Dr. Retard

So maybe it's good for us to stick with one proposal. Say, paralysis. When you try to rape someone, you suddenly lose control of your body. You would be incapable of pulling it off. The rest of the world operates as usual. The only restriction on our freedom occurs when we endeavor to rape.

So the drama is drained right out of life? The drama of being a woman on a street? The drama of being alone with a stronger man? "Man, this is dramatic! I hardly know who's gonna rape me next!" That's drama we can do without.

Incidentally, your "drama" objection works equally well against any foolproof anti-rape law enforcement method. If we had such a method waiting in the wings, you could object, "But if rape were eliminated, that would drain the drama right out of life!" Maybe you have other objections that would defeat divine anti-rape provisions without also defeating human anti-rape provisions. But the "drama" objection defeats both, or neither.

Zadok001

Rainbow:

"Z: I'll say again. Omniscience is incapable of being an guiding force. Omniscience tells us what IS. It is knowledge, such as "The wall is white." "The cat is black." "I am 6'1"." Etc. To say that omniscience can tell us what to do is a naturalistic fallacy:"

rw: My response to this is twofold:

1. First, on a human level, normative values are taught, thus they are learned, thus they are a form of knowledge. They are a form of knowledge I call EXPERENTIAL knowledge, as opposed to intellectual knowledge. You can teach a person all the qualifications of love, for instance, and when someone talks about love they’ll understand the concept on an intellectual basis. But once they EXPERIENCE love they’ll have a much fuller normative comprehensive knowledge of the concept. This is similar to teaching a child not to touch the burner of a stove. You can instill an intellectual understanding of why they shouldn’t do that, but until they actually EXPERIENCE getting burned, it remains just intellectual knowledge. That burning sensation will instill in them the normative value of hot stoves in contact with human flesh. They’ll avoid it like the plague.


Ok, let's run with that. Normative values are taught. That 'teaching' depends on culture. Different cultures 'teach' normative values in direct contradiction to one another. ("Burning corpses is a good thing, as it shows respect for the dead;" "Burning corpses is a bad thing, as it is a denial of that individual's existance.") To say that normative claims are a part of omniscience is to leave God in a lurch.

Look, for any normative claim, a contradictory claim can be made. X is good; X is bad. Furthermore, either claim can be taught. Hence, if omniscience includes normative claims, you end up with a God who has no capacity to distinguishing "right" from "wrong." The only way this problem can be resolved is to take normative values, subjective values, away from omniscience. This is why omniscience doesn't guide action independantly.

2. Secondly, you have committed the fallacy of equivocation here between limited human knowledge and omniscience. Omniscience is considerably different from human limited knowledge. Omniscience is knowing all possible past, present and future events. This is different from human knowledge as it puts its possessor on an entirely different level. From this perspective predicting how its possessor’s normative values should guide it are not cut and dried. A simple example should suffice:


Not sure I'm in comprehension land here. Omniscience is to know everything that can be known. (Take away the "that can be known" clause and you get "Omniscience is knowing everything, including that which cannot be known," which is a contradiction in terms.) You may have to clarify this point to me, but moving onto the example:

1. Joe is dying from a rare form of cancer but he has a healthy heart that he plans to donate to medicine.

2. The recipient of his heart will be a 16 year old girl who, twenty years later, finds a cure to cancer, thus saving the lives of literally millions.

3. I love Joe and ought not let him die so young.

4. But there are one hundred and eleven million people whom I love as much as Joe, who will contract this disease before humanity evolves beyond the reach of diseases, therefore if I don’t interfere with Joe’s death, none of these people will die of this disease.


Looks good to me! But you skipped two very important somethings. Remember, I'm claiming that an omnimax deity is required to eliminate evil and suffering. In this case, you've given a VERY good reason for this omnimax deity to let poor Joe die. However:

1. No reasoning here says Joe needs to die PAINFULLY. An omnimax deity would be required to allieviate Joe's suffering, even if his death were necessary.

2. Joe's death will facilitate a cure for cancer. Whence cometh cancer? Surely not from an omnimax deity, since it causes suffering...

You see the complications that arise in your response when we take into consideration omniscience as opposed to human knowledge? If you were omnipotent and omnibenevolent but only possessed limited human knowledge, you'd rush right in and save Joe's life. But then, later, you'd discover the price that humanity had to pay for your omnibenevolent behavior. It's not likely they'd view you as being so omnibenevolent.


Indeed, but the two issues above should make it clear why this example is somewhat flawed. It's rather difficult to excuse suffering for the purpose of preventing more suffering, when my standard is that suffering shouldn't be there at all.

"Z: This in no way entails action without forethought or consideration. Omnibenevolence is our 'guiding' force, however. It is the aspect of a being that allows that being to decide which, of a range of actions, is the 'correct' action. Omniscience CANNOT do this on its own, under any circumstances. It requires a normative idea."

Rw: And since we allow that normative idea to be love, (however that’s translated), it is the task of PoE to demonstrate that allowing evil and suffering contradicts that idea and account for the ramifications of omniscience.


I'm not sure I understand, again. The PoE needs to demonstrate that an omnimax deity could not have created this world. It seems to do so quite effectively.

"Z: You therefore allow that something can both exist and not exist simultaneously?"

Rw: Something other than god…yes. That would be my only limitation…that god cannot will himself out of existence and still exist.


But now you've got a problem. You're no longer defining omnipotence as the capacity to do ANYTHING, either. You're allowing contradictions, but not one specific contradiction. Why not? What makes THIS contradiction special? Why doesn't this rule apply to the street lamp outside my window, what reason is there for it be both existant and non-existance simultaneously, but not God.

Remember, you've already allowed that God break his own nature. It seems difficult to claim God can do that, but not both exist and not exist. (Note this argument. Existance is a property. So is omnibenevolence. God can both be omnibenevolent and not be omnibenevolent. So he can alter his attributes or properties. What makes "Existance" special while "Benevolence" is not?)

"Z: There are two ways I can go with this. Either way, the PoE wins.

Method 1: Under your definition, God both exists and doesn't exist simultaneously. Therefore, the PoE is correct: God doesn't exist. This is a relatively primitive method, and it accomplishes nothing."

rw: See my qualification above. Yet PoE is no more correct than incorrect in this case because god also does exist. As you say, it accomplishes nothing.


This is exactly why I think this concept is useless to us. If we allow God to be a contradictory being, one that exists outside of a priori knowledge, we end up in all sorts of ridiculuous positions. It's like a game of deistic Twister.

I'm going to ignore Method 2, for two reasons. First, you agreed to my limitations (thank you!), so I have no good reason to discuss it. Second, it's fucked up beyond all rational belief.

"Z: See previous on the naturalistic fallacy. God's omniscience tells him what IS, his omnibenevolence tells him what SHOULD BE, and his omnipotence allows him to act accordingly. In conjunction, he is REQUIRED to act accordingly."

rw: Not quite, this god’s omniscience tells him every potential could be…miles apart from what is. Same equivocation fallacy applies.


Now that's interesting. One problem I see off the top of my head. There is a difference of properties here: What MAY be, and what WILL be have different properties. (One is the case, one may be the case.) If God knows all, then he knows these properties. That creates a problem, for obvious reasons, because now he knows the future again.

Actually, I just thought of a second problem. If God knows what MAY be, and cannot or does not distinguish between what MAY be and what WILL be, how can he prophesize? We see prophecy as a common theme in most religions, and it's in EVERY religion that appeals to an omnimax deity. That seems to be illogical, if God cannot tell EXACTLY what the future holds.

"Z: By having different natural laws. Again, simply put: The claim "The world has evil in it" is not a priori. If I negate it, I get "The world does not have evil in it." No contradiction is apparent. As a result, it is a 'possible' thing: It can exist. Hence, God is capable of creating such a world."

Rw: This appears to be a straw man since I don’t recall saying this was a contradiction.


My bad, I didn't mean it was your argument. I was taking an aggressive stance and negating a possible defense before it was brought up. I do that a fair amount. In this case, a possible response to my argument is "God can't create contradictions, but by eliminatig evil we have one." That argument fails to hold water, and I decided to take it apart before anyone presented it. I didn't really expect it WOULD be presented, but on the off chance it was, I had a defense already prepared for it.\

Barring that, you haven’t shown how this god can create such a world without incurring a whole heap of other logistical problems. That’s why I insist you describe how such a world works. You have to assume such a world is possible or PoE doesn’t get off the launch pad. It’s when you try to escalate the assumption beyond the possible that you run into problems.


I thought I did. Any attempt to do evil is foiled. All suffering is allieviated. Oh, hell. My Brave New World is the Christian Heaven, without the Hell, and without the need to go through Earth (purgatory?) first. Does that work? Failing that, just think "Garden of Eden," sans fruit trees and Lucifers. I don't see how that fails to fit the needed description, especially since most Christians describe the Garden as exactly the world I describe: No evil or suffering. The problem was, it had a fruit tree, and Lucifer existed. In my theoretical world, no tree, no Lucifer.

"Z: A deity that is omnipotent and omniscient but has no normative qualities never acts. It just sits there."

rw: But he’s already acted or you wouldn’t be here making this statement.


Eh? Nein. We're discussing an omnimax deity. If we posit the existance of the same deity sans omnibenevolence, he never does anything. Such a deity CLEARLY didn't create this world, or any other world: It doesn't act! :P

"Z: It knows everything, and can do anything, but it won't."

rw: You just negated that claim by typing that sentence.


Nein. I don't claim such a deity exists. I'm explaing what such a deity would be life IF it existed. It doesn't. If it did, I wouldn't. I do. Hence, it doesn't. (If A, not B. B. Therefore, not A.)

"Z: It has no normative qualities. Such a deity is TOTALLY without guidance for its powers. (In fact, this is true of any being: No normative qualities, no independant action.) (And no, it wouldn't just do something for fun. That would require "I ought to act if it would be fun to act." That's normative.)"

rw: O’kay, let’s run with this. Normative values are based on experiential knowledge. This, accompanied by other forms of knowledge, allow judgment calls about how to act, when, in what manner, or even not to act. Omniscience takes this to a whole nuther level.


Normative values are not, by necessity, learned through experience. (If they were, this would imply God was at some point not omnibenevolent.) Normative values are like little voices. You get some information about the world. The normative voices then tell you how the world SHOULD be, and whether this is in conflict with how the world IS. If these things are in conflict, normative voices say "Fix it!" But they don't independantly say HOW. With the knowledge we have, we find possible ways to 'fix' the problem. (With infinite knowledge, we get the best fix every time.) Then we enact our power to change the world (in God's case, infinite power), and try to bring about the state of affairs our normative voices claim SHOULD be.

Omniscience, in this case, does only two important things. First, it tells us the state of the world. Second, it tells us how best to get to that state. With infinite power (omnipotence), the 'best' solution is "Make it so." (In our limited power, the best solution is often "Make a sandwich" or "Look out the window." In God's case, these are unneeded steps.)

"Z: Fortunately, the deity in question has a normative quality: Omnibenevolence! It's all-loving. Now, omnibenevolence basically prevents our deity from having OTHER normative properties. (What's it gonna have? Omnimalicence creates a contradiction. Any amount of evil creates a contradiction. Extra 'good' cannot exist in excess of omnimax. No other normative properties can be squeezed in.)"

rw: According to the mythological record, from which this omnimax deity has been derived, this god also hates evil, which I suppose could be attributed to its omnibenevolence. But goes towards showing that omnibenevolence doesn’t preclude other normative values. Obviously he’s capable of hate, even if it’s expressed as an act of love.


I'm confused. Either A) This is a very good argument, but it supports me and not you OR B) This is irrelevant.

A) God hates. Hate is not benevolence, or an act of love. Hence, God is not omnibenevolent. The PoE says an omnimax God doesn't exist, and we've just shown he doesn't.

B) God hates, and this hate is an act of benevolence since it is aimed at evil. Now God is still omnibenevolent, but the rest of your statements are erroneous: 'Hatred of evil' is a subset of omnibenevolence, and no other normative properties are at work.

"Z: So, what can we conclude? We can safely say our deity has only one guiding normative principle: Love. Now, said deity ain't got nuthin' else that can tell him what to do. "

rw: Cept his omniscience that tells him a whole heap more about what his doing anything will incur down the road. Omnibenevolence doesn’t tell him WHAT to do, only WHY he’s doing what he does or does not do. Big difference. “Why did god do nothing?” Because he loves you. “Why does god do that?” Because he hates evil.


Something has failed to get through. Omniscience tells God the best way to bring about the state of affairs omnibenevolence tells him should be the case.

You seem to be making the 'Greater Good' argument. God lets Bad happen because it's necessary to bring about Greater Good. This is nonsensical, as it holds an omnipotent deity to trade-offs. Any state of affairs God desires can be brought about INSTANTLY, with no expenditure of effort. If God wants to achieve a state of "Greater Good," then gosh darn it, he can do it instantly. No trade-offs. No drawbacks. It just *poofs* into being.

There's no rational way to say "God's just trying to make us perfect!" because there's no reason for God to make us IMPERFECT to begin with.

"Z: He sits still, and looks around. (Remember, omniscience can't guide an action independant of a normative claim.) Therefore, any action this deity takes is based on love, and love alone."

rw: And since he’s done nothing to eliminate evil and suffering, he therefore don’t wuv us no more…unless any action he takes to eliminate evil and suffering will have a different effect that doesn’t equate to love in the final analysis. Omniscience would allow him to see all possible consequences of every potential action or in-action. From this knowledge he would be able to plot the best course for the maximum effect of demonstrating omnibenevolence.


Yups. But if you say this, you're taking away God's omnipotence again. God can reach ANY rational state of affairs instantly. He has no reason to allow Bad to get to Good, when Good is literally acheivable with a thought.

"Z: That means that if the deity chose to create, it would create only the most loving environment possible."

rw: Only if his purpose for creation was to create a slew of congenital dependents.


Here's a better way to think about it. Purpose. God has a "purpose?" What is this purpose? And why aren't we already there?

God is omnipotent, and has a purpose, i.e., a goal. Let's grant that God's plan will eventually bring about a state of affairs equivalent to his purpose. That means his purpose is not an inherent contradiction. And if it's not an inherent contradiction, HE CAN CREATE IT! He can make his purpose just BE. Why hasn't he? You can come at from several directions, they've all got problems:

1. His purpose IS the journey! Ok, sure. Robert Frost loves you. Problem is, if this is his purpose... Why is there evil here? There shouldn't be if this is the final destination. This negates omnibenevolence.

2. His purpose requires we have certain attributes that can only be achieved in the journey. This is inadequate, mainly because it begs the question: What virtues can't God instill in us by default anyways? The best one I ever heard was "Patience." That answer suffers the unfortunate side effect of only being a virtue that only matters if problems already exist. (You don't need patience in a world sans problems.) This negates omnipotence.

3. God wants humans for human's sake. i.e., humans exist in the way they exist because God somehow values them. This is a wierd one. Humans have nothing to offer God. If God wants love for him, he could create freedomless worshipers. If God wants love for US, he could create a world without evil. Then we would only experience love. He did neither. Something's clearly gone wrong.

"Z: Such an environment would not contain evil."

rw: This is true, but then humans would not be human and freewill would not exist.


Neat assertion, but unsupported. (This also has a problem with the Heaven/Garden contradiction. If a world without evil cannot contain humans or free will, Heaven and the Garden of Eden both lacked these things. If the Garden lacked free will, how'd Eve eat the apple?)

"Z: This world contains evil. Hence, such a deity did not create this world."

rw: This world contains humans with freewill that enables them to grow, mature, progress and become benevolent creatures themselves. Rhetoric does not support assertions. Show how humans can attain to their full potential in a world other than this one. Until you do you are just spinning your wheels with what this god COULD do and an even weaker WOULD/SHOULD do, without justification.


Humans can attain their full potential the instant God wants them too. They don't. Hence, God doesn't want them to. Something's wrong here.

This is an example of the second possible argument about God's goal, and denies omnipotence.

*phew* again. At the very least, food for thought.

7thangel

I am still on the process of making a real good presentation. But anyways, In Jamie_L thread titled "existence doesn't make sense," it is very common for many atheist's to lose their argument of the sense of their life because of the concept of man's mortality, and the goodness of just taking care of the same people who are mortals makes every argument coming into mere preferences. Knowing the mortality of man is really making atheist's argument irrational because it doesn't really have a good answer to posit when asked why prefer one's life to other same mortal beings. And being ignorant of the future, atheists reasoning sink to absurdity. It really has something to do with the sense of having eternal life. I hope this can help.


I am glad too about your knowledge of free will because it will be easier for you understand some things that seems absurd of the Bible.

God Bless.

Philosoft

Yes.

Because I don't understand the distinction you make between our current inability to commit "mental genocide" and some force that prevents us from raping children. If it's the thought rather than the act that counts, God's physically preventing us from raping children wouldn't be a violation of free will - we would still be able to instantiate the required mental state.
Because all you're doing is labeling properties P, Q and R that are true about this world, "Freedom." If our world instead had properties X, Y and Z, you would similarly call that, "Freedom." Your definition requires the presupposition that God would instantiate a world with maximal Freedom and that this is true about this world. If I reject that presupposition, your definition has no foundation.
You don't think most people would rather have a world that also permitted them to fly unaided, or breathe underwater?

rainbow walking

Hi Zadok,
“phew” is apt description of this discussion. It’s getting tedious. You’re forcing me to think. Good for you.
For the purpose of this response I’m putting our previous replies in quotes , you most recent responses in bold and my replies in normal font.

Z: Ok, let's run with that. Normative values are taught. That 'teaching' depends on culture. Different cultures 'teach' normative values in direct contradiction to one another. ("Burning corpses is a good thing, as it shows respect for the dead;" "Burning corpses is a bad thing, as it is a denial of that individual's existance.") To say that normative claims are a part of omniscience is to leave God in a lurch.

rw: Not at all. I only used the “learning” as support for my contention that normative values are a form of knowledge. This is true for man but not for god. He’s omniscient. He already knows the best responses and has access to all knowledge.

Z: Look, for any normative claim, a contradictory claim can be made. X is good; X is bad. Furthermore, either claim can be taught. Hence, if omniscience includes normative claims, you end up with a God who has no capacity to distinguishing "right" from "wrong." The only way this problem can be resolved is to take normative values, subjective values, away from omniscience. This is why omniscience doesn't guide action independantly.

rw: True for humans but not for an omniscient god who is all knowing.


Z: Not sure I'm in comprehension land here. Omniscience is to know everything that can be known. (Take away the "that can be known" clause and you get "Omniscience is knowing everything, including that which cannot be known," which is a contradiction in terms.) You may have to clarify this point to me, but moving onto the example:

rw: The point I’m making is that normative values are a form of knowledge. God knows all. Your previous arguments equivocated limited human understanding with omniscience. This other thing about the “including that which cannot be known” is a contradiction you are creating with an inaccurate definition.


Z: Looks good to me! But you skipped two very important somethings. Remember, I'm claiming that an omnimax deity is required to eliminate evil and suffering. In this case, you've given a VERY good reason for this omnimax deity to let poor Joe die. However:

1. No reasoning here says Joe needs to die PAINFULLY. An omnimax deity would be required to allieviate Joe's suffering, even if his death were necessary.

Rw: You want Joe to die peacefully in his sleep? No problem. Done. Hey I, (speaking as god here), do it all the time in select situations. Sometimes I even heal a few. Haven’t you heard? I’ve dealt with humanity like this all through its history. But I can’t do it for everyone across the board. Man must have the incentive to do for himself. You guys are, well, just plain lazy. You don’t WANT to do anything until you have to. So I only intervene when it serves my purpose.

Z: 2. Joe's death will facilitate a cure for cancer. Whence cometh cancer? Surely not from an omnimax deity, since it causes suffering...


Rw: My allowing things to happen is not the same as my causing it, my son. And don’t forget my purpose for allowing things like this to happen is to provide you the incentive to prevent them from happening. You also have my permission to destroy this disease because I care more about you than an entire universe full of viruses and genetic implosions. You destroy that disease and you’ll have done something only a god can do. Which is GOOD. I want you to be good. To be even better than me if possible. Whether that’s possible or not I’m not going to say. It would spoil the moment. But I can’t, I won’t force you to. It must be something YOU want. When you choose the good, irregardless of the consequences, it will be YOUR choice. It’s not mine to make.


Z: Indeed, but the two issues above should make it clear why this example is somewhat flawed. It's rather difficult to excuse suffering for the purpose of preventing more suffering, when my standard is that suffering shouldn't be there at all.


Rw: I hope I’ve satisfied your concerns. No pain, no gain. Sorry it’s got to be that way but I didn’t set out to create dependents or lifelong playboys. If I gotta work, you gotta work. I work because I WANT to. I work on your behalf whether you believe that or not. It’s often a thankless job. But you have to WANT and make the CHOICE for yourself. I’m only agreeing to provide the incentives. I do this permissively by allowing those incentives to exist. I know it hurts. I hurt with you. But it would hurt a lot more any other way.



Z: I'm not sure I understand, again. The PoE needs to demonstrate that an omnimax deity could not have created this world. It seems to do so quite effectively.

Rw: Effectively? When?

(skip the meaningless philosophistry)



Z: Now that's interesting. One problem I see off the top of my head. There is a difference of properties here: What MAY be, and what WILL be have different properties. (One is the case, one may be the case.) If God knows all, then he knows these properties. That creates a problem, for obvious reasons, because now he knows the future again.

rw: He knows when he wants to know. Omniscience doesn’t force itself upon him.

Z: Actually, I just thought of a second problem. If God knows what MAY be, and cannot or does not distinguish between what MAY be and what WILL be, how can he prophesize? We see prophecy as a common theme in most religions, and it's in EVERY religion that appeals to an omnimax deity. That seems to be illogical, if God cannot tell EXACTLY what the future holds.

rw: Where do you get the notion he cannot distinguish? God can do anything he WANTS to do. It doesn’t follow that this forces him to do or know or see anything he doesn’t want to.



Z: I thought I did. Any attempt to do evil is foiled. All suffering is allieviated. Oh, hell. My Brave New World is the Christian Heaven, without the Hell, and without the need to go through Earth (purgatory?) first.


rw: Well, I don’t know about all the interpretational asides you’ve clustered into this f-king but I am glad you mentioned heaven. Allegory for when god does, indeed, do just what you ask…but not until it’s time. Patience my boy, patience. You also haven’t detailed how this god can do all these things and still maintain the progressive evolution of man as a free moral agent. You’ve just stripped away all the incentives for man to want to do anything. You’ve got him living in Disney World. Permanent recess.

Z: Does that work? Failing that, just think "Garden of Eden," sans fruit trees and Lucifers. I don't see how that fails to fit the needed description, especially since most Christians describe the Garden as exactly the world I describe: No evil or suffering.


rw: Hey, you guys been there, done that. You the ones what decided to muck it up, not me. I just gave you the choice. I gave you what you wanted. Now you don’t want it? What’s up with that?





Z: Normative values are not, by necessity, learned through experience. (If they were, this would imply God was at some point not omnibenevolent.)


rw: Experiential knowledge, covered under omniscience article 14 chapter twelve line six. :^D

Z: Normative values are like little voices. You get some information about the world. The normative voices then tell you how the world SHOULD be, and whether this is in conflict with how the world IS. If these things are in conflict, normative voices say "Fix it!" But they don't independantly say HOW. With the knowledge we have, we find possible ways to 'fix' the problem. (With infinite knowledge, we get the best fix every time.) Then we enact our power to change the world (in God's case, infinite power), and try to bring about the state of affairs our normative voices claim SHOULD be.

rw: Nice try but knowledge is knowledge. The little voices don’t just pluck thoughts out of a vacuum. They’re fed by experiences that are stored in the memory and make comparative assessments when confronted by circumstances requiring a value judgment. No world of pain and suffering…along side joy and healing…and no such experiences from which these little voices can operate. If the challenge isn’t bigger than the man, they say…

Z: Omniscience, in this case, does only two important things. First, it tells us the state of the world. Second, it tells us how best to get to that state. With infinite power (omnipotence), the 'best' solution is "Make it so." (In our limited power, the best solution is often "Make a sandwich" or "Look out the window." In God's case, these are unneeded steps.)

rw: uh…no…omniscience contains the wellspring of all knowledge. Omnibenevolence drinks from the same bucket. Normative values tell us why we ought or ought not, should or should not act. It’s a form of knowledge. When you ask someone why they are doing something they give you an answer that’s either rational, based on reason and knowledge, or irrational, based on bad reasoning or erroneous knowledge.


Z: I'm confused. Either A) This is a very good argument, but it supports me and not you OR B) This is irrelevant.

A) God hates. Hate is not benevolence, or an act of love. Hence, God is not omnibenevolent. The PoE says an omnimax God doesn't exist, and we've just shown he doesn't.

B) God hates, and this hate is an act of benevolence since it is aimed at evil. Now God is still omnibenevolent, but the rest of your statements are erroneous: 'Hatred of evil' is a subset of omnibenevolence, and no other normative properties are at work.


rw: O’kay, methinks there’s a misunderstanding under foot here. I’m allowing omnibenevolence to apply towards man. Not necessarily everything man does or becomes or brings into existence with his choices. You see the difference? If we just give omnibenevolence carte blanche rule here it creates this sort of contradiction that I could use to diffuse PoE quite easily. I could argue that since god is omnibenevolent that means he loves everything about man, his pain and suffering, his evil choices…everything, so there’s no incentive for the Shoulds you keep implying in your argument.

Omnibenevolence, properly understood, is like me saying, “Zadok, I love you, but I hate it when you pick your nose in public.” My hatred of your nose picking stems from my love for you because you are lowering your esteem among your peers with this bad habit, something I’d prefer you not do. So, IMO, omnibenevolence has to make room for all types of normative value assessments, else it creates problems you don’t want to have to deal with.


Z: Something has failed to get through. Omniscience tells God the best way to bring about the state of affairs omnibenevolence tells him should be the case.

You seem to be making the 'Greater Good' argument. God lets Bad happen because it's necessary to bring about Greater Good. This is nonsensical, as it holds an omnipotent deity to trade-offs.

Rw: It only seems nonsensical because you are missing the significance of this gods alleged purpose for man. That man learn to WANT to choose the good of his own volition. This is god’s purpose because he loves man and knows this is the best case scenario for man. Genuine omnibenolence wants what’s ultimately best for the object of its affection. This god LETS things run their course as an incentive to bring man to a state of WANTING to choose the good of his own volition. Man has not reached that state. This god has done much to help in an unobtrusive manner, relying on FAITH as the avenue of access. This puts man in a unique position of being unable to manipulate god.

Z: Any state of affairs God desires can be brought about INSTANTLY, with no expenditure of effort. If God wants to achieve a state of "Greater Good," then gosh darn it, he can do it instantly. No trade-offs. No drawbacks. It just *poofs* into being.

rw: Yet this god, via omniscience, seems to disagree with you. Now why should I take your word based on limited understanding over a god’s word based on omniscience? You say this god OUGHT to have done things differently and I don’t entirely disagree. I’m saying there must be a reason, (and arguing some damn good ones) and you’re saying that because he didn’t, when he very well could have, is proof to you that he doesn’t even exist. Maybe you’re right. Maybe not. Your arguments, thusfar, have not attained.

Z: There's no rational way to say "God's just trying to make us perfect!" because there's no reason for God to make us IMPERFECT to begin with.


rw: And my arguments aren’t based on this god MAKING us anything, but on his ALLOWING us to make ourselves into anything we so desire, but preferably good. Self determination. I’m arguing that without the full range of choices available, including those that produce evil and suffering, we can’t accomplish our own greater good or perfection. If god does it for us, sure it gets us past the bullshit, but it ain’t the same thing as us getting ourselves past the bullshit. Big difference. And somehow this god knows this and is acting and basing his interventiveness on this. It’s both a reasonable and logical argument. And I’m not omniscient either.



Z: Yups. But if you say this, you're taking away God's omnipotence again. God can reach ANY rational state of affairs instantly. He has no reason to allow Bad to get to Good, when Good is literally acheivable with a thought.

rw: Yeah, achievable by him. So what’s left for us to achieve? Good is available with a thought for man also. So why does man continue to think up evil? What if god poofed us into another existence where we were only able to think good thoughts. How would we know and recognize those thoughts as good? How would we develop any normative values at all? You’re wanting god to create a matrix type situation for man where man has no values and hence, cannot love, has no incentives and hence, cannot create music, art or science, no desires and hence, cannot procreate…I just don’t see this as being a good thing for man. Maybe you do but any such form of existence you posit, forces me to insist you describe it in detail and show how man can still function as man.



Z: Here's a better way to think about it. Purpose. God has a "purpose?" What is this purpose? And why aren't we already there?

rw: Because of atheists like you…:O! (just kidding)

God is omnipotent, and has a purpose, i.e., a goal. Let's grant that God's plan will eventually bring about a state of affairs equivalent to his purpose. That means his purpose is not an inherent contradiction. And if it's not an inherent contradiction, HE CAN CREATE IT! He can make his purpose just BE. Why hasn't he? You can come at from several directions, they've all got problems:

1. His purpose IS the journey! Ok, sure. Robert Frost loves you. Problem is, if this is his purpose... Why is there evil here? There shouldn't be if this is the final destination. This negates omnibenevolence.

rw: Wrong purpose…try harder.

Z: 2. His purpose requires we have certain attributes that can only be achieved in the journey. This is inadequate, mainly because it begs the question: What virtues can't God instill in us by default anyways? The best one I ever heard was "Patience." That answer suffers the unfortunate side effect of only being a virtue that only matters if problems already exist. (You don't need patience in a world sans problems.) This negates omnipotence.


rw: Getting warmer….

Z: 3. God wants humans for human's sake. i.e., humans exist in the way they exist because God somehow values them. This is a wierd one. Humans have nothing to offer God. If God wants love for him, he could create freedomless worshipers. If God wants love for US, he could create a world without evil. Then we would only experience love. He did neither. Something's clearly gone wrong.


rw: Out in left field again. You’re dancing all over the grave of PoE here Zadok. God wants us to want to reach our fullest potential by our own efforts. Removing any negative value from our range of choices or removing us from the access to negative values does not benefit this purpose. How would you know what to love without access to knowing what not to love? If you love everything equally how will you know it’s love? Love is unrecognizable without its contrasting reciprocal:hate. Good is unknowable without its anti-thesis Evil. If you can show otherwise…you win.


Z: Neat assertion, but unsupported. (This also has a problem with the Heaven/Garden contradiction. If a world without evil cannot contain humans or free will, Heaven and the Garden of Eden both lacked these things. If the Garden lacked free will, how'd Eve eat the apple?)

rw: Freewill is not the same as self determination. It’s only the tool necessary for that purpose. Without recourse to all choices available the will is not free, self determination ends, and normative values vanish. The potential for evil existed in the garden in the moral tree and it exists in heaven because Revelation talks about a war in heaven between the angels.



Z: Humans can attain their full potential the instant God wants them too. They don't. Hence, God doesn't want them to. Something's wrong here.

rw: Goes back to my previous arguments. God wants them too, but not if he has to do it for them. Doing it for them disintegrates humanity and god’s purpose for creating them.

This is an example of the second possible argument about God's goal, and denies omnipotence.
rw: It’s not a logical argument because it excludes the middle…which contains all the good stuff, like an Oreo cookie.

Z: *phew* again. At the very least, food for thought.
rw: Oreo cookies…food for thought…Yum, I’m hungry.

rainbow walking

Hi Clutch,

It’s amazing the things you find hanging around begging an answer, when you look carefully. I must have missed this reply somewhere along the way. Sorry Clutch. Better late than never.


Clutch: Sorry, was there an argument there? I might have missed it, if it was hidden amongst the bizarre questions.

rw: O’kay, let’s assume you did.

Clutch: You seem unable to grasp, or unwilling to take seriously, the notion of omniscience. Were I a Christian, I don't think I would insult my idea of god by supposing that he would have to put on a Superman outfit for the paltry purpose of deflecting a bullet here and there -- many bullets everywhere, for that matter. He's omnipotent. Nothing is burdensome, tiresome, a hassle, exhausting, distracting, diverting, draining, bothersome or fatiguing for him.

rw: Well, not that I’m a Christian, or that a christian’s personal opinion of the FWD is relevant, but I digress…

The point I’m making in these ridiculous question/examples is to demonstrate cause and effect. You remember that little plaything of the disciplines, don’t you? If PoE destroys man’s self determination to detroy an omnimax god it fails to obtain. So anytime an advocate of PoE picks out a particular evil and asserts an omnimax attribute to show that this god could do X, I’m well within the parameters of FWD to show how such a band aid, rather than affecting a resolution, causes a cancer that ends in the death of self determination. Cause and effect, my friend, cause and effect. It’s not an argument against what god could do but a demonstration of the consequences were god to do it. Big difference.

And, just for the record, my questions had no bearing on omniscience, but on omnipotence.

So, to answer your initial question, yes, there is an argument there. One, I dare say, you will be hard pressed to refute, with or without the sarcasm.

Clutch: If you are incapable of taking that seriously, you should say so up front. Fair warning for your interlocutors.

Rw: Now it’s my turn. Is there an argument in there somewhere? Whatever it is you imagine I’m incapable of taking seriously might actually be a reflection of your own inability to consider ALL the ramifications of wielding this god’s attributes so recklessly. Fortunately, that’s not a reality any of us have to worry about…yes?

tw1tch

Philosoft,
I don't think anybody is saying this. There is a huge difference between thinking something and actually doing it.


Ok...I need to clarify this.


Again what exactly do you think is arbitrary?

A-'Freedom' defined as 'anything the set of physical laws P and logical laws L allow'

or

B-the specific set of physical laws P and logical laws L that make up our universe.


'A' isn't really arbitrary as it is a meaningful idea of 'Freedom' regardless of what the specific physical laws P and logical laws L are. I am inclined to think you consider 'B' arbitrary...our (this universes) specific P and L...is this the case?



Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

Clutch

RW,
Yes, you're free to show this. But what you actually have to do is actually SHOW it. Hence my question, Is there an argument here? Your questions were relevant to, at most, the question of how big a hassle it would be for a god to intervene, to frustrate some attempts to do evil. This is not only a mangling of the notion of omnipotence, it's a complete non-sequitur with respect to "destroying man's self-determination." Not an argument.It's not any sort of demonstration. It's just you asserting that if a god intervened, then there would be no human self-determination. You need to prove this conditional claim, and, as I pointed out, your list of ridiculous questions (as you called them) proves nothing of the sort.

Philosoft

The definition is arbitrary because it would apply equally to any universe with any properties. Because you lack a prior definition of "Freedom," your formulation is ad hoc and an appeal to that definition as an objective standard that cannot be violated is fallacious. Thus you are reduced to the tautology that the Freedom we observe is necessarily a function of God's nature, which must be assumed.

tw1tch

Philosoft,
Correct. 'Freedom' is equally applicable in all universes...it is a universal concept...thus it is not arbitrary (or chosen randomly). It is the exact same construct or idea in every case.


I believe what you mean to say is that ...

is arbitrary (ie the properties of a universe could be anything)...not the idea of 'Freedom' in that universe.



I think we need to clarify this distinction before we go on. It's one thing to say 'the physical and logical laws of this universe are arbitrary' and completely different thing to say 'the concept of Freedom is arbitrary'.



Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas