that this alleged miracle occurred in a “religious context” make it more or less likely that it actually occurred? Would you be more inclined to believe that someone had actually levitated if instead a large group of disinterested skeptics had witnessed the event, and no one had a religious interpretation handy? Of course you would; anyone with the slightest understanding of human nature would. A “religious context” makes any such report of a supposed miracle much less credible than it would be in the absence of such a context.

Now let’s suppose that a supposed miracle is alleged to have occurred for which there was no “religious context” at the time, but for which one is invented or created after the fact. Does the existence of such a context make it more plausible that the alleged miracle really occurred? Of course not. Anyone with a little imagination can come up with a religious explanation or interpretation of any unusual event after the fact; indeed, this has occurred countless times. In fact, it’s so natural that, especially among backward, superstitious peoples, it is completely predictable that such a “religious context” will be invented after the fact for virtually any striking, unusual event. Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and eclipses have been subjected to such interpretations with depressing regularity throughout history.

But of course the most common source of claims of miraculous events is legends and myths that develop after an event. Robert Price gives some revealing (and amusing) examples in the chapter <a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/robert_price/beyond_born_again/chap5.html" target="_blank">Evidence That Demands A Mistrial</a> in his book Beyond Born Again:

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The history of Sabbatai Sevi is more readily accessible to the modern historian than are the gospel events. Sabbatai Sevi lived much closer to our own era and much documentary evidence of various kinds survives him. Here, too, according to the apologists, legends should have waited at least a couple of generations till they reared their heads. But Gershom Scholem speaks of "the sudden and almost explosive surge of miracle stories" concerning Sabbatai Sevi within weeks or even days of his public appearances! Listen to his description:

“The... realm of imaginative legend... soon dominated the mental climate in Palestine [during Sevi's residence there]. The sway of imagination was strongly in evidence in the letters sent to Egypt and elsewhere and which, by the autumn of 1665 [the same year] had assumed the character of regular messianic propaganda in which fiction far outweighed the facts: [e.g.] the prophet was 'encompassed with a Fiery Cloud" and "the voice of an angel was heard from the cloud."

Letters from December of the same year related that Sabbatai "command a Fire to be made in a publick place, in the presence of many beholders... and entered into the fire twice or thrice, without any hurt to his garments or to a hair on his head." Other letters tell of his raising the dead. He is said to have left his prison through locked and barred doors which opened by themselves after his chains miraculously broke. He kills a group of highwaymen merely with the word of his mouth. Interestingly, the miracle stories often conformed to the patterns of contemporary saints' legends...

A similar phenomenon occurred with Jehudah the Said (died 1217). In his own lifetime, legends made him a great purveyor of religious magic, though actually Jehudah was a staunch opponent of such things! More recently, African prophet and martyr Simon Kimbangu became another "living legend" despite his own wishes. One group of his followers, the "Ngunzists," spread his fame as the "God of the blacks," even while Kimbangu himself disavowed the role. Legends of Kimbangu's childhood, miracles and prophetic visions began within his own generation. Faith-healer William Marrion Branham was held in exaggerated esteem by legions of his followers, many of whom believed him to be Jesus Christ returned or even a new incarnation of God. He, however, did not teach such notions. In fact, once on a visit to such a group of devotees in Latin America he explicitly denied any such wild claims made for him, but his followers reasoned that he was just testing their faith! Many believed in Branham's virgin birth despite his published recollections of his alcoholic mother. A final example is more recent still. Researcher Ed Sanders encountered a number of legends about Charlie Manson during the writing of his book The Family. On one particular bus trip in Death Valley, "several miracles were alleged to have been performed by Charles Manson." One story relates that "Charlie levitated the bus over a creek crag."
It’s noteworthy that all of these miracle claims had a “religious context”. This is how the human mind works: if there was a miracle, it must have had some religious significance. And for that matter, for many people it would seem that, if a miracle would have had great religious significance of a kind that appeals to them, it must have occurred! Precisely because this is the natural bent of the human mind, the existence of a “religious context” generally has no evidentiary value whatever for miracle claims. In fact, it quite properly makes us more skeptical about such claims than we would be otherwise.

[ February 16, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>
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Old 02-18-2002, 04:07 PM   #43
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Quote:
Originally posted by HRG:
<strong>That is to say, many, many people have been observed to die and not come back to life again. Thus the evidence that people do not come back to life by natural causes is pretty good, and we would be perhaps quite sceptical of one anomaly in this data since natural laws always work the same way. However, when there is a religious context, there becomes a possibility of a miracle.</strong>

Why, actually ?
If a supernatural being regarding the religious context were to exist then that being may well choose to interfere in the situation. (Perhaps in order to answer a worshiper's prayer etc.)

Look at it this way: Normal repeated observations and experiences in non-religious contexts serve to define "natural law" for us. That is to say, it lets us recognise and understand the unchanging laws which control physical reality. What such observations do not tell us is whether there exists a supernatural entity capable of interfering or temporarily suspending the physical laws. Our previous observations, (while being evidence against an entity which intereferes often just for the sake of it) provide no evidence about whether such a being actually exists. For such evidence, we would have to examine cases where our observed natural laws had allegedly been broken inside a religious context. Upon gathering reasonable evidence that the event(s) desribed (which were contrary to our previous observations of natural law) did in fact occur, we can look to the religious context for general guidence about the nature of the being doing the interfering.

Quote:
IOW, if we admit that (within Religious Context 1 ) Being A can rise from the dead, then we have to admit too that (within Religious Context 2 ) Being B can make it appear to everyone as if A has risen from the dead, contrary to reality.
Of course. However using common sense, a tad of Occam's razor, and a large number of miracles: we can sort out the most likely religious context without much difficulty. I would also note that it is epistemologically pointless to assume deception unless some evidence suggests that - do you believe that the world is merely an illusion created by some deity or do you go simply trust your senses? Why assume deception on the religious context front then?

Quote:
<strong>This was Hume’s major mistake,</strong>

I'd call it a major insight :-)
You do that.

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Old 02-18-2002, 04:40 PM   #44
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Bd-from-kg,
So the Catholic Church doesn't like miracles occurring in other branches of Christianity who don't entirely agree with the Catholic Church's theology. Suprise, suprise...
And it likes discrediting them too. More suprise...

The example was not intended as an example of something I believed to be a miracle (Indeed I knew nothing about it beyond the Hume quote, thanks for the info btw), but rather of what someone else believed to be very good evidence of a miracle - yet they still wouldn't believe it. Look back at what I've been discussing earlier in this thread: There seems to me to be a disproportionately high standard of evidence demanded for belief in a deity as there is for any normal belief. I am apt to get a little sick of arguing and producing evidence when it's asked for only to have the bar for required evidence put through the roof it response. In David Hume's case, he seems to believe that this example is the strongest possible piece of evidence that can be possibly offered, to his mind it means all the criteria. And yet he rejects it, why? Because he raises the required evidence level to the impossible by stating that miracles are impossible, that every reasonable person should agree with him, and end of story. His only alleged rational support for this position is that he advances a averagely-pathetic a priori argument against miracles.
Is this Materialistic Presuppostion or what?
You skeptics, I've noticed get very sick of Theophilus saying he presupposes Christianity, and I must say I agree with you I think evidence is necessary. At which point you turn around and presuppose the non-existence of any deities and proceed to completely ignore any and all evidence.
~sigh~ Anyway, back to it...

Quote:
Of course you're free to disagree (and certainly you can find more sympathetic accounts), but this poses two problems:

(1) The evidence for the fundamental Christian miracles such as the Resurrection rests entirely on the Catholic Church. These miracles are reported in what we now call the Gospels and other books of the NT, but these works are part of the NT solely because the Catholic Church vouches for their authenticity and reliability. To reject the authority of the Church regarding miraculous claims is to reject Christianity itself.
What is inconsistent with me rejecting the Roman Catholic Church's judgement in some matters and not others, based on my own opinions? I have several problems with the Catholic Church as it is today: which is why I'm a Protestant. However that hardly stops me assessing the evidence provided by Church tradition or agreeing with previous decisions by the Church Universal. Just because I disgree with some of what the RCC decreed in the council of Trent in the 16th Century and some of their decisions since, hardly binds me to say the same about the Eccumunical councils in the 4th Century or other universal decisions of the Church.

Quote:
(2) You cannot at the same time accept the alleged miracles at Lourdes, for example, and the Jansenist miracles.
Of course I can.

Quote:
As Hume points out, the very same authority for the one is an equally good authority against the other.
I think Hume must have been having a really bad day when he wrote that essay.

Quote:
And it just doesn't make sense that God would favor a heretical sect, preaching doctrines fundamentally at odds with orthodox teachings, with miracles while also favoring orthodox Catholicism with its own miracles.
Who says God's particularly interested in doctrine taught beyond the basic fact that they're all Christian's. Why can't he favor any and all Christian sects, orthodox or no, at will?

Quote:
And whichever you choose.... you are admitting that it is entirely possible to have evidence that you consider to be very good for miracles that are in reality pious frauds or mass hysteria or something of the sort.
I admit that anyway. I'm not stupid nor gullible you know.

Quote:
This suggests strongly that it is you who needs to raise the bar in terms of the evidence that you require before accepting miraculous claims.
I take such considerations very seriously in assessing a miraculous claim. I do not simply start cheering when I hear someone claiming miracle. Nine times out of ten such a claim is not even worth considering seriously.
Don't worry, I am a very skeptical and cynical person. The difference is: I actually am prepared to accept the miraculous as such where the evidence warrents it.

Quote:
It seems that the skeptics have a point in demanding very strong evidence indeed before accepting such claims.
Again, in my experience the "skeptics" tend to be closed-minded materialistic presuppositionists who would try to ignore evidence if it kicked them in the face. But I hope I'm wrong here and just being too cynical as per usual.

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Old 02-18-2002, 05:18 PM   #45
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Quote:
Originally posted by bd-from-kg:
A while back David Gould said:
"My personal opinion is that a miracle without a mythological context is no evidence for anything ..."

You [Tercel] replied:
"I agree, a miracle requires a religious context as well as an unlikely/unbelievable event."

bd-from-kg writes:
Already we have a problem. A miracle is not merely an “unlikely” or “unbelievable” event. If, for example, I were to persuade you to become an atheist, that would be an unlikely, unbelievable event, but it would not be a miracle. A miracle is an event that unambiguously violates the laws of nature.
Of course: I completely agree. (I was simply being a bit sloppy) I can see what I said could be taken to suggest I accept things that could be reasonably termed "coincidence" as miracles: I do not.

Quote:
But otherwise this seems innocuous enough. If one believes that a miracle has occurred, it is difficult to see how one can make anything of it without a religious or mythological context (although I find it interesting that you equate “religious” with “mythological”).
I simply said "religious context" because those were the words used by a number of books discussing miracles and Hume's argument. Since it's what David seems to mean by "mythological", I have no problem equating the two since the distinction between religion and mythology is not always clear.

Quote:
This is a horse of a different color. David’s statement had to do with interpreting a miracle that was presumed to have actually occurred, whereas yours deals with the evidentiary requirement (the burden of proof, if you will) that must be met to justify rational belief that a miracle has occurred in the first place. While David’s statement is quite correct, yours is completely wrongheaded.
What we seem to be discussing here is the definition of the word "miracle". I would say I can define it how I like and if you happen to disagree then it's not very nice to call my version "completely wrongheaded". I prefer my definition though as it serves to rule out some occurances which otherwise might mistakenly fall under the definition of a miracle, eg a laboratory experiment discovering that something didn't conform to currently recognised laws etc.
In order to distinguish truly miraculous things from possible natural causes I suggest 3 criteria for recognising a miracle:
* Inexplicability given known natural laws
* Unrepeatability (that is to say, the fact that similar things have happened before and continue to happen suggests that the cause of the alleged event was not a constant, but as yet unknown, natural law)
* A religious or similar context (Which provides us both with a much-needed difference between the alleged event and past experience of the working of natural laws, as well as a framework for interpretation of the event to take place)

Having a religious context as a requirement for the definition was not my idea, and indeed when I first read book which stated that an event was not a miracle unless it occured in a religious context I wasn't very happy (indeed, I remember reading the page several times and still being not happy with it). However I now think the idea of a religious context is a definite requirement for a miracle. (I think you'll find also that the Catholic Church has some clear guidelines about religious contexts being required), but I can certainly understand if you disagree.

Quote:
The existence of a “religious context” does not increase the likelihood that a miracle has actually occurred in the slightest. In most cases it makes it less likely. For example, suppose that a group of true believers gathers at a spot that they consider sacred expecting to see a holy man levitate; in fact, their faith requires that the holy man must levitate at that place and time. Now suppose that later many of them report that the holy man did indeed levitate. Does the fact that this alleged miracle occurred in a “religious context” make it more or less likely that it actually occurred?
It makes it more likely to be a miracle since if it hadn't occured in a religious context then by my definition it's not a miracle.
Of course the religious context and "faith" and emotions etc involved make it more unlikely than usual that the event actually happens. The human race has a fascination with the miraculous and is good at inventing miracle stories and such things must be taken into account of course. However, I disagree with the conclusion that many atheists make at this point which is to deny the miraculous altogether. Such logic is clearly mistaken, simply because such stories can be false gives no reason whatsoever to assume all are: It merely makes our job of determining truth harder. If anything it is the other way around: After all, if any of the stories are true then the supernatural does exist, for atheism to be true they would have to all be false. And given the sheer volume of reasonable quality evidence that is out there, I find that a big call.

Quote:
Would you be more inclined to believe that someone had actually levitated if instead a large group of disinterested skeptics had witnessed the event, and no one had a religious interpretation handy? Of course you would; anyone with the slightest understanding of human nature would. A “religious context” makes any such report of a supposed miracle much less credible than it would be in the absence of such a context.
Of course a skeptical audience is much more reliable. That definitely must be taken into consideration. However the event would not constitute a miracle to me if it happened outside a religious context. After all: Why did it happen?? It apparently wasn't caused by natural laws, we've got no reason to believe it was caused by supernatural interference - so we're left with an alleged event with no plausible explanation. This is, I would contend, evidence against the alleged event.

Quote:
Now let’s suppose that a supposed miracle is alleged to have occurred for which there was no “religious context” at the time, but for which one is invented or created after the fact. Does the existence of such a context make it more plausible that the alleged miracle really occurred? Of course not. Anyone with a little imagination can come up with a religious explanation or interpretation of any unusual event after the fact; indeed, this has occurred countless times. In fact, it’s so natural that, especially among backward, superstitious peoples, it is completely predictable that such a “religious context” will be invented after the fact for virtually any striking, unusual event. Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and eclipses have been subjected to such interpretations with depressing regularity throughout history.
Agreed. I do not think religious contexts constructed after the alleged event count.

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Old 02-18-2002, 08:34 PM   #46
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Wyrdsmyth,

Good news. God actually gave you the sign you asked for 2000 years ago. Notice the following...


1-Context
John 3:16-17
For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life. For God did not send his Son into the world to condemn the world, but to save the world through him.

2-Repetition
Matthew 8:13
Then Jesus said to the centurion, "Go! It will be done just as you believed it would." And his servant was healed at that very hour.

Matthew 14:14
When Jesus landed and saw a large crowd, he had compassion on them and healed their sick.

Matthew 14:36
and begged him to let the sick just touch the edge of his cloak, and all who touched him were healed.

Matthew 15:30
Great crowds came to him, bringing the lame, the blind, the crippled, the mute and many others, and laid them at his feet; and he healed them.

Matthew 21:14
The blind and the lame came to him at the temple, and he healed them.

Mark 6:56
And wherever he went–into villages, towns or countryside–they placed the sick in the marketplaces. They begged him to let them touch even the edge of his cloak, and all who touched him were healed.


3-Overt results: See 2


4a-Publicity...
Matthew 4:24
News about him spread all over Syria...

Matthew 9:26
News of this spread through all that region.

Mark 1:28
News about him spread quickly over the whole region of Galilee.

Luke 4:14
Jesus returned to Galilee in the power of the Spirit, and news about him spread through the whole countryside.

Luke 4:37
And the news about him spread throughout the surrounding area.

Luke 7:17
This news about Jesus spread throughout Judea and the surrounding country.

The speed at which the news of Jesus spread is almost unfathomable...nearly a miracle in itself.

Notice the people of the time didn't have film, radio, newspapers, email and most did not read.
Moreover, they didn't have things like news media
to help spread the news.

There are currently over 2 billion Christians on the planet today...nearly twice as many as the next religion (Hindu). 1 out of 3 people (33%) on the planet today claim to be of one form of Christianity or another.

That's one hell of a publicity stunt.

4b-Documentation.
In the era of Jesus day almost all news was spread
by word of mouth or decree. The ability to read was not nearly as common as it is today. The fact that Jesus life and mission are so well documented is a miracle in it's own right considering the culture, time and place where they happened.

The New Testament is by orders of magnitude the most documented ancient text of all time. There are nearly 5000 supporting writs and texts that form the documentary base for the NT. In addition there are numerous extra-Biblical accounts of Christ's life. It is hard to fathom
that a written work from ANY era of mankind's history could be more documented than the NT.


If you don't believe this...there is nothing you will believe.

My $0.2


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Old 02-18-2002, 09:21 PM   #47
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The real "good news" is knowing that sick, petty, violent gods like Yahweh and Allah exist only in the imaginations of weak-minded people who can't accept the finality of death.

[ February 19, 2002: Message edited by: atheist_in_foxhole ]</p>
 
Old 02-18-2002, 11:34 PM   #48
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Quote:
Originally posted by Tercel (in part):
<strong>
Look at it this way: Normal repeated observations and experiences in non-religious contexts serve to define "natural law" for us. That is to say, it lets us recognise and understand the unchanging laws which control physical reality. What such observations do not tell us is whether there exists a supernatural entity capable of interfering or temporarily suspending the physical laws. </strong>
What is the difference between such a supernatural entity and my PHI-field (which can be switched off or on) ?

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Old 02-19-2002, 11:54 AM   #49
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There were some comments earlier, which were so sharp I think they are worth repeating:

Quote:
Originally posted by Mageth:
<strong>There is a category of "unacceptable" prayers that most theists think are asking god too much, such as raising the dead, regrowing severed limbs, repairing severed spinal cords, parting of the sea, and miraculously providing suitcases full of money. For some reason they think that, by performing obvious, spectacular miracles, god would be destroying the need for faith and circumventing our free will, even though the bible is chock full of supposed examples of such "miracles."</strong>
and

Quote:
Originally posted by Echo:
<strong> From my experience, theists seem to find it believable that if you pray to God, he can or will heal your arthritis or cancer, but they don't find it believable (or likely) that if you pray to God he can or will restore to life your beloved dead pet or cause you to regrow a severed limb. &lt;snip&gt; But I've yet to hear them list some criteria for what types of miracles God performs versus the types of miracles he does not perform, other than that the miracles he *doesn't* perform are so outrageous that even the theists don't accept or expect them. But all things should be possible for God, which makes me wonder why theists designate some miracles as "too outrageous" even for God. Unless, like atheists, they realize that some things just don't happen.</strong>
You guys really hit the nail on the head. Notice that Tercel still hasn't replied to my earlier question, about how many artificial arms and legs are left at Lourdes? Sure, there are plenty of crutches and wheelchairs. God can heal rickets and broken bones... He can make your cancer go into remission... but he never, never, never will regrow one of your amputated limbs.

Never.

Tercel, I know why. Do you?

[ February 19, 2002: Message edited by: Wyrdsmyth ]</p>
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Old 02-20-2002, 03:30 PM   #50
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Tercel:

This is a response to your post of February 18, 2002 05:40 PM . It’s turned out to be pretty long, but the issues involved are central to this whole thread. I hope to reply to the following post shortly (and I promise it will be much shorter).

1. On Hume

I’m really taken aback by your argument. You seem to be saying that Hume was wrong to reject the Jansenist miracle claims. Yet even you are not prepared to assert that these claims were true. In fact, it’s almost impossible to find anyone today who is prepared to defend these claims, so I think we can take it as given here that they were false. Thus you are in the position of criticizing Hume for rejecting false claims of miracles! Am I the only one who finds this bizarre?

Perhaps the key here is your statement:

Quote:
The example was not intended as an example of something I believed to be a miracle ... but rather of what someone else believed to be very good evidence of a miracle - yet they still wouldn't believe it.
Wrong. Hume was citing an example of a case where the evidence of miraculous events was about as good as evidence in the form of eyewitness testimony ever gets in practice. He did not consider it to be “very good” evidence in the sense of being good enough to justify rational belief, because (for reasons he explains at length) eyewitness testimony just isn’t very reliable and miraculous claims are inherently extremely implausible.

Yet later you say:

Quote:
And yet he rejects it, why? Because he raises the required evidence level to the impossible by stating that miracles are impossible, that every reasonable person should agree with him, and end of story.
This contradicts your claim that Hume believed that the testimony for the alleged Jansenist miracles was very good evidence for them. If one is convinced that something is impossible, nothing would constitute “very good evidence” for it. For example, since I believe that it is impossible that 2 + 2 should equal 5, no amount of testimony or other evidence would (to me) constitute “very good” evidence that it’s so.

But in fact Hume does not say that miracles are impossible, only that they are extremely unlikely. It’s true that one might be led to the opposite conclusion by certain passages such as:

Quote:
In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event.
But if so, you’re misinterpreting what Hume means by “full proof”. He does not mean absolute proof, but only “as good a proof as is possible in this world”. This is clear in another passage:

Quote:
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined... And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior..[Italics added.]
Hume here implicitly admits that it is possible in principle for a “proof” based on “infallible experience” to be “destroyed” by a “superior” proof. This would make no sense if he thought that such a proof was absolute.

Besides, if Hume really regarded “infallible experience” to be completely decisive there would be no point in going on at length about the unreliability of human testimony, especially when religious faith enters into the mix.

But the most decisive proof that Hume did not claim that miracles were impossible, or that evidence of a miraculous nature would be needed to justify rational belief in one, is the following passage:

Quote:
...I own that ... there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history. Thus, suppose all authors, in all languages, agree, that, from the first of January 1600, there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days: suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people: that all travellers, who return from foreign countries, bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or contradiction: it is evident, that our present philosophers, instead of doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain...
You then go on to say:

Quote:
[Hume’s] only alleged rational support for [rejecting the Jansenist miracle claims] is that he advances a averagely-pathetic a priori argument against miracles.
Well, Hume’s argument was first published over 250 years ago and is still widely read today and is highly respected by professional philosophers. I only wish that I could come up with such “pathetic” arguments.

As for calling it a priori, do you even understand what this means? Hume’s argument is the very opposite of a priori. Hume is so far from ignoring the evidence that he considers the evidence in some detail. His entire argument is based on the evidence. What you apparently object to is that when considering any particular miracle claim, he insists on considering all the evidence regarding the occurrence of miracles (and especially miracles of the specified kind) rather than looking only at the specific evidence for and against that particular event as if it were completely isolated from the context of being an event in this world, about which we already know a few things from previous experience.

2. On the standards of evidence for miracles

Quote:
There seems to me to be a disproportionately high standard of evidence demanded for belief in a deity as there is for any normal belief.
Let’s stick for the moment to the question of what the standard of evidence should be for accepting a miracle claim and leave the question of what evidence would justify belief in a deity aside for now. The subject Hume was addressing, after all, was what evidence would justify rational belief in a miracle, not what evidence would justify rational belief in God.

Assuming that you have essentially the same complaint about the standard of evidence demanded by skeptics (i.e., rational people) for miracle claims, the answer is simple. Yes, a much higher standard of evidence is demanded for miracle claims than for “ordinary” claims – i.e., claims that non-miraculous events have occurred. But this is perfectly rational; in fact, it would be completely irrational not to do so.

One way of explaining this is by way of Bayes’ Theorem. Thus, say we have a hypothesis A and a possible confirming event (or evidence) B. for any X and Y, define P(X) as the probability of X and P(X|Y) as the probability of X given that Y. The Bayes’ theorem says that, for any hypothesis A and evidence B:

P(A|B) = P(B|A) * P(A) / P(B) .

<a href="http://faculty.vassar.edu/lowry/bayes.html" target="_blank">This page</a> has a nice explanation of Bayes’ Theorem with a built-in calculator, and a link to a page explaining that it can be applied to subjective probabilities (which is what we’re dealing with here, of course). It gives the following example. (Here sP refers to “subjective probability”.)

Quote:
Suppose an investigator is 75% confident that hypothesis A is true ... [That is]:

sP(A) = .75 and sP(~A) = .25

Suppose also that the investigator believes event B to have a 90% chance of occurring if the hypothesis is true (B|A), but only a 50/50 chance of occurring if the hypothesis is false (B|~A). Thus: sP(B|A) = .9, sP(~B|A) = .1, sP(B|~A) = .5, and sP(~B|~A) = .5 .

The application of Bayes' theorem to these s-probability values would lead the investigator to adjust his/her degree of subjective confidence in hypothesis A upward, from .75 to .844, if the outcome is confirmatory (event B occurs), and downward, from .75 to .375, if the outcome is disconfirmatory (event B does not occur). Similarly, the degree of subjective confidence that hypothesis A is false would be adjusted downward, from .25 to .156, if event B does occur, and upward, from .25 to .625 if event B does not occur.
It is a common notion that P(A) represents an a priori probability. This is a serious misunderstanding. Bayes’ theorem is often applied sequentially as new evidence comes in; in this case P(A|B) from one step becomes P(A) for the next step. P(A) is a “prior” probability only in the sense that it is the value prior to factoring in the evidence represented by B.

So what does all this mean, and how does it relate to the current discussion? The key point here is that, in estimating the probability that something is true given a piece of evidence, one must take into account the probability of its being true prior to factoring in this evidence. The lower this prior probability, the stronger the evidence must be to overcome this initial presumption against it. More precisely, P(B|A) must be much larger than P(B|~A) to “make a dent” in the presumption against A

To get a real feeling for this it may be helpful to pair the standard form of Bayes’ Theorem with the corresponding expression for ~A:

P(A|B) = P(B|A) * P(A) / P(B)
P(~A|B) = P(B|~A) * P(~A) / P(B).

Now the question of whether A is more likely than not to be true given B is simply the question of whether P(A|B) &gt; P(~A|B). Thus there is no need to try to estimate P(B), P(B|A), or P(B|~A); we need only estimate how large P(B|A) is relative to P(B|~A). If the ratio P(B|A) / P(B|~A) is greater than the ratio P(~A) / P(A), then B is good enough evidence to overcome the initial presumption against A represented by a low value of P(A).

By the way, this corresponds so well with intuition that Hume almost seems to have had Bayes’ theorem in mind when he said:

Quote:
When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened.
This is exactly right. The ratio of the probability that this testimony would have been given if the event had occurred to the probability that it would have been given if it had not, must exceed the ratio of the prior probability that the event had not occurred to the probability that it had.

Now let’s see how this relates to your comment:

Quote:
You skeptics, I've noticed get very sick of Theophilus saying he presupposes Christianity, and I must say I agree with you I think evidence is necessary. At which point you turn around and presuppose the non-existence of any deities and proceed to completely ignore any and all evidence.
By now it should be clear that the problem is not that skeptics disregard any and all evidence, but that based on the totality of the evidence they quite rationally set the prior probability of any alleged miracle very, very low and (for the reasons explained so eloquently by Hume) estimate P(B|A) / P(B|~A) to be not all that high. In other words, although it may be much more probable that such testimony would be forthcoming on the assumption that the alleged miracle actually occurred than on the assumption that it didn’t, it’s not nearly enough more probable to overcome the initial rational presumption against any given alleged miracle. In fact, for typical alleged religious miracles like the Resurrection (or the Jansenist miracles) it fails to overcome this initial presumption by many orders of magnitude.

3. On God, miracles, and religious sects

Quote:
What is inconsistent with me rejecting the Roman Catholic Church's judgement in some matters and not others, based on my own opinions?
The problem is that the only plausible grounds for trusting the early Church’s judgments on such matters would be that the Church was being guided by God to render true judgments. But if you believe this, it is difficult to comprehend why God would have stopped guiding the Church in this way at some later point.

Of course, the problem is even more acute regarding the Jansenist miracles, because the doctrines that the Jansenists rejected had been established as part of the orthodox creed by the same early Church that established the canon.

Quote:
bd:
You cannot at the same time accept the alleged miracles at Lourdes, for example, and the Jansenist miracles.

Tercel:
Of course I can.
Well, OK. You can also deny that triangles have three sides. But this position is irrational.

Quote:
bd:
And it just doesn't make sense that God would favor a heretical sect, preaching doctrines fundamentally at odds with orthodox teachings, with miracles while also favoring orthodox Catholicism with its own miracles.

Tercel:
Who says God's particularly interested in doctrine taught beyond the basic fact that they're all Christians. Why can't he favor any and all Christian sects, orthodox or no, at will?
For that matter, why can’t he favor all non-Christians at the expense of Christians? Aside from the fact that it doesn’t make sense, that is? If God isn’t particularly interested in whether we have true beliefs about Him, why did He become incarnate and suffer on the cross? If it doesn’t matter, why do all these sects exist in the first place?

Besides, the Jansenist were using the miracles discussed by Hume as evidence that they were right and orthodox Catholicism is wrong. It would seem to be totally weird for God to cooperate with this effort by performing miracles that were otherwise pretty much pointless if in fact the Jansenists were teaching false doctrines and undermining the One True Faith.

Similarly, the Catholic Church never tires of using the alleged miracles at Lourdes as “evidence” that it’s the One True Faith. The very history of Lourdes supports this interpretation very strongly (if the miracle claims are true). I mean, the Virgin Mary communicated with a devout Catholic girl to tell her where to dig to find a miraculous healing spring. If this isn’t evidence for Catholicism, what is? Why would God take the trouble of doing this for a corrupt version of Christianity that had long since departed from the true path?

4. Summary

Quote:
bd:
This suggests strongly that it is you who needs to raise the bar in terms of the evidence that you require before accepting miraculous claims.

Tercel:
I take such considerations very seriously in assessing a miraculous claim. I do not simply start cheering when I hear someone claiming miracle. Nine times out of ten such a claim is not even worth considering seriously.
Try 999,999 times out of a million and you’ll be closer to the mark. Frankly, it’s hard to believe that you take such considerations anywhere near as seriously as they deserve. Are you really that bad at evaluating evidence when religious faith isn’t distorting your judgment?

Quote:
Don't worry, I am a very skeptical and cynical person. The difference is: I actually am prepared to accept the miraculous as such where the evidence warrants it.
If this were true, it wouldn’t be a difference between us. I, too, am prepared to accept the miraculous when the evidence warrants it. But I have yet to see a case where the evidence comes anywhere near warranting it.
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