Freethought & Rationalism Archive

HRG · 08-27-2002, 03:17 AM

[quote]Originally posted by Philip Osborne:

"This should be obvious since every possible world can be described in first-order logic."

I'm not so sure about this. Suppose w is a possible world and x is something that possibly exists.
[quote]
"x" is just a label for something, not the "something" itself. You would have to tell me properties which uniquely identify this something. How else could I identify this "x" in other worlds than w ?

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Suppose further that x does not exist in w. If this is so, since x is possible, w will have the property of x possibly existing in it. Since first-order logic does not have modal operators, it cannot account for these properties.

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My PoV is that "possible existence in w" is not an actual property of w, but of the description of w in the mind of a philosopher, scientist, theologean etc. Without such an intelligent describer of w, the situation is simple: either there is an x in w with the required properties, or there isn't.

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Also, since my knowledge is relatively limited, does Godel's proof exclude modal operators from the purview of his proof?

Yes, modal operators are not included.

I've asked a friend who works in foundations of logics and mathematics and he told me that modal logic does not enjoy a high reputation among his colleagues. AFAIK, no one has ever attempted an argument to show that modal logic is consistent.

IMHO, when X says that some event possibly happens, this is not so much a statement about reality, but about the concepts, theories, beliefs, experiences etc. that X has about reality - even if the number of Y's which share those concepts etc. is large.

"And this follows exactly from what definition or from what axiom?"

It does not follow from any definition or axiom. It IS the definition. I'm not sure what the problem is here, unless you are asking for a clarification of what "unlimited" means.

Well, it was not included in your definition (see your post - which spoke about "omnipotent/-scient/-benevolent. And I do not know what "unlimited" means. Unlimitedly positively charged ? Unlimitedly evil ? Unlimitedly indifferent ?

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"And what should stop me from defining a necessary, but limited being , call it "God" - or God-6, to distinguish it from your God-0 - and apply the OA to it?"

I tend to think that if a property is limited, it possibly has a cause of its instantiation.

As someone who has taught quantum theory for some time, I tend to think the opposite

.

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This cause may not be a sufficient condition for the thing's existence, but nonetheless it entails the contingency of the thing in question, as I've argued before.

OK, so what is the cause of God's unlimitedness ? Isn't this just another property ?

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It is true that there are some parallels to the OA that may seem to work, such as an "evil God," etc. The problem is that they all stumble over the same possibility premiss that the OA does.

If I understand you correctly to say that the OA stumbles over a possibility premise, I could not agree more

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I think there are solutions to this problem, though time and space prohibit me from giving them here.

"Modern physics seems to contradict your assumption. It says that there is no explanation why one specific pion decays into muon + neutrino, and not into electron + neutrino."

My definition of "explanation" does not require that this explanation necessitate or be a sufficient condition for what is being explained. At any rate, is it at least true that that there is a reason for the pion to decay into either the muon + neutrino or the electron +neutrio rather than not decay at all?

But IMHO you cannot just "bundle" different kinds of events and explain them as a bundle. The fact which is to be explained is not that pions decay (that follows from the standard model), but that at 12:00 GMT within a specific region of space a pion decayed into electron + neutrino, the elecron travelling due north. This - to use your language - is a contingent fact, yet lacks (as far as we know) an explanation as an individual fact.

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"Anyway, your requirement would end in an infinite regress of explanations, explanations of explanations etc. Different universes are differentiated by "brute facts"."

Not necessarily. Supposing I accept that different universes are differentiated by different brute facts, my proposition can still be true. For instance, x may be the brute fact of w, but that does not rule out it having an explanation in w1. On this construal, even though every fact possibly has an explanation, every world still has its own brute facts.

But you would still need to explain the antecedents of your explanations, their antecedents etc.

Best regards,
HRG.

BTW, are you interested to join the theist-atheist debates at CARM (www.carm.org - atheist board) ? I've already sung your praises there.

Kenny · 08-27-2002, 08:12 AM

A side note on QM�

A couple of claims about Quantum Mechanics have been made here which I find dubious. The first is that QM shows that there are certain events which occur without explanation. QM shows nothing of the sort. The best one might be able to say is that QM is consistent with the idea that there is no explanation for certain events. It is true that local hidden variable theories are ruled out by Bell�s Theorem violations, but that still leaves the possibility of non-local hidden variable theories. There are still other possibilities. For all we know, perhaps God directly determines the outcome of each quantum event in such way that is consistent with QM statistics overall, or perhaps this is a means by which other spiritual beings (e.g. angels, demons, and humans insofar as they have non-physical attributes) influence reality in a manner that is still consistent with the laws of physics. Bottom line is that we don�t know what the explanations are, but QM does not rule out the existence of explanations for these events or the possibility that such events could have explanations in some possible world even if they were brute facts in our own.

The second claim is that QM allows the creation of something from nothing. This isn�t really true either. Virtual particles arise from the quantum ground state, which isn�t really �nothing� in the metaphysical sense, and if you want to convert virtual particles into real particles, then you�d better have an adequate supply of energy on hand.

God Bless,
Kenny

[ August 27, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p>

Philip Osborne · 08-27-2002, 08:15 AM

"Rw: Please describe the inductiveness of the argument as it has been deducted from observable events. The OA...."

The fact is that no true proposition can be "deducted" from repeated observations. The reason is that for every repeated set of observations, it is conceptually coherent for there to be a counterinstance to such observations. For instance, the fact that I have only seen black crows may lead me to believe that all crows are black; nonetheless it is epistemically possible that there is at least one crow which is not black. Deductive logic guarantees conclusions with certainty; repeated observation makes conclusions probable, and so is not deductive.

"A state of being either possesses the property of existence or it does not."

Existence is the state of having properties, and so is not itself a property. This was Kant's basic objection to Anselm's OA. Also, I am not sure what you mean by "state of being." That sounds like something a Scholastic philosopher would say.

"Therefore any logically possible world must have been instantiated as a transient act of an existent causal agent whose existence necessitated a causal transient act."

Quentin Smith has written it is logically impossible for any possible world to be caused. The reason is that if x causes world w, and x is actual in w, then it follows that x is a part of w. But causes and effects do not overlap. Hence, possible worlds cannot be caused. The only consistent way to hold that a world's existence can be explained (not necessarily caused) is to suppose that a necessary being freely brought it about. A necessary being is self-explaining, as I've said, and at least according to Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss, a free action stands in no further need of explanation, at least on the Libertarian theory of free will.

"IMHO, when X says that some event possibly happens, this is not so much a statement about reality, but about the concepts, theories, beliefs, experiences etc...."

It seems to me that as long as there is real contingency in the world, there are objectively true statements concerning the modalities of things. And it seems to me that there are such contingencies in the actual world. You seem to be suggesting that modalities do not exist, and that all modal claims are false.

"Well, it was not included in your definition (see your post - which spoke about "omnipotent/-scient/-benevolent. And I do not know what "unlimited" means. Unlimitedly positively charged? Unlimitedly evil? Unlimitedly indifferent?"

An unlimited being has all of its essential properties attributed without diminishing qualification (for instance, in the statement, "the shield is white with respect to its one half," "with respect to its one half" is diminishing qualification on the whiteness of the shield). Secondly, these properties must be of a kind that cannot be constrained by causal features of any world. For instance, being stuck in a bear trap constrains my ability to walk. An unlimited being cannot be constrained in this way.

"OK, so what is the cause of God's unlimitedness ? Isn't this just another property?"

It is a conceptual truth than an unlimited being can have no cause. You might object that this makes such a being impossible. This is an important objection, and the only way I think it can be met is to provide seperate arguments for the existence of a necessary being. I can't get into that here.

"But IMHO you cannot just "bundle" different kinds of events and explain them as a bundle. The fact which is...."

I am using a causal and extremely weak sense of "explanation." For instance, I could point to the presence of egg as a necessary condition for fertilization. Obviously, the existence of the egg is not a sufficient condition for fertilization, but it satisfies my weak sense of causal explanation. I assume that causes do not necessitate their effects (we have discussed this before), so to establish even this weak sense of causation is enough to establish the event's contingency, since there is at least one event which does not necessitate it.

"But you would still need to explain the antecedents of your explanations, their antecedents etc."

Not necessarily. The chain of explanation at w might end with fact q, but in w1, q might have an explanation in terms of r. Every chain of explanation can end somewhere, although for every possible fact x, there is at least one world at which it has an explanation.

"BTW, are you interested to join the theist-atheist debates at CARM (www.carm.org - atheist board) ? I've already sung your praises there."

Thanks for the compliments. I'll see about joining the CARM debates, though I will probably still consider the II board to be the definitive place for philosophy of religion discussion.

Sincerely,

Philip

HRG · 08-27-2002, 10:35 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Philip Osborne:

"IMHO, when X says that some event possibly happens, this is not so much a statement about reality, but about the concepts, theories, beliefs, experiences etc...."

It seems to me that as long as there is real contingency in the world, there are objectively true statements concerning the modalities of things.

That's my point. I am not sure that contingency and possibility are objective properties, and not part of our description of the world. I tend to believe the contrary.

The famous "fundamental constants" of the fine-tuning argument make an excellent example. We don't know whether they could be "possibly" different or not, since we lack comparison with other universes. According to our current state of knowledge, they "could" be independently different, but there may well be a basic principle which links their values.

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And it seems to me that there are such contingencies in the actual world. You seem to be suggesting that modalities do not exist, and that all modal claims are false.

I don't say that, only that they inherently involve our description of the universe. What does "possibly different" mean but "according to my state of knowledge, I can well conceive that it might be different.

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"Well, it was not included in your definition (see your post - which spoke about "omnipotent/-scient/-benevolent. And I do not know what "unlimited" means. Unlimitedly positively charged? Unlimitedly evil? Unlimitedly indifferent?"

An unlimited being has all of its essential properties attributed without diminishing qualification (for instance, in the statement, "the shield is white with respect to its one half," "with respect to its one half" is diminishing qualification on the whiteness of the shield).

This is pure semantics, IMHO. If I define "X is hawhite" as "one half of X is white", your shield is hawhite without any diminishing qualifications. IOW, by defining additional properties, all limitations can be semantically eliminated.

In any case, what are the essential properties of your definition of God ?

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Secondly, these properties must be of a kind that cannot be constrained by causal features of any world. For instance, being stuck in a bear trap constrains my ability to walk. An unlimited being cannot be constrained in this way.

Not if the property itself is "able to walk unless stuck in a bear trap". Again I see this as a kind of semantics.

I suggest that our differences of opinion are due to the fact that in your worldview God is an actually existing entity - with given properties which you of course regard as essential. As a weak atheist, for me God is a concept in someone else's mind. Its "essential properties" are yet undefined.

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"OK, so what is the cause of God's unlimitedness ? Isn't this just another property?"

It is a conceptual truth than an unlimited being can have no cause.

You mean that it follows from your definition of "unlimited". I have to object because I do not think you have given a valid and unambigous definition of an "unlimited being".

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You might object that this makes such a being impossible. This is an important objection, and the only way I think it can be met is to provide seperate arguments for the existence of a necessary being. I can't get into that here.

<snip>
But you would still need to explain the antecedents of your explanations, their antecedents etc."

Not necessarily. The chain of explanation at w might end with fact q, but in w1, q might have an explanation in terms of r.

But q is a fact in world w. Thus all its explanations would have to come from world w; what happens in world w1 has nothing to do with what happens in w. We are running into the same question I've asked already: how do we identify facts, entities, events "across" world boundaries ?

Regards,
HRG.

HRG · 08-27-2002, 10:50 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Kenny:
[QB]A side note on QM…

A couple of claims about Quantum Mechanics have been made here which I find dubious. The first is that QM shows that there are certain events which occur without explanation. QM shows nothing of the sort. The best one might be able to say is that QM is consistent with the idea that there is no explanation for certain events. It is true that local hidden variable theories are ruled out by Bell’s Theorem violations, but that still leaves the possibility of non-local hidden variable theories. There are still other possibilities. For all we know, perhaps God directly determines the outcome of each quantum event in such way that is consistent with QM statistics overall, or perhaps this is a means by which other spiritual beings (e.g. angels, demons, and humans insofar as they have non-physical attributes) influence reality in a manner that is still consistent with the laws of physics. Bottom line is that we don’t know what the explanations are, but QM does not rule out the existence of explanations for these events or the possibility that such events could have explanations in some possible world even if they were brute facts in our own.

True, but the sense in which QM doesn't "rule out" the possibility of explanations like those you describe is very close to the sense in which celestial mechanics doesn't rule out the possibility that invisible djinns are moving the planet around.

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The second claim is that QM allows the creation of something from nothing. This isn’t really true either. Virtual particles arise from the quantum ground state, which isn’t really “nothing” in the metaphysical sense, and if you want to convert virtual particles into real particles, then you’d better have an adequate supply of energy on hand.

Unfortunately for philosophers, reality isn't bound by metaphysical concepts. If a state is zeroed by all annihilation operators, this means that it literally contains "no thing".

The adequate energy supply in many cosmological models is the gravitational binding energy, which makes the total energy of the universe remain at zero.

Regards,
HRG.

Philip Osborne · 08-27-2002, 12:46 PM

"That's my point. I am not sure that contingency and possibility are objective properties, and not part of our description of the world. I tend to believe the contrary."

It is an applied logical truth that everything that exists is either necessary or contingent. Everything either has to be the case or might not have been the case. If you deny both necessity and contingency, it seem you are denying excluded middle.

"This is pure semantics, IMHO. If I define "X is hawhite" as "one half of X is white", your shield is hawhite without any diminishing qualifications...."

Interesting objection, but I think it can be refuted. It seems clear to me that the property of "hawhiteness" is logically equivalent with the property of "whiteness w/ respect to one half." I will call the former F and the latter G. Thus, for any being x, if x has F, then x has G. So although F itself does not have diminishing qualification, this does not change the fact that x does have a property that does have such qualification, G.

The same considerations can be applied to God. Suppose I want to semantically eliminate the limitations on a weaker God by constructing the definition omnipotence*, which means "x is able to do all actions an omnipotent being can do except a, b, c, and d." Omnipotence* does not have any diminishing qualification imposed on it, but it clearly entails that x has the property "omnipotence, except for the inability to do a, b, c and d." And "except for the ability...." is diminishing qualification on omnipotence. Thus, while omnipotence* has no qualification, it entails that God does have a property which such qualification, even though that property is not necessarily omnipotence*. On this construal, I think it can be said that any property which entails a property with diminishing qualification is itself a limited property.

"In any case, what are the essential properties of your definition of God?"

God is essentially able to instantiate all logically possible states of affairs and know all truths. He is an essentially personal being. There are legitimate questions about whether or not such a being would be omnibenevolent, but I think the most plausible assumption is that God contingently chooses to be benevolent in the actual world. This would have to be established by seperate argument, which would be too far off-topic to discuss here.

"Not if the property itself is "able to walk unless stuck in a bear trap". Again I see this as a kind of semantics."

This objection can be answered with reasoning similar to what I used to answer the previous one. The property H, the ability to walk unless stuck in a bear trap, seems to entail the property J, the ability to walk. Suppose x has H, which entails that x has J. If x is stuck in a bear trap, this will not constrain H but it will constrain J, from which it follows that x has a property which can be causally constrained. The same reasoning can be used to construct a coherent definition for an unlimited being.

"But q is a fact in world w. Thus all its explanations would have to come from world w; what happens in world w1 has nothing to do with what happens in w...."

Here, you seem to be arguing against transworld identity, which is closely related to the thesis of essentialism, if not identical to it. I have previously argued that there are good reasons to accept transworld identity; the fact that I am the same person I was ten minutes ago gives me good reason to think I can be the same person without always having all and only the same properties throughout my existence.

Sincerly,

Philip

[ August 27, 2002: Message edited by: Philip Osborne ]</p>

Kenny · 08-28-2002, 06:55 AM

Quote:

True, but the sense in which QM doesn't "rule out" the possibility of explanations like those you describe is very close to the sense in which celestial mechanics doesn't rule out the possibility that invisible djinns are moving the planet around.

I don�t think these two situations are at all analogous. It is true that celestial mechanics is consistent with the idea that invisible djinns are responsible for moving the planets about, but it is also true that postulating the existence of such djinns adds no explanatory value to understanding how the planets move since we can account for their motion in much better and much simpler ways. It is a different matter entirely, however, to claim that an event has no explanation than it is to claim that an explanation is superfluous. The former is a far more extraordinary claim than the latter.

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Unfortunately for philosophers, reality isn't bound by metaphysical concepts. If a state is zeroed by all annihilation operators, this means that it literally contains "no thing".
The adequate energy supply in many cosmological models is the gravitational binding energy, which makes the total energy of the universe remain at zero.

An energy state valued at zero is still an energy state.

God Bless,
Kenny

HRG · 08-28-2002, 11:33 PM

I'm sorry that due to time constraints I cannot answer all your points in this interesting debate.

[quote]Originally posted by Philip Osborne:
[QB]"That's my point. I am not sure that contingency and possibility are objective properties, and not part of our description of the world. I tend to believe the contrary."

It is an applied logical truth that everything that exists is either necessary or contingent.
[quote]
Only if "necessary" and "contingent" are objective properties of things - which I doubt - and not properties which depend on the philosophical system which one adopts.
In the latter case, we can only say that (for any particular philosophical system PS) all things are either "necessary according to PS" or "contingent according to PS".

An uncritical appeal to the excluded middle would lead to the statement that the parallel postulate or the continuum hypothesis have to be true or false.

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Everything either has to be the case or might not have been the case.

But is it an objective property of X that it "has to be the case", or a judgment by a particular philosopher, with which another one would disagree ?

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If you deny both necessity and contingency, it seem you are denying excluded middle.

As explained above, I doubt their objective character.

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"This is pure semantics, IMHO. If I define "X is hawhite" as "one half of X is white", your shield is hawhite without any diminishing qualifications...."

Interesting objection, but I think it can be refuted. It seems clear to me that the property of "hawhiteness" is logically equivalent with the property of "whiteness w/ respect to one half." I will call the former F and the latter G. Thus, for any being x, if x has F, then x has G. So although F itself does not have diminishing qualification, this does not change the fact that x does have a property that does have such qualification, G.

I think you have not refuted it: you had to change your definition, but that's OK. My next example is blawhite which is the property of being part white and part black (I do not specify the "percentages"). Blawhite is unlimited.

[quote]

The same considerations can be applied to God. Suppose I want to semantically eliminate the limitations on a weaker God by constructing the definition omnipotence*, which means "x is able to do all actions an omnipotent being can do except a, b, c, and d." Omnipotence* does not have any diminishing qualification imposed on it, but it clearly entails that x has the property "omnipotence, except for the inability to do a, b, c and d." And "except for the ability...." is diminishing qualification on omnipotence. Thus, while omnipotence* has no qualification, it entails that God does have a property which such qualification, even though that property is not necessarily omnipotence*. On this construal, I think it can be said that any property which entails a property with diminishing qualification is itself a limited property.
[quote]

As I saidm you have changed the definition. NOw it is "unlimited in all unlimited properties". Of course, "totally powerless" is an unlimited property as well.

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<snip>

"But q is a fact in world w. Thus all its explanations would have to come from world w; what happens in world w1 has nothing to do with what happens in w...."

Here, you seem to be arguing against transworld identity, which is closely related to the thesis of essentialism, if not identical to it. I have previously argued that there are good reasons to accept transworld identity; the fact that I am the same person I was ten minutes ago gives me good reason to think I can be the same person without always having all and only the same properties throughout my existence.

But you are still living in the same world as ten minutes ago, haven't you, and we can trace out a continous path which connect you/now with you/10 minutes ago ?

Actually, I think that this kind of identity demands an application of Zadeh's Fuzzy Logic. I am "99.999% the same" as I was yesterday, "99% the same" as I was last year, "75% the same" as I was 20 years ago, etc,

Regards,
HRG.

Philip Osborne · 08-29-2002, 08:15 AM

"But is it an objective property of X that it "has to be the case", or a judgment by a particular philosopher, with which another one would disagree?"

I think this proposal stumbles over problems similar to the ones ethical subjectivism stumbles over. I am going to assume first that for any claim C which is about a person A's belief ("My belief is that x is true"), C does not receive any evidential support from extra-human sources. For instance, my belief that it is cold receives evidential support from my empirical experience of coldness, but my belief that it is my belief does not receive support in this way.

For any two propositions p and �p, I will assume that p is more rational than �p if p has more evidential support from extra-human grounds. For instance, my belief that 1+1=2 is not supported by any inference about what I believe my other beiefs to be, but is supported by my knowledge of the mathematical and conceptual truths involved. My crucial assumption is that some modal claims are more rational than others. For instance, the claim that square circles is impossible is more rationally supported than the claim that horses are impossible. But according to your proposal, modal claims express nothing more than beliefs; "x is possible," when spoken by Joe, means nothing more than "Joe believes x is possible." And as I've mentioned before, it is impossible to give such claims the kind of evidential supported needed so that some modal claims can be more rational than others. But this contradicts the prior assumption that some modal claims are more rationally supported than others.

"My next example is blawhite which is the property of being part white and part black (I do not specify the "percentages"). Blawhite is unlimited."

My objection is the same as before. Blawhiteness entails being both white with respect to a part and being black with respect to a part. While blawhiteness does not have any diminishing qualification, it entails two properties which are limited. By the additional criterion I presented in my last post, it follows that blawhiteness is itself a limited property.

"Of course, "totally powerless" is an unlimited property as well."

Total powerlessness is not a property, but the absence of a property. For instance, if one says I have the property of "not-computerness," that doesn't mean I have some special metaphysical property of not-computerness which is in addition to my other properties; it means that my other properties are such as to preclude me being a computer. If we say that x is totally powerless, we are saying that the nature of x is such as to preclude it having any causal power. It seems plausible to suppose that any such nature leading to this consequence would contain limited properties.

"But you are still living in the same world as ten minutes ago, haven't you, and we can trace out a continous path which connect you/now with you/10 minutes ago?"

I don't see how this can be done if essentialism is not true. According to anti-essentialism, any beings which do not have all and only the same properties are not the same being. "Me" ten minutes ago was a person named Philip Osborne who was eating lunch. "Me" now is a person named Philip Osborne who is typing on the computer. These people do not have the same properties, so how do we trace a continuous path to connect them?

"Actually, I think that this kind of identity demands an application of Zadeh's Fuzzy Logic. I am "99.999% the same" as I was yesterday, "99% the same" as I was last year, "75% the same" as I was 20 years ago...."

The reason that I think essentialism solves this problem of personal identity is that it allows me to say that right now, I am not a numerically distinct person from who I was ten minutes ago. I'm not sure your proposal solves this problem, since it still seems plausible to say that a person who is 99% the same as I was on May 28, 1985 (about where I was shortly after my birth) is numerically distinct from a person who is 20% the same as me on May 28, 1995.

Sincerely,

Philip

rainbow walking · 08-30-2002, 03:13 PM

Quote:

"Rw: Please describe the inductiveness of the argument as it has been deducted from observable events. The OA...."

Phillip: The fact is that no true proposition can be "deducted" from repeated observations.

Rw: Depends on how you define “true” proposition. The proposition that the sun will rise and set at specific times is a true proposition based on observation. While it may be possible that the sun might supernovae at some future date, for the present time it is a true proposition deduced from observation.

Phillip: Deductive logic guarantees conclusions with certainty; repeated observation makes conclusions probable, and so is not deductive.

Rw: Ha! If that we’re true the OA would be a moot issue.

Quote:

rw: "A state of being either possesses the property of existence or it does not."

Phillip: Existence is the state of having properties, and so is not itself a property. This was Kant's basic objection to Anselm's OA.

Rw: Properties are contingent on entities which can be reasonably said to exist, thus existence is a state of being.

Phillip: Also, I am not sure what you mean by "state of being." That sounds like something a Scholastic philosopher would say.

Rw: State of being as opposed to a “state of having”?

Quote:

rw:"Therefore any logically possible world must have been instantiated as a transient act of an existent causal agent whose existence necessitated a causal transient act."

Phillip: Quentin Smith has written it is logically impossible for any possible world to be caused. The reason is that if x causes world w, and x is actual in w, then it follows that x is a part of w.

Rw: Or that W is a part of X. So it is logically impossible to create a glass enclosed ant farm without doing so from within?

Phillip: But causes and effects do not overlap. Hence, possible worlds cannot be caused.

Rw: In light of the dubious reference to authority above I see no reason to allow this claim any more credibility than the previous one.

Phillip: The only consistent way to hold that a world's existence can be explained (not necessarily caused) is to suppose that a necessary being freely brought it about.

Rw: Uh…no. That is not the only consistent way to explain a world’s existence.

Phillip: A necessary being is self-explaining, as I've said, and at least according to Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss, a free action stands in no further need of explanation, at least on the Libertarian theory of free will.

Rw: Only if you assume that free agency is predicated on there actually “existing” such a being and, as I’ve already demonstrated, such a being’s necessity remains in question due to the state of existence that carries a greater necessity to such a being’s ability to bring a world into existence. Its action of creating a world necessitates its actual existence rendering it contingent upon said existence to freely act. A contingent being cannot be both contingent and Necessary.

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08-27-2002, 08:12 AM	#62
Kenny Senior Member Join Date: Jul 2000 Location: South Bend IN Posts: 564	A side note on QM� A couple of claims about Quantum Mechanics have been made here which I find dubious. The first is that QM shows that there are certain events which occur without explanation. QM shows nothing of the sort. The best one might be able to say is that QM is consistent with the idea that there is no explanation for certain events. It is true that local hidden variable theories are ruled out by Bell�s Theorem violations, but that still leaves the possibility of non-local hidden variable theories. There are still other possibilities. For all we know, perhaps God directly determines the outcome of each quantum event in such way that is consistent with QM statistics overall, or perhaps this is a means by which other spiritual beings (e.g. angels, demons, and humans insofar as they have non-physical attributes) influence reality in a manner that is still consistent with the laws of physics. Bottom line is that we don�t know what the explanations are, but QM does not rule out the existence of explanations for these events or the possibility that such events could have explanations in some possible world even if they were brute facts in our own. The second claim is that QM allows the creation of something from nothing. This isn�t really true either. Virtual particles arise from the quantum ground state, which isn�t really �nothing� in the metaphysical sense, and if you want to convert virtual particles into real particles, then you�d better have an adequate supply of energy on hand. God Bless, Kenny [ August 27, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p>

08-27-2002, 08:15 AM	#63
Philip Osborne Regular Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Cherry Hill, NJ Posts: 147	"Rw: Please describe the inductiveness of the argument as it has been deducted from observable events. The OA...." The fact is that no true proposition can be "deducted" from repeated observations. The reason is that for every repeated set of observations, it is conceptually coherent for there to be a counterinstance to such observations. For instance, the fact that I have only seen black crows may lead me to believe that all crows are black; nonetheless it is epistemically possible that there is at least one crow which is not black. Deductive logic guarantees conclusions with certainty; repeated observation makes conclusions probable, and so is not deductive. "A state of being either possesses the property of existence or it does not." Existence is the state of having properties, and so is not itself a property. This was Kant's basic objection to Anselm's OA. Also, I am not sure what you mean by "state of being." That sounds like something a Scholastic philosopher would say. "Therefore any logically possible world must have been instantiated as a transient act of an existent causal agent whose existence necessitated a causal transient act." Quentin Smith has written it is logically impossible for any possible world to be caused. The reason is that if x causes world w, and x is actual in w, then it follows that x is a part of w. But causes and effects do not overlap. Hence, possible worlds cannot be caused. The only consistent way to hold that a world's existence can be explained (not necessarily caused) is to suppose that a necessary being freely brought it about. A necessary being is self-explaining, as I've said, and at least according to Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss, a free action stands in no further need of explanation, at least on the Libertarian theory of free will. "IMHO, when X says that some event possibly happens, this is not so much a statement about reality, but about the concepts, theories, beliefs, experiences etc...." It seems to me that as long as there is real contingency in the world, there are objectively true statements concerning the modalities of things. And it seems to me that there are such contingencies in the actual world. You seem to be suggesting that modalities do not exist, and that all modal claims are false. "Well, it was not included in your definition (see your post - which spoke about "omnipotent/-scient/-benevolent. And I do not know what "unlimited" means. Unlimitedly positively charged? Unlimitedly evil? Unlimitedly indifferent?" An unlimited being has all of its essential properties attributed without diminishing qualification (for instance, in the statement, "the shield is white with respect to its one half," "with respect to its one half" is diminishing qualification on the whiteness of the shield). Secondly, these properties must be of a kind that cannot be constrained by causal features of any world. For instance, being stuck in a bear trap constrains my ability to walk. An unlimited being cannot be constrained in this way. "OK, so what is the cause of God's unlimitedness ? Isn't this just another property?" It is a conceptual truth than an unlimited being can have no cause. You might object that this makes such a being impossible. This is an important objection, and the only way I think it can be met is to provide seperate arguments for the existence of a necessary being. I can't get into that here. "But IMHO you cannot just "bundle" different kinds of events and explain them as a bundle. The fact which is...." I am using a causal and extremely weak sense of "explanation." For instance, I could point to the presence of egg as a necessary condition for fertilization. Obviously, the existence of the egg is not a sufficient condition for fertilization, but it satisfies my weak sense of causal explanation. I assume that causes do not necessitate their effects (we have discussed this before), so to establish even this weak sense of causation is enough to establish the event's contingency, since there is at least one event which does not necessitate it. "But you would still need to explain the antecedents of your explanations, their antecedents etc." Not necessarily. The chain of explanation at w might end with fact q, but in w1, q might have an explanation in terms of r. Every chain of explanation can end somewhere, although for every possible fact x, there is at least one world at which it has an explanation. "BTW, are you interested to join the theist-atheist debates at CARM (www.carm.org - atheist board) ? I've already sung your praises there." Thanks for the compliments. I'll see about joining the CARM debates, though I will probably still consider the II board to be the definitive place for philosophy of religion discussion. Sincerely, Philip

08-27-2002, 12:46 PM	#66
Philip Osborne Regular Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Cherry Hill, NJ Posts: 147	"That's my point. I am not sure that contingency and possibility are objective properties, and not part of our description of the world. I tend to believe the contrary." It is an applied logical truth that everything that exists is either necessary or contingent. Everything either has to be the case or might not have been the case. If you deny both necessity and contingency, it seem you are denying excluded middle. "This is pure semantics, IMHO. If I define "X is hawhite" as "one half of X is white", your shield is hawhite without any diminishing qualifications...." Interesting objection, but I think it can be refuted. It seems clear to me that the property of "hawhiteness" is logically equivalent with the property of "whiteness w/ respect to one half." I will call the former F and the latter G. Thus, for any being x, if x has F, then x has G. So although F itself does not have diminishing qualification, this does not change the fact that x does have a property that does have such qualification, G. The same considerations can be applied to God. Suppose I want to semantically eliminate the limitations on a weaker God by constructing the definition omnipotence, which means "x is able to do all actions an omnipotent being can do except a, b, c, and d." Omnipotence does not have any diminishing qualification imposed on it, but it clearly entails that x has the property "omnipotence, except for the inability to do a, b, c and d." And "except for the ability...." is diminishing qualification on omnipotence. Thus, while omnipotence* has no qualification, it entails that God does have a property which such qualification, even though that property is not necessarily omnipotence*. On this construal, I think it can be said that any property which entails a property with diminishing qualification is itself a limited property. "In any case, what are the essential properties of your definition of God?" God is essentially able to instantiate all logically possible states of affairs and know all truths. He is an essentially personal being. There are legitimate questions about whether or not such a being would be omnibenevolent, but I think the most plausible assumption is that God contingently chooses to be benevolent in the actual world. This would have to be established by seperate argument, which would be too far off-topic to discuss here. "Not if the property itself is "able to walk unless stuck in a bear trap". Again I see this as a kind of semantics." This objection can be answered with reasoning similar to what I used to answer the previous one. The property H, the ability to walk unless stuck in a bear trap, seems to entail the property J, the ability to walk. Suppose x has H, which entails that x has J. If x is stuck in a bear trap, this will not constrain H but it will constrain J, from which it follows that x has a property which can be causally constrained. The same reasoning can be used to construct a coherent definition for an unlimited being. "But q is a fact in world w. Thus all its explanations would have to come from world w; what happens in world w1 has nothing to do with what happens in w...." Here, you seem to be arguing against transworld identity, which is closely related to the thesis of essentialism, if not identical to it. I have previously argued that there are good reasons to accept transworld identity; the fact that I am the same person I was ten minutes ago gives me good reason to think I can be the same person without always having all and only the same properties throughout my existence. Sincerly, Philip [ August 27, 2002: Message edited by: Philip Osborne ]</p>

08-29-2002, 08:15 AM	#69
Philip Osborne Regular Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Cherry Hill, NJ Posts: 147	"But is it an objective property of X that it "has to be the case", or a judgment by a particular philosopher, with which another one would disagree?" I think this proposal stumbles over problems similar to the ones ethical subjectivism stumbles over. I am going to assume first that for any claim C which is about a person A's belief ("My belief is that x is true"), C does not receive any evidential support from extra-human sources. For instance, my belief that it is cold receives evidential support from my empirical experience of coldness, but my belief that it is my belief does not receive support in this way. For any two propositions p and �p, I will assume that p is more rational than �p if p has more evidential support from extra-human grounds. For instance, my belief that 1+1=2 is not supported by any inference about what I believe my other beiefs to be, but is supported by my knowledge of the mathematical and conceptual truths involved. My crucial assumption is that some modal claims are more rational than others. For instance, the claim that square circles is impossible is more rationally supported than the claim that horses are impossible. But according to your proposal, modal claims express nothing more than beliefs; "x is possible," when spoken by Joe, means nothing more than "Joe believes x is possible." And as I've mentioned before, it is impossible to give such claims the kind of evidential supported needed so that some modal claims can be more rational than others. But this contradicts the prior assumption that some modal claims are more rationally supported than others. "My next example is blawhite which is the property of being part white and part black (I do not specify the "percentages"). Blawhite is unlimited." My objection is the same as before. Blawhiteness entails being both white with respect to a part and being black with respect to a part. While blawhiteness does not have any diminishing qualification, it entails two properties which are limited. By the additional criterion I presented in my last post, it follows that blawhiteness is itself a limited property. "Of course, "totally powerless" is an unlimited property as well." Total powerlessness is not a property, but the absence of a property. For instance, if one says I have the property of "not-computerness," that doesn't mean I have some special metaphysical property of not-computerness which is in addition to my other properties; it means that my other properties are such as to preclude me being a computer. If we say that x is totally powerless, we are saying that the nature of x is such as to preclude it having any causal power. It seems plausible to suppose that any such nature leading to this consequence would contain limited properties. "But you are still living in the same world as ten minutes ago, haven't you, and we can trace out a continous path which connect you/now with you/10 minutes ago?" I don't see how this can be done if essentialism is not true. According to anti-essentialism, any beings which do not have all and only the same properties are not the same being. "Me" ten minutes ago was a person named Philip Osborne who was eating lunch. "Me" now is a person named Philip Osborne who is typing on the computer. These people do not have the same properties, so how do we trace a continuous path to connect them? "Actually, I think that this kind of identity demands an application of Zadeh's Fuzzy Logic. I am "99.999% the same" as I was yesterday, "99% the same" as I was last year, "75% the same" as I was 20 years ago...." The reason that I think essentialism solves this problem of personal identity is that it allows me to say that right now, I am not a numerically distinct person from who I was ten minutes ago. I'm not sure your proposal solves this problem, since it still seems plausible to say that a person who is 99% the same as I was on May 28, 1985 (about where I was shortly after my birth) is numerically distinct from a person who is 20% the same as me on May 28, 1995. Sincerely, Philip

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