John Page

JenniD:

Thanks - I'm now thinking the mice were pan-dimensional. P.S. I'm suggesting the bodies are the vats.

Cheers, John

King's Indian

Hi, Mykell!

I’m very flattered by your compliment. What I wrote above was just nit-picking, really: I’ve enjoyed the opportunity for constructive thought that you introduce below far more. I introduce my next slice of waffle in anticipation of your knocking it into shape (and of course, to anyone else who wants to join in).
The rules for a metaphysical hypothesis.
A good point: How does one go about it? How do you? It seems to me, that while one is casually following one’s line of thought the only indispensable aspect of a hypothesis is that it be interesting. It must be able to generate lots of mental light and heat, and hopefully one has those happy moments when one cannot usefully hold all the ideas of interest in one’s head all at once. It seems to me, though, that I should distinguish what is an essentially creative activity from the sort as used by Mr. Chalmers: this type of hypothesis functions analogously as geometrical axioms, clearing the ground before the main activity can begin; and very important this is too. This definition of hypothesis as rolling up the sleeves and spitting on the palms is deceptive, however: as Derrida noticed in his discussion of the way Hegel uses prefaces, introductions, prolegomena, etc. in his work. (which is complicated even further of course by the question of the Phenomenology of Spirit being an introduction to the Logic). The single point I want to draw from this (which is in “Dissemination”, by the way) is the fact that introductions, grounding hypotheses and the like appear when the real work is done. By this I mean that when one has arrived at what seems an interesting conclusion, then one goes back in order to frame the argument for clarity in ways that were not apparent when the problem, let alone the solution, was gestating. In fact I believe it is a commonplace that writers in all disciplines write their introductions last. In one way this is only common-sense- after all, if the guide-lines were as clear-cut from the beginning, then the answer to a particular problem is grasped with as much effortlessness as picking up windfall apples.
In this sense, then, Hypotheses such as those used by Mr. Chalmers must be established with far more rigor than the creative tools we use to winnow out anything of interest from our surroundings. We need to trust them, in fact, and it is a trust that must be earned. To do this we must then, after setting down what appear to be the foundations by which the argument is most easily followed, attack these very foundations with fresh vigour, with all means to hand and from every angle. I suspect far more work of this sort goes into good thinking than what seemed the real business beforehand (which, paradoxically, would then constitute a type of introduction in its own right). In such a way one may arrive at conclusions of superior interest that the original argument may have only hinted at.
On the question of underlying levels
As someone who, by taste, is disposed to explanations encompassing separate disciplines, I feel a little uncomfortable in my difficulty to accept this. However, I still have real problems with the approach outlined. Firstly although I can have no difficulty in accepting that biological systems are composed of smaller units that are better described by the discipline of chemistry, I cannot then draw from this that the science of the smaller units will necessarily have a part to play in understanding the larger. I go further: the drive to apply disciplines appropriate at levels below the phenomenon under discussion is in no way sanctioned by science itself (see below).
As for whether physics has a problem with an observational limit: I don’t think so. Physics, has rightly been thought of as one of the most subtle and rich of all the sciences. One such aspect allows us to correspond together at this moment, and if physics could show nothing else, it would have more than justified itself. But then again, physics has achieved much more: the Dirac equations that forced science to accept the possibility of anti-matter, its discovery, and the theory of quantum-electrodynamics are things we can all, in some small measure, take pride in. When looked at like this, physics is not short of fruitful areas of consideration, nor approaches to them. It, after all, has rigorous ways in showing that the smaller particles are, the less reality they seem to exhibit.
No, the problems seem to start when one applies explanations suitable at our level to levels where it has no business. In the case of the preference to apply reductionism (not a dirty word to me, by the way),it is one that has its first applications in the level of reality we are most comfortable viewing, and in fact these can be extended to other levels. Cars, clocks and the relationship of bodies to organs all do yield, to some extent, to this approach. The search for the constituents of atoms and beyond, has also found success, up to a point. But this is only half the story: we find that the development of egg to embryo to foetus, the patterns of weather, and the interactions of ecologies are much better described by taking into consideration the wider context. Even those particles at levels far below atoms do not make sense as solitary billiard balls, but only in relation to other particles. The point where our everyday thoughts should be discarded is one where we apply pre-selected aspects of them to the exclusion of others. One such confusion seems to apply at the sub-atomic level: whether the particles are thought of as billiard balls or “pure” bits, the hope is that thus far, and no further. The trouble is, it’s always common sense to ask, “and then what?”. Unfortunately the only way such an approach allows is: yet another level below.
I have to confess my ignorance about auto-catalytic webs. Even these, to me, sound as if context, not billiard balls, may play a useful part. I rather distrust the idea, though, of separate disciplines as combatants, all looking to carve up as much reality for their own as possible. I’d rather like to think of chemistry and biology in co-operation.
To mention ultimate limits briefly: We have discarded “ultimate” when discussing the observable limit of the universe, and there is no argument from evidence that we need it for the most intricate aspects of reality. It has to be shown that “ultimate” may be rigorously applied at that level.
On suggestions for improving the Matrix Hypothesis
Don’t ask for much, do you? Honestly, it’s an excellent point. Hitherto I’d rather come to the conclusion that where the matrix hypothesis was interesting, it was unsupported by argument. I’d like to turn the question on yourself, and I’d welcome the benefits on any thought you’ve already given to the matter.
Well, that’s it: another great lump for your consideration. I welcome any and all thoughts.
Take care,
KI

John Page

Hi KI!

Great twist - how do we hypothesise about how we hypothesise. Answer - we can only hypothesise because we don't really know!

Cheers, John

MyKell

KI,
I appologize for taking a long time to reply. I just logged in today, and, wow! the whole iidb "landscape" has changed.
Well, I think your idea about a metaphysical hypothesis being interesting is really neat. Sometimes, one gets too caught up in hypothesizing about things in science and forgets the main reason why one is in science in the first place. It is the beauty of it that attracts everyone. The opportunity to fantasize about lost worlds, extraterrestrial life, technological advances, and what not. Curiousity is what drives us all and it is the very thing that gives science its beauty.
I agree that a metaphysical hypothesis should be interesting and should be made in retrospect. That kind of gives a distinction between an "anterograde hypothesis" and a "retrograde hypothesis". Science does operate in a retrograde fashion, and I see no reason why metaphysics should not. Afterall, it is the study of reality, isn't it!
Now regarding reduction in science. I agree with you that reducing predators and prey to quarks is quite meaningless. However, hierarchial reductionism, where one goes one or two hierarchial levels to explain a complex system by the working of its parts is nontrivial. In fact, I think this is where we gain information the most. Now explaining something like biology will almost certainly need us to expand our understanding of non-equilibrium thermodynamics, autocatalytic webs, and other parts of chemistry that are still at their infancy right now. You are right, those things are by no means "billiard balls".
To improve the matrix hypothesis I think we can do two things. One is a short term investigation, which relies on gathering more information regarding the mind/body problem, the physical plausibility of thinking about the universe as a cellular automata, and probably finding more interesting (and profound) idea of a creator that would not lead to infinite regress. I have no idea how the last point would be accomplished, however, it is something that would make any metaphysical hypothesis involving a creator much more interesting.
The long term investigation would be constructing a matrix sometime in the future. It is an empirical way to test such a hypothesis and might shed some light on whether it is plausible to suggest that we are BIVs.
Take care,
MyKell

King's Indian

Hi, Mykell!
You don't have to apologize for your absence. I could probably do with spending a little more time away from here myself. I'll take your last post as a convenient point on which to end. Not because it doesn't set the gears whirling, but it'll be worth boning up on autocatalytic webs and whatnot, even if only to approach your level of understanding, and not to tax your patience. You don't happen to know of any books that might interest the layman?
Take care and catch you later,
KI

PS: I suppose going down one or two levels isn't too bad (mutter mutter grumble).