Dante Alighieri

Okay, regardless of whether or not Plantinga's Free Will Defense works [1], what about believing that God can have morally sufficient reasons for evil? When a theist offers a theodicy or when a skeptical theist points out the possibility of morally sufficient reasons, I believe that they have a very weighty burden of proof, one I think that can't be satisfied, even for the skeptical theist. Such theists must at least be committed to the thesis that it is logically possible for God to have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. If we let p represent that "God has a morally sufficient reason for evil" the theist is committed to:

(1) ◊p

This initially seems like a modest proposal, but I don't think that it is.

Now, here's the thing: what does it mean for God to have a morally sufficient reason? What it means that there are certain purposes that are good and that God should accomplish, and to do accomplish them, God must create evil. But, is it logically possible for God to accomplish His purposes without bringing about evil? If it is, then it follows that God must bring about His purposes without bringing about evil, for if He brings about His purposes with evil, then the evil in question was non-necessary and hence, gratuitous, which is not compatible with God's existence. So, it seems that it must be impossible for God to bring about that purpose without evil, for if it were possible, that since God is omnipotent, He could have brought that about. If we let p represent "God accomplishes His purpose and creates evil" (which is what p really means in the first place), the theist is really saying is that

(2) ~◊~p

But this entails that p is necessary:

(3) □p

So, if that the theist says that it is possible for God to have a morally sufficient reason is to really say that

(4) ◊□p

But, this entails (3) by Becker's Postulate under S5 modal logic. Furthermore, (3) entails (4), for any true proposition is possible, therefore, necessary propositions are also possible. So, (3) and (4) are logically equivalent: they mean the exact same thing. So, the theist is simply saying that it is logically necessary that God accomplishes His purposes and creates evil.

But, why should anyone believe that? Necessity is not acquired by fiat, but that the theist must show a formal contradiction in ~p, particularly in that God accomplishes His purposes and does not create evil. And per our modal intuitions, there is no reason to find that impossible. Therefore, we can construct the following argument

(5) □p → ~◊~p
(6) ◊~p
(7) ~□p

So then, it is not necessary that God brings about His purposes with creating evil. But, here is the problem: if God exists, then God has a morally sufficient reason for evil. But, God does not have a morally sufficient reason for evil since it was possible to bring about His purposes without evil. Therefore, God does not exist. In other words, if let q represent "God exists" it follows that

(8) q → □p
(9) ~□p
(10) ~q

So, it seems that theodicies and skeptical theists have to do a lot more work than they are currently doing. For they can't simply establish seemingly plausible scenarios for God accomplishing His purposes, but must establish that those scenarios are necessary; and there is no good reason for believing that, therefore, any theodicy or skeptical theist response that applies to an omnipotent God (it's clear that this objection does not touch, for instance, extremely powerful and yet non-omnipotent Gods) is a failure, since there is no contradiction to be had in that God accomplishes His purposes without creating evil.

What do you guys think of this?

[1] I'm pretty doubtful that it does. On one hand, if libertarian free will is false, and a certain type of compatibilism is true (one that denies the ability to do otherwise: I actually think that this is quite defensible, even without Frankfurt-style examples), then there are going to be possible essences such that in placed in any circumstance whatsoever they will always freely choose the good. Or, moreover, there will be possible essences such that for a certain set of circumstances, they will always do the good, and God could have brought about such essences. Furthermore, there seems to be concerns that transworld depravity (the centerpiece of Plantinga's FWD) is not as plausible as Plantinga makes it out to be. See here for instance. In any case though, a denial of libertarian free will takes out most of the power of Plantinga's FWD.

Dante Alighieri

Anyone? In any case, I have recently argued this objection elsewhere. The version of my objection presented there is as follows, and so, as far as I can see, the logical problem of evil is not as dead as Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, or others declare it to be.

In any case though, it's pretty clear that any theodicy whatsoever is bound to fail. First of all, note that God is omnipotent. We can define omnipotence as follows:

S is omnipotent if and only if that for any logically possible state of affairs A relative to S that in any logically possible world wherein S exists, S has the power to actualize A and that there is some logically possible world such that S actualizes A

Basically, this means that S has power over all logically possible states of affairs. Now, consider the fact of moral evil and natural evil. [2] Now, the point that proponents of theodicy and skeptical theism make is that it is at least logically possible and actual (and proponents of theodicy argue that we know the actual reason) [in actuality, skeptical theists argue that it is epistemically possible, but plainly, they must also hold to that it is logically possible and also actual] that God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil. First of all, one need only point out the implausibility of such theses to begin with: do theists really think that God could not have done a better job at this? It seems they need to show that significantly good worlds, or maximally good worlds (worlds which contain significantly free creatures that do good and that such worlds contain no suffering) is not possible for God to have done. I shall draw out this thesis below. Secondly, skeptical theism seems to be one of hyperbolic Cartesian skepticism. So, skeptical theists proclaim how do you know that God, in His infinite wisdom, couldn't have a plan behind it all? First of all, one need only point out for instance, that God, in His infinite wisdom, could have at least comforted us about such evil and told us that there is a plan. But, God has not sufficiently revealed Himself in the world, nor does He comfort, which makes the parent-child analogies skeptical theists draw wholly implausible. Perhaps the same sort of skeptical theist response can be made against this. Moreover, it seems that this type of response makes the explanatory power of theism worthless, for it is compatible with any logically possible state of affairs whatsoever. Suppose we live in a chaotic world. The skeptical theist's response: "How do you know that God didn't have a plan behind the chaos?" We may as well ask: "How do you know that the world wasn't created five seconds ago with God with our (false) memories intact and that God has some plan behind it?" The conjunction of God's wisdom and power literally removes any sort of explanatory power behind theism, and so, theism literally says nothing about the world. But, I think there is a good objection to be made. I have posted it here before, and I shall make it explicit once more.

The theist, at least, holds that it is logically possible (and also actual) that God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil. So, if let p represent "God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil" the theist holds to that

(1) It is possible that God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil [i.e., ◊p]

However, what does it mean for God to have a morally sufficient reason? It means that there are some purposes such that God should accomplish and in order to accomplish them, God must allow evil. But, wait, God must allow evil to accomplish such purposes? The theist must hold that it is logically impossible that such purposes are accomplished without God's allowing of evil, for if it were possible, then God could have accomplished such purposes without evil. Had that been so, and God allowed evil regardless, such a world would be a world with gratuitous evil, and hence, an inconsistent world since such evil is inconsistent with God. So, the theist must actually hold is that, if we let (p & q) represent "God accomplishes His purposes and allows evil" (which is what p really meant in the first place),

(2) It is impossible that God accomplishes His purposes and does not allow evil [i.e., ~◊~(p & q)]

However, this means that

(3) It is necessary that God accomplishes His purposes and allows evil [i.e., □(p & q)]

Recall that the theist wants this to be possible. So, the theist affirms (4)

(4) It is possible that it is necessary God accomplishes His purposes and allows evil [i.e., ◊□(p & q)]

However, under S5 modal logic, (4) entails (3), since anything that is possibly necessary is necessary. (Intuitively, it follows from the notion of possible worlds, since if the proposition "p holds in all possible worlds" is true in a possible world, then it follows that it is also true in all possible worlds) However, (3) also entails (4), since any true proposition is possible, and therefore, given that (3) and (4) entail each other, (3) and (4) are materially equivalent, and not merely materially equivalent, but also logically equivalent, since they both express the necessity of (p & q). So, in reality, the so-called "modest" proposal of the theist is the acceptance of (3). However, here is the problem: a proposition is necessary if and only there is a contradiction in its negation. But, what contradiction follows from that God accomplishes His purposes and does not allow evil [i.e., ~(p & q)]? Necessity is not acquired by fiat and theists must show such a contradiction. Unless they can, by our modal intuitions, it is possible that God accomplishes His purposes and does not allow evil [i.e., ◊~(p & q)]. No logical contradiction seems to result from that. We can then construct the following argument.

(5) If it is necessary that God accomplishes His purposes and allows evil, then it is impossible that God accomplishes His purposes and does not allow evil [i.e., □(p & q) → ~◊~(p & q)]

(6) It is possible that God accomplishes His purposes and does not allow evil [i.e., ◊~(p & q)]

(7) Therefore, it is not necessary that God accomplishes His purposes and allows evil [i.e., ~□(p & q)]

Here, one can continue. Let (r & s) represent "God exists and evil exists." As we've made clear, (r & s) entails the necessity of (p & q), otherwise, (r & s) is false. So, we have the continued argument:

(8) If God exists and evil exists, then it is necessary God accomplishes His purposes and allows evil [i.e., (r & s) → □(p & q)]

(9) It is not necessary that God accomplishes His purposes and allows evil [i.e., ~□(p & q)]

(10) Therefore, it is false that both God exists and evil exists. [i.e., ~(r & s)]

By DeMorgan's Law, (10) entails

(11) Either it is false that God exists or it is false that evil exists. [i.e., (~r v ~s)]

We can then add the fact that evil exists

(12) Evil exists [i.e., s]

By disjunctive syllogism, it follows that

(13) It is false that God exists [i.e., ~r]

Given the falsity of the Free Will Defense (see below) we have a cogent logical problem of evil against God's existence. Moreover, we can even construe this problem evidentially by pointing out that the theist has to show that it is beyond the power of extremely powerful and yet non-omnipotent entities to create, at least, a world with significantly free creatures that do not significantly cause moral evil, nor that there is a significant amount of non-moral evil. And the implausibility of such a thesis cannot be stressed enough. Skeptical theists tell us that we do not take omniscience seriously enough. Perhaps one ought to reply that skeptical theists do not take omnipotence seriously enough.

...

[2] First of all, if theists are going to introduce hyperbolic Cartesian doubt of whether or not we know that we feel suffering, at the very least, we have knowledge of our phenomena, knowledge that is utterly intractable. And some of such phenomena includes suffering. Secondly, yes, I am aware that Alvin Plantinga made a powerful objection to the logical problem of evil by pointing out the possibility of transworld depravity, in which a possible person is transworld depraved if and only if that for any logically possible world in which that person is instantiated, there would be at least one circumstance in any such possible world such that when placed in that circumstance, that person goes wrong, and that such circumstances exist in all logically possible worlds in which that person exists, and therefore, in all logically possible worlds in which that person exists, that person goes wrong at least once. However, there are significant difficulties for transworld depravity. One of the most significant is its reliability on libertarian free will, which if false (which I shall argue below) shows transworld depravity to be untenable. Moreover, given a certain type of compatibilism, Plantinga's appeals to transworld depravity utterly fail. Furthermore, Plantinga's transworld depravity is not as plausible as Plantinga makes it out to be. In an excellent summary provided by exapologist here, he argues the following.

Plantinga construes the key claim in his Free Will Defense as possibly true:

(TWD) Possibly, every creaturely essence suffers from transworld depravity.

According to Plantinga, if a creature suffers from transworld depravity, then *every* God-accessible world (i.e., every world that God can create) is one at which the creature goes wrong at least once.

So if some free creature FC is transworld-depraved, then we have:

1) Necessarily, if God actualizes FC, then FC goes wrong at least once.

And if every creature is transworld-depraved, then we have:

2) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a free creature, then if God actualizes x, then x goes wrong at least once.

If so, then if Plantinga is using "possibly" in (TWD) in the metaphysical sense (as in (1)), then (TWD) amounts to:

3) Possibly, it's necessary that for any x, if x is a free creature, then if God actualizes x, then x goes wrong at least once.

But Plantinga accepts S5 modal logic. If so, then he accepts the following axiom of S5 modal logic:

(AS5) If it's possible that P is necessary, then P is necessary.

But if so, then by (3) and (AS5), (TWD) reduces back to (2):

2) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a free creature, then if God actualizes x, then x goes wrong at least once.

But this can’t be what Plantinga meant to assert, can it? For now we don’t just have a defense – we have a theodicy. For we have an account that’s not just possibly true, but necessarily true. And you can’t have a stronger theodicy than one that’s necessarily true.

The problem, though, is that it’s extremely implausible to think that (2) is true: is there some shortage of souls, so that there is no possible creaturely essence that has at least one God-accessible world at which it never sins? Plantinga grants that there are possible worlds at which free creatures never sin; it’s just that none of them are worlds that God can actualize. Is this really plausible?

I think that this problem (in addition to some things that Plantinga says) leads many to say that Plantinga's "possibly" shouldn't be construed as *metaphysical* possibility (i.e., that there is, as a matter of fact, at least one possible world at which it's true), but rather as *epistemic* possibiliity (i.e., *we can't rule it out*, given all our evidence, that it's metaphysically possible).

Now the relevant notion of epistemic possibility can be construed in at least two ways:

(Strong EP) We're not quite justified in thinking that P really is metaphysically possible; however, we're not justified in thinking that P is metaphysically impossible, either -- given our evidence, it could go either way.

(Weak EP) We're not justified in thinking that P is possible; however, although it's implausible to think that P is possible, we can't *conclusively* rule it out that P is possible.

Of course, the theist hopes that (TWD) is at least strongly epistemically possible; if it's merely weakly epistemically possible, one wonders how interesting the Free Will defense really is: "Sure, it's pretty far-fetched to think that every essence suffers from transworld depravity, but it hasn't been *conclusively* ruled out as impossible -- hooray!")

The problem is that the same objections arise all over again for the strong epistemic possibility construal: it seems *implausible* that it's metaphysically possible. It seems that there are infinitely many free creaturely essences that God could actualize; are we to think that *every one of them* is such that *all* of the worlds in which they always freely do right are inaccessible to God? And as I’ve mentioned before, it looks to be a part of conservative Christian theology that angels exist, are free, and that some never sin. But if so, then it’s not necessarily true (because it's not *actually* true!) that all free creatures are transworld depraved. Thus, not even theologically conservative Christians believe it’s epistemically possible – let alone metaphysically possible. Even if the Old and New Testaments don't force belief in a doctrine of sinless angels, it needs to be pointed out (again) that Christians who endorse Plantinga's Free Will Defense *have no choice* but to reject such an idea.

Let me simply say that I disagree with the use of "metaphysical possibility." Philosophers have typically defined metaphysical possibility as "broad logical possibility" (which seems to be a misnomer, for "narrow" logical possibility is a necessary condition for metaphysical possibility [and hence, the set of logically possible worlds is a superset of the set of metaphysically possible worlds] but not vice versa) in which we may say, for instance, that a proposition is metaphysically necessary if and only if in all possible worlds, that proposition is true. But, what possible worlds? Doesn't seem utterly strange to posit that somehow, something can be true in all possible worlds, and yet, not in some logically possible worlds? [i.e. Saul Kripke believes that it is metaphysically necessary that one has the same parents as you do. Plainly, it is logically possible that you do not. However, if metaphysical possibility subsumes logical possibility (which it does not), then how any subset of metaphysically possible worlds have it such that a metaphysically necessary proposition is false?] Possibility is typically construed according to a modality; logical possibility is construed according to the consistency of a proposition (whether or not the proposition is non-contradictory) whereas nomological possibility is construed according to a proposition's compatibility with the laws of nature. But, metaphysical possibility isn't construed relative to any modality at all. So, I have no real clue what philosophers mean when they say that a proposition is metaphysically necessary, and yet logically contingent. It seems pretty clear that all metaphysical possibility consists of is epistemic possibility in disguise; when a person says that a proposition is metaphysically necessary, all they mean is that "such and such proposition is highly plausible and I believe it to be true." So, in any case, let's forget this entire business of "metaphysical possibility" (which I personally find to have polluted philosophy, especially since there is no good way to know whether or not something is metaphysically possible or necessary) and simply consider logical possibility, in which instance, Plantinga's claim becomes wholly implausible, since there is no logical contradiction in the falsity of the universality of transworld depravity (for plainly it is possible that there are some essences such that placed in any situation whatsoever, they will freely do the good), and therefore, TWD is false, along with Plantinga's Free Will Defense. However, exapologist points out shift to emphasizing epistemic possibility on the part of the Free Will Defender. See for instance Howard-Snyder, Daniel and John O'Leary-Hawthorne. "Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga's Free Will Defense." International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 44 (1998): 1-21. (Available as html here) Howard-Snyder and O'Leary-Hawthorne (I shall abbreviate the pair as HS&OH) argue that it is epistemically possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil, and moreover, they seem to deny the principle that given the ability, one should prevent preventable, known evil. Let me briefly comment on both notions. The latter view is literally incredible. It even seems like an incoherent notion, since, by definition, evil is that which one ought not to do, and hence, that which one ought to prevent. I seriously wonder what worth humans or even good has under theism (wherein we exist by the arbitrary fiat of some divine entity), and if HS&OH are willing to deny this basic moral principle, perhaps the logical problem of evil does not apply to God, ironically, because entities that fail to follow such a principle aren't good to begin with. HS&OH have emptied the term "good" of any content whatsoever. (So much for theists harping on about "value" "worth" "meaning" or "morality" in a theistic universe) HS&OH argue that it is metaphysically possible that God has a morally sufficient reason. Substitute metaphysical possibility for logical possibility (if we accept this whole business of metaphysical possibility) and take my argument above. HS&OH have the burden of showing that is metaphysically impossible that God could not have brought about the world without moral evil. And plainly that does seem metaphysically possible. Showing the possibility of that shows the impossibility of God having morally sufficient reasons. So then, contrary to HS&OH, the burden is not on the defender of the logical problem of evil (unless showing the possibility of God bringing about the world without moral evil is to be construed as a significant burden), but that the theist must show that it is metaphysically impossible for God to have brought about the world without moral evil. (Which is to say that they must show it to be metaphysically necessary that God brings about the world with moral evil) So, if anything, theists are ruling out the possibility of God bringing about the world without moral evil. And needless to say, they had better provide good reasons for that thesis.

Furthermore, TWD is construed in terms of incompatibilist freedom, or libertarian free will. Libertarian free will considers that one has the ability to have done otherwise, and by that, philosophers do not mean that given different circumstances, a person acts differently, but given the exact same circumstances, that same person acts differently in some logically possible world. In order to hold to this thesis, defenders of libertarian free will hold that persons are causally undetermined: there are absolutely no causal antecedents of one's actions whatsoever, not even the prior mental states of the agent. Now, here's the problem: if that the agent does some action is uncaused, then how is that action the agent's action? For if that action is uncaused, then the agent exercises no causal influence over the action since the action is uncaused. Most defenders of libertarian free will reply that the agent causes the action. But, what about the event "the agent causes the action?" Is that caused or uncaused? If uncaused, the agent continues to lack freedom. If caused, then either the agent was caused by something else (and hence lacks libertarian free will), or the agent caused the action. And so, we continue down an infinite regress with the agent causing that they cause that they cause that... But, this is absurd; no agent can control an infinite regress. And moreover, what about this infinite regress? Nothing can be prior to such an infinite regress, so the agent exercises no causal influence over this infinite regress, and so, that the agent acts as they do consists of a brute fact; it's just something that sort of happens to the agent. And such is not a free action. Since it is not the agent's action, it is not anyone's action, which means, that it was not an action to begin with. Therefore, libertarian free will is incoherent. Moreover, plainly, agents act according to their mental states, desires, and so on. To deny this is to divorce the agent's action from the agent itself. So, needless to say, libertarian free will is not the theory of freedom we should adopt.

What should we adopt? First of all, it has been shown that indeterminism precludes free will. Therefore, we have the following argument:

(1) It is logically possible that agents exist.
(2) If anything is an agent, then that thing is free.
(3) Either the agent's actions is caused or uncaused.
(4) If the agent's actions are uncaused, then the agent is unfree.
(5) No agent can be unfree.
(6) Therefore, the agent's actions are caused.

(1) is necessarily true since there is no contradiction in the actuality of agents, and moreover, agents are actual; we are agents, and we have infallible phenomenal knowledge as such. (2) is necessarily true by definition. (3) is true analytically, as it exhausts range of logical possibilities. (4) follows by our above analysis, and (5) and (6) follow by modus tollens.

So then, what have we shown? We have shown compatibilism to be true: that our actions are caused, and that such causation is compatible with freedom. However, it must be made clear that this type of freedom precludes the ability to do otherwise. And the ability to do otherwise does not support freedom, it destroys freedom (see above). Per the ability to do otherwise, there is some logically possible world in which given the exact same circumstances, I act differently. But why? Given who I am, why would I act differently at all? The ability to do otherwise is disguised as freedom, when all it really consists of is the antithesis of freedom: for I am no longer free to act in accordance to my desires and personality, in other words, who I am. And given that I am the same person in all logically possible worlds, it is necessary that given the same circumstances, I do not act differently. I lack the ability to do otherwise not because of external circumstances, but given who I am. This type of compatibilism is necessarily true (per the above) and accords with our understanding of freedom. It should be made clear that the only thing that really causes our actions besides ourselves is that fact of our creation: that we are brought into being in this world. And from that point on, we act in accordance to who we are, and this does not impinge on freedom. It seems that this form of compatibilism is immune to many of the challenges given by defenders of libertarian free will, such as the Consequence Argument. The best statement of the Consequence Argument is espoused by Peter van Inwagen. He argues from the notion of an untouchable fact, a fact being untouchable if and only if we could have causally influenced such a fact to be other than what it is. According to van Inwagen, if it is an untouchable fact that (p → q) and an untouchable fact that p, it follows that it is an untouchable fact that q. So, van Inwagen continues, it is an untouchable fact that given that the laws of nature and determinism hold, I do some action. It is an untouchable fact that given the laws of nature and determinism, I do some action. And therefore, it is untouchable that I do some action. But, van Inwagen is missing some parts of the causal chain. First, part of the causal chain is the fact that I am born (it should be clear that "I" is not completely born until around the age of seven, when we have pretty much developed our personalities) and then after that, I act according to who I am. And there is no lack of freedom in this, per the above. And this understanding of free will gives us an insight into the type of personal identity that holds. We need not construe identity in terms of what a person actually does, but what conditional propositions hold on them. These conditionals are of the form If a person P is in circumstance C and has the ability to actualize A, P actualizes A. Moreover, this set of conditional propositions is maximal according to the modality. For the most part, the modality of local possibility (possible insofar as to the closest possible worlds to the actual world) is all fine and well, but it should be noted that there is also maximality qua logical possibility; wherein C and A subsumes all logically possible C's and A's relative to P. Now, here's the thing: there will be some (indeed, an uncountably infinite number) P such that given any C and any A, P goes right with respect to A. Here's the thing: such P are possible; therefore, God could have actualized various P such that they always freely choose the good. Or, even more modestly, there are some P such that a subset of their conditionals include C's and A's such that when placed in such situations, P goes right with respect to A. And, of course, it was logically possible for God to actualize such persons and such circumstances. So, Plantinga's Free Will Defense fails.

Steven Carr

Why does God command people to stick swords into the belly of expectant mothers?

He must have a morally sufficient reason for that.

The 'God moves in mysterious ways' defense means Christianity is not rationally defendible.

Steven Carr

*ANY* logically possible world??? What, *any*? You don't mean 'some', do you?

Let us take this logically possible world, where this set of circumstances applies :-.

1) A is faced with a choice between good and evil
2) God infallibly knows A will choose good.

What will that person choose in that logically possible world? Good or evil?

Dante Alighieri

They will choose good. However, Plantinga (or at least as I read him in the Nature of Necessity) says that for that person, no matter what circumstance God places him in, he will go wrong with respect to at least one action. Now, Plantinga doesn't apply to just this person, but all persons, so it is basically not within God's power to have actualized a person who would always freely do the good. [This is the thesis of "transworld depravity" the key to Plantinga's FWD] (I suppose that Plantinga arbitrarily limits this requirement from those in Heaven or for sinless angels)

Plantinga is basically relying on true (so, it holds in the actual world) contingent counterfactuals of freedom of the form:

(1) If S were in circumstance C, S would freely actualize A.

Now, supposedly, it's possible that corresponding to every possible S, no matter what C God placed S in, S would go wrong with respect to at least one action. But, this is a very strong claim and highly contestable, since Plantinga would hold that necessarily if God creates some "free" (free in the libertarian sense), they would freely go wrong at least once. And there seems to be no contradiction in holding, for instance, that some entities are transworld depraved and others are not. In any case, it's difficult to see that libertarian free will is coherent at all in the first place: at best, Plantinga would be defending a counterpossible that "if LFW obtains and all essences are transworld depraved, then God could not have created moral good and yet not moral evil" since the antecedent is impossible, since I think there are powerful arguments to show that LFW is impossible. In any case though, it's doubtful if Plantinga's use of counterfactuals is compatible at all with libertarian free will. As I have argued elsewhere:

First of all, libertarian free will is committed to the following thesis:

(2) If S freely actualizes A, then that S actualizes A is undetermined.

What does this mean? Analyzed modally, let us consider the notion of an initial world segment (call it IWS): the state of affairs obtaining up to time t, which is immediately prior to the free choice of A. According to defenders of LFW, this initial world segment is insufficient for that S actualizes A or that S does not actualize A. So, there are some possible worlds W such the IWS obtains, and that S actualizes A obtains and there are some possible worlds W* such that the IWS obtains and that S does not actualize A obtains. So, that S actualizes A (or doesn't) is indeterminate.

Suppose we have an IWS* such that there is some true counterfactual of freedom such that

(3) If S were in circumstance C, S would freely actualize A.

According to LFW, being in C does not determine that S actualizes that A, for there will be some possible worlds wherein C obtains, but that S actualizes A does not. Now, this counterfactual of freedom is part of IWS*. Moreover, consider that part of IWS* is S and C. Now, here is the problem: there are no worlds W** that contain IWS* and that S actualizes A does not obtain; there are no worlds W*** such that IWS* obtains and S refrains from actualizing A, in all possible worlds where (3), S, and C obtain, that S actualizes A obtains. But, per libertarian free will, no IWS determines that S actualizing A or S refraining from A. Therefore, counterfactuals of freedom (and consequently, God's knowledge of "free" ["free" in the libertarian sense] actions) are incompatible with libertarian free will.

Steven Carr

*NO MATTER WHAT*???

ALL Plantinga means is that no matter what circumstances God places a person in, if those circumstances include God knowing he will go wrong, then he will go wrong.

Dante Alighieri

Although that's very simplified, well, yes, that is what Plantinga is saying, although Plantinga refers to counterfactuals of freedom (although they aren't really "counterfactual") in relation with essences.