Dr. Retard

Here are some different issues:
1. Does the truth of a reporting proposition necessitate the reported fact? For example, proposition p, "He loves to rock", reports my real-world love of rocking. Does p's truth make me love to rock?

2. Does the truth of a reporting proposition make the reported fact? Does p's truth make my love of rocking a necessary part of reality, one that couldn't have been otherwise?

3. Does the temporal relationship between the reporting proposition and the reported fact matter? So, assume that "He will love to rock in 2002" was true in 1980. Does that make me love to rock today? Does that make it a necessary love of rocking? Now assuming that "He loved to rock in 2002" will be true in 2010. Does that make the reported fact true or necessarily true?

4. When a reporting proposition is known with unimpeachable certainty, does that change its effect on the reported fact? Does it matter whether someone apprehends the proposition's truth?

Suppose God is in time like us, and, in 1980, God knew "He will love to rock in 2002". Does that make me love to rock? Also, does that make me necessarily love to rock? It depends on these issues above. It depends on whether the truth of reporting propositions, or the infallible apprehension thereof, make the reported facts true or necessary.

Suppose God is out of our time, and God knows "He loves to rock in 2002". Does God's being out of time matter? Only if the temporal relationship matters (the relationship between the truth reporting propositions, or the infallible apprehension thereof, and the reported facts).

I think one seed of confusion is this belief: For God, in 1980, to know "He will love to rock in 2002" with unimpeachable certainty, he would have to know some 1980-facts that necessitate my 2002 love of rocking; and then those 1980-facts are what make me love to rock (necessarily?). But theists don't think that God has to figure out things on the basis of limited knowledge. Instead, God just knows ("boing!"). God could know things about the future, without having to first know some future-necessitating present facts and natural laws, and then having to figure out the future.

Evangelion

Shadownought -

True.

True.

Yes, it is predetermined by human decision. That's what free will is all about.

False. I only lack free will if my personal future is predetermined by someone who is not me. Fortunately, I am capable of making my own decisons, which in turn predetermine my own future. It's exactly the same for everybody else.

Why not?

[ December 08, 2002: Message edited by: Evangelion ]

[ December 08, 2002: Message edited by: Evangelion ]</p>

Devilnaut

Predetermined means that the future is essentially written. It also means that it will happen in one specific way. Free will (the non-compatibilist version) requires that there be options and that humans be free to choose from them. If the future is predetermined, there are no "options". Tomorrow you will get up and "choose" which cereal you want to eat. But, an omniscient creator already knows which one you will pick. Therefor your choice is not truly free: if it was free and independant, it could not possibly be known in advance.

Devilnaut

I'm not sure it is relevant. As long as God knows that you will love to rock in 2002, there is exactly zero chance that you will not love to rock in 2002. This is regardless of whether God's knowledge preceded the event or the other way around.

[ December 09, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]</p>

Evangelion

Devilnaut -

May I remind you that we're not disputing the definition of "predetermined"? What we are disputing here, is the source of that predeterminism.

I have already explained what I mean when I say that the future is "predetermined." I mean that it is determined by human volition - not that it is determined in the absence of human volition. IOW, future actions can be said to be "predetermined", but only in the sense that they are determined by the people who choose them, before they actually occur.

Correct.

No, there are only "no options" if the future is not determined by individuals, at their own discretion.

Correct. I shall choose.

Correct. He will know what I will choose.

Non sequitur. The task before you is to prove a causal connexion between freedom and foreknowledge, with foreknowledge as the catalyst.

But you have shown no such thing.

Devilnaut

If the future is in any way predetermined, there are no options, from the omniscient being's perspective, by definition. What you seem to be saying is that although the future is predetermined, it isn't actually predetermined.

If someone knows (with 100% accuracy I might add) about a particular state of affairs, then that state of affairs could not possibly be otherwise, or someone could not have been said to have known about it.

If, to continue my previous example, God knows that you will choose shreddies instead of cornflakes tomorrow morning, is there a possibility that you might freely choose cornflakes? I await your answer to this simple question.


Edit to try to expand:

For someone to know about something in advance, that something must have a knowable causal connection with that someone's time frame. What I mean is that it's impossible to know the outcome of a truly random event.

If God knows the outcome of your "free choices", then it can be said that they are dependant on a causal chain of events leading back to God's time frame (this can certainly be said w/o God but we're concentrating on him in this thread). If this is indeed true, then the future is truly predetermined and can and will happen in only one particular way.

The only way to avoid this is through complete randomness. If any of your "free choices" are truly random, then the future cannot possibly have been predetermined. If this is what you are suggesting free choice is, however, there are two issues: an event cannot be said to be truly random if God knows its outcome beforehand, and an action that is based on complete randomness is not a choice.

Anyway Eva, I would say that your task is to explain how God's omniscience can be reconciled with the existence of completely random events, and how random events can constitute "choices".

Either that, or the much more difficult task of explaining how a purely caused event could occur in more than one possible way without the existence of randomness.

[ December 09, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]</p>

Evangelion

Devilnaut –

What, even by human decision? (Let’s be clear about our definitions, please.)

No, that’s not true. You’re using “predetermined” as a reference to an inexorable chain of events which must necessarily come to pass. Within this chain, you include all events - whether humanly caused or not. (Correct me if I’m wrong.)

But when I refer to something that is “predetermined”, I restrict the application of “predetermined” to human decisions. So when I speak of “predetermined human actions”, I refer to “that which humans have freely decided to do.”

Ergo, if you go to the fridge for a beer, I would say that this action was predetermined. Predetermined by what? By your active decision to get a beer, of course! But does this mean that getting a beer was the only option available? Not at all.

I’ve already been through this in my previous posts.

No, I already explained what I meant by “predetermined.” I mean that when a human being decides upon a certain course of action, we may refer to this course of action as “predetermined”; that is to say, he has determined in advance, that he will pursue this course of action. This does not mean that he is only capable of pursuing this course of action, nor does it mean that he is incapable of ceasing that action before it is even completed (should he so desire.)

You’ve got it backwards. By His divine foreknowledge, God knows that I will have cornflakes (or shreddies, if you prefer), because I have freely chosen to have them. The knowledge is contingent upon the choice; it’s just that he knows my choice before I do.

Either way, it’s my choice, and His knowledge is logically contingent upon it.

Yes, that’s right. The knowledge of someone’s decision, is itself the result of that decision being made. Logically, the decision is anterior to the knowledge. Logically, the knowledge is a consequence of the decision.

For humans, yes. But if you’re going to talk about the foreknowledge of God and its (alleged) causative influence upon human free will, you’ve already accepted (if only for the sake of the argument) that God has this foreknowledge. What we’re supposed to be discussing here, is not “Does God have foreknowledge?” (which has already been advanced as a “given” for the purpose of this debate), but “What is the effect of God’s foreknowledge upon human free will (if any)?”

*snip*

No, all you’ve shown is that God’s foreknowledge is logically contingent upon my freewill decisions. What you have to do now, is prove that foreknowledge somehow causes future events.

*snip*

No, I don’t have to do any such thing, because I claim that God’s foreknowledge is logically contingent upon the events of which He has foreknowledge – whether random or not.

Again: the task before you is to prove a causal connexion between freedom and foreknowledge, with foreknowledge as the catalyst.

[ December 09, 2002: Message edited by: Evangelion ]</p>

Devilnaut

Ah, so God knows what choices you will make.. but he only knows once he sees you make them. We might as well be calling me omniscient, I have the same ability.

However, if God knows the outcome of any event before it happens, then by definition his knowledge has preceded the event. How can you argue that God knows what cereal you will choose tomorrow, yet that his knowledge is contingent upon your choice? This seems nonsensical.

Devilnaut

It doesn't matter if foreknowledge is the catalyst, as long as it actually exists and can be called knowledge. If the knowledge exists, it must refer to something that could not be otherwise! If it refers to something that could go one of many different ways, in what sense is it knowledge?

My point is still that if God knows today that tomorrow you will choose shreddies, there is no possibility of you choosing cornflakes. That is unless you'd care to argue that God's knowledge is maleable and changes according to what occurs, but this would negate his omniscience altogether and seems nonsensical to me. Is this what you are arguing?

If your choice is free, there is no way to know what you will choose until you make your choice.

If God's knowledge is contingent upon observing your choice once you've made it (much like my knowledge), then he is no longer omniscient.

[ December 09, 2002: Message edited by: Devilnaut ]</p>

Keith Russell

Greetings:

It's still not possible for an omnipotent 'God' to have given up any of 'His' power (when 'He' 'gave us' 'free' will) and remain omnipotent. 'God' either has all the 'power', or 'He' is not omnipotent.

'Free will' contradicts 'omnipotence'.

('Omnipotent' doesn't mean 'great power', it means 'all-power'. If 'God' is all-powerful, then there can be no other power apart from 'God'--not even the power to freely choose.)

Keith.