Clutch

God exits? Ah, if only...

First, it is very far from clear that (1) is "true by definition". If I tell you that it's definitional of snarfs that they podinkle, I'm still not in a position to say that, by definition "snarfs podinkle" is true. Because, after all, in the absence of further specifications, I haven't ruled out that my definition is incoherent. Podinkling cannot, for instance, be the hobby of successfully squaring the circle. So (1) also might be incoherent; and since it deploys the notion of perfection, a likely candidate to have unrestricted predication tucked away inside of it somewhere, it's more than just a vague possibility!

Second, this doesn't seem to show, as you suggest, that the OA isn't committed to existence being a predicate. Quite the opposite. Step one is that existence is a perfection; step two is that all perfections are correctly predicated of God. Existence is a predicate; without it the argument as you've written it would not work.

Third, what is the "first assumption" that Kant attacks? Do you just mean (1)? That hardly seems the focus of Kant's discussion.

Fourth ( -- okay, this is more numbers than I'd envisioned when I started this post! sorry -- ) I have little idea on what grounds eastern philosophies would reject (2), but the western grounds are clear. (2) is risible because (1) is undefined in the way I've already mentioned. Namely, the notion of perfection is left completely obscure; so the stipulation of (2) is a mere vocis flatus. (Oops, was that me? Sorry.) I know that other folks have pointed this out; just wanted to get it off my chest too.

Finally... Frege seemed to get this right, when he said that existence is a concept of "second level". So you have concepts of first level (ball, red, red ball, whatever), that specify via their contents what their extensions, if any, would be. Then there's existence, one level up, that you apply to concepts of first level in order to say that they do have extensions (ie, instances). So the OA confuses existence for a property of first level.

Thanks for your patience!

[ January 30, 2002: Message edited by: Clutch ]</p>

citpeks

With regards to the treatment of existence as a predicate, it might be useful to point out some apparent differences between all other predicates and existence.1) Predicates classify the world into different types of things: red things, big things, round things, etc... But if we say of anything that it exists, then we are not distinguishing that thing from anything else in the world. Ie, everything in the world exists, but not all things are red, or round or big.2) For every predicate, we can find something that does not have that predicate. We can find something that is red and something that is not red. We have exemplars of existing things, but not of non-existing things. Anyone can point to something that is not red, but can anyone show me something that does not exist?This is my understanding of Kant's worry. These concerns would seem to suggest, at the least, that existence is a very different predicate from all other predicates.Also, it seems to me that our language, English, treats existence as a predicate. So, “John runs” or “The sky is blue” are subject-predicate sentences, and they have the exact same form as “God exists.” This, I think, is a source of confusion, especially when trying to analyze “nothing.” For example, I take it that nothing simply has no properties. But the previous sentence treats “nothing” as a subject, or a thing of which we can ascribe properties! This confusion might lead some people to argue something like “Nothing is really something!”

Whoa!

Kenny

In light of more contemporary formulations of the OA, Kant's critique (which, when applied to Anselm's version, I agree with) is somewhat dated, IMHO.

At any rate, I believe the following may be of interest to some:

<a href="http://www.stats.uwaterloo.ca/~cgsmall/ontology.html" target="_blank">Godel's Ontological Argument</a>

(Yes, the very same Godel of Incompleteness fame)

God Bless,
Kenny

Vorkosigan

It's an interesting article, but Godel's interest in god reminds me very much of Newton's -- a nice hobby, but a great waste of a great mind.

Michael

David Gould

Didn't Aquinas dump the ontological argument also?

I have just finished reading an intro to philosophy and in it, Aquinas gives the unicorn example mentioned above.

He demonstrates that existence is necessarily a seperate question from properties.

He gives a list of properties that a horse has to a child. After he has done so, the child asks: 'Do horses exist?'

He gives a list of properties that a unicorn has to a child. After he has done so, the child asks: 'Do unicorns exist?'

This to me clearly shows that the two are separate questions.

But I am a beginner so what do I know...