tk

There's a lot I'd like to write here, but I can't afford the time to dump all my thoughts at one sitting, so I'll have to do so in dribs and drabs...

Regarding what "rationality" is, I think it is of utmost importance that we have a working definition of "rationality". One may say that "rationality" means subscribing to arguments that seem to "make sense", but this is the wrong definition, for many bogus beliefs do make sense to certain people. (Indeed, one problem I find with Vuletic's article is that, just like many other writings, it fails to state what "rationality" is.)

After thinking about the issue for a while, I arrived at a possible description of "rationality": it has to do with seeking objective truth through objective methods. This notion of "rationality" will seem roughly equivalent to the notion of "skepticism".

The next question is then whether Dialetheism (1) agrees with this notion of rationality, (2) is contrary to this notion, or (3) is independent of rationality. The question is not whether any proposition "exists" (since we agree that all propositions exist), but whether a proposition can be "true" and "false", where truth and falsity, intuitively speaking, refer to the interpretation mapping of a proposition on the set { t, f } under a "profane" view of logic (as expounded in Section 3.1.2 on this random link).

I'll now try to "objectively" examine the rationality of Dialetheism. It is universally agreed that a proposition is "not true"/"inconsistent"/"irrational" if it logically entails some observable physical phenomenon, but the phenomenon is not observed (after all, even fundamentalists use a similar line of argument against religions other than their own, so it can't get more objective than that). This "unobserved phenomenon" argument is however is just a specialized version of the Law of Non-Contradiction. But what is the justification for preferring the specialized LNC over the general LNC? It's not clear.

John Page

But rationality, like truth, is subjective (IMO). Something appears rational to the observer when it makes sense to the observer.

Consider:Who is being rational? Who is being most rational? With whom do you most identify in the above scenario. Me? I'm the monkey on god's shoulder.

I still think the trick is understanding what goes on inside the mind.

Cheers, John

jpbrooks

No problem! You are engaged in a very interesting philosophical activity.

True. But (and this was my original point) so must Dialetheism. Dialetheism must assume that pre-existing assumptions of logic exist in order to hold that Dialetheism is preferable to any other view. So that kind of "counterargument" cannot be used to "eliminate" views that oppose Dialetheism without simultaneously providing a reason to "eliminate" Dialetheism itself.

Not exactly. The sentence "fragment" "minus three little pigs" is not a complete statement by itself and thus has no truth value at all because only statements can have a truth value. Standing alone, it can have no more truth value than an exclamation (such as "ouch", for example). So it provides no reason for adopting Dialetheism.

I'm stumped here, I haven't gotten far enough into this analysis to offer you a competent critique. But this is interesting!

Your presentations are excellent. I'm just not prepared to critique the details of your analysis.
However, while I can find nothing wrong with your analysis, I hesitate to agree that this kind of analysis has any consequences for the basic assumptions of Logic. As I alluded to in an earlier post, the assumptions and claims of any view are statements. And statements (that are not logically inconsistent) assume the basic "laws" of Logic. These "laws" are not easy to evade.
The basic "laws" of Logic are even more fundamental than the axioms of Set Theory. Thus, Set Theoretical considerations cannot affect the basic assumptions of Logic.

John Page

I think these are your pre-existing assumptions. It seems you are evaluating Dialetheism according to the system of logic i.e. what does a dialetheic logic system look like. However, holding that there are no (true) contradictions (LNC) is an axiom. I could (and probably do!) argue that outside the mind the issue of truth and falsity is a none issue and it is the prejudice of our thoughts that makes the judgement.

How about in reality contradictions exist? That is, human beings state things (contradictions) that arise because statements can have different meanings depending upon a) the mind interpreting the statement and b) the point from which that mind views reality. Relativism bites again!
OK - "Once upon a time, there were minus three pigs"

Why do you mention "adopting" dialetheism? Isn't it just a thinking tool, like logic? Its not like having to believe in a religion. Dialetheism does not necessarily exclude propositional logic as a system (where as the opposite is "True" heehee).
Propositonal logic, though, is at least. It uses the LOI as an axiom and at its most fundamental level a) assumes that all truths are equal - i.e. same identity and b) uses a system of representation involving symbols to indicate more than one thing with the same identity. The LNC is a tighter but is little more than a tautology helping to define negation of truth values.

As to your last comment above I ask "Are all statements either assumptions or claims?" I think it comes down to a convention that reduces to "An accepted fact is considered to be true" - which can be true or false depending upon the observer of the statement.
...and I argue that underlying deficiencies in the system of propositional logic ultimately result in the incoherence of that logic, and set theory itself.

Cheers, John

jpbrooks

The basic axioms of Logic are only subjectively apprehended (and "discovered") as being characteristics of propositions. They are not subjectively produced apart from any such considerations.

Yes! That's because Logic is relevant to the evaluation of a view's assumptions and claims.

It apparently can take on any form that the Dialetheist desires it to have since it rejects the LNC.

True. But again, it is an axiom that underlies all intersubjectively meaningful statements including the ones that we are using here to communicate with one another.

But is it even possible to think about things in a manner that is consistent and/or meaningful without, at the same time assuming the basic axioms ("laws") of Logic?


We can think about those meanings as being "contradictory" to one another (as alternative interpretations of the statement - alternative interpretations that are held by different people, or by the same person at different times, are not automatically contradictory because the context and/or situation, within which the truths are stated, are different) but we can't have two contradictory thoughts at the same time about the same thing. For example, we can't think that a table top is brown while we are thinking that it is not brown.

This would be an example of the "contextual" difference I alluded to above.
Outside of a "context" that includes mathematical concepts as meaningful, your statement cannot be true.

Nor does it have to be. It is a view, and one can certainly adopt a view.

True! But it would be pointless to use Logic to make inferences within Dialetheism because both A and ~A would be equally acceptable.


I'm not sure why that would be the case since the LOI simply states that A is not ~A. How does it follow from that that all truths are equal?

But again, it is a "tautology" that we have difficulty evading, since it applies to every statement that is made. (For example, a statement with a "paradoxical truth value" cannot be, at the same time [and interpreted the same way], a true statement. In a two-valued system of Logic, its truth value would have to be ~T [or "false"].)

Perhaps. But not all statements are truth claims. Some are lies.

But again, differences in interpretation, whether in the meaning of statements or of sense data, don't imply inconsistency.

So, assuming that an alternative is possible, what alternative to some system of Logic for evaluating statements, arguments, views, etc., would be available?

I have to run.

tk

Sorry for the delay...

John Page:
To continue the story, the 3 men move on to observe an opaque vessel which is coloured with stripes of yellow and green. The first 2 men agree that the vessel is both yellow and green. The 3rd man stares incredulously at the vessel as if he has seen a ghost. A 4th man comes along and says, "As far as the first 2 men are concerned, the vessel is both yellow and green. As for the 3rd man, he is surprised that yellow and green can come together." The imaginary god observes the situation, then thinks to himself, "Time for ambrosia."

I think this shows us that Dialetheism has nothing to do with differing "points of view" of different people. All 3 people can clearly see that the vessel is both yellow and green, yet the 3rd person still believes there is a contradiction. In fact, relativism does not even preclude the existence of objective truth, or the validity of the LNC; neither does the absence of relativism preclude Dialetheism.

Also, truth can always be expressed in objective terms, as the 4th man has done. Given any bunch of "subjective" truths, we can parameterize the predicates involved with a `point of view' -- e.g. instead of Evil(Bush) "Bush is evil" we have Evil(Bush, Saddam) "as far as Saddam is concerned, Bush is evil" -- and take the union of all these predicates, and thus arrive at an "objective" truth.

(Aside: actually I do not understand what the great deal is with relativism/subjectivism vs. absolutism/objectivism. They are not even diametrically opposed. I guess the relativism vs. absolutism hoo-ha is simply caused by a refusal of both sides to properly cast their thoughts in symbolic logic notation -- the whole debate evaporates once we do this.)

Since objective truth exists, so an objective notion of rationality also exists. (Here I will say that the 3rd person is being the most irrational, as he is trying to view the world through a dichotomy which isn't.)

jpbrooks:
Certainly though, a Dialetheist logic will contain the notions of "true" and "false" somewhere within...

John Page

Apologies in advance for brief response!

Hmmmmm. The mind can be trained, you know.
Yes, but you can never be completely objective under this model - you just end up with an infinite regression or circular argument.
Perhaps you would care to illuminate our darkness with an undoubtable logical explanation.
I'm glad you put "objective" in quotes. I think our "objectivity" is limited by our brain/mind.

Cheers, John

John Page

I still don't see how Dialetheism and logic necessarily but heads. I can no longer resist the challenge of proposing a "Dielethical Logic" even if, of course, such a thing is a true contradiction!!

Let A represent a proposition considered "True" under propositional logioc and ~A represent the contra, "False"

The result "True" is derived from or is considered a property of A which we perceive through a brain state represented as {A}. Therefore {A} -> A -> True.

For each proposition A there must be (under dialetheism) a brain state {B} under which A is false. Thus {B} -> A -> False.

Thus the truth functionality of any proposition depends on the view of the observer which in turn is determined by their brain state.

Is this coherent or what?

Cheers, John

jpbrooks

Sorry for the brevity of my replies but I'm pressed for time.

But how could "true" and "false" even be defined without assuming the LNC? For instance, how could the "definition" of "true" exclude what is not "true" without the LNC?

jpbrooks

John, is "truth functionality" the same as "truth value"?

I'll be back later.