DRFseven

Where does the mind get the information with which it controls?

[ July 08, 2002: Message edited by: DRFseven ]</p>

John Page

They are separated by being different physical or actual instances of similar things.

I think there are two different things going on here. The first is that the mind seeks patterns and brings them to our (conscious) attention. Our perception is, therefore, of sense data that repeats itself so its stands out from the rest of our environment. Example 1. You see the numeral 1 on your screen and detect it through its constancy over time in your perception. Example 2. You see a numeral 1 on a plane in the sky and it remains constant w.r.t the plane.

The second thing is a repeatable process such as a computer program or DNA, or you might even say a tree is a repeatable process. Let's extend that to the brain process (mind) which includes the conscious mind. My "worldview" is not that conciousness is boundaryless.

Now to information, a concept that we confer on objects that heave meaning to us beyond their actual existence. This "meaning" is conferred by us so that the numeral 1 is information. It doesn't mean anything to the plane and probably not to a cat. In this way I propose that information is interpreted within the mind and has no "meaning" outside the mind. Only minds that view said information in the same context will confer the same "meaning" through intersubjectivity. This allows the information to have multiple manifestations - but these are specific manifestations within minds and not boundaryless.

Sorry for the long post - hope the above is clear and would be interested if you see this a different way.
I think memory or a mechanism for memory is an integral part of the machinery for consciousness - the part of our brain/mind that watches the movie filtered and buffered and spliced through our senses. I don't go for the Trekkie pure consciousness concept, you have to be conscious of something and the something is transmitted/stored memories.
I can't seem to make the jump from a recurring physical process to boundaryless information.
I agree we can consider human minds collectively but that does not mean they are a collective (in the sense of being a single unified process). I still conceive of reality as including many separate instances of the human form which, when exising contemporaneously and being presented with the same set of issues and prior research will tend to think the same way and reach similar conclusions.

Cheers, John

owleye

John....

"OK. Could you tell me prior to what? Clearly, the concept must exist as a precondition to having "sense data" (for example) compared with it to generate the perception. Do you mean prior to the event of perception or do prior to the existence of a mind or some other condition?"

I thought I was clear but let me restate it.

To observe an instance (an object) of class X requires having the prior ability to discriminate objects of class X (i.e., recognize that the object is an X) from among the totality of all recognizable objects.

To be able to discriminate objects of class X requires the prior possession of a concept of X sufficient to make any instance which fits that class recognizable as such. (Concepts in this usage are (in effect) rules governing perception of objects. This does not represent the entirety of what constitutes a concept in humans (i.e., almost all creatures can discriminate objects, many that humans can discriminate, and many that humans cannot). Humans also have the ability to treat concepts as objects, such that humans are capable of making errors in recognition.

Thus, the above may not accurately portray how human concepts work in perception, however. What may happen is that objects are perceived in accordance with what concepts (or conceptual framework) we happen to possess, regardless whether or not the instances of objects which are allegedly what the perception is about actually fits that concept. Notwithstanding this, I suspect there has to be some features of the actual object that are picked out which would trigger the perception in the first place, even if it is a wrong perception.

"The actual location of the concept is flexible, as is the location of the car being perceived. All I am asserting is that for perception to occur, both the concept of car and the car must exist at some time/space locations."

Why must the concept of the car exist at some location? Why is this important to you?

"If this were not so, comparison of the concept and the sense data from the object could not take place (unless there is some hitherto unknown physic that enables this to happen)."

This assumes that a comparison is made. What makes you think this? Indeed, I don't think the concept has a location at all, notwithstanding that your theory seems to demand it. I gather from the above, that laws that govern the mind (or govern perception) must be physical laws. I might then suppose that this would make the laws of logic and rationality physical. How do you propose to specify the truth of a law of logic in physical terms? You indicated earlier that I was guilty of committing a contradiction. This was somehow important to you. What physical laws did I break that caused me to produce a contradiction?

"Because a concrete thing is a material thing by definition."

I had hoped I wouldn't have to drag out my dictionary again, but it appears you have formed your own view of what this term means and ignored the common usage.

concrete -- adj 1. constituting an actual thing or instance; real: a concrete proof of his sincerity. 2. pertaining to realities or actual instances; particular (opposed to general): concrete ideas. 3. representing or applied to an actual instance or thing, as contrasted to an abstract quality.

"If you provide me an example of something that is concrete but not detectable using light then I will proceed to ask you how you can prove to me such material thing exists, ... this takes us into the realm of physics. All this harks back to by suggestion that "physical" is a better opposite to "abstract" than "concrete".

I think you are just plain wrong here. One example from my dictionary, concrete idea, is not physical, while the other (concrete proof) might be, though its meaning is not physical.

"Care to define "ideal entity" so we can discuss the relation between things falling under such category and physical/imaginary entities?"

Ideal entities (if they exist) are entities which are governed by mathematical-logical-linqistic rules and not by physical laws. They are immaterial. There is a timeless/spaceless aspect to them. Any properties they have are timeless and unchanging. Abstract entites are ideal in the above sense. The mind, however, has additional properties, including the ability to make decisions based on subjective probabilities and desires/fears. It appears that minds (like ours) having some access to a world apart from it, possess a (and also possess the ability to develop a) conceptual framework as well as a capacity to gather information from that world through its organs of sense. The fascinating aspect of perception (and object cognition generally) is that consciousness (as self-consciousness) determines the form in which all such mental activity occur. The two major forms in which consciousness manifests itself are (1) in ordinary experiencing, which involves a special relationship between a subject and the objects of its conscious experience such that the experience is one in which it (the subject) is immersed in a world and the second form is one in which the subject reflects on these experiences and, among other things, notices that there is a subject-object relationship -- what is known by the name of "intentionality" in phenomenological circles. The quality of subjective experiences is something rather special as well, one in which I have found particularly difficult to describe, but recognize that such feelings seem to have some influence over our actions, judgments, and thoughts, though it is not clear to me how they do this.

"Yes, but I seem to remember the descriptor "in" is something you're not happy with. Is it better if I say "Thought process are synonymous with brain activity"?"

I certainly would not subscribe to this view.

"This is not the limit of the ontological framework I'm exploring. Again, if you want more info on the ontology please provide me an email address I can send you a file that contains details. You can do this privately by clicking on the icon of a stamped envelope at the top of any of my postings."

I have little interest in details of a physicalist theory of the mind unless it can tell me how the brain deals with rules (or with language for that matter). (For example, how would you physically instantiate the following spelling principle: 'i' before 'e' except after 'c' excepting words ending in the sound 'ay' such as neighbor and weigh.) If this is too difficult, feel free to pick out any rule we follow and try to physically instantiate it. (Note that concepts, considered as objects, are comprised of rules.) (Behaviorists have an answer to this: Rules are the result of operant or other conditioning. However, this fails to explain why rules, say the rules of counting, can produce a discipline in which many interesting features are discovered, such as the interesting properties of prime numbers, or that the ratio of a circle to its diameter is an irrational number, or that the laws of nature can be expressed mathematically using numbers residing in the so-called complex number domain.

"IMO any conclusion is limited by the scope of what has been tested and found repeatable. This provides us reliable conclusions about the nature of our environment. However, these conclusions are limited by the viewpoints considered, variables accounted for an tested etc. So, a scientific experiment carried out in both space and on earth can be considered more objective. But we cannot reach absolute objectivity because we cannot test all variables in space and time. Hence, to suppose that an objectively reached conclusion will hold good for all space and time is irrational."

Could it be that the last sentence represents a claim of yours that could turn out to be false at some point in space and time just because you are being rational about it.

What I believe is that all conclusions, because of the limited scope of human consideration, are to some extent subjective."

If they are only to some extent subjective, I take it then, that to a complementary extent, they are objective. Moreover, as you have indicated there appear to be degrees of subjectivity. The earth's journey around the sun in annual cycles may have a certain subjectivity to it, but, in the scheme of things, this seems to be a reasonably objective characterization of things. True, some day this will no longer be true since in the future the sun will swallow the earth as it expands into a giant red ball, but the objectivity of this characterization didn't really extend beyond this eventuality anyway. Moreover, it may very well be the case that no humans would be around when this eventuality occurs, making the subjectivity of the issue evaporate, it seems to me. (I suspect I'm being particularly obtuse here, but I'm not up to clarifying things right now. My apologies.)

"So, with respect to an individual, true belief would be less subjective than belief alone."

I'm not sure I understand this. If I believe in Santa Claus, I believe he is objectively real. That is, I believe Santa Claus is an object of possible experience and this fact about me would not be altered if in fact Santa Claus were not real. It is true that a belief in the existence of some object can be altered if new information about the status of the object (in this case Santa Claus) is gained. However, it seems to me the psychological status of the belief (whether I believe it to be objectively real or that I have some reservations) is fairly independent of whether or not it happens to be true.

Now in one use of 'belief', when one believes X, one believes X to be true while in anothe use, as it is expressed in the following: "I think X is true", indicates that there is some uncertainty about it.

One theory of belief (Kant's, among many others) differentiates belief from knowledge (and from opinion). On this account, a belief is a holding to be true, but only subjectlvely so (i.e., it is not expected that everyone subscribe to it). Knowledge, on the other hand, is a holding to be true, but objectively so (i.e., it is expected that everyone subscribes to it).

Your fascinating interpretation of subjectivity and objectivity rather inhibits my being able to make sensible use of the distinctions between beliefs, knowledge, and opinion. They all kind of run together.

owleye

owleye

Coleman Smith...

I gather we should submit as you have to the authority of Scientific American on this issue. Not being inclined to do so, however, perhaps you would be so kind as to provide us with a few reasons why what it has to say would put the issues being discussed here to rest.

owleye

owleye

John...


"First, I think the studies quoted do show that the brain is definitely involved in mental activity (not just "may be")."

This had not really been in dispute. My use of "might" is to leave room for alternaive positions. I'm not intending to represent my position on the matter. I'm trying to provide a critique of what you are offering, regardless of whether I hold the position or not which is being critiqued.

"I consider the results of these and other studies as reasonable proof that certain brain anomalies produce different mental phenomena and thus behavior."

Behavior is usually thought of as what the body does, not what the mind does. To incorporate the mental activity in the context of behavior, we regard it as action. Notice that even though the brain/body produces the mind, this doesn't say much until you can describe it in such a way that, in the absence of a first hand account, we can determine that the activity so produced is mental. What's more, when all is said and done with this approach, the mind will remain as much a mystery as before.


"e.g. Doctors have traced back physical and mental symptoms of certain types of epilepsy to demonstrate correlation with specifc brain abnormalities."

If I remove both my eyes, I won't be able to see. That the brain (including the organs of sense) is involved in perception is not in dispute. The question is what makes percpetion what it is. How is the experience of green produced in seeing an object? (This is a different question from how is green produced.) For example, how do you know that your experience of green is the same as my experience of green? What is the experience of green that is claimed to be produced by the brain and organs of sight?

"Second, I like you muscle example. Your use of the adjective metaphoric to describe "muscle memory" indicates you don't consider that the muscle has a mind of its own. However, do you consider muscle as purely the muscle cells or including the integration of nervous system sensors and motor actions."

I don't claim to know the physiology of muscles. The example that comes to mind is that the muscle configuration that holds the feet in a position for standing depends on what one was doing just prior to this as well as on the shoes being worn and the mechanics of balancing that goes along with this. The stability of the muscle configuration seems to rely on our not changing shoes (or changing in and out of them) often. Presumably standing and walking are difficult mechanical tasks and it pays to remember the muscle configuration that works.

"This is exactly the kind of issue I had in mind. For example, there is evidence that significant signal processing occurs within the spinal cord. Thus, the question arises as to whether this is brain/mind processing or whether its just signal transmission."

Do you really have some question about this? What would you look for to regard it as mental?

"Hence I have been seeking a mind/body border definition that represents a reasonably coherent starting point for epistemological investigation of how we know what we know (or at least what we think we know)."

I don't think you should be looking for a definition here. I suspect you are seeking to determine what constitutes mental activity within the maze of activity that the brain is capable of. You should not be defining it. After all, anyone can define things according to their own house of cards. If I defined mental activity to be equivalent to signal processing, all computers that process signals would have minds. Few would think I've accomplished much if anything by doing so, however.

owleye

Mr. Sammi

Drf_Seven,

Where would the mind get the information with which it controls? Interesting question.

I try my best to visualise the human as being divided at least into a LowerBeing and a ThinkingBeing. LowerBeing supports ThinkingBeing. ThinkingBeing enhances LowerBeing. ThinkingBeing augments ThinkingBeing as a Thing-in-itself.

LowerBeing supports ThinkingBeing by giving it energy and environmental data.

ThinkingBeing enhances LowerBeing by its ability to interpret the environmental data and energy and issue control sequences.

ThinkingBeing augments ThinkingBeing through active qualities of ThinkingBeing like reflection, refining external and internal data, and furthering control of LowerBeing.

At least 3 places to get data, external environment through internal representation, internal environment through internal representation and thirdly through active memoryless internal feedback looping.

* * *
The distinction of the representative data, can be outlined where the mind recieves data and must necessarily accept it (then move on to discover color blindness, deafness to certain wavelengths, and so on). Then there is the data of the mind's own accord, active mind data, in the realm of : I'll call her cute, even though she is disastrously ugly and sinful.

Drf_seven, I realise you may hold opposition to my ideas based on the fact that all the representative data must necessarily be in the head.

I say Yea, Yea, but the mind can alter some data and some other data it cannot. To turn this into a useful example, on a dark night go outside and try to make it seem like you are seeing what you see as if daylight is on. You should find your mind has no control over this data. However while you are outside and then you close your eyes, you may be able to flood your consciousness with light, that is making your mind light up and think Yea, Yea, it is daytime.

Sammi Na Boodie (yes? no?)

DRFseven

But all signal processing does not involve self-modulation. We exist in our environments by detecting signals and transforming these signals into advantageous behavior. How does this transformation occur? We are "self-regulating" organisms in an open-feedback system (where extrinsic factors are part of the loop) due, it is becoming apparent, to neuromodulary effect. Various chemicals are triggered by stimuli to act on different receptor sites that combine to cause modification of input-output (threshhold) function as well as changes in afferent/efferent properties. An essential part of this modification involves modulation of memory function because of its role as intrinsic stimulator in the process of neuromodulation.

The borders of our bodies intermingle with our environments, I think, with the mind.

DRFseven

Sammi, I will think about your post and your questions while my granddaughter sits in my lap and plays "Crocodile Hunter". She is disinclined to wait.

John Page

owleye:

Agreed we need a third person (i.e. more objective than first person) account of brain/body effects that explain how and why the first person account occurs.

I don't understand why you make such a definite statement that the mind will remain a mystery after we have a coherent explanation as above. I think it remains to be seen.
You might be interested in this thread and the links contained therein <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=57&t=000337" target="_blank">Color discussion thread</a>
Yes, I do. As to a definition, that's why I started the thread. Based on responses so far I'm leaning toward properties that define a physical state that contains intrinsic information, thus giving rise to an abstract mental state. The intrinsic information can be derived from external sense data and from internal data such as memories or the results of other mind/brain processes. I know this isn't clear but I'm trying to arrive at a strict existential definition that excludes all anthropomorphisms, assumptions that there is a perceiving "I" and everything phenomenally external to the mind (since that is just "stuff" interpreted by the mind through the senses.
Yes, its tempting to go into the "maze" and that's why I want to stay at the very edge (philosophically). I think we should be defining the Mind/Body Border and I think it can be defined. If we cannot zoom in on the border then we have no ontological basis to be discussing the mind and mental properties at all. If you accept that we can perceive things in our environment isn't it just a question of finding out what is being perceived, what is doing the perceiving and how. Unfortunately, beyond the sensory layer things get very complicated so we have to resort to the abstract for meta-explanations.

Cheers, John

DRFseven

How does it alter data? What is the process by which that alteration occurs? I'll give you my explanation after you answer; I'm trying to determine if we are meaning the same thing by "mind."