Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Vanderzyden:

"That would depend on the additional powers, if any, that are associated with the new abilities. Your suggestion is puzzling: I wonder, how would the all-powerful Being suddenly acquire these new abilities?"

It doesn't matter. Let me get this straight, though: You don't think the abilities to eat, to learn, to forget, to delude oneself, to surprise oneself, to perform an evil action, etc., count as any powers? But you do grant that if God suddenly gained a billion new abilities, He would be no more powerful, as long as these abilities don't fit your definition of "power."

"If your Rock-Maker is simply a button-pusher, then he makes (i.e. creates) nothing. Something else is ultimately responsible for the creating the rocks. What being would that be?"

I don't know. But we can change this slightly to make it more appealing. God cannot form a bar of gold so heavy He cannot lift it. I can, just by melting together smaller bars of gold.

"Anyway, your ability to write a book whose reading duration exceeds one hour is not a power."

Then you grant that there is at least one logically possible action God cannot perform. Do you grant that the definition "can perform any logically possible action" is indeed coherent?

"I have submitted this definition..."

And I would be surprised to find any contemporary apologist who finds it adequate, or to find many people who think it agrees with our intuitions.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Philip Osborne:

"I think even if we are saying that God strongly actualizes the state of affairs in which someone freely chooses evil, then God can do so, so long as He has sufficient moral reason."

But if God is bringing the state of affairs about, I don't see how we can really say it's free. It sounds as if God would be causing someone to make a free choice.

"Also (and this seems to be a premise of your second argument) no being can strongly actualize a state of affairs in which someone else freely chooses anything, for if some being did, that action would not be free."

Well, right. That's why I'm limiting it to strongly actualizing the state of affairs in which someone or other freely chooses evil. I can actualize this state of affairs.

"This is an interesting argument. Outside the notion of free will, I'm not sure the idea of bringing about a state of affairs under one's own power is even intelligible."

Well, to bring about a state of affairs, to me, seems similar just to causing something to happen. God can't cause someone or other to make an evil choice, but it would seem that I can -- I can cause myself to make an evil choice. And if I learn something by going to the library and reading some books, I think I have brought about the state of affairs in which someone or other learns something under his or her own power, but if God is causing me to do so, this seems different. (I'm not sure if "under his or her own power" is the right wording, though; see below.)

"Supposing you have been so far correct, it is true that no being other than Sam can do this. This is true for any being, even Joe, who can barely do anything. But it is also true that Sam cannot bring about the SOA in which God does x under His own power; so if God is said to be lacking in something, it must also be true that Sam is lacking in something. Hence, it is not immediately made clear by the argument that Sam actually is more powerful than God."

I think this is the best response to my line of argument. I would say that you seem to have departed slightly from the conception of omnipotence under discussion, although you may have come up with an adequate one. Let me reprint something I posted in another thread...

Let S be the state of affairs in which someone or other learns something, and S' be the state of affairs "someone or other brings about S." I can bring about S' and S, but God can only bring about S. The reason is that if I cause myself to learn, I have brought about S' and S, but God cannot cause Himself to learn and therefore can only bring about S -- He could cause me to learn, but, e.g., He could not cause me to learn without being caused to learn by an outside force.

So God can bring about any (1) logically possible state of affairs that is (2) bring-about-able by an agent... and there's a third criterion lurking somewhere. Would it be something referring to relative power? I think we need something else, because there's the (rather cheap) move of pointing out that God cannot bring about a state of affairs that was not brought about by an omniscient being. But at heart I think these moves are not so illicit; the fact that God is unable to learn seems to be a genuine limitation, even if it doesn't explicitly refer to states of affairs.

"Perhaps for any moral decision God could make, there is some decision that God could make which is better. This seems to make sense, since God has infinite power. However, God would not then be flustered into total inaction by this phenomenon; He would be free to choose any of the options available to Him and which fulfill His purposes in some respect."

My response here would be that maybe then there's no such thing as moral perfection, because it's always possible to imagine a morally better being. If, on the other hand, moral perfection is simply a matter of never committing any evil, then we could probably formulate a similar argument about God never being able to choose evil.

Vanderzyden

Thomas,

I wrote: "I have submitted this definition..."

You reply: "And I would be surprised to find any contemporary apologist who finds it adequate, or to find many people who think it agrees with our intuitions."

You have not shown it to be inadequate, because you have not given one power that ranks with creative power.

You have not shown that it does not agree with our intuitions.

We've been over the other stuff in your reply several times.

Thanks for the opportunity to think this through. I've enjoyed the discussion.

John

Silent Acorns

Thank you Venderzyden for your reply,

I strongly disagree.

Who are you to say that such a god can't lie? What if he wants to lie? Are you saying that he can't want to lie? It sounds like you claim to have power over an omnipotent god's will. Interesting.

<strong> If a being has more power by every objective measure than all other beings combined, and can enforce his will everywhere and always, then "complete power" has nothing to do with it. If such a god wanted to create X, no other being could stop him. After all, if someone could stop him then your god would no longer have the ability to "enforce his will everywhere and always", and he would cease to be omnipotent by your own definition.

<strong> Creative ability has nothing to do with my objection to your definition. This may be an important feature for your theology, but it is irrelevant as far as whether or not "can do anything logically possible" is the same thing as "can enforce his will everywhere and always".

<strong> I never said it was. It's only the combination of all three omnis and the reality of suffering that creates a paradox.

<strong> Is this your way out of the paradox? I looked up your link and there you claim that god has immeasurable benevolence, as opposed to infinite benevolence. I fail to see the difference between immeasuarable and infinite. If something isn't infinite, then it is finite, and if it is finite, then it is measurable - at least in principle. Are you saying that god is "very big" good? Are there flaws in his "goodness", or is his goodness perfect?

Vanderzyden

Hello SA,

You've brought a slightly different angle to our discussion. Let's pursue it a bit further.

I didn't invent this notion. God is the Supreme Good. As such, it is neither necessary nor possible that he could want to lie.

You are emphasizing God's desires, his will. However, his will must be consistent with his character and his power. Because he is the Creator, any being he creates is necessarily a creature. No creature has power over its own existence. This power is exclusive to the Creator.

It is not necessarily important for "my" theology. Again, I did not invent these notions. Something exists rather than nothing. It follows directly that there is a Creator that is responsible for existence.

You are attempting to equate logical possibility with God's freedom of will. However, it seems intuitively obvious that enforcement of his will is alltogether different from performance of any logical possibility. Again, I would refer you to the example of "creating a rock too heavy to lift".

The problem of evil is a separate discussion. It is not a "problem" if you remember that some creatures are free agents who may choose to reject God.

God is the Supreme Good. All that is good comes from him. Yes, his Goodness may be "measurable" in principle, but can be ascertained and "quantified" only by God himself. No creature can fully comprehend the Creator.

Anyway, remember that omni-benevolence means "always disposed to doing good", not "infinite goodness". For one thing, no actual infinite exists. And, while God is the Supreme Good, his actions may be perceived by his creatures as less than good because their evil desires are not satisfied.


John

[ October 26, 2002: Message edited by: Vanderzyden ]</p>

Silent Acorns

I feel that the problem of evil is the implicit reason for this thread, but to maintain focus, I'll confine myself to attributes of god. You caught me off guard by claiming that omni-benevolence is "not an attribute of god" ...

Forgive me for being confused, but if god is the "supreme good" and omni-belevolence means "always disposed to doing good" then wouldn't "omni-benevolence" be an attribute of god? Or, are you saying that while god may be the supreme good, he is not always disposed to doing good?

I don't see how it is "obvious" since it is impossible for us to limit the will of an omnipotent being. If a being has the ability to "enforce his will everywhere and always" then this is the same thing as saying that he can do "anything he wants". The instant you say that "he can't do _____", you are putting a limit on his will. Since you admit that no creature can comprehend god, how can you claim to know the limits of his will?

How do you determine what these limits are? If these limits can be determined by logic, then you are saying that god's will is only limited by logic, which is the same thing as saying that god's power is only limited by logic. In otherwords, god can do anything that is logically possible.

If not by logic, then what? Did god personally inform you that he can't lie? Maybe he was lying to you.

[ October 26, 2002: Message edited by: Silent Acorns ]</p>

Silent Acorns

Vander,

One more thing. Since you claim that it is "intuitively obvious", are you in fact claiming that god's will, and thus his power, is limited by your intuition?

Vanderzyden

Again, the creature cannot limit the Creator. However, the Creator knows his limits. Surely you'll agree. I am not stipulating what God can't do: I make direct inferences from the Bible and from nature.

"Anything he wants" does not equate with "anything at all", or "anything logically possible". Do you understand the distinction?

Why do you insist that we may expand the power of any being to fill the bounds of the human imagination? There are many things that are logically possible in theory but impossible to be actualized. This is the problem that I have been addressing in this thread. Have you read the last several pages? My contention is that we must discard the "anything" and "logically possible" (strong and weak) definitions, since they are far too broad to be applicable to any being that exists.


John

[ October 26, 2002: Message edited by: Vanderzyden ]</p>

Philip Osborne

For the most part, I think we agree on the first few paragraphs, so I will skip ahead a bit.

So God can bring about any (1) logically possible state of affairs that is (2) bring-about-able by an agent... and there's a third criterion lurking somewhere. Would it be something referring to....

I think we can say, at any rate, that God is able to bring about any possible state of affairs which is not of the form "S freely does x," where S is not identical to God. Even though this imposes a limitation which may not be immediately obvious, it still seems true that we cannot imagine a being more powerful than this. If God being unable to cause God to learn is a genuine limitation, in some sense, on God, the inability to cause God to learn would also be a limitation on Sam. So even if there are states of affairs which Sam can bring about and God cannot, there will necessarily be corollary states of affairs which Sam cannot bring about and God can (i.e. If God can't cause Sam to freely do S, it is also true that Sam can't cause God to freely do S). So it has not clearly been demonstrated that Sam is more powerful than God; if this is so, then it has also not been demonstrated that God fails the "maximal power test," and so state-of-affairs omnipotence has not been refuted.

My response here would be that maybe then there's no such thing as moral perfection, because it's always possible to imagine a morally better being. If, on the other hand, moral perfection is simply a matter of never committing any evil, then we could probably formulate a similar argument about God never being able to choose evil.

Your challenge to moral perfection is a very serious one; I've been considering how I would answer such a challenge for some time. Moral perfection may simply be a matter of making moral judgements w/out error. Unless every theodicy that could ever be given is unsuccessful, this is not logically equivalent with not being able to commit evil.

Sincerely,

Philip

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Vanderzyden:

"You have not shown it to be inadequate, because you have not given one power that ranks with creative power."

The ability to perform any logically possible action, which is a coherent ability, seems to produce a more powerful being. You have still not provided reason to reject "able to perform any logically possible action."

"You have not shown that it does not agree with our intuitions."

Of course it doesn't. I don't have the resources to take a survey, but I have a feeling most people would say being x is more powerful than being y if x can perform a trillion more actions than y can perform.