Koyaanisqatsi

dk, I sincerely apologize and I'm not being glib or meaning to insult you, but I haven't the faintest idea what you're talking about, because you simply make no coherent points or observations (beyond irrelevant tautologies) that I can discern.

I simply do not know what the hell you're talking about. It is as if you read a textbook and concluded that regurgitation of terms suffices for the proper application of terms.

It is as if you are saying things like: The purpose of language is to communicate ideas between people.

Such a declaration of the obvious--while certainly true--serves no purpose and presents no salient or relevant observation, other than a declaration of the obvious.

Again, I'm sorry, but you simply are not coherently stating anything relevant that I can comprehend or discern, so either it is a failing within my cognitive abilities or something lacking from your explanatory process.

Regardless, I suggest you address your posts to others, since I do not wish to be rude (yes, I'm actually trying to "better" myself) and will most likely not respond to any posts you make to me for the reasons outlined above.

[ June 19, 2002: Message edited by: Koyaanisqatsi ]</p>

99Percent

Koyaanisqatsi: I think we are getting somewhere.

If it is "objectively immoral" to kill, then that immorality must apply to anything that kills, since the immorality--in order for it to be considered "objective"--must, in turn, be an intrinsic element to the act itself.

See, you are trying to derive objectivity from an absoluteness outside of the human realm. You are saying that in order for something to be objectively wrong or right there must be an absolute good/bad outside human understanding - this is clearly absurd (unless you go to theistic objective morality which is still absurd ) Non theistic objective morality must reside in the human point of view, from humanistic beliefs, from what is good and bad within the human realm of things, ideas and inventions.

A table is tangible, not an abstract concept such as morality.

There are many abstract concepts that are objectively true. Isn't "tableness" an abstract concept? In fact, maybe only abstract concepts can be objective.

Also, the question of morality is not a fixed number like a table is a fixed number; the question of morality is a judgment call; a determination of "rightness" as opposed to "wrongness" and therefore hopelessly comparative at all times, which, in turn, mandates subjectivity.

The judgement call is always made from a human, any human and all humans, being alive and of rational sense share the same goal - happiness. That is where objective right and wrong derive from - from our human common desire which is happiness.

Yes, because the table exists independently of our perceptions, which is the primary defining quality of "objective."

The table as a bunch of matter certainly exists independently of our perceptions. But what does not exist independent of human perception is the quality of tableness. That is what I am trying to say that right and wrong does not exist independent of human perception but that does not mean that it is no longer objectively so much like the perception of tableness.

Morality--as everyone in here agrees--does not exist independently of human perception, so if immorality is not intrinsic in the act it cannot be said to be objective, just as the abstract quality of the "concept of a table" is instrinsic in the actuality of the table.

Immoratily can be intrinsic in the act - from the perception of any human. Much like the perception of a table must reside from the perception of any man. Even though you can claim that if no human existed there would be no tables, likewise if no humans existed there would be no good or bad.

Morality, however, does not "contain" itself. That act is what is judged, but the act is not intrinsically "right" or "wrong." That is a judgment that is made by an individual; a comparative judgment that does not exist in the case of the table.

But of course it exists, what is the interpretation of a bunch of matter that determines that it is a table nothing but a "judgement" too?

One cannot look at a table and say, "That's not a table" (in any relevant way).

Of course anyone can look at a table and say it is not a table. If I were freezing to death and the only source of wood was this stupid useless table I would not call it a table anymore, but ubstead a lot of useful wood that can generate some heat. The interpretation (and judgement) of this bunch of matter is far from trivial.

Well, technically that's correct since without humans no table would ever have been formed out of wood to begin with (or stone or concrete, etc.), but, once the table is constructed and can therefore be said to exist as a "table," then it intrinsically contains the "concept of tableness" the carpenter had as his meta blueprint, if you will.

Likewise with objective morality.

Technically, it can be said that it is this "concept of tableness" contained within the meta structure of the physical object that mandates objectivity. It is therefore said to be a "table" by every human being who views it and would still be "considered" a table even after a nuclear blast destroyed all humanity, because it contains and conveys, ultimately, the intrinsic "concept of tableness."

Not if every human being was destroyed - there would be no one left to make the "judgement call" of what is a table. Tables in fact cease to exist as such.

Your inability to see that an analogy that involves a tangible object cannot be equally applied to an abstract comparative judgement (other than in the manner I turned it around to demonstrate your fallacious reasoning), or the fact that the crux of the entire argument is in the action of judgment and that "judgment" will always be a necessarily subjective decision is impossible to reconcile.

Its your inability to see what direction your subjectivism is taking you - complete and utter nihilism to the understanding and reason of our existence. Judgements come from human beings but that does not mean that all judgements will differ.

dk

Modern logic evaluates statements to determine 'what is asserted' when a sentence is used to say something true or false.

P: Human Beings created morality
Q: morality is subjective.
If P then Q asserts human beings are creative (and nothing about morality)

This is the fallacy of “post hoc, ergo propter hoc” that asserts causation because A follows B in sequence (even the sequence is iffy). Alternatively, human nature entails culture and morality. Analogously, does a slab of marble distinguish a marble table top from a marble statue? To assert something about objective/subjective moralities we must look to the efficient cause e.g. whether culture and/or human nature are the efficient cause of morality and culture. Subjective morality entailed by culture applies many independent domains to tell people apart. Objective morality entailed by human nature applies one domain to all people. Does morality distinguish one person from another, as more or less “cultural” or “human”? NO. If we say, P(law of nature) necessitates Q1(morality) and Q2(culture); P subscribes morality and culture to the laws of nature; i.e. human nature; but “subscribe” is much to strong a word in lieu of other alternatives. People are social rational creatures by nature, therefore suited to moral and cultural norms. Still we haven’t inferred causation, merely sequence. To infer causation we need to talk with Darwin.
Plato and Aristotle observed morality is a necessary feature of human culture (or visa versa), and anthropologists have confirmed the fact . People as rational social creatures can’t exist (survive) without culture or morality, i.e. survival entails morality and culture. Subjective morality is a function of culture i.e. ; whereas objective morality is a function of human nature. Darwin’s mechanisms of natural selection (though hypothetical) are ambivalent to human creativity, or are at best the material cause of human creativity. Still we can’t infer causation, merely sequence…

Please explain how you know morality is subjective?

[ June 20, 2002: Message edited by: dk ]</p>

Koyaanisqatsi

As were you with your analogy of the table and bd with his analogy of the Earth.

No, I am not. I am saying that for there to be an "absolute" (aka, "objective") good/bad it must be an intrinsic quality of the action, which in turn effects human understanding; i.e., impacts upon human understanding, thus triggering within the human the "objective" response, "I have done an objectively, absolutely bad thing in all possible universes according to all possible humans throughout all of time which is necessarily independent of human interpretations and therefore not subjective."

That is what objectivity means; independent of human interpretation so that it is not simply a matter of agreement.

Morality, however, cannot possibly ever be said to be outside of human interpretation.

That is an impossibility that we both agree upon.

So, since it is impossible for good/bad to exist oustside of human interpretation (not understanding, necessarily but interpretation) then it is trivially pointless and equally impossible to label any action as "objectively bad."

Using the qualifier "objectively" must mean that the action is bad in and of itself independent of human interpretation so that the "badness" quotient is not susceptible to human interpretation.

In other words, the Universe (or "nature" if you will) as a construct must be the one that declares "this action is bad," an obvious absurdity.

If this is not the case (as is abundantly and obviously so) then it is impossible to state an action is objectively bad for all humans.

For anyone to state, "Murder is objectively bad for all humans" they will instantly and automatically be making a subjective judgment call; i.e., declaring their personal opinion.

It is impossible to demonstrate that an action can be said to be objectively "bad" for all humans no matter what the circumstances.

Impossible.

If you disagree, then please post an action that is unquestionably "objectively bad."

Not murder, not rape, not torture, not eating babies alive; not one single action can ever be said to be objectively bad in all circumstances for all humans regardless of human interpretation.

If you can think of just one, kindly present it.

(edited to correct for "table" not "chair" - Koy)

[ June 21, 2002: Message edited by: Koyaanisqatsi ]</p>

Koyaanisqatsi

Sorry, I had to break up your post because my boss was coming...

So you assert. Kindly demonstrate how this can be established independently of your own personal subjective view.

Would it be by consensus? If so, who makes up that consensus and how would they be able to remove their personal opinions and disagreements, etc., in order to arrive at a non-subjectively created "objective morality?"

Please stop telling me what you think an "objective non-theistic morality" would entail and demonstrate how it is possible to establish it. Name an objectively "bad" act that is bad for all human beings in all possible worlds and what the mechanism is that establishes this mandate for all human beings in all possible worlds.

Hell, just one act that is morally bad for all humans will do.

Thank you for that irrelevant observation that has no bearing on the point I was making in regard to the invalidity of your analogy.

That is intrinsic within the table itself; i.e., it contains itself.

For your analogy to be valid, the act of killing would have to be intrinsically "bad;" the "badness" of the act of killing would have to "contain itself" just as the table “contains itself.”

Please explain how an abstract concept can be said to "contain itself" in any relevant (i.e., non-tautological) manner that would render your analogy involving the table applicable.

Let me see if I can spell this out as simply as possible. There is one act, one question, and two possible answers that you are saying do not exist. Let's take killing as the one act. The one question becomes, "is the act of killing objectively 'bad?'" The two possible answers are either "yes" or "no," which you are saying is incorrect. What you are saying is that there is only one answer to that question. So which is it?

If you answer "yes," what are your objective qualifications for doing so?

If you answer "no," what are your objective qualifications for doing so?

False. Beyond being impossible to qualify what "happiness" is (or, for that matter what it means to be of "rational sense"), as any psychologist can prove rather conclusively, for many millions of humans “being alive and of rational sense" do not share that goal.

A masochist, for example, does not share that goal. A sadist, does not share that goal, or are you here to selectively declare that neither a masochist nor a sadist are of "rational sense" and if so, who died and made you King, to put it bluntly?

Only in a colloquial sense could it be argued that a masochist of "rational sense" shares the goal of happiness, because it can be said that he or she is only "happy" when they are miserable. For the sadist, it is even more complex, since they are only "happy" when they are making somebody else miserable. To the sadist, another person’s happiness makes them unhappy.

To go to an even greater extreme, a necrophiliac is only happy when having sexual intercourse with the dead. Are you here declaring that a necrophiliac is not of "rational sense" and if so, again, who died and made you King?

The best we can all do as a group is selectively exclude these people as being--in our eyes--not of "rational sense" and therefore it can be said by us that their actions are "immoral," but that's all it would be! Group consensus.

Says you.

I would contend that our common desire is misery, as evidenced by the overwhelming amount of it seen throughout the world on such a pervasive level that it is almost impossible for me to conclude other, but in keeping with your selectively arrived at standard, a sadist is then being "objectively right" when he or she causes another human to be unhappy, right? Their desire is happiness and they arrive at this happiness through another's unhappiness, yes?

False. The "quality of tableness" is intrinsic in the table, such that no matter what sentient being that would happen upon it long after all of humanity has been irradiated will recognize the purpose inherent within the "meta" structure we call "table."

In other words, one billion years from now, Krull from Rigel 5 will recognize immediately the intrinsic purpose--the "tableness"--of the table and use it to put things upon accordingly, because the “tableness” informs the intellect of its own purpose and design.

That act of killing, however, does not contain an intrinsic “wrongness” that informs the intellect of its own “wrongness,” primarily because there is also the flipside to that, which is intrinsic “rightness.”

Do you see what I’m going after? With the table, there is only one abstraction that can be said to be contained within itself (in any relevant way), but “morality” necessarily contains both “rightness” and “wrongness,” which demands a judgment call; a choice must be made between those two diametrically opposite constructs and that choice will always be subjective.

Is it “right” to kill in self defense? Is it “right” to kill in war? Is it “right” to kill for survival? Is it “right” to kill for revenge? Is it “right” to kill for sport? Is it “right” to kill just for the sake of killing?

That act “to kill” is exactly like a particle in quantum physics. It cannot be said to be either “right” or “wrong” until the wave collapses and there is an event; a singularity of occurrence that can be determined by the circumstances and group consensus to be considered either “right” or “wrong,” but there is no intrinsic singularity contained within the act in the same manner that there is an intrinsic singularity contained within the table.

Well, all I can say is, yet again, IMO, you are incorrect.

How? How is killing intrinsically immoral when the question of morality necessarily mandates a choice; a judgment call? Once again, who or what is the mechanism that makes this judgment call that in turn mandates that the judgment is absolutely applicable to all possible humans in all possible worlds?

What is the mechanism that removes subjectivity?

Incorrect. The "tableness" is intrinsic within the table independently of human perception. If there were no more humans, the table would still be a table. If, however, there were no more humans, killing would no longer be either moral or immoral as you have stated.

Which means that "good" and "bad" are selectively determined judgment calls.

It is impossible to name just one objectively bad act; rape, torture, killing; not a single one of those is objectively bad for all humans in all circumstances. It will always be possible to imagine a set of circumstances in which any human action can be morally justified, rendering any "objectiveness" about the action trivial.

For example, rape. I am told that if I don't immediately go out and rape a man within the next ten minutes thirty people will be killed. Although it can be trivially argued that it is still "wrong" to rape the man, such a designation is overridden by the "greater good" others have spoken of, that turns the rape of the man into an ultimately morally "good" act, because it saved thirty lives. Now, what happens if after I raped the man and it is revealed to me that the thirty people I subsequently saved were all Al Queda terrorists?

It is all subjective and necessarily, inherently so.

Comparative judgment between two diametrically opposed polar opposites?

Enough. The table is a fixed object. That act of killing is an event.

HOW YOU INTERPRET THAT ACT IS MORALITY AND IT WILL ALWAYS AND FOREVER BE A SELECTIVE JUDGMENT CALL DEPENDENT UPON CIRCUMSTANCE.

IN ANY RELEVANT WAY? No.

Incorrect. Beyond the fact that this clearly does not fall under the relevance standard I applied, the table is still a table that you are simply destroying to turn into fuel, thus, you are burning the table.

Support that declaration. It is nothing but a trivial designation that is not relevant to the context of my argument.

Incorrect. You will never be able to establish an intrinsically, objectively immoral act or standard that isn't simply agreed upon.

Group consensus does not equal objectivity, yet morality is defined by group consensus!

Entirely irrelevant to the intrinsic "tableness" contained within the table.

Homocentric (and contradictory) nonsense. A table will always be a table and contain itself (the “tableness”), if only in a "dormant" sense, regardless of humanity's existence or lack thereof.

Non sequitur. The “understanding and reason of our existence” is, likewise, purely subjective.

Name one that doesn't.

(edited for lysdexia and clarification - Koy)

[ June 21, 2002: Message edited by: Koyaanisqatsi ]</p>

99Percent

Hehe, talking about doing "bad" things...!

Koyaanisqatsi

Always!

Vive la (subjectiv) différence!

99Percent

Koy, I will get to your post shortly, but first feel I should answer Alonzo Fyfe's and bd-from-kg's post as they are older.

Alonzo Fyfe: The most significant mistake is a fallacy pointed out by David Hume. Ayn Rand barely gets two steps away from the gate before falling over this piece of logic.

Man is a rational animal
Therefore, man ought to act rationally.

It does not follow. It is no more logical than saying "My car is green, therefore my car ought to be green."

What would be the name of this fallacy? Anyway I can see where this is getting to. In fact, it is not unlike the argument I am having with Koy right now. First of all I think your car analogy is not correct. The right analogy would be "My car is a mode of transportation therefore my car ought to transport me." The distinction is important because as human beings we make value judgements to everything. It is our modus operandi and ultimately our means of survival and happiness. When I look at a table I say: "The table supports objects therefore a table ought to support objects on top of it". The important thing to realize is that by making these value judgements we can tell if things are working correctly or not, if they are working the way they are supposed to.

Therefore when we say "A car is a mode of transportation, therefore it ought to transport me" and indeed if there is a flat tire, the engine won't start, etc we can tell that the car is indeed not doing what it is supposed to be doing. The car is not fulfilling its "ought". Likewise when we say "Man is a rational animal, therefore man ought to act rationally" and indeed when a man is acting irrationally (for example believing in a god) then we can say he is not fulfilling his "ought", his intrisic nature of being a man.

In my argument with Koy we both agree that a table has an objective intrisic attribute we call tableness. We both agree that a table has an ought - it has to fulfill its role as a table otherwise it is not a table. Say if the table is missing two legs and it is balancing precariously on just two legs - it is not really a table anymore, it is not fulfilling its ought. So when I say X is Y, what I am really saying is that X ought to be Y for X to have any meaning at all.

Also, I noticed that my Objectivist friends would always say that the virtue of capitalism was not its capacity to produce great conseqeunces. Like Ayn Rand herself, they condemned utilitarian capitalists for building capitalism on the uncertain foundation of "best consequences" rather than the more solid foundation of "natural rights."

Yet, they all believed that unfettered capitalism would, in fact, bring about a golden age. Was this golden age really just an accidental and unimportant side-effect of obeying natural rights? Listening to them talk, I found this hard to accept after a while. If one were to provide evidence that Objectivism would spread misery and poverty, then these people would in fact suddenly see the is-ought fallacy.

In short, a longing for the promised "golden age" of unfettered capitalism blinded them to the huge logical crack in its foundation.

I don't want to get into a discussion of capitalism here in MF+P but I think you are mistaken on what the objectivist position of capitalism is. One thing is to believe in the principles behind capitalism and another is to believe what the consequences of capitalism would be good. Its not so far from objective morality after all. I might believe that I should kill anyone of race X on principle, but I can also believe that not doing so will lead to a happier and fulfilling life, but it does not mean that it automatically leads to a happier and fulfilling life. Heck I might be brutally raped and murder the minute I walk out my home by someone of race X despite having the best of principles towards people of race X.

Now, I think that, ultimately, there must be some sort of bridge across the is/ought gap. Fact/value dualism has the same problem as mind/value dualism -- if these different types of entities exist then how do they interact to influence things in the real world? Values must be real, must exist in some way in the world of "is", or they are irrelevant in making real-world decisions.

It would be nice if it could scientifically or on purely logical grounds bridge the gap between is/ought. For better or for worse this can only be determined through human reasoning only, or else we would just be a bunch of robots acting purely on logical consequences.

bd-from-kg: I was wrong. I have no idea where you’re coming from. So this reply is necessarily disconnected. I can’t “connect the dots” to infer a coherent moral philosophy from the things you’ve said. Maybe you can help.

Actually I am the one who has no idea where you're coming from. I have stated here numerous times I am sort of "freethinking" objectivist very much on par with Ayn Rand's ideas with slight modifications. You seem to want to establish objective morality too, based on human empathy, which I find basically fallacious on the grounds that empathy - the perception of other's happiness- is necessarily subjective.

Here it seems that you want to have it both ways. You want to say that the “rightness” of an act depends on its intrinsic nature (e.g., telling the truth vs. lying), but that it also depends on its consequences (whether it produces “true” happiness). Unfortunately this only seems tenable if one invents polite fictions like distinguishing between “true” happiness (the kind of happiness produced by “virtuous” acts) and other happiness, which isn’t “really” happiness no matter how much it may feel like it to the person experiencing it

The consequences I am talking about does not depend on the external, but on what you experience afterwards, although the external can indeed force false situations that appear to be superficially true at first glance. Human beings can distinguish between what is true and what is false and this is what makes things wrong despite our pathetic attempts to pretend otherwise. This is in fact what is called conscience. So for example I might win the marathon race by cheating and pretend to be happy even though I in fact know it is not true. Everyone might even think I am the champion and everything might just end there with that false conclusion, even though at any time truth can come to light - someone might have seen me run through the short cut and taken photographs of me cheating. There is no need to invent polite fictions to demostrate this, our consciences takes care of that.

This doesn’t work. In the real world there is no special “flavor” of happiness that can only be obtained by being a moral person. (For example, when I read to my three-year-old granddaughter, she enjoys it immensely in spite of the fact that she didn’t “earn” this happiness by being “virtuous”.

But who is indeed experiencing this moment of happiness but yourself? Who else can indeed determine the truthfulness of this happiness but that of the one you are experiencing yourself?

In general, it is simply not true that being virtuous always leads to more happiness than being “wicked”. If this were so, there would be no need for morality; such a miraculous correspondence between “moral-ought” and “practical-ought” would be noticed by everyone, and almost everyone would draw the obvious lesson that it’s always in one’s interest to be virtuous.

In fact it is an obvious to be virtous (in the objective sense). It just seems easier all the time to make short cuts to quick but in the end false happiness, it us our constant temptation, so to speak. That is why we need morality.

But even if it were true that being virtuous always leads to more “true” happiness than any alternative, you would still have a dilemma: is an act morally right because of its intrinsic nature (and it’s just a happy coincidence that in our world “virtuous” acts always happen to be in the agent’s best interest), or is it morally right because of its consequences (and it’s just a happy coincidence that in our world the choice with the best consequences is always the most “virtuous” one)? The only other possibility is that there is some mysterious metaphysical principle that makes it logically necessary that these two senses of “morally right” must always coincide (i.e., have the same extension).

As a nonconsequentialist, I don't see any dilemma. An act is morally right because if it leads to a happy consequence you can be sure it is of your own moral integrity. If leads to an unhappy consequence you can be sure it is despite your best good intentions. Imagine you decide to build a house. You feel lazy at first and put little effort in making a strong foundation. Later on you decide to make your house attractive and comfortable investing in decorating it nicely and buying very expensive furniture. Yet when a strong storm is approaching and you hear about tornado warnings you feel uneasy - you know you should have placed more effort in the building of a stronger foundation. A tornado might or might not rip your house appart, that is irrelevant, it is the fact that you cannot have a clear conscience in case the tornado destroyed your home that it might not have been your fault. Your happy feelings toward your home is undermined. Objectively speaking if I externally see that when you are building the foundations of your home that you did not put enough reasonable effort in doing so and then see how you spent too much time and money decorating it, then if a tornado destroys your home I can objectively say - "well you really didn't do your best did you?" OTOH if I did see that you really did put the required reasonable effort in building the foundation of your home at the expense of nice and frivolous decorations then I can objectively say when the tornado destroyed your home - "well, you did your reasonable best, it really isn't your fault the tornado destroyed your home".

First, I’m not so sure that this is the fundamental reason for your rejection of consequentialist theories. It appears to me that the basic reason is that such theories make it practically impossible to formulate universally valid moral principles. They imply that on rare occasions it may be “right” even to murder your grandmother to collect an inheritance.

Yes, but not even in "rare" occasions". In fact it would be consequentialist theories that would say that to murder my grandmother to collect an inheritance to be entirely right - as I am actually making a monetary benefit. Although I do say that when you initiate violence you enter into a state of perpetual violence.

A. It does not follow from the fact that it is impossible in principle to know whether X is true that there is no objective truth regarding X. For example, it may be impossible in principle for us to know whether there is life on the tenth planet circling Betelgeuse. (Even if scientists from this planet sent a signal telling of their existence which was reaching Earth right now, it would tell us only that there was [probably] life there when the signal was sent – about 310 years ago - not whether there is life there now.) But it is either objectively true or false that there is life on this planet.

This is a bizarre example. I am not sure what you are trying to say here. You mean it is necessary to make moral decisions in the face of uncertainty? Aren't all moral decisions ultimately this way?

B. Some philosophers have argued that it is the consequences that are most probable or which a reasonably person could be expected to anticipate or foresee which determine the “rightness” of an act. But I think that this confuses two distinct issues: whether an act is right, and whether the agent should be praised or blamed for doing it. If there is every reason to think that the consequences of a given choice will be “better” than those of any alternative, but actually turn out to be catastrophic, it seems to me to be more natural to say that he made the wrong choice, but that he is not to blame (and often should be praised) for making it. But this has always seemed to me to be an argument about language, not about morality per se.

Its an argument about intentions. Catastrophic consequences could have been caused from the best of intentions. He made the wrong choice - but what were his intentions?

I think you should completely eliminate the empathy if you consider that people have free will (even children to a more limited degree).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I’m still mystified as to why you think so. Are you saying that the psychological effects that our actions will have on children are irrelevant to whether they’re right or wrong? If so, what exactly is wrong with statutory rape? Is a priest who seduces an altar boy doing anything wrong? Is it more wrong than having an affair with a woman from another town? If so, why?

I admit that it is hard to determine objective morality regarding children. By the nature of children, children are actually a commitment from parents to take care of them. Commitment is a promise that can be objectively seen. If a promise to take care of children is broken then you can judge objectively there is an immoral act. Before birth control the commitment would have to come through marriage before sex. Now the commitment can come in the first three months of pregnancy, before pregnancy is even visible.

If so, what exactly is wrong with statutory rape?

Statury rape is a violation of trust.

Is a priest who seduces an altar boy doing anything wrong?

It is also a violation of trust. The priest made vows and he is breaking them. The parents (and therefore guardians) of the boy are being mislead as to what the priests intentions are with the boy.

Is it more wrong than having an affair with a woman from another town? If so, why?

It is still wrong because he is breaking his vows and pretending to be someone he isn't, he is in fact lying. But he can be engaging in a consensual sexual activity with another woman who knows all of this.

Like most decisions in real life, you guess and hope you’re right. But as I pointed out above, the fact of uncertainty doesn’t mean that there’s no “objectively right” decision. What if the patient really is in agonizing pain? Are you saying that it would not be objectively right to relieve the pain? I’m truly bewildered.

What I am saying is that it ceases to be an objective moral decision. You have to now subjectively evaluate the pain and act accordingly. You could be right or wrong. Your conscience or your peers cannot judge you objectively. The only one who can tell you is the one agonizing, and if there is no communication with the one perceiving the pain then there is no objectivity.

It would be nice if we could always know for certain what we morally-ought to do, just as it would be nice if we could always know for certain what we practical-ought to do, or for that matter what is really the case, or what will happen tomorrow. But the real world was not designed for our convenience. We just have to muddle through as best we can.

Exactly. The best we can considering current knowledge and understanding is the key.

From the general tone of your replies here, I take it that your answer is that there is no way to determine this, even roughly, and that therefore the infliction any amount of pain is morally irrelevant. since the question here is how much pain is morally acceptable, not how much is occurring this would seem to apply to anyone, not just to a patient unable to communicate. (After all, what communication would have any bearing on whether a given amount of pain is morally acceptable?)

Well if you hit my finger with a hammer and I yell "ouch that really hurt, don't do it again" and yet you still do it then it becomes morally relevant. You are going against my wishes. So communication is important - vital in fact.

Why ever not? If a person who is flat-out insane should be permitted to make life-and-death decisions on his own behalf [see below], why not an eight-year-old?

As I said, it seems obvious to me that neither children nor the insane should be able to make such decisions, but your position looks to me to be clearly inconsistent.

Again because the children and the insane are being taken care (have to be taken care of in fact or they would quickly die) by those who have made a commitment to do so.

Huh? The well-being of a madman is certainly not going to come from his rational desire to be well. Does that mean that it is objectively right to ignore his well-being? Once again your thinking here is beyond my comprehension.

Who then is going to take care of the madman? Is it everyone's duty to take care of every madman that exists? I rather think not.

I can only assume that you are young and have very little experience of real life. My aunt tried to kill herself. Fortunately the people who dealt with the situation did not share your moral philosophy. Instead, what happened was that usually happens in this situation. She was hospitalized for a short time and counseled during that time. Also, her many friends and relatives visited here and made it clear how important she was to them and how upset they would be if she were to die. (In fact, in many cases I’m sure they overdid it.) After being released she didn’t try to kill herself again. Of course, this sort of thing doesn’t always work, but it often does. In any case it’s worth a try. If the desire is really transient it usually works; otherwise it generally doesn’t. Suppose the folks at the hospital had said “Too bad you failed. Here’s how to do it right next time” and then released her immediately. Or suppose they had refused to treat her in the first place on the grounds that this would be interfering with her clear desire and intent? Would that have been more “humane”?

Your aunt was fortunate to have friends and family that had great empathy with her. The her irrational death would have caused them great pain. This is what compelled them to act, their own happiness. Not a moral "duty" to so. If she had no friends or family or no one who really cared for her she would have died for sure or suffered miserably in a white room. A person who is temporarily insane can be later on reasoned with, convince her of what is best so she in turn acts out of her own free will to be well. But in the end she is the one who decided to get well. It is very unfortunate that many people do enter into depressions they never get out of despite all the best efforts of friends and family. They end up killing themselves anyway, because they lack their own will to live.

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bd:
Unfortunately for your theory, the only relevant factors in such cases are those relating to the welfare of the person involved. But this is just the sort of thing that you want to exclude from consideration in making moral judgments.
99%:
From making objective moral judgments yes, but that doesn't mean that someone has to throw empathy out of the window in every moral judgement he makes.
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I’m baffled. Do you mean that there are objective moral judgments and non-objective moral judgments? In what sense is a non-objective moral judgment a moral judgment as opposed to a personal, subjective preference? Do these sometimes apply to the same act?

I’m also perplexed about why you call such judgments non-objective. For example, suppose that a father beats his one-year-old daughter to within an inch of her life because she got sick and vomited on the sofa. Are you saying that such an act is not objectively wrong?

The goal of any action moral or not is to try to achieve happiness. The suffering of others can definitely affect my happiness. If I help someone to avoid suffering I am in effect trying to avoid suffering myself.

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What is important in trying to establish objective morality is that then establishes the basis for objective laws.
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And everything else is unimportant? It doesn’t matter if you inflict psychological torment on your family, deliberately destroy friendships by means of lies and deceit, or otherwise cause misery and hatred by means that can’t practically be regulated by laws?

Of course not, because when there is a victim in the violation of an objective law, he can sue the criminal. "Psychological torment" to family is definitely subjective. Nobody is forcing the wife or husband into "suffering" this psychological torment. e.g.: "Hey Judge, put my husband in jail for inflicting me insufferable psychological torment". Friendships, misery and hatred are also subjective, you cannot regulate that with laws either, at least not objectively. e.g: "Hey Judge, I demand you put my former friend Robert in jail - because he hates me".

On to the slavery subject:

I thought that your moral philosophy was based entirely on survival. You devoted a good bit of verbiage to trying to show that survival is objectively good.

I was wrong as you evidently you showed me that and why. Survival merely an instrumental good. (btw that is why I chose 99%t as my handle - I reserve 1% for mistakes, honest ones at least )

I have yet to see a single line even purporting to show (purely from facts about the real world) that happiness is objectively good.

It is self evident that happiness is good. Nobody desires to be unhappy. Note btw, that pain is not unhappiness, likewise pleasure is not happiness. Some people could enjoy pain, and some people could hate pleasure, but everyone pursues their own definition of happiness.

Besides, treating happiness as an intrinsic good seems inconsistent with your rejection of empathy as a basis for objective morality. What do you think empathy is all about?

Empathy is subjectively perceiving the pain and pleasures of others, which might or might not contribute to your own pleasure or pain. It certainly participates in determining moral actions, but it is not the basis of objective morality.

(1) Define what you mean by “objective morality”.

Objective morality is what determines the wrongness or goodness of human actions independent on what one might feel it is. Non theistic objective morality is derived from pure reason.

(2) Explain whether you think that the “rightness” of an action depends ultimately on its consequences, or on its intrinsic nature, or on something else.

The rightness of an action depends on its intrisic nature considering knowledge and understanding at the moment the decision of said action.

(3) Explain what you mean by saying that happiness is a self-evident moral premise, but that objective morality cannot be based on empathy.

Happiness can only be perceived by the individual. I determine what can make others happy and therefore cannot chose to act on the perception of the supposed happiness of others. Only the individual perceiving the happiness or not can ultimately chose his goals and act accordingly. Empathy is is the subjective perception of the possible happiness of others, that is why objective morality cannot be based on empathy.

[ June 20, 2002: Message edited by: 99Percent ]</p>

Koyaanisqatsi

EDITED: I've cleaned up my post now, so have at it! YEE HAW!

[ June 21, 2002: Message edited by: Koyaanisqatsi ]</p>

bd-from-kg

To all (but especially the Antichris):

The time has come to outline my own moral theory. Since it takes some preparation (and I tend to be long-winded) I’m going to break it up into two posts.

Toward an objective moral theory

Full disclosure note: In this post (and no doubt in following ones) I will be cribbing extensively from stuff I posted some time ago on other threads.

Part 1: Principles of rational action

In my last post I pointed out that all rational humans form beliefs on the basis of a number of principles and assumptions that cannot be logically justified. I mentioned the Principle of Induction and Occam’s Razor, but there are many others, for example, the assumption that we are basically rational (i.e., that our cognitive faculties function in a way that tends reliably to produce true beliefs) the assumption that what we “remember” really happened for the most part, that there is an external world that is perceived by our senses, that most other humans have minds that work roughly like our own – i.e., that they believe, desire, and will things, experience emotions similar to ours, etc. It might seem at first blush (especially to those who are not familiar with epistemology) that we actually have evidence for at least some of these things, but on careful analysis it becomes clear that we don’t.

I want to expand this by pointing out that all rational humans act on the basis of many such principles; this is by no means limited to acts of acquiring beliefs. And while these principles cannot be logically justified, anyone who does not act on them is universally considered irrational, even insane.

The first such principle is that one’s actions should correspond to one’s beliefs. Thus, if Smith rushes to catch the 3:00 train on Sunday even though he is practically certain that it doesn’t run on Sunday, he is being irrational.

A second is that one’s actions should correspond to one’s desires. Thus, if Smith desires to enjoy his food and stay healthy, and if he hates asparagus and knows that it makes him sick, yet eats a lot of asparagus anyway, he is being irrational.

Now even actions that violate these very simple, fundamental principles are not illogical in the sense of violating some axiom or theorem of logic. Nevertheless almost everyone would agree that they are contrary to reason. Thus we see already that reason and logic are two different things; one can be unreasonable (even to the point of insanity) without being illogical.

Another such principle which almost everyone agrees to in principle, although it is not so universally followed in practice, is that beliefs about the “real world” should be based on evidence. Thus, if Brown believes that the family next door is from Mars, but admits that he has no evidence that they are, we send him off to the funny farm without further ado. Once again there is no axiom or theorem of logic that demands that beliefs be based on evidence.

Two other principles of this sort that have been discussed before are the Principle of Induction and Occam’s Razor. At this point we will just note that both of these principles are in the same category as the earlier ones: rejecting them is plainly irrational, but they cannot be derived from pure logic; i.e., they are not tautologies.

At this point we need to consider whether there is a common thread that ties together all of these aspects of rationality. The obvious answer is that all of them help us to function effectively in the real world. In particular, many of them are essentially strategies for acquiring true beliefs. A rational agent presupposes that true beliefs are desirable, because that is of the essence of rationality. And the point of having true beliefs, in the final analysis, is to make better choices. However, rationality [i]per se] does not involve any presuppositions as to the appropriate ends to which these choices are to be directed. In fact, one of the purposes of acquiring true beliefs (what I often refer to as “knowledge and understanding”, or K&U) is to determine what these goals will be. In the absence of any knowledge about the real world there could be no desires at all, except for the baseline desire (based only on the assumption that the agent in question is rational) to acquire K&U. Thus the question of what a rational agent would do if he had more K&U is highly relevant, since the essence of rationality itself is maximizing the probability of acquiring true beliefs while avoiding false ones.

This gives us another principle of rationality, which I think few people would dispute, and which in any case derives from the essence of what it means to be a rational being. This might be called the “Desirability of Knowledge” principle:

The choice that one would approve of if one had sufficient knowledge and understanding is preferable to any other choice.

A few explanations:

I add “understanding” because merely knowing a lot of fact isn’t enough; it is also necessary to be able to “connect the dots”. Also, some relevant knowledge consists of intimate acquantance with something rather than mere abstract knowledge of the truth of certain propostitions.

By “sufficient” K&U I mean enough so that still more K&U would not result in one’s preferring some other choice.

As for the “would approve of” clause, this needs to be understood properly in order to make the principle strictly valid. If we interpret it as meaning that that preferable choice is always what one would do if one had sufficient K&U, it is easy to think of counterexamples. E.g., take the statement “You should read this mystery novel; I think you’ll like the ending.” Trying to interpret this statement along these lines would yield something like: “if you knew enough about this novel (including the ending) you would choose to read it.” But of course if you knew the ending you might choose not to read it, for that very reason. The problem is that the hypothetical “you” who is aware of all of the relevant facts is not the actual “you” who will be making the decision. And sometimes this affects which choice is the most rational one. Thus the correct understanding of this principle is that a “hypothetical X” who has the “sufficient K&U” that the actual X lacks would have the actual X do Y. Or, to get a little closer to moral language, we can say that this “hypothetical X” would approve of the actual X doing Y. This seems to work in all cases.

Just the same, I will often abuse language slightly by representing the principle as saying that the choice that we would make if we had enough K&U is always the preferable one.

An interesting but subtle point about all of these “principles of rationality” is that none of them can be interpreted meaningfully as expressing propositions; none of them can really be said to be “true” or “false”. (This is why it is impossible to “prove”, or even to give evidence in favor of, any of them.) Each of them is actually a rule or guideline – a piece of advice or instruction to act in a certain way. Thus, they can be restated:

1. Always act in a way that corresponds to your beliefs.

2. Always act in a way that corresponds to your desires.

3. Believe only things that are consistent with your observations, and only things for which you have evidence.

4. Expect that patterns or regularities that hold in the part of the “real world” that you know about also hold in the part that you don’t. (The Principle of Induction, or Regularity).

5. As between explanations that fit the facts that you know, always prefer a clearly simpler one to a more complicated one.

6. Always try to do what you would approve of if you had sufficient knowledge and understanding.

Another way of looking at these principles is as a partial description of what it means to be a rational agent. If someone asks why he “should” adhere to these principles (or prescriptions, if you will) the answer in each case is simply that to do otherwise is irrational. If he then asks why he “should” be rational, there is no answer to this question; one cannot reason with a madman, or with someone who does not accept the compelling authority of Reason itself.

I call such things “Principles of rational action”. Each of them can be stated in the form of “One should...”, or in imperative form: “Act in accordance with the following rule:...” Thus they at least resemble objective moral principles. To be sure, most of them wouldn’t ordinarily be called “moral principles”, but only because this term is generally used in a more restricted sense. In any case they are objectively valid principles of action that any perfectly rational being will find compelling, for the simple reason that rejecting or violating them is ipso facto irrational. And this is just the sort of thing that would have to constitute anything that could meaningfully be called “objective morality”.

Part 2: What does “X should do Y” mean?

The word “should” has a lot of meanings, and I do not propose to analyze all of them. But there is one particular, very common meaning that is non-moral, but which is very close to its moral meaning. It is exemplified by statements like “You really should come over here and look at this” and “You should change your car’s oil every 5,000 miles”. What are statements of this sort really saying?

It seems clear (to me at least) that they are saying something like this: “If you knew (or understood) certain things you would choose to do Y”. Thus the first statement can be reasonably interpreted as “If you knew what you would see if you came over here and looked, you would”. And the second really seems to mean “If you understood how a car works, you would change the oil every 5,000 miles.” To confirm this, imagine that someone replied to the second statement, “Oh, my chauffeur does that sort of thing”. In that case he would not change the oil no matter how much he knew about cars, so the original statement that he should is false. Similarly, if after seeing whatever was referred to in the first statement someone said, “I didn’t really want to see that” we would say that the first statement was probably false.

To be more precise, it seems that when “should” is used in this sense, “X should do Y” means that Y is the choice that, in an important but special sense, X would like to make – the one that he would not regard in retrospect as a mistake no matter what he might come to know later. In this sense we are saying that any other choice will be a mistake from X’s point of view, and that X “really” – in this sense – wants to do Y, even if he doesn’t “want to” in the ordinary sense.

To put it another way, when we say “X should do Y” in this sense, we are appealing to the sixth “principle of rational action” above.

Two points are worth emphasizing here. First, the desire to do what we would do if we knew enough is not just a strange peculiarity of human nature. It seems self-evident that any rational being would also prefer this. In fact, if we learned that someone did not desire it in a given case, we would conclude from this fact alone that he was not perfectly rational. Second, this is not just another desire “competing” with other desires; it is, so to speak, a “meta-desire”, which automatically takes priority over all others. No matter what our reasons for “wanting” to do Z, if we knew with certainty that we would want to do Y if we had sufficient K&U (even if we didn’t know why we would make that choice), we would choose to do Y. Or at least, we would if we were perfectly rational. And thus the choice that we “should” make is in this sense the “correct” or “rational” choice, regardless of whether we know or believe it.

At this point I have laid part of the foundation for my moral theory. I have explained what sort of thing I would consider an objectively valid principle of action, and that the word “should” is often used to refer implicitly to such a principle. However, we’re not home yet. We still need to show that moral principles can be brought into this framework; that there is a reasonable interpretation of “X should do Y” along these lines which gives the statement a recognizably moral meaning. This will be the subject of a subsequent post.

[ June 22, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p>