Stephen T-B

Jeffery, I’m confused. “All that objective morality implies,” you wrote, “is that there is an objective fact of the matter in ethics.”
I think that “objective facts of the matter” are rather rare: one I can think of is the time it takes for light to travel from the Sun to the Earth when the Earth and Sun are in a specific relationship with one another.
Are you saying that “objective morality,” comes into the same category? That whatever circumstances you find yourself in; whatever culture you are brought up in, you still have access to “objective morality”?
Does someone brought up in a cannabilistic society have this access, or must he wait until a “civilised” visitor from outside informs him of it?
The cannibal might say: “He says he is civilised, but I don’t believe it. He eats with the same hand that he wipes his bottom with, for goodness sake? Who is he to tell me that eating people is wrong?”
(Perhaps you’ll tell me I don’t understand what morality is. And you’d probably be right.)

Nataraja

This would depend on my mood, my relationship with my daughter, how long before she drowns, my alternatives, my chances of saving either party, my chances of eventually getting to safety, et al. The most responsible thing for me to do would be to rescue the larger group, mostly for findings of our scientist friend. It would not be entirely morally reprehensible for one to paddle over to the left. Irresponsible, perhaps, but I would not be hasty to cast labels. One's frame of mind at the time of the act is a large determining factor.

jlowder

Yes, that's what objective morality entails.

You've confused the ontology or metaphysics of morality with moral epistemology. Again, all that objective morality implies is that there is an objective fact of the matter in ethics. By itself, objective morality does not imply anything about our ability to know objective moral facts. That's why one can consistently be a moral objectivist and a moral skeptic: one could believe that there is an objective fact of the matter in ethics, but at the same time one could believe that there is no way to know what the fact of the matter is. Of course, many moral objectivists, including John Post, Quentin Smith, Michael Martin, David Brink, et al reject moral skepticism and have given detailed explanations for how one could know objective moral facts.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

galiel

Whew! For a minute there, I had a high-quiz flashback. I thought you were going to ask:

"How fast would the liferaft have to travel in kph in order to make it to shore before sharks ate a hole through the hull, taking into account the average weight of the passengers, a peak motor efficiency of 18 kilometers per liter and a head-wind of 25 knots? Record your calculations."

Plump-DJ

Ok JJL.. you asked me to post my "complaints" with a non-theistic meta ethics in here. So I shall. I have not read in detail what the others have had to say here so i hope that in some sense i am bringing something new to this.

My 'complaint' was outlined in my first post to you in the other thread. Quite simply, how can i have an ontologicaly meaningful and binding morality when i know that from a non-theistic perspective it's simply the result of time + chance. Naturalistic "survival of the fitest" darwinian evolution rules the day and i cannot even begin to see how you can derive a meaningful (ontologicaly) and *binding* ethic that finds it's origins in that process. As Michael Ruse notes..

"The position of the modern evolutionist . . . is that humans have an awareness of morality . . . because such an awareness is of biological worth. Morality is a biological adaptation no less than are hands and feet and teeth . . . . Considered as a rationally justifiable set of claims about an objective something, ethics is illusory. I appreciate that when somebody says 'Love they neighbor as thyself,' they think they are referring above and beyond themselves . . . . Nevertheless, . . . such reference is truly without foundation. Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction, . . . and any deeper meaning is illusory . . . "

And Rorty..

"The idea that one species of organism is, unlike all the others, oriented not just toward its own increated prosperity but toward Truth, is as un-Darwinian as the idea that every human being has a built-in moral compass--a conscience that swings free of both social history and individual luck."

Granting that naturalistic Darwinian evolution rules the day (what other option does the non-theist have in explaining the origin of our moral sense?) from that perspective where can I ground a meaningful and binding moral ethic? Certainly not in mater or energy nor in the process used to create our moral sensibilities, as Ruse notes? Where else might I place them from a non-theistic perspective?

[ October 24, 2002: Message edited by: Plump-DJ ]</p>

kingjames1

In response to Jeffery Jay Lowder


Jeff, in making those assertions I was answering babelfish's question as to what I believe in that regard - not making an argument.

My argument against secular ethical realism is not that such cannot be conceived (e.g. Platonism w/out the god-talk), but that for a naturalist (strictly speaking -- i.e. the natural universe is all there is and all there ever will be), such a case has not been convincingly made, in my estimation. The arguments against atheist, naturalistic ethical realism are hackneyed and do not require rehash - without a transcendent basis for good there can be no ethics proper.

I am familiar with G.E. Moore's non-natural category in his 'intuitionism' - however, his category, by nearly every account, is unclear and indeed one of the greatest weaknesses of his approach. This criticism is hardly new, and has yet, to my knowledge, been adequately dealt with.

My approach to the divine command theory is perspectival. For more, see the works of theologian John Frame, particularly "The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God."

J.

Nataraja

KJ, are you a troll?

There is no god, therefore it is foolish to speak as if there is one. The nonexistance of your deity makes your entire position crumble, you lose, go away.

Psycho Economist

I for one behave morally because not to do so is an open invitation for others to act immorally against me. Which is not to say that it won't happen... it's just that every person who withdraws from the implicit social contract we live together under makes it easier (maybe even necessary) for others to do so. (P.S. that's why fundy conservatives hate atheists; they consider God belief to be a part of the social contract (Lakoff, 2000).)

I don't know if you consider that a "justifiable" reason or not, since ethical realism is not necessary to sustain such belief... since i think that's how you're defining "justifiable" (I might be wrong).

That said, there are moral relativists who are Christian, and moral relativists who are athiest... there are moral absolutists who are Christian, and moral absolutists who are atheists... and everything else in between.

babelfish

LOL!

It's also like that riddle - Q: If you were driving down the road and saw that if you swerved to the left you'd hit a guy named Nate, and if you swerved to the right you'd hit a lever that would wipe out all of humanity, which way should you swerve? A: To the left of course, because Better Nate than lever!

HA HA HA HA HA!.......

Oops, ahem, so sorry!

We now return you to the serious discussions going on in this very serious thread....

[ October 25, 2002: Message edited by: babelfish ]

[ October 25, 2002: Message edited by: babelfish ]</p>

kingjames1

Jeff, in response to your request, here is a brief summary of MacIntyre's work. (Actually, it may be best for you to start with "After Virtue," as "Whose Justice, Which Rationality" is sort of the sequel).

In "Whose Justice..." MacIntyre contends that any rational justification of moral judgments must presuppose some particular tradition's conception of rationality. He illustrates his contention by examining four philosophers: Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and Hume to show how their different views about justice and practical rationality derive from different sources. He then demonstrates that the present liberal (i.e. modernist) academic theorizing in ethics and meta-ethics is actually an exercise within the particular liberal tradition, presupposing the tradition's conception of rationality (which in turn is dependent on previous philosophical traditions) and not, therefore, some 'objective' evaluation of 'the facts of the matter' as it supposes (or least did prior to Rorty and others).

It's a fascinating read.


The whole modernist project claimed to get to 'the truth', to know reality as it 'really' is...however, the modernist project itself is the product of a stream of traditions within the West, and is demonstrably a tradition itself. I.e. it is one particular interpretation of the world among many. It's claims to 'objective truth' (and hence to supremacy over competing interpretations/traditions) are in turn dependent upon it's traditional conceptions of rationality (typically manifested in a particular epistemology and metaphysic, the bases for which must be presupposed).

As the pomo would say, the modernists take their interpretations far too seriously. They actually believe that their conceptions and epistemic constructions are 'real' and 'universally true' (this is what critics of modernism mean by 'reification'), not realizing that they are part of yet another 'system of doctrine' that has evolved w/in the traditions of the West, particularly in the (post)Enlightenment. I.e. they buy their own press about 'objective investigation' and 'brute facts', and 'self-evident truths', and other such supposed 'universally valid' claims -- which are all actually part of an extremely peculiar and complex tradition: modernism. We modern folk seem to think (unthinkingly) that our conception of rationality goes without saying - or at least that it is 'the light' for those in darkness (i.e. other traditions).

Now, don't get me wrong: I am not a thorough-going anti-modernist or pomo. But I do think the observations of the critics are impressive and in some instances compelling.

J.

[ October 25, 2002: Message edited by: kingjames1 ]</p>