K

That statement makes at least two huge assumptions.

1. That God exists.

2. That free will exists.

I would also include the existence of evil, but in fairness to you, you never said objective evil.

Vanderzyden

#1 is more than an assumption, to be argued in another thread.

Regarding #2: Would you care to demonstrate that humans don't make choices?

Vanderzyden

Devilnaut

Humans most certainly make choices and this is not what is in contention. The fact that people have a "free will" from our human perspective does not mean that their actions are not caused!

For a human action to be free of a causal chain of events it must be random. If some of our choices are random, I don't see how we can be condemned for them.

If they are not random, they are caused, and the causes for every one of your choices could, in principle, be traced as far back as the beginning of the Universe (leaving aside issues of quantum uncertainty for the moment). They would certainly be in the knowledge spectrum of an omniscient being.

Try picking a number between one and ten. Once you've done that, ask yourself what would happen if we rewound time to a few moments before your choice, and then play it forward again. Would you choose a different number? Of course not, unless there is an element of true randomness in your thought process. If there is not, in what sense are our choices truly "free"?

[ October 08, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]</p>

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Vanderzyden:

"I think that have shown in the last post that these putative definitions are nonsensical, and therefore should be discarded. Perhaps you could address the points I made there."

If they are nonsensical, then you can't understand them. But I think most of us here can understand them. You're right that they can't apply to God; that's part of my argument against Him, that no good definition can apply to God.

"Incidentally, God can 'bring about a state of affairs in which a human freely chooses evil.' He has done it, since we are here, choosing evil on a daily basis."

No, because if God caused it to happen, it wasn't a free choice.

"I will admit that we may arrive at a loose, uncontradictory definition. However, you seem to insist that you may somehow comprehend the immensity of God. That is impossible for anyone other than himself."

No, I simply claim that we know what the word "omnipotent" means. After all, we get to define it. And if we don't know what it means, we can't say God has it.

"Yes, with the recognition that 'create' has specific meaning. Why do you find this insufficient?"

There are things God can't create, and there are things God ought to be able to do that aren't covered by that definition. God ought to be able to perform miracles; this does not seem to be any act of creation in some cases. God ought to be able to change something into something else, and God ought to be able to communicate with humans. By your definition of "omnipotent," a being without these powers could be omnipotent and therefore be as powerful as God. Also, God cannot create some things; He cannot create a stone, the creator of which can't lift it. He cannot create something it is evil to create. He cannot create something that will cause Him to be surprised, deluded, or to learn something (because He is omniscient).

And I must add that simply being able to create and destroy things isn't very close to what philosophers usually think of as being "all-powerful."

Darkblade

Thomas, I loved your idea on McEar!!!

The whole idea that the nature of omnipotence can not be known is skewed. It's black and white to me; omnipotence means having the ability to do anything, regardless of whether or not you want to or any limitations imposed by logic, the laws of nature, et cetera.

I do not think that something not omnipotent should be considered to be a god, as it would have limitations in what it could do. I have limitations in what I can do. Am I to be considered a god? Sure, this "god" would have "less" limitations than me, but still infinitely many limitations. If you use logic, for instance, as the limiter that causes non-omnipotence, than the infinite number of different, yet specific things that could not logically exist or coexist would be impossible for this “god” to create or do. Something non-omnipotent would be “ruled” or “under” some other laws (as of nature or logic). This would make this “god” inferior to something else that it couldn’t (or wouldn’t (why wouldn’t it??? (even if it wouldn‘t, it would still be non-omnipotent at whatever time it was unable to do certain things, even if it could remove the barriers that force this))) change, just like me.

Therefore, god could not be non-omnipotent if you want god to be truly separate (and therefore unique and special) in the scope of its abilities from me. Just having more or greater abilities doesn’t cut it, as then I could argue that in relation to a stick, I am god.

The only other option other than non-omnipotence is omnipotence, and thus anything that should be considered a god must be omnipotent.

Being omnipotent is only possible if logic can be overridden (and thereby disobeyed). It seems obvious to me that, with no need to believe in god in the first place, there is no need to believe in it, as it is illogical, because it doesn‘t obey the laws of logic. Believing in something illogical entails lacking knowledge, purely logical thought processes, or the want to think logically yourself.

[ October 09, 2002: Message edited by: Darkblade ]

[ October 09, 2002: Message edited by: Darkblade ]</p>

Olorin

I disagree that a being would be as powerful as God, by his definition. It does not entail that all beings that are omnipotent (which would be all beings, really) would have the same amount of power at their disposal. This would only be true if the nature of all beings were equal.

K

Vanderzyden:

Devilnaut summed up exactly why I don't believe in free will. And as he/she said, I never indicated that we don't make decisions - it's just that those decisions are causal.

Primal

Vander: Is God's nature free and contingent or determined and necessary?

If you say God has free will then you are saying his nature and decisions are contingent i.e. unneccessary. Made more or less, at random.

If you say God's nature is neccessary as are His decisions, then you are saying God has no free will. In which case God is kinda like a machine. So which is it Vander?

Vanderzyden

I agree with you to some extent: as you define strongly- and weakly-omnipotent, the definitions don't apply to God. But that does not mean that these are the only definitions that may be formulated. The inapplicability of these definitions to the Creator of the universe does not preclude the formulation of other suitable definitions.

Now, I can understand your definitions, but you have not shown that are sensible. My contention is that they are nonsense because they are inapplicable to anything that we know. They do not define God, nor do they define anything that exists. Your inability to apply your variant definitions of "all-powerful" to God himself does nothing to contribute to a demonstration that God does not exist.

Yes, this is what I clarified earlier: a free agent cannot be forced to make a choice. However, free agents do exist. They do choose evil. There is no contradication in making the additional statement that God created free agents. Furthermore, this does not mean that he himself is evil for creating agents with the potential to do what is evil.

Here's an analogy: My son commits a crime, alone. He will admit that he learned nothing wrong from anyone. This crime is the first wrong decision that he has made. In what way may he assign blame to anyone but himself?

Here again is my revised definition:

Omnipotence = All-powerful; having supernatural creative power.

Now, you find it inadequate on the following basis:

Please note that the definition does not entail the creation of anything possible. I think you are attempting to conflate your definitions with mine. I like your challenge, but that is not my goal. My goal is to arrive at the simplest, adequate definition. For the moment, let us set aside what the "philosophers" say. They could be wrong, or they might be interested in stroking their egos. Or, they could be refusing to consider what is likely in favor of what they prefer. So, let's just work this out together.

A being without genuine creative power would necessarily be a created being. Whatever other powers it possessed, it would always be a creature. It, along with its powers, could be destroyed at any time by the Creator. Furthermore, because it could not create, this being it would not fit your definition of weak omnipotence (since the act of creation is logically possible).

On a personal note: Now that we've been engaged for a while, Thomas, I'm curious about your studies. I presume you are a student at UW. What are you pursuing, if you don't mind my inquiry?


Thanks,

Vanderzyden

[ October 09, 2002: Message edited by: Vanderzyden ]</p>

Clutch

I've read and re-read VZ's "argument" that the notions of weak and strong omnipotence are nonsensical.

It appears to be this: "weakly all-powerful" and "strongly all-powerful" sound funny. Therefore, the weak/strong omnipotence distinction is nonsense.

Why anyone would think this amounts to any sort of argument -- even a bad one -- is unclear. What is one to reply? "They don't sound funny to me"?

In fact, if anything VZ's rephrasing makes Thomas's point clearer: There are a range of readings of the quantifier "all", and the distinction in question indicates two of some significance. The weak reading of "all" ranges over the so-called logically possible worlds, where logical possibility itself is a notion underwritten by conceivability. This would normally be the strongest reading of "all", but the conception of God's mind as transcending ours, as being literally perfect, leaves it an open question whether omnipotence as applied to him shouldn't receive an even stronger reading.

The stronger reading would eschew any sort of constraint on the range of the quantifier. God can do absolutely anything, and if some of these things would embody logical contradictions, well, these are simply cruces in reasoning that defy our ability coherently to entertain. Why should God's ability to do be constrained by our ability to understand?