dk

99percent: No, I am not. I am saying that for there to be an "absolute" (aka, "objective") good/bad it must be an intrinsic quality of the action, which in turn effects human understanding; i.e., impacts upon human understanding, thus triggering within the human the "objective" response, "I have done an objectively, absolutely bad thing in all possible universes according to all possible humans throughout all of time which is necessarily independent of human interpretations and therefore not subjective."
dk: - All sense-data are interpreted, then rendered intelligible in the context of signs, schemers, concepts, forms, etc.. to be stored for further reflection or retrieval in memory. Objective means ambivalent to human consciousness. It’s also quite possible some objects are rendered intelligible (judged) by mental processes subconsciously, for example a bad smell.
dk: - People aren’t privy to the subconscious, therefore the question’s validity ranges from circumspect to nonsense. All we can objectively say is that everything people consciously know is interpreted (rendered intelligible). Its possible the subconscious interprets sense-data from genetically transmitted primitive forms and concepts inclined to a moral compass or even inalienable human rights. Behavioral Psychology demonstrates that experience can overcome natural inhibitions with unnatural (contrived) associations, fears, rewards and taboos (and visa versa). Since people aren’t privy to the subconscious its contents are empirically invisible, mysterious and non-testable. People have many natural inhibitions to heights, smells, and sounds; and anything out of context generates apprehensions. People can overwhelm natural inhibitions and inclinations with experience, rationalization, propaganda, pain & pleasure associations, and indoctrination. It’s possible, plausible, and coherent that such mechanisms and inclinations inform the conscience with a genetic moral compass, and Ockham's razor favors the simplicity.
dk: The act of setting off a nuclear, chemical or biological doomsday device is morally wrong in all circumstances, for all human beings regardless of anyone’s interpretation.

[ June 22, 2002: Message edited by: dk ]</p>

dk

[quote]bd-from-kg
Part 1: Principles of rational action
dk: - First we must assume imaginary worlds can’t exist, and real worlds do exist. Then whatever “we” know falls into the domain of plausible, possible and uncreated truth (potential), as things not real but about the real world; then it follows that what we know of reality is certainly plausible and possible whether we can comprehend, explain or understand the reality is another matter.
dk: - I don’t see how its possible that non-rational people are insane. For starters a person isn’t rational until they reach the age of reason, yet infants and toddlers are certainly human, and within limited boundaries act rationally or irrationally. But are toddlers insane? Even adults aren’t privy to their subconscious, so whether the subconscious is rational or irrational is circumspect or even nonsense. Then there’s the autonomic nervous system that many people only become conscious of when it breaks down, if at all. It seems quite obvious to me that insanity is a much more complex issue, even a contrivance of sane people against apprehensions, fears and doubts.
dk: - I disagree, the first principle is that first principles are unassailable. It is by first principles that people distinguish context from pretext, knowledge from nonsense, and essence from appearance to render reality intelligible.
dk: - Alternatively I submit consciousness is a primitive impossible to describe except in terms of itself. For example we describe human consciousness as caricatures or characteristics of judgment, cognition, soul, heart, passions, subconscious, conscience, and self awareness. How much asparagus a person eats depends upon what knowledge they consciously act upon. If a person isn’t conscious that they have an allergy to asparagus then they are free to eat it, but are forced to suffer the consequences. A compulsive asparagus eater might block from their consciousness the allergic reaction too fulfill their desires, or for passions sake. How do most people act irrationally, by subconsciously depriving themselves of pertinent knowledge i.e. people learn to live in denial quite sanely and rationally.

Alonzo Fyfe

99Percent:

The right analogy would be "My car is a mode of transportation therefore my car ought to transport me."

We can take your alternative; the same facts can be pointed out.

First of all, a car is not always a mode of transportation. It can be a status symbol -- never actually driven (out of fear of denting it), but parked in front of the house for show. It can be a work of art (or a part of a modern sculpture). It can be a prop in a movie that is bought simply for the purpose of being wrecked in a chase scene. It can be a source of spare parts.

Three general principles are illustrated here.

(1) In your example, you presuppose an end or "goal" -- transporation, in your case. The car is evaluated entirely according to the traditions of means/ends rationality; is it well suited as a means for the presumed end?

(2) Nobody I know would dispute that if a car is to be used as a means to a particular end (whether it is transportation or a status symbol or as a movie prop) then it ought to be well suited to that end -- whatever that purpose may be. One ought not to use a screw driver to pound in nails, or a hammer to turn a screw (under normal circumstances). This is the crux of traditional means/ends rationality.

(3) Nothing can be inferred from the fact that a car is suitable to some particular end that it cannot be used for some other end, even if that other end destroys its capacity to be used in some other way. For example, nothing about a car being a mode of transporation implies that we ought not to use it as a movie prop and, thereby, destroy it.

I do not raise any objections against Ayn Rand about rational means. Actually, I do not know anybody who would. But rational means always presuppose one or more ends (e.g., transporation, status symbol) written into the premises. Change the ends, and you change the value of the means.

The problem is that Ayn Rand repeatedly denies that she is talking about traditional means/ends rationality. She claims to be able to prove the fixed, unchanging, objective rationality of particular ends.

[Note: The objectivity that I argue for is not the sense being used here. I do not believe that ends can be rationally justified through any method other than tranditional means/ends rationality. However, consistent with this view, one end (desire) can be evaluated as a means to fulfilling yet other ends (desires).]

To create her proof, Ayn Rand must eliminate any presumption of further ends from her premises. As long as those presumptions remain, her argument is yet another example of traditional and contingent means/ends rationality.

Unfortunately, the instant these further ends are scratched from the premises, the is/ought fallacy emerges.

So, this is where Ayn Rand's arguments leave us.

Either the presumption of further ends remains in the premise and we get nothing more than a standard example of means/ends rationality (which fails to support the type of objectivism she claims to support).

Or she removes these presumptions from her premises and ends up with an is/ought fallacy.


In my argument with Koy we both agree that a table has an objective intrisic attribute we call tableness. We both agree that a table has an ought - it has to fulfill its role as a table otherwise it is not a table.

So, then it is not a table. What argument can you provide that it ought to be a table?

More importantly, everything you state here is still captured entirely within the concept of traditional means/ends rationality -- and is fully captured in your own phrase "fulfill its role".

We presuppose a particular set of ends, and then evaluate the table as a means to fulfilling those ends.

And, yes, we can build certain ends into the definition: "An X is an item that fulfills ends E1, E2, ... En." In which case, it remains true that anything that does not fulfill the ends E1, E2, ... En is no longer an X.

But these facts still fail to say anything about the rationality of particular ends. None of this yields the type of objectivity that Ayn Rand needs.

Alonzo Fyfe

bd-from-kg:

I argue that for your theory to qualify as an objective morality in any serious sense there must be such a reason. Since you have said several times by now that there isn’t, yours is just another subjective theory.

OK, you have no idea how there could be a nontheistic objective morality. No problem. Now would you please stop calling yourself an objectivist?

Actually, I have no idea how there can be a theistic objective morality either -- since divine command theory actually comes out as "third-person subjective".

But, more to the point, since my very first post I have stated that there are many different meanings of the terms 'objective' and 'subjective' -- that a common mistake is made in assuming that these there is a single clear definition of these terms.

As a result of this mistake, a great many false dichotomies and equivocations litter the logical landscape.

The only way to avoid these issues is to state the sense in which one is an 'objectivist' or 'subjectivist'.

In the sense that you are using the word here, I am and have always been a subjectivist. There are no desire-independent values; all true value claims must describe relationships between states of affairs and desires; without desire there is no value.

But it does not follow that I am "just another subjectivist".

Your recent postings suggest a view that objectivists and subjectivists are involved in explaining a choice that must be made between (for example) all-things-considered value and pleasing-to-the-KKK value. An objectivist says that the choice can be made objectively; a subjectivist says that the choice must be made subjectively.

I assert that there is no choice to be made -- at least, there is no choice to be made. At least, not the right type of choice. Neither the objectivist nor the subjectivist can make sense of the type of choice you are calling for. So, I am neither an objectivist nor a subjectivist.

I think, referring back to earlier discussion, it would be best if you classified me as a moral nihilist. Though even this has some misleading implications. Values, understood as relationships between states of affairs and desires, are objective, scientifically knowable, real-world phenomena. There is such a thing as a value/fact.

[ June 23, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

Alonzo Fyfe

bd-from-kg:
[b]As we have seen, logical implication doesn't "work" either in the sense that it yields only a tiny, insignificant fraction of what's needed to function in the real world."

You have taken logical inference to be equivalent to deductive inference. It is true that there is also inductive inference. I agree that it also exists, as well as other forms of inference (abduction).

But you need to do more than show that these other forms of reasoning exists. You need to demonstrate how, on any one of them, a set of beliefs or facts can imply (deductive, inductively, abductively, donald-duck-tively) implies some change in desire.

For as far as you take this argument, it is possible to prove just about anything. 99percent could just as easily assert that his basic principles are merely a basic foundational proposition. And a theist can assert that the existence of God is a basic foundational proposition.

Alonzo Fyfe

bd-from-kg:

You make the same mistake that 99percent makes. Some of what you say is true, but it is true of the rationality of means. You are attempting to demonstrate the possibility of some sort of rationality of ends, but you fail to successfull cross the gap between the rationality of means and a rationality of ends.

I hold that there is no rationality of ends.

[Note: It is possible to talk eliptically of a rationality of ends, because no end is ever solely an end. Instead, each end is also a means of achieving still further ends. Desires cause actions, and those actions are capable of fulfilling yet other desires. We have no way to evaluate the rationality of an end qua end, but we can use traditional means/ends rationality to evaluate the rationality of an end qua means. In this way, we are not totally blocked from talking about a rationality of ends, but it is nothing more than the rationality of means applied to ends as means.]


What you say about this rationality of ends is:

At this point we need to consider whether there is a common thread that ties together all of these aspects of rationality. The obvious answer is that all of them help us to function effectively in the real world.

This type of talk fits quite comfortably within traditional means rationality. Means rationality is typically what people are talking about when they say "function effectively."


In particular, many of them are essentially strategies for acquiring true beliefs. A rational agent presupposes that true beliefs are desirable, because that is of the essence of rationality.

Below, I will give an example of a case where true beliefs are not desirable.

Yet, these exceptions are few. Generally, true beliefs are very useful means.

In addition, traditional belief/desire theory states that a person who desires that P seeks to make "P" true, and an agent who believes that Q always acts as if "Q" is true. The desire that "P" be true, and the fact that all actions are made under the assumption that "Q" is true, makes true beliefs particularly relevant.

However, rationality per se] does not involve any presuppositions as to the appropriate ends to which these choices are to be directed. In fact, one of the purposes of acquiring true beliefs (what I often refer to as "knowledge and understanding", or K&U) is to determine what these goals will be.

K&U is indeed relevant to selecting the best means, but could you provide me with a single example of how K&U can be used to determine the rationality of ends? I have seen examples of various types of deductive logic, and examples of induction, and of other forms of reasoning. But I have not seen even one viable example of the rationality of ends.


In the absence of any knowledge about the real world there could be no desires at all, except for the baseline desire (based only on the assumption that the agent in question is rational) to acquire K&U.

The classic conception of a desire is that of a propositional attitude. An agent who desires that P has a sentence programmed in the brain that says "make P true." Desires come in different strengths (which helps in making tradeoffs among competing ends). There is nothing about this traditional conception of a desire that requies any sort of a belief. It is simply a line of programming code that, like any line of programming code, can exist in a system by itself (even though it does not do much work).

In other words, ends can be determined quite independently of belief, but the means of fulfilling these ends requires beliefs.


Thus the question of what a rational agent would do if he had more K&U is highly relevant, since the essence of rationality itself is maximizing the probability of acquiring true beliefs while avoiding false ones.

Again, I will dispute the part about acquiring true beliefs below. But, again, the value of K&U is purely in selecting the appropriate means to an end. I need you to provide any sense in claiming that K&U is at all relevant in evaluating ends qua ends.

As for your principles of rationality, let's take a look at them.


1. Always act in a way that corresponds to your beliefs.

2. Always act in a way that corresponds to your desires.

The received view is that these are not principles of rationality but are, instead, essential components to intentional action. Every intentional action can be explained in terms of an agent doing what would maximize fulfillment of his own desires if all of his beliefs were true beliefs. Any force outside of an agent's beliefs and desires influencing the action (e.g., an electrical short circuit that causes a muscle to move in a particular way, or a strong wind), are external forces not relevant in what would be that agent's actions.


3. Believe only things that are consistent with your observations, and only things for which you have evidence.


Problem #1:

Your original statement was that a person's beliefs should be "based on the evidence."

This principle is vague. Particularly, the phrase "based on evidence" has several connotations. A very broad connotation is required for this to be true.

For example, some presently argue that certain core beliefs evolved -- that there is a type of innate knowledge. Locke's "blank tablet" theory has been thrown out, largely because of what we have learned from computer programming. A blank disk cannot learn -- every disk must be written on with some sort of initial code that provides the initial intructions on how to handle additional input, conduct basic output (behavior), and how to develop further subroutines. Is a belief which is grounded on evolutionary selection "based on the evidence?"

Another relevant issue; the mechanisms for belief formation are not all open to introspection. Researchers are capable of reproducing a number of experiments whereby a person forms a true belief "based on the evidence" without being able to accurately identify the evidence that lead to the belief. The belief comes almost instantly after the researcher gives some clue which the subject picks up subliminally. But the subject does not consciously percieve the clue -- when asked how they came up with the answer they invent a story that seems relevant, but makes reference to variables that the experiment has controlled for.

It serves no evolutionary benefit for us to have access to these processes. (Access takes up space, takes energy, takes time, and these are all things that can be best spent elsewhere, so the methods are hidden from conscious thought.) All that matters for evolutionary purposes is that the processes are reliable.

(Therefore, Brown may believe that the family next door is from Mars, this belief can be based on the evidence, but Brown may not be able to report the evidence upon which this belief is based.)

Reliable, of course, does not mean perfect. There is reason to believe that the system of reasoning we are conscious of is merely an error-trapping routine. We compare beliefs that we obtain through different systems at different times, and compare them for compatibility. Where we notice incompatibility, we have an error in our belief-formation system that we need to correct. (But which belief do we discard?)

This leads to another ambiguity over "based on the evidence". There are particular sense where errors can be "based on the evidence." We can be decieved, or be successful in finding only a fraction of the evidence. Our belief is "based on the evidence", but it is still false.


Problem #2:

There are instances in which true beliefs are not the best beliefs, all things considered.

For example: military trainers know that the possibility of survival in a despirate situation is linked to the agent's beliefs about the probability of success. But this is not a one-to-one correspondence. A person who believes he has a 5% chance of survival may, indeed, have a 5% chance of survival. But a person who believes he has a 50% chance of survival may, in fact, have a 10% chance of survival.

So, military trainers take pains to teach recruits to overestimate their chances of survival in these types of cases.

bd-from-kg

Alonzo Fyfe:

What I mean by an objective morality is a moral theory such that:

(1) If a specific act is “right (wrong)” for any one person at any one time, it is “right (wrong)” for all persons at all times. For example, if Jones’ killing of Smith in a particular way at a particular time and place is “wrong” for you, it is “wrong” for everyone, always.

(2) There are some objective grounds for preferring this particular moral theory (i.e., this meaning of “right” and “wrong”) over other possible ones.

Your theory satisfies the first requirement, but fails to meet the second. While the reason you have given for preferring it to “intrinsic-value” theories are sound, you have offered no remotely convincing reason to prefer it to other non-intrinsic-value theories.

Lots of people, including many subjectivists, have offered moral theories that meet the first criterion. But because they recognize that they don’t meet the second, they call their theories “subjective” on the grounds that other people’s moral theories are just as “valid” as theirs, and which to adopt is a matter of subjective preference.

Now if I understand you correctly, your position is that it is unreasonable to criticize you for not offering any objective grounds for preferring your moral theory over others because there cannot be any such objective grounds. So be it. This position is called subjectivism.

You’re the one who used the word “entailed” with regard to beliefs. “Entailed” means that something is the conclusion of a rigorous logical proof from the premises in question.

Other forms of so-called “implication”, such as induction, are in a completely different category. The conclusions of an inductive argument are not entailed by the premises. This leads to the question: in what sense can they be said to be “implied” at all? So far as I can see, the answer is simply that any rational person will be persuaded by sufficiently strong evidence of the relevant kind to believe the conclusion. But this leads to the question of just what one means by a “rational person”, and how one can objectively distinguish between a rational person and an irrational one. And the only possible answer to this, so far as I can see, is that a rational person adheres to certain principles of action which more or less define rationality. I listed some of these in my last post, although the list was not intended to be exhaustive.

Not so. As we have seen, saying that A “implies” B in one of these “non-logical” senses means nothing more than that, for a sufficiently rational person, knowledge (or sufficiently strong belief) that A is true will result his believing that B is true. There is no reason to rule out a priori that knowledge or strong belief that certain things are true will lead a sufficiently rational person to have certain desires. In fact, it seems perfectly obvious to me that this is often the case. For example, if a rational person learns (or comes to believe) that doing such-and-such will be an incredibly enjoyable experience with no offsetting negative consequences, this knowledge will cause him to desire to have that experience.

Yes, one must have some criterion for recognizing “valid” or “rational” foundational principles of action (not propositions, as I argued in my last post). I discussed this at length in the thread <a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=21&t=000384" target="_blank">On the nature of metaphysical axioms</a>.

Alonzo Fyfe

bd-from-kg:

Now if I understand you correctly, your position is that it is unreasonable to criticize you for not offering any objective grounds for preferring your moral theory over others because there cannot be any such objective grounds. So be it. This position is called subjectivism.

Again, you are misusing your second criterion for an objective theory.

You are continuing to draw an invalid inference from the subjectivity of the language in which the propositions of a theory are stated (the absence of objective reasons for choosing one term over another) to the subjectivity of the theory itself. If valid, this type of inference would render every theory in every field of study (including math and logic) subjective.

I can provide you with an objective reason for preferring my theory over any theory that uses intrinsic values; intrinsic values objectively do not exist.

I can provide you with an objective reason for preferring my theory over any theory that uses a rationality of ends; their rationality of ends will turn out to be either a misidentified rationality of means or an invalid inference of "ought" conclusions from strictly "is" premises.

I can provide you with an objective reason for preferring my theory over any theory that derives the subjectivity of a theory from the subjectivity of language; these interences are invalid.

I cannot provide you with an objective reason to prefer my theory over any theory offered by somebody who says exactly the same thing that I say, only does so using different words. However, it is a mistake to say that such a person is offering a different theory. It is the same theory, only expressed in a different language. Thus, the choice to be made here is not the type of choice that is relevant to your second criterion.

[ June 24, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

The AntiChris

bd-from-kg

I'm reluctant to comment before you've revealed the full story but I have have a minor question.

When you say that:

Who is the "one" tasked with dispensing approval here?

Chris

Koyaanisqatsi

dk, I'm only responding to your last post because you attributed a quote of mine to 99Percent.

Once again (and no offense intended) I simply have no idea what it is you are talking about when you launch into your tautalogical ramblings.

I typed this, not 99.

As for your one example of an objectively "bad" act:

Incorrect.

Just three circumstances in which setting off a "doomsday" device--and by that I'll assume total annihilation of humanity on Earth--could be considered "morally right:"

<ol type="1">[*] It is learned that an Asteroid is on a collision course and the planet will be completely destroyed, but not instantly, so as an act of mercy, the nation's leaders--with popular support--mutually agree to detonate their respective "doomsday" devices, which end human existence in a flash, rather than over days/weeks/months.[*] By one of our space probes, it is discovered that we here on Earth are a lost tribe of the Galaxy, which is full of humans, the majority of which travel in one gigantic spaceship, being the explorers we all are. We find all of this out because they have found our space probe and reprogrammed it with necessary information to send back to us in preparation for their arrival in three weeks.

Our scientists discover with this information, however, that due to our pollution and the level of toxins in our systems, if we meet any of them or they actually land here, which is the plan--much like with the early settlers--we will infect and ultimately destroy them, but, of course, no one listens to the scientists. Everyone is so excited and can't wait until they are taken off of Earth and get to travel to the real homeworld at the center of the galaxy.

The scientists have no way of communicating any kind of warning to the ship (though they repeatedly try anything they can) and it is clear that no one will heed their warning on Earth, so they are left with a dilemma. If the extraterrestrial humans make contact with us, they will die and the infection will spread throughout the entire galaxy, eventually killing every human being including all of the Earth humans, since the immunities we have will eventually be overcome by the transference and growth of our viruses in the new hosts with no hope of antidote. Neither they nor we have the medical technology to stop it and it is absolute; an inevitability simply awaiting the catalyst.

Thus, the only hope for the continued survival of the entire human race is for these scientists to take it upon themselves to blow up the Earth before the ship can arrive.[*] It is the year 2158 and humanity has completely destroyed the entire ecosystem of this planet, but managed to adapt themselves enough (largely through cannibalism) to survive long enough to launch a colonization space "ark" after it is discovered that there is not just water and life on a moon of Saturn's, but abundant life and minerals and all that would be required for us to survive.

The world has become a much more violent place, however, since resources were so drastically consumed and all world societies have broken down completely into an elite vs. slave mentality, where human beings have been harvested for food and fuel.

Only a select group can be chosen for survival on the enormous space ark, of course, and it is determined that the majority of the remaining population will simply be systematically killed so that their bodies can be necessarily processed in order to both fuel and feed the crew on their journey.

The rest will simply be left to rot, since the resources to kill and process their worthless bodies is not worth the time or effort to even provide them with a merciful death, let alone a final purpose, no matter how warped and pathetic, so with their last bit of energy left, they trigger a doomsday device not necessarily as pre-emptive revenge, but primarily so that these particular despicable humans are not allowed to either destroy yet another planet in the manner they did to this one or be the final legacy of the human race.[/list=a]

There you go. Three scenarios in which triggering a doomsday device is the morally "right" thing to do.

After all, it's objectively right, right? Therefore, there is no further discussion and I am absolutely correct and these scenarios prove that there is no other morally right action, yes?

[ June 24, 2002: Message edited by: Koyaanisqatsi ]</p>