hedonologist

I should say that I'm trying to prove that more than info matters to any reader who wouldn't die for a physical copy of their brain or "their self", etc. I don't have to appeal to intuition to prove that a particular person values "more than info". Their behavior or words can demonstrate this.

The statement that "info matters" or that anything matters, if this is viewed as a "correct" statement as opposed to it being viewed as a preference of a certain person, is an appeal to intuition.

A materialist may agree with this: It is impossible to copy a "self" because the "copy" is in a different position in space, thus it is not identical materially. So what does it mean to say the self is info? A self is defined relative to the whole universe, not just some info in a brain.
You can define "I" that way, but the significant meaning of the statement seems to come from its implications on values thus behavior. If you don't indicate how you would act, I don't see how it matters if you call a copy of yourself "I". Would your current brain decide to die, if a copy of it was made, because your current brain thinks "you" would be surviving this processes because it thinks "you" are information?
What would be "more than" saying there are material differences? Answer: Differences in how we value the two beings.
You have a desire to gain something for yourself, presumably pleasure. So, if you "become him" this has some affect on how you value *his* pleasure. But if he is not really "you", then the desire to gain for yourself is not fulfilled by working for his gain.

excreationist

Well I think that you also need a system that has the potential to interact with the world based on the information in their long-term memory and their desires. I mean I would consider a freshly dead person who has had their head frozen to be dead (the "self" is dead) even though the information *may* be intact and they might be revived in the future.

Well in the Sixth Day at least, copies didn't have proper human rights. It just helps to solve legal problems I guess. I mean what if you and your copy are fighting over who can keep your car? Your car can only have one owner. The most straightforward solution is that the original you gets the car and the copy gets whatever the original gives it. Or it could be about your wife or something. Maybe one of you goes bad and the other one wants to put a restraining order against it and stop it from accessing their bank account, etc. You need to distinguish between them for practical reasons even though in an ideal world everyone would all get along.

But would the copy receive any type of benefit? e.g. more money or better health, etc. Otherwise there isn't much reason to do it, except for "kicks". (I like trying new things every now and then)

If you are copied after your decision is made, then the personality that made that decision is also copied and is a part of that copy. This assumes that the copy will be happier or be richer or healthier or something. (I don't know if you said that that was the case)

[ January 20, 2002: Message edited by: excreationist ]</p>

hedonologist

What are you-- married?

What if they had you eating nothing but banana peals, rolling cigarettes all day, until your hands stopped working from carpel tunnels syndrome. You thought this was the most enjoyable life possible because they brainwashed you, but in reality you didn't realize that other people had more enjoyable lives and you could too.
But a test could be based on observations of what people put into practice.
Well I could promise to put brain B into a body it liked a whole lot better, then it wouldn't need the old one. But I suppose that is not what you are asking.

First would be to convince you that you are not and do not really "become", the experiencer who would exist in your future body, even if you kept your current brain. So it is impossible to be "selfish". Then try the following ways of reinforcing values which may make you more likely to desire the transplant.

Try to reinforce your value to have certain "improved" brain functions, which my brain has and yours lacks, or something like that.

Trying to get you to die for me, by reinforcing the desire to love in an altruistic way. (Of course you wouldn't have to believe it were dieing if you believed the first reason I gave.)

Trying to convince you there was or could be an afterlife, and that since you would die anyway you may as well bet your life on this most virtuous of deeds-- Pascal's Wager.

I might ask brain B, if it would like to have just a little bit of brain A hooked up to it, to test it out. Start with no essential functions like extra memories, analytical skills, etc. In this process I might transfer the desire to replace brain B with A, so the combo brain will want to go the rest of the way.
I'm mostly just asking what you would do.

tronvillain

hedonologist:

Well, I wouldn't do it for no reason, but yes.

tronvillain

hedonologist:

I don't see how. That the preservation of information is what matters to the survival of the self is a position I have achieved by reason, not intuition.

God Fearing Atheist

I dont value my brain for what its made out of, but rather what it produces...me. But, of course, thats just me.

hedonologist

How about just to "upgrade"?
Matters to who? That is not what matters to my self. I view a copy of myself as another person entirely, though one I would probably like a lot, because we had so much in common and could help one another, etc.

What does it mean to say something matters in that sense? That it matters to everyone? That it matters to anyone who knows all the pertinent facts?

How does the reasoning go, where you conclude that something "matters"? For example, how do you conclude that preserving the self "matters"?

(I bolded some of the following quote)
You are info, correct? But how can you be defining yourself as info if you don't know what info you are?

If you defined yourself as some info, it seems it would be a simple matter of copying that info. But it looks to me like you are really concerned about some subjective state, which you think the info causes.

I don't think of myself as my whole brain. I could think of many brain functions I could theoretically improve, by replacing that part of the brain, without replacing myself, including those areas of my brain that are said to be where we feel things from different body parts, if I tested replacing one of those brain parts and experienced that I still felt that body part.

If you would not define yourself as the experiencer of your brain, how do you define yourself? For example, if you are your personality or memories, I don't think you are interested in preserving these exactly as they are, necessarily, because if you want to learn new things that involves forgetting, and if you change some bad habits or malignant desires these can radically alter your personality.

It seems one may want memories to convince themselves that they are the "same being" who experienced what the memories recorded, but this may be an illusion anyway. That fact that we can make a copy which has a different experience from the original proves that the experiencer was not preserved.
I suppose the question is whether we have the experiencer in common. I think the "meaning" is partially dependent on our unique (subconscious) principles governing our values and actions, such as whether we are intending to benefit our "self", etc.

(editted to change: "There is no way to know if an experiener has been preserved" to "That fact that we can make a copy which has a different experience from the original proves that the experiencer was not preserved. ")

[ January 20, 2002: Message edited by: hedonologist ]</p>

hedonologist

Are "you" produced by a copy of your brain? I say "no". I would not trade my life for the life of an experiencer produced by my brain's copy.

Jamie_L

I think in his post, GFA (pardon the acronym) summed up my thoughts on the subject much better than I was. If I wasn't making myself clear, go back and read this post of his on page 2. That's pretty much my position (I think). Thanks GFA for having more ability than I for putting this into words.

How does this impact morality? Well, to be honest, I've skimmed a lot of the long, detailed posts relating to hard-drives and upgrades. But here's my nutshell view:

I feel identity, consciousness, and "person-hood" are tied to a physical brain and its causal history. I tend to agree that replacing things bit by bit wouldn't impact my consciousness, but wholesale changes could.

Copies of me, where they possible to create, would be independent counsciounesses - separate people - even if they are at one moment in time nearly identical to me. However, being different pieces of matter occupying different places in space at the same time, I'd say that they are never completely identical to me. Neither copies nor the original me should be destroyed or damaged any more so than any other human being should. Being an exact copy makes them (and me) no less "valuable" in a moral sense.

Jamie

God Fearing Atheist

I agree. A clone who is exactly like me is still not *me*....and it so happens that i value myself more than others.