rainbow walking

rw earlier: Nothing in your statement above addresses perfection. "Morally better" is not equivalent to moral perfection.



Thomas: Yes, but my decision procedure for moral perfection is to imagine if there could be a being morally better than X. If there couldn't, X is morally perfect. What's your decision procedure?

rw: I have no problem with that test as long as I reserve the right to critique any example proferred.

rw earlier: Even if it were possible, (which it isn't), my answer would not change. The world would not be a better place. There are so many ways a child can be accidentally burned, for instance, if her house caught on fire during the night while she slept. This would constitute accidental burning.



Thomas: Yes, obviously, eventually, there could be too much prevention. I'm not asking for that. I'm saying that it doesn't seem like preventing kids from accidentally scalding themselves is too much protection. Is it? Why?

rw: From our shared human perspective I agree. But when applying this to an alleged morally perfect being a problem arises immediately. I see no moral perfection in a limited intervention. If such a being is morally motivated to intervene in one trivial case and no other, he loses his claim to moral perfection for the same reason as your test above. If such a being only intervened to alleviate causes of accidental scalding, for instance, and neglected disease, you and I both could immediately imagine a morally better being. If he has a reason precluding intervention across the board, he must remain consistent to remain omni-max.

rw earlier: 1. The abrogation of man's responsibility for his children, leading to more irresponsible parents.



Thomas: They don't have to be irresponsible in other areas of their lives. I don't think that if kids burned themselves less, parents would be prohibitively more irresponsible. They would be responsible in other areas of their lives.

rw: On the surface this sounds like a reasonable conclusion, until you begin to seriously think about man’s propensity to expect more and more when given a little. If humans observe that accidental scaldings always seem to mysteriously or miraculously fail to happen, they will surely begin to test this in other intentional ways. Of course, an omniscient god would know the difference between an accident and a trap and could just refuse to intervene in such contrived cases. But then you’d have children getting scalded as a result of his intervention, as people try to reproduce the effects of the intervention out of curiosity or scientific research.

rw earlier: 2. Tampering with a childs desire is to tamper with its inquisitive nature.



Thomas: This is just as much a criticism of us humans telling kids not to touch the handles of pots of boiling water.

rw: Yes, but human intervention is the desired result of a non-interventionist god. Humans also are able to provide hands on training to channel curiosity in positive ways to effectuate learning, after they prevent the child from scalding itself.

rw earlier: 3. Tamper with man's nature and you negate his ability to establish his own limitations.



Thomas: Why is that more important than preventing severe accidental pain?

rw: Because man relies on knowing his limitations to prevent future, more severe, suffering.

rw earlier: 4. An intelligent child may figure out that an extraneous force is dictating his desires and start testing the limits of that force by intentionally placing himself in danger.



Thomas: You need to think more carefully about what God can do. God can keep the child from realizing that, if that's more important.

rw: Well, I was only remembering your earlier claim that god could dispatch elves to prevent the accidents. Surely a child could become totally infatuated with such a hero and might begin to create dangerous situations to coax the elves return.

[b]rw earlier: Yes, no one outside of other men, that is. Let a supernatural force begin to "convince" man not to do certain things and man no longer shoulders any responsibility for the things he does.



Thomas: I'm saying in some situations, that's okay. God doesn't have to do it for everything, just a few cases when a child is about to experience extreme pain. It looks to me like if children scalded themselves less, parents would still be responsible in other areas of their lives. Sure, there's a point at which it would be too much, but it doesn't look like simple prevention of scalding is there. If it is, you have to show that it is.

rw: For the same reason I gave at the top of this response. It seems to me it would become like a damn springing a leak that turns into a raging flood. Once the initial intervention starts, such a being would be less than morally perfect to limit himself to just one cause of suffering. If he did limit himself he’d be vulnerable to your imagined more moral being test.

rainbow walking

alix: You realise, of course, that there is a trivial, naturalistic response to your questions, i.e. that there exists a mindless algorithm that produces creatures with a strong desire to exist and to procreate?

Evolution. Survival of the sexiest.

rw: Can you prove the "mindless" claim?

alix: In short, biological organisms without these two desires would be extinct: after a few billion years of biological activity, organisms without these desires have disappeared from the gene pool.

rw: Natural selection...with nature doing the selecting.

alix: There is no need to even bring the possible existence of Gods into the discussion, yes?

rw: What is the difference between a purpose for man's existence prescribed by a non-intervening god through nature, and a purpose for man's existence prescribed by nature via genetic coding? In either case does man have more or less input in his existence?

Alix Nenuphar

rw:

Prove? In what sense? There exist known mechanisms for developing biological entities and structures. These mechanisms are not 'conscious'; they are the best explanation for evolution.

Precisely. Elegant, yes?

I fail to understand your question. What do you mean by 'purpose'? There is no evidence that man has a 'purpose' in the sense that man is 'intended' to do something by a conscious entity.

Alix Nenuphar

rw:

Given the world postulated: a group of humans who freely choose the right; a world of humans who are diverse in appearance, interests, capabilities, and desires.

You asked for an example: you have made an unsupported assertion concerning it. If such a world is logically impossible, then there exists within it a logical contradiction, in the form of P and ~P, where P is a postulate about that world.

As you reject my example as being logically impossible, then you should be able to easily show me the logical contradiction.

If you cannot show such a contradiction, then your claim that this world is logically impossible is clearly false, yes?

Where is the contradiction? Be precise. Please couch it in the form given. As an example, here is the contradiction implied in the PoE:

God would not create unecessary suffering AND God created unecessary suffering.

Quite simple really to produce for a 'razor sharp mind.'

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

Okay. Suppose that there's such a thing as too much intervention. At some point, God would be intervening too much, and that would be bad, for whatever reason. Maybe humans, if they didn't witness lots of accidental scaldings, would start to suspect that God existed, or stop trying to prevent accidental scaldings, or something bad like that. I think you've been holding this position throughout the debate, so I doubt you'll abandon it now. Some amount of intervention is too much intervention, because humans start to lose their abilities or requirements to do x, y, and z.

If it's true that there's such a thing as too much intervention, then there's a point at which God should stop intervening. But that doesn't mean God shouldn't intervene at all. In fact, it seems quite reasonable to me that some intervention more than now wouldn't necessarily be too much intervention. I agree that if God prevented every accidental scalding, there would be some serious consequences. But it doesn't seem like we're anywhere near that level yet. If God prevented more than he does now, we'd probably get closer to that level. In fact, there's some level such that God is preventing every accidental scalding he can without precluding the greater good of humans. Let's call this level L. I don't think we're at L right now. If you think we are, that's a positive claim. After all, we're at some level of accidental scaldings, but what is the background probability that we're at L? It seems pretty low, objectively. You know, think of all the possible levels of suffering, and only one of them is L.

That means, we have reason to think God should prevent more scaldings than he does now, unless you can find good reasons to think we're at L right now.

Your response that a morally perfect being would have to prevent all suffering doesn't work here, because we both agree (at least for the purposes of debate) that there's some level L that includes some scaldings. So God obviously wouldn't need to prevent all suffering to be morally perfect. But preventing more than he does now seems like a good thing. To me, at least.

God can give humanity any knowledge it needs.

Again, you need to think more carefully about the extent of God's power. Please do so before you offer these possible problems; please think of whether there's a way for God to prevent them. That way, we don't have to keep going through this. My response to this particular point is that God could make the elves invisible and undetectable. My response to the above point was that God can give humans any knowledge they need, and I can't see any obvious problems with that.

Here's a good example of what I was talking about earlier. Limiting himself probably wouldn't be a problem if he limited himself such that L was attained. At that point, if he intervened more, he'd be committing a moral wrong. You just have to make it seem likely that we're currently at L.

rainbow walking

rw earlier: Can you prove the "mindless" claim?



alix: Prove? In what sense? There exist known mechanisms for developing biological entities and structures. These mechanisms are not 'conscious'; they are the best explanation for evolution.

rw: These "mechanisms" are associated with developing biological entities capable of consciousness. How do you know the mechanisms are not conscious?



rw earlier: Natural selection...with nature doing the selecting.


alix: Precisely. Elegant, yes?

rw: How does a mindless, non-conscious nature select? I know the process is called evolution and survival goes to the fittest and most proficient at replication, but these biological entities are not doing the fittest and replication thing on their own. They're responding to their genetic coding which is mutating in concert with external pressures and it all falls back to one basic element: Survival...why should nature endow organisms with the survival mechanism in their coding? Why does nature care if life exists or not?




rw earlier: What is the difference between a purpose for man's existence prescribed by a non-intervening god through nature, and a purpose for man's existence prescribed by nature via genetic coding? In either case does man have more or less input in his existence?


I fail to understand your question. What do you mean by 'purpose'? There is no evidence that man has a 'purpose' in the sense that man is 'intended' to do something by a conscious entity.

rw: Not even a continuation of existence, or replication, or inquisitiveness, or social evolution? Did man have anything at all to do with the state of affairs in which he is born, or the genetic coding that regulates much of his behavior? How do you derive consciousness from non-conscious coding?

rainbow walking

alix: Given the world postulated: a group of humans who freely choose the right; a world of humans who are diverse in appearance, interests, capabilities, and desires.

You asked for an example: you have made an unsupported assertion concerning it. If such a world is logically impossible, then there exists within it a logical contradiction, in the form of P and ~P, where P is a postulate about that world.

As you reject my example as being logically impossible, then you should be able to easily show me the logical contradiction.

rw: Not to be pedantic but the above postulate is not where we were in this discussion. Here is your postulated world in its original form with one modification you made after my original response:


Omnimax could create a group of people who freely chose the right under all circumstances. In such a world, all men (and women) would be virtuous, even though they would never need to demonstrate that virtue under adverse circumstances (such as situations of immorality, willfull evil, or other unpleasantries). No suffering would be required to create such a world, therefore the PoE would be satisfied by the condition of reduced suffering.

Whether or not they recognize their choices as 'right' is irrelevant: a virtuous man can be unconscious of the fact that he is virtuous; his virtue is not predicated or connected with the fact that he is aware of it.

No logical contradictions are involved.

rw: Definition of virtue:

vir·tue (vûr“ch›) n. 1.a. Moral excellence and righteousness; goodness.

Definition of moral:

mor·al (môr“…l, m¼r“-) adj. 1. Of or concerned with the judgment of the goodness or badness of human action and character: moral scrutiny; a moral quandary. 2. Teaching or exhibiting goodness or correctness of character and behavior: a moral lesson. 3. Conforming to standards of what is right or just in behavior: a moral life. 4. Arising from conscience or the sense of right and wrong; virtuous.

Fact: In every case where a normative value such as good, right, moral, virtuous, or just is to be assigned, its converse in bad, evil, wrong, immoral, or unjust must also be available else the assignment becomes incomprehensible, meaningless and valueless.

Contradictory Premises: a group of people who freely choose the right under all circumstances in conjunction with the assertion of never needing to demonstrate virtue under adverse circumstances such as situations of immorality, willful evil and other unpleasantries.

In a world where all people freely choose the right under all circumstances there would be no adverse circumstances of immorality or willful evil.

therefore

In a world devoid of immorality and willful evil there is no basis for recognizing or assigning any normative value to any choice and all choices become non-value assigned choices.

Contradiction: It is logically impossible for the same choice to be both right and non-right in any logically possible world.

Contradictory Premises: In such a world, all men (and women) would be virtuous, even though they would never need to demonstrate that virtue under adverse circumstances (such as situations of immorality, willfull evil, or other unpleasantries).

In a world where no immorality or willful evil exist there would be no occasion for the concept of virtue to arise as a normative assignment for a person based on their actions.

therefore

In such a world no person can possibly be virtuous.

Contradiction: It is logically impossible for any or all persons to be both virtuous and non-virtuous in any logically possible world.

Contradictory Premises: Omnimax could create a group of people who freely chose the right under all circumstances.

Whether or not they recognize their choices as 'right' is irrelevant:

In such a world where value assignment is forced upon a choice against the choosers ability to recognize the value assigned, said choice cannot be described as a right choice freely chosen as though the chooser is a moral person.

Contradiction: A person cannot be both moral and non-moral from the same choices in any logically possible world.

Contradictory Premises: In such a world, all men (and women) would be virtuous, even though they would never need to demonstrate that virtue under adverse circumstances (such as situations of immorality, willfull evil, or other unpleasantries).

a virtuous man can be unconscious of the fact that he is virtuous; his virtue is not predicated or connected with the fact that he is aware of it.

From the definition of virtue in 1 a. (Moral excellence)

and the definition of moral in 4. (Arising from conscience or the sense of right and wrong)

A man can have no conscience or sense of right and wrong if he is unconscious of his virtue.

Therefore

Contradiction: A man cannot freely choose the right if he has no conscience or sense of right and wrong in any logically possible world.

p and ~p
q and ~q

You haven’t been minding your P’s and Q’s Alix


That should be enough to get us started although it is by no means exhaustive.

Alix Nenuphar

rw:

I mentioned your lack of reading comprehension earlier; permit me to offer an example from your last thread. My original proposition was,
It is your insinuation (not related to my post, but rather to your misunderstanding of how morality operates) that these people are unconscious - as we note from this exchange:
Now we can move on to your post.

You supplied a definition of virtue and a definition of moral, supplied by dictionary.com. I have no argument with their definitions.

You continue,
Sorry, this is not a fact. This is your unsupported assertion.

Let us consider a simple example: a man a wallet on the sidewalk; he returns it to its owner without taking any money from it. He has committed a virtuous, highly moral act. In my omnibest world, he will choose (entirely freely) not to keep the money. He is certainly done a good deed: even if he has no 'bad' deeds to contrast it to.

Where is need for immorality, badness, evil, etc.? You are, perhaps, confusing the opportunity for evil, suffering, etc. with the actuality of evil, et. al. They are not equivalent.


--------------------
This is semantically meaningless:

P1: the group of people - A - freely chooses the right under all circumstances

P2: the group of people - A - do not need to demonstrate their virtue.

These are not even contradictory.

Why? God has created this world where people freely choose the right - the morally correct, virtuous choice by definition. All choices are 'right'; this does not make them valueless.

A non-sequitur even by your own statements: if all choices are non-value choices, then they are neither right nor non-right - they are valueless. And by my definition of this world, these choices are right.

You cannot generate a contradiction by changing the terms of my example. This is basic logic.

-------------------

Getting a bit repetitive.

Again, non-sequitur. The people in this world make morally correct choices by definition.

According to your own definition, they are virtuous.

This is precisely the same mistake you made the last time: if you cannot assign a value to something, then it does not possess both that value and its negative.

--------------------------
Remember my definition of omnibest world: people freely choose the right.

Again, you cannot choose to make contradictions by changing the terms of the example. To do so is to create a strawman to refute. Very brilliant of you, and no doubt exercises your claymore-like wit, but it is a false refutation.

And no one, except you, ever said they were. Do try to read the example next time: it will save you time when you try to refute it.

How many times are you going to repeat this? It's unecessary, really.

Since YOU are the only person suggesting that my omnibest people are unconscious of their own morality, this is a moot point. My sole point was that man can do morally correct deeds without realising it. I never stated this was the condition in omnibest world. You have projected your belief onto my construct.

Remember what I said about your inability to read other's posts? Please bear it in mind in the future.

Why? Again, this is an unsupported premise. And you are ADDING to my example by asserting that these people have neither conscience nor sense of right and wrong.

And you, I regret to say, don't even appear to be able to spell them.


If you are planning to actually start doing some refutations, that would be nice, but apparently you are unable to do so, save by inventing straw-worlds to declare illogical.

Please: read, study logic, study ethics. It will make these discussions more profitable.

Consider the fact that after six pages of argument, no other person accepts any of your contentions. If your intelligence is as razor-like and incisive as you claim, then why are you unable to produce a convincing argument?

Alix Nenuphar

rw:

It also occured to me that you may not be aware of the fact that your last post is not even formally correct, from a logic point of view. Allow me to clarify:

A logical contradiction is of the form P & ~P, yes? Let us look at the formal structure of your 'contradictions.'

The premises here are:

P1: a group of people (omnifolk) freely choose the right under all circumstances.

P2: omnifolk do not need to demonstrate their virtue.

You will note that P2 != ~P1 and P1 != ~P2; therefore this is not a logical contradiction.

--------

The premises here are:

P1: omnifolk are virtuous.
P2: omnifolk never need to demonstrate their virtue.

You will note that P2 != ~P1 and P1 != ~P2; therefore this is not a logical contradiction.

----------------

The premises here are:

P1: it is not possible to assign 'virtue' to any omnifolk action.

P2: therefore omnifolk are not virtuous.

You will note that P2 != ~P1 and P1 != ~P2; therefore this is not a logical contradiction.

In fact, it is of the form: If A then B.

But if it is not possible to assign a 'virtue' value to any omnifok action, then one also cannot say that omnifolk are not virtuous; their actions are undefined (in your scheme), therefore your premise If A then B is a non-sequitur

--------

The premises here are:

P1: Omnimax could create a group of people who freely choose the right under all circumstances.

There is no P2, therefore this is not a logical contradiction.


Oh, my. Where to start....

P1: omnifolk are constrained in their choices
P2: therefore their choices are not free
P3: non-free choices are not 'right'

C3: a single choice cannot confer morality and immorality on the same person.

Regrettably, NOTHING in that follows the form P & ~P, and your contradiction does not follow from your premises.

-------------------

Here is a strawman: nothing in my proposal requires the omnifolk to be without conscience - that is something you are ADDING to my proposal.

In addition, this argument is of the form:

P1: If A then B.
P2: ~A
C1: ~B

You will note that P2 != ~P1 and P1 != ~P2; therefore this is not a logical contradiction. It is not even in the form of a logical contradiction. In addition, your argument is fomally wrong. The formally correct version would be

P1: If A then B
P2: ~B
C1: ~A

Are you quite sure you understand what is meant by logically impossible? Are you sure you understand what a logical contradiction is?

rainbow walking

alix: I mentioned your lack of reading comprehension earlier; permit me to offer an example from your last thread. My original proposition was,



It is your insinuation (not related to my post, but rather to your misunderstanding of how morality operates) that these people are unconscious - as we note from this exchange:

rw: I’m sorry, was there suppose to be some evidence of this “insinuation” you’ve accuse me of in all that? Which of my replies supports this accusation? All you’ve done here is re-post your claim where you specifically state “a virtuous man can be “unconscious” of the fact that he is virtuous”. Now which of my responses, to this claim, support your accusation that I have insinuated or miscomprehended your explicit reference to virtue?

Further, why do I need to insinuate anything? You’ve explicitly stated your position. If anyone is guilty of “insinuation” here it’s you.




alix: Now we can move on to your post.

You supplied a definition of virtue and a definition of moral, supplied by dictionary.com. I have no argument with their definitions.

rw: Let’s drive a stake up here for future reference.

alix: You continue,

rw: Fact: In every case where a normative value such as good, right, moral, virtuous, or just is to be assigned, its converse in bad, evil, wrong, immoral, or unjust must also be available else the assignment becomes incomprehensible, meaningless and valueless.



alix: Sorry, this is not a fact. This is your unsupported assertion.

Let us consider a simple example: a man a wallet on the sidewalk; he returns it to its owner without taking any money from it. He has committed a virtuous, highly moral act. In my omnibest world, he will choose (entirely freely) not to keep the money. He is certainly done a good deed: even if he has no 'bad' deeds to contrast it to.

rw: Bzzzzt. Fallacy of equivocation. You are equivocating good and bad from this state of affairs where both concepts exist, with a state of affairs where one of them, by your own design, can not possibly exist. You aren’t allowed to flip-flop back and forth between worlds to justify the illogical. In your illogical world no act can be assigned a value because such values do not exist. Remove one half of the equation and you negate the entire artifice. If a person in your illogical world has no reference of bad or evil, good and moral cannot be used to assign value to his actions. He has done a deed, to be sure, but “good” is not available as an assignment to it.

Unfortunately, without an assignable value, he has no reason to do anything with the wallet. So if he does return it, it isn’t a freely chosen act. Some other, non-value force has compelled him to return the wallet to its owner.

alix: Where is need for immorality, badness, evil, etc.? You are, perhaps, confusing the opportunity for evil, suffering, etc. with the actuality of evil, et. al. They are not equivalent.

rw: No one said they are, but they are both necessary concepts in any state where morality, virtue, goodness, right and all other value assigning terms are validly applicable. You can’t create an oil painting without a canvas upon which to paint in any logically possible world.

Furthermore, another devastating consequence to your illogical world, arising out of a cancellation of all value assignments, is the negation of the very omni-attribute responsible for the existence of your world. Your intent was to show how omnipotence could be used to create a state of affairs sans evil and suffering. The attribute you depend on to motivate a god to do this is omni-benevolence. This is implied in your reference to evil and suffering. Benevolence, omni or otherwise, is a value assigning attribute. So you’ve negated the reason for the creation of your illogical state of affairs when you negate value assignment. The net effect is that your world ceases to exist.






alix: This is semantically meaningless:

P1: the group of people - A - freely chooses the right under all circumstances

P2: the group of people - A - do not need to demonstrate their virtue.

These are not even contradictory.

rw: Uh…read further alix.



alix: Why? God has created this world where people freely choose the right - the morally correct, virtuous choice by definition. All choices are 'right'; this does not make them valueless.

rw: It makes no difference if the IPU created this illogical world. A world sans evil and suffering is a world sans right and virtue.

The people in this world neither choose, choose freely, nor freely choose the right.

“Right” doesn’t exist in this world. Remove all reference to evil and you remove any logical definition of right. There is no frame of reference for value assignment. Without value assignment, no reason to make a choice exists. Any choice that is made can no longer be logically declared free, some other motivation must be introduced to compel a choice. Even the concept of “freely” has been included as a value to preserve. A world sans value is a world where “freely” is a non-concept. People in this illogical world would have no way to know if “freely” was preferable to slavery.

rw: Contradiction: It is logically impossible for the same choice to be both right and non-right in any logically possible world.



alix: A non-sequitur even by your own statements: if all choices are non-value choices, then they are neither right nor non-right - they are valueless. And by my definition of this world, these choices are right.

rw: Another fallacy of equivocation rears its ugly mug.
But let’s first rectify the accusation of non sequitur. Non-right and valueless are equivalent terms Alix. The fact that I have demonstrated the “valueless” factor inherent in your illogical world further supports my use of non-right here to express just this meaning, thus they are equivalent.

Now to your fallacy: Alix: And by my definition of this world, these choices are right.

Since when does it become a matter of basic logic to assign a contradictory term as though, because you assign it, it therefore must be correct and logical?

I have, and will continue, to demonstrate that your use of the concept of “right” in this illogical world is erroneous; that your continued use of it amounts to a fallacy of equivocation when using a value assigned term in a non-value assignable state. If you must resort to a fallacy in defining your example, how do expect to arrive at anything other than a logically impossible state?

alix: You cannot generate a contradiction by changing the terms of my example. This is basic logic.

rw: I did not generate the contradiction alix, you did. I merely point it out.




alix: Getting a bit repetitive.

rw: It gets more so due entirely to the sheer number of inherent contradictions. Don’t like redundancy, stop posting examples of contradictory worlds as though they are valid.



alix: Again, non-sequitur. The people in this world make morally correct choices by definition.

According to your own definition, they are virtuous.

rw: I supplied those definitions to show you their reference to both sides of the coin. Your illogical world is a one-sided coin. You cannot define value assignment into a world where no value assignment could possibly obtain. Either your definition is fallacious or your world is illogical. This exposed contradiction is very sequitur and stands on its own merits.



alix: This is precisely the same mistake you made the last time: if you cannot assign a value to something, then it does not possess both that value and its negative.

rw: Non-virtue is not a value assignment alix…it is a negation of value assignment, which is precisely what your illogical world accomplishes. If I had said “not virtuous” you may have a trivially valid argument here. But I note you haven’t lifted a finger to defend against the primary contradiction I’ve exposed but prefer, rather, to snipe hunt.





alix: Remember my definition of omnibest world: people freely choose the right.

rw: Yukyukyuk…alix, your definition is where the contradiction resides. How could I forget such a brilliant example of ignorance?

alix: Again, you cannot choose to make contradictions by changing the terms of the example. To do so is to create a strawman to refute. Very brilliant of you, and no doubt exercises your claymore-like wit, but it is a false refutation.

rw: And you accuse me of deliberate misunderstanding. I didn’t make the contradictions up out of whole cloth Alix, I didn’t create them by changing the terms. I used your terms, offered dictionary definitions and simple logic to show how those inherent contradictions are glaringly fallacious when you negate the canvas of evil and immorality in a world contingent on value assignment to demonstrate the possibility. It’s an illogical world…period.



alix: And no one, except you, ever said they were. Do try to read the example next time: it will save you time when you try to refute it.

rw: Uh…no alix, you said it…in your description. I’m the one taking the reigns here and showing you the fallacy of equivocation you’ve incorporated, and continue to defend, residing throughout your description. The burden is on you to show how value assignment can still obtain in a world where its constituent parts have been stripped.



alix: How many times are you going to repeat this? It's unecessary, really.

rw: It wouldn’t be necessary if you hadn’t invented such an illogical world and then offered it as an example supporting the conclusion of PoE. The only way proponents of PoE can make their argument appear to fly is by just such tactics. Appealing to fallacy and unsupported assumption through and through.



alix: Since YOU are the only person suggesting that my omnibest people are unconscious of their own morality, this is a moot point.

rw: Uh…no alix, I’m not the one suggesting this, the dictionary is, the same definitions you earlier conceded were acceptable. The dictionary uses virtue and morality inter-changeably. You are the one who said a virtuous man can be unconscious of his virtue. The dictionary says otherwise. I’m just the thorn in your flesh pointing out the discrepancy. It’s another shining example of equivocation. A fallacy not allowed in establishing a logical world. One cannot have an unconscious sense of right and wrong. He is either consciously aware of it or else it doesn’t exist.

alix: My sole point was that man can do morally correct deeds without realising it. I never stated this was the condition in omnibest world. You have projected your belief onto my construct.

rw: You never stated this?: a virtuous man can be unconscious of the fact that he is virtuous; his virtue is not predicated or connected with the fact that he is aware of it.?
Or you didn’t intend this to be a condition of your example. Yet you said this in defense of your example. Funny that. Then you are in the habit of making un-connected statements that have no relevance to one another? I rather suspect what you are doing here is back peddling in the hopes of extricating yourself from the horns of this dilemma you now realize you’ve created.

alix: Remember what I said about your inability to read other's posts? Please bear it in mind in the future.

rw: Right alix, you go right on harboring that self delusion.



alix: Why?

rw: How does one experience conscience in the absence of conscious awareness? You are the one who said the people in your world are unconscious of their virtue. The dictionary declares virtue and morals to be a conscience sense of right and wrong. Without some means of awareness of the value of the choice what’s to motivate an autonomous choice either way? Any choice made in spite of this condition must be forced by an extraneous power. Are you now going to argue that force and freedom are equivalent??

alix: Again, this is an unsupported premise. And you are ADDING to my example by asserting that these people have neither conscience nor sense of right and wrong.

rw: Bullshit on both counts. The criticism is more than adequately supported, and the support continues to grow as you struggle against the logic, and I have added nothing to your claims. I have used an acceptable reference dictionary to expose the contradictory nature of the terms with the conditions YOU have described.



alix: And you, I regret to say, don't even appear to be able to spell them.

rw: Where have I misspelled P or Q, Einstein?




alix: If you are planning to actually start doing some refutations, that would be nice, but apparently you are unable to do so, save by inventing straw-worlds to declare illogical.

rw: Snipe hunting again…chuckle.

alix: Please: read, study logic, study ethics. It will make these discussions more profitable.

rw: You mean like you have Einstein? It hasn’t seemed to take any of your arguments out of the bullpen and into the major leagues yet, but why not submit a list of these works that you’ve learned from so I can avoid them like the plaque.

alix: Consider the fact that after six pages of argument, no other person accepts any of your contentions. If your intelligence is as razor-like and incisive as you claim, then why are you unable to produce a convincing argument?

rw: The old ad populum fallacy. Seems I remember watching C-SPAN last week when the Senate was debating limitations on the filibuster. The Republicans, as always, weren’t getting their way in the judiciary appointments because the Democrats were using the filibuster to delay the vote. Old Senator Byrd, a scholar par excellence on Senate rules, noted that the filibuster, as tendentious as it is, has actually been instrumental in preventing the majority from passing some really bad legislation in the past, and therefore aught not be tampered with.

Just one reason why the appeal to popular opinion is a fallacy in any man’s world.



Now are you actually going to defend your position or shovel real estate?