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Senior Member
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: South Bend IN
Posts: 564
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Re: To What End?
Capnkirk,
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You said in your last posting: "Note that I am not suggesting an anything goes approach here. I’m not saying that just any belief not based on evidence is automatically rational..." If you are not taking universal license, please specify the limits and constraints of the license you are proposing/defending.
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That’s not an easy question as it requires, in my opinion, a well developed epistemological theory to properly answer. It is also a discussion I did not necessarily want to get into at the moment because the issues involved are complex and take a great deal of time and effort to properly discuss. Nevertheless, you asked. I have done research in this area and I believe that Alvin Plantinga’s proper functionalist account of warrant is the best philosophical characterization of knowledge currently available. Since I have already done some work in this area, and my time is limited, I will simply provide selections from an essay I wrote on this subject. I apologize for the length, but I do not think it can be avoided in giving an adequate treatment of these issues. In the following excerpt I describe Plantinga’s approach and some of the rational behind it:
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A first approximation for a characterization of knowledge might be that knowledge is “justified true belief” and indeed this characterization was once widely held in the field until the twentieth century philosopher, Edmund L. Gettier, wrote a short essay entitled “Is justified true belief knowledge?” in which he showed that there are several possible scenarios in which one might have justified true belief, but not knowledge. One such scenario described in Gettier’s essay is as follows: Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job and Smith has strong evidence for the proposition “Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.” This proposition entails the proposition “The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket” and Smith accepts this new proposition on the basis of the former proposition. Now suppose that, unknown to Smith, it is he and not Jones who will get the job and furthermore that (unknown to him) he, Smith, also has ten coins in his pocket. Smith’s belief in the proposition “The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket” is both justified and true, but is it knowledge? The standard way out of this dilemma is to redefine knowledge not as justified true belief, but as warranted true belief where warrant is some sort of enhanced justification capable of avoiding such counter-examples with the particulars of the nature of the enhancement being the subject of much debate. It is this convention which I will adopt here as we turn to a discussion of what it is for a belief to have warrant. At this point, one might be tempted to think all this merely a sort of semantic game, but as Plantinga points out, Gettier’s essay carries an important philosophical consequence: Gettier problems afflict internalist epistemologies and they do so essentially. That is, Gettier problems show that more than just the state of the subject and the internal rationality of the subject’s belief in terms of the mental states she has access to must be taken into consideration when evaluating whether or not the subject poses genuine knowledge; one must also take into account what is happening in the external environment and which conditions hold there.
One early attempt at an externalist theory of warrant came by means of Alvin Goldman whose views then went through several refinements. Goldman, in the interest of solving the problem raised by Gettier, first attempted to produce a causal theory of how knowledge is acquired. Whether or not a true belief counted as knowledge, in this account, depended on whether or not it was produced by an appropriate causal chain in relation to the truth of that belief. Goldman latter revised this view, when seeking to develop an account of perceptual knowledge, by dropping the requirement that in order for a belief to be known it had to be connected with the truth of that belief in an appropriate causal way, holding instead that a belief is known if it was formed by a reliable mechanism. In order to be reliable, in this account of perceptual knowledge, that mechanism had to be capable of distinguishing an instance of p from not-p. The motivation behind this shift was to be found in the fact that there are several situations in which a belief may very well be appropriately casually related to the truth of that belief and still, because of certain additional factors, not be known. Goldman would later refine and generalize this view by applying it to all forms of rational justification (warrant, in the convention adopted here) by defining a belief as justified (on Goldman’s use of the term) (roughly) if that belief is formed by a reliable cognitive process (or set of processes) -- that is by a cognitive process which tends to, on the whole, produce more true beliefs than false ones.
Goldman is not the only one to have taken such a path. Another philosopher to focus heavily on an externalist conception of how knowledge is obtained has been W.V. Quine. Quine adopted a far more radical position than Goldman in that Quine completely rejected the traditional program in epistemology (which he called a “failed research program”) all together and sought instead to place epistemology into the context of natural science (specifically, empirical psychology) and thereby forgo all the prior concerns of normativity and justification. Instead of trying to determine some sort of normative cannons of knowledge, Quine believed that the job of the new “naturalized epistemology” would simply be to describe, in an empirical scientific way, the relationship between data and theory, sensory input and cognitive output.
There are many attractive features to externalist accounts such as those offered by Goldman and Quine. As we have already seen, the Gettier problem makes wholly internalist accounts of knowledge untenable. By calling attention to the objective relationship between the subject and its environment, externalism contributes to the possibility of obtaining more objective, publicly verifiable, accounts of the processes by which knowledge is obtained (e.g. Quine’s emphasis on empirical psychologically). Also, by calling attention to the relationship between the subject and its environment, externalism calls attention to interesting features about how our cognitive faculties are actually adapted to our physical environment rather than focusing on how some supposed ideally rational agent might form its beliefs in all possible worlds in which it might find itself. While externalism has a number of strengths, it is also not without its share of problems. As Pojman also points out, it seems to us that knowledge is more than simply having properly caused beliefs or even beliefs that are formed by reliable mechanisms. Pojman notes that, “we can imagine counterexamples where a belief that p has been properly caused, but where we would not want to say that the subject knew p.” To support this point, Pojman cites the following example from Laurance BonJour:
Samantha believes herself to have the power of clairvoyance though she has no reason for or against this belief. One day she comes to believe, for no apparent reason, that the President is in New York City. She maintains this belief even though she is at the same time aware of a massive amount of evidence, consisting of news reports, press releases, allegedly live television pictures, and so on, indicating that the president is, at the same time, in Washington D.C. Now, the President is in fact in New York City, the evidence to the contrary being part of a massive official hoax mounted in the face of an assassination threat. Moreover, Samantha does in fact have completely reliable clairvoyant power under the conditions which were then satisfied, and her belief about the President did result from the operation of that power.
Even though Samantha’s beliefs were formed by a completely reliable process in this instance, one might hesitate to say that Samantha really posses knowledge. Along these lines, is it really all that wise to throw out the concepts of normativity and justification all together? How would this preserve the possibility of rational criticism and dialogue?
Despite the apparent difficulties, however, given that the Gettier problem infects all forms of internalism and given the inherent strengths of externalism, externalism seems like both a fruitful and a necessary direction to take. Let us now turn to one more account of warrant that follows the externalist tradition, that of Alvin Plantinga, and see what its potential advantages might be and if, perhaps, it is capable of avoiding some of the pitfalls of other externalist views. According to (my summary/paraphrase of) the account put forth by Plantinga in his book Warrant and Proper Function: A belief is warranted if and only if it is formed through the proper functioning of one’s cognitive faculties which are part of a well designed plan aimed at the production of true beliefs in the type of environment in which those cognitive faculties were designed to function in the absence of sufficient defeaters for said belief. Let us briefly go through the various features of this characterization and the rational behind them.
The Proper Function of One’s Cognitive Faculties: The notion here is that, in order for our beliefs to have warrant, our cognitive faculties must be behaving as they ought to. This feature of Plantinga’s characterization can incorporate within it much of the advantages of internalism while avoiding the pitfalls given that it focuses on what is happening in the mind of the subject and whether or not the subject’s cognitive faculties are functioning appropriately. In fact, this component can potentially incorporate much of the traditional discussion regarding normativity and rational justification through an exploration of just what sort of inferences and belief forming processes are the result of proper functioning and which are not. The whole notion of proper function presupposes an element of normativity.
A Well Designed Plan: In order to talk meaningfully of what it means for one’s cognitive faculties to function properly, it is necessary to introduce the notion of some sort of teleological aim -- that is we have to talk about how our cognitive faculties are supposed to function. This is not an uncommon practice, but one that happens in the biological sciences all the time. A design plan, then, might be roughly defined as a “set of specifications” directed to a particular aim or set of aims describing how an organ is supposed to function such that the notion of “proper functioning“ is evaluated with reference to these specifications It need not be the case, Plantinga argues, that we initially take terms such as “design plan” or the “way things are supposed to function” to presuppose conscious design or conscious intention. One might imagine that natural selection or evolution acting without conscious guidance somehow furnished these design plans. At this point it is not necessary to decide whether this set of specifications comes about by means of God or natural selection or both or by some other means. What is important is the central idea of a set of specifications which provide a reference point for proper functioning.
Furthermore, not just any design plan will do in relation to our cognitive faculties in order for warrant to be present; it must be a well designed plan. The specifications of the design plan must be such that the proper functioning of our cognitive faculties are well suited toward accomplishing the aims of the design plan. Here, Plantinga’s characterization incorporates the notion of reliability which we found in our earlier discussions of externalist accounts. In order for a design plan to be characterized as a well designed plan, it must have a sufficiently high objective probability of accomplishing its aims when things are functioning according to their specifications in the circumstances under which the design plan was intended to operate.
Aimed At The Production of True Beliefs: It is still not enough, for warrant, that our cognitive faculties be functioning properly as part of a well designed plan. Knowledge, after all, is concerned with the production and holding of true beliefs. Not all of our cognitive faculties appear to be directed toward this aim. As Plantinga points out, some of our cognitive faculties seem to be aimed toward such ends as sympathy which might cause us to do such things as give the benefit of the doubt. At times we are prone to conclude hastily that danger is present for the sake of our survival, even though the evidence does not warrant such a conclusion. Consequently, the kind of design plan necessary for warrant to be present is one aimed at the production of true beliefs.
In The Type of Environment in Which They Were Designed To Function: This too is an essential feature of warrant. A human brain in a vat, for instance, being fed false sensory information by a group of mad scientists in Ohio, may have nothing wrong with the function of its cognitive faculties, but the environment in which it finds itself is radically different from the type of environment in which those cognitive faculties were designed to function. Consequently, very little of the brain’s beliefs will have warrant.
In The Absence of Sufficient Defeaters: Finally, a belief may meet all of the above conditions and still not have warrant because there are other factors present which destroy the warrant one has for that belief. Consider our clairvoyant friend Samantha’s belief that the president is in New York although all evidence is to the contrary. Even though it is in fact the case that Samantha’s belief is reliable and perhaps even the case that it was formed as the result of the proper functioning of a cognitive faculty which is part of a well designed plan aimed at the production of true beliefs in the type of environment in which it was designed to function, Samantha still has very strong evidential reasons for believing that her belief is false. This evidence, then, may be sufficient to cancel out the warrant Samantha might have otherwise enjoyed for her belief. The introduction of the notion of defeaters into this characterization of warrant helps to preserve the possibility of critical reflection and rational dialog by allowing for the possibility that further evidence and information from other cognitive sources might serve to override the warrant one might otherwise have. Plantinga actually incorporates the notion of defeaters into his notions of the design plan and proper function rather than listing them as a separate component as I have done, but I have done so to make this feature more explicit.
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From this material, we can develop the notion of properly basic beliefs (beliefs which do not have to be inferred from evidence to be rationally held):
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A properly basic belief, in light of our previous discussion, is simply a belief which is formed, in a non-inferential manner, through the proper functioning of one’s cognitive faculties which are part of a well designed plan aimed at the production of true beliefs in the type of environment in which those cognitive faculties were designed to function in the absence of sufficient defeaters for said belief. We are familiar with both inferential and non-inferential types of beliefs. For instance, I believe that 1+1=2, not because I infer it from other beliefs, but because, upon understanding the meaning of the terms involved, my cognitive faculties naturally produce with in me a firm conviction of the truth of that mathematical statement. Not being all that gifted at intuiting the answers to addition problems in general, however, I find that I must infer the answer to more complex addition problems from more simple, intuitively obvious, statements of addition like the one above. Likewise, I believe that I ate chicken noodle soup for lunch today, not because I infer this belief from the dirty dishes in my sink, but because I simply remember doing so. By my memory of the fact that chicken noodle soup has tasted good to me every time I have eaten it in the past, however, I infer that it will likely taste good to me the next time I eat it. The former belief is non-inferential and properly basic whereas the latter belief is inferred from other properly basic beliefs. Or, more controversially, consider my belief that other minds exist or that the principle of induction holds. Even though it is widely known that these beliefs are difficult if not impossible to justify on inferential grounds from other sources of belief, I find myself with a natural and firm conviction that they are true. Perhaps it is because, as part of the way my cognitive faculties have been adapted (either by God or evolution or both) to suite my environment, I have a natural inbuilt tendency to form these beliefs. If this tendency is part of a well designed plan aimed at the production of true beliefs, then I have warrant for both of these beliefs even in the absence of an inferential argument for them. Then again, perhaps they are not part of a well designed plan aimed at the production of true beliefs. Perhaps my tendency to believe in other minds and the principle of induction is merely some sort of evolutionary adaptation aimed solely at my survival and indifferent to whether or not it produces true beliefs. In that case, my beliefs in these areas would not have warrant. Once again, we see the relationship between epistemology and ontology rearing its ugly head. Which types of beliefs actually have warrant for me depend on just what sort of creature I actually am and just what sort of reality I actually find myself in.
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So, might belief in God be construed as properly basic?:
[quote] If God has made us in the divine image, which, in part, means that we reflect within ourselves (to the limited degree of a finite creature) God’s capacity for knowledge and rationality, then it follows that God has designed our cognitive faculties either directly or indirectly (through, perhaps, guiding some natural process such as biological evolution). Furthermore, if God intends for us to know God and be in a relationship with God, then it is also likely that God has endowed us with certain cognitive faculties which are directed toward producing the relevant knowledge necessary to obtain that goal. Often in Christian theology, the name given to this cognitive faculty (or, perhaps, a certain set of cognitive faculties with this particular aim) has been the “sensus divinitatis.” …
So, is belief in God based in the operation of the sensus divinitatis warranted? If the above account is accurate, then, yes it is provided that there are not sufficient defeaters for that belief. If the sensus divinitatis actually exists and has been designed by God to produce accurate beliefs about God through interaction with the world around us, then the beliefs formed by it are formed via the proper functioning of one’s cognitive faculties which are part of a well designed plan aimed at the production of true beliefs in the type of environment in which they were designed to function….
I go on to give an expanded Plantinga-style account to argue that not just belief in God, but full fledged Christian belief might also be warranted in a properly basic manner if Christian beliefs are true, but that need not concern us at the moment
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The skeptic might be tempted to charge this defense of the rationality of Christian beliefs with circularity at this point, and there most certainly is an element of circularity inherent within it, but it is not a vicious circularity. The Christian is not saying she believes her beliefs are true because she believes they are true. Instead, what she is saying, is that her beliefs carry, along with them, certain implications about the manner in which they are grounded such that if they are true, they are also warranted for her and therefore genuinely known by her in a basic way. The fact of the matter is that it is no less circular for the skeptic to deny the Christian’s beliefs are warranted for her in a properly basic way than it is for the Christian to affirm it. Ultimately both the skeptic of Christianity and the Christian believer believe what they do about the origins and epistemic status of Christian belief because of how their basic presuppositions about reality color how they view the nature of the world and the nature of human beings. Since we are on the level of worldviews here and fundamental presuppositions, there is no way to escape this situation.
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So does this mean that just any belief might be construed as properly basic?:
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Recall that the reason Christian beliefs are properly basic defensible is because if they are true, there is a high probability that they would have warrant for their adherents in a properly basic way. Such is not the case for all metaphysical beliefs. I, for instance, happen to be an adherent to a form of mathematical Platonism. This seems like a reasonable metaphysical belief on my part and I believe that I am being rational in holding it (even if it turns out I am wrong) because I hold it for various philosophical, theological, and intuitive reasons which I find convincing. Nevertheless, I would not claim that belief in mathematical Platonism is properly basic. I am aware of no good argument to the effect that mathematical Platonism, were it true, would have a high degree of probability of being warranted for me in a basic way. I certainly did not acquire this belief in such a way. Thus, it is not the case that just any metaphysical belief is a plausible candidate for being considered properly basic for those who adhere to it, whether this be a rationally held belief like mathematical Platonism or an irrationally held belief (it is not clear, for instance, that the existence of the Great Pumpkin would render it likely that belief in its existence has proper basic warrant).
Third, not all metaphysical beliefs or worldviews entail positive consequences for their own knowability or for human knowledge in general. In fact some worldviews might actually entail destructive consequences for their own knowability or the existence of human knowledge. I would like to propose that one such worldview may be Metaphysical Naturalism. I raise this issue only to give a demonstration of how it is not necessarily a trivial matter to claim that the beliefs of a worldview can be rationally regarded as properly basic by their adherents. I will not come to a definitive conclusion about the rational status of Metaphysical Naturalism, only show that it is not obvious that it could be held in a properly basic way. To capture the basic intuition behind the challenge Metaphysical Naturalism faces in this regard, consider the following scenario:82 Suppose you are driving through the country side and are thoroughly lost such that you have no idea where you are (perhaps you are suffering from amnesia or some such malady). You look out the window and happen to see very large letters carved into the side of a hill which say *Welcome to Ohio.* At first, you are overjoyed because, at last, you think you may have an idea of where you are, but alas, soon your hopes are dashed. You come to find out (never mind how) that the carving on the side of the hill was formed entirely by erosion without the assistance of an intelligent agent. Now you have no reason to trust that the carving on the side of the hill is in anyway conveying to you accurate information about your location -- you have acquired a defeater for any belief about your location that you might have formed based on that carving.
Likewise, we trust our cognitive faculties to relay to us truthful information about the world, but if it is the case that our cognitive faculties have come about without any conscious purpose behind them, what reason do we have to trust them? Of course, a standard answer that a naturalist might give is that our cognitive mechanisms were brought about as a function of natural selection in such a way as to ensure our survival, and having cognitive faculties aimed at the production of true beliefs is more beneficial to our survival such that it is likely that natural selection would, in fact, convey to us reliable belief forming mechanisms.
However, is it really the case that having cognitive faculties aimed at the production of true belief is essential to our survival? Might beliefs be survival enhancing and still be false -- possibly. Survival, after all, is ultimately the result of luck combined with certain behavioral patterns. It is conceivable that false beliefs might lead to behaviors which are survival enhancing. A primate in the jungle who believes he is constantly surrounded by predators, for instance, even when there is no good reason for him to hold that belief, might tend to be more cautious such that the probability of his survival is enhanced. What, then, is the probability that our belief forming mechanisms, on the whole, are reliable given naturalism combined with the theory evolution? Plantinga, in Warrant and Proper Function, actually constructs a Bayesian probability argument that the probability of our belief forming mechanisms given the conjunction of naturalism with evolution is quite low. I shall leave the details of Plantinga*s argument to the reader to investigate if the reader is interested.83 The point is that it is not a trivial matter for the naturalist to assert that her beliefs can acquire proper basic warrant. In order to do so, she must show that it is probable given the conjunction of evolution and naturalism that our belief forming mechanisms are reliable and, to go for a properly basic defense of her beliefs, show that these belief forming mechanisms entail the high probability that naturalism would achieve warrant in a basic way. Neither of these are necessarily small tasks.
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In summation, it seems clear that there are indeed some beliefs which are properly basic with respect to warrant. If God exists, then belief in God is likely one of them. I take it as axiomatic that if S is warranted in believing in p, then it is rational for S to believe P. Thus, the question as to whether or not belief in God is rational cannot be divorced from the question of whether or not it is true. Such a properly basic defense of rationality cannot be plausibly applied to just any belief, however, as the above discussion illustrates. Specifying specific generalized conditions for what may or may not be considered as a plausible candidate for a properly basic belief, however, may not be feasible and may perhaps be impossible. So, the issue, in my opinion, has to be dealt with on a case by case basis.
God Bless,
Kenny
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01-20-2003, 09:04 AM
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