LoopHooligan

Jamie

I thing you are very probably correct, I'm just asking questions to help myself to understand, to help me clarify what I think. After all if I don't question things I might as well take up religion. I thank you all for your help.

Dr. Retard

There's a difference between subjective reality and objective reality. Subjectively real things are essentially subject-oriented and objectively real things aren't. Headaches are part of subjective reality and planets are part of objective reality.

(And presumably there's some material entity or configuration in the brain that is identical to, or the realization of, or responsible for, (or whatever) all the subjective feelings like headaches. And these brain-states are part of objective reality. Subjective reality consists of feelings which, in some very tight way, result from these objectively real brain-states).

So affections, desires, goals, interests, aims, ends, etc. are all subjectively real. A lot of people refer to these things as subjective values. Adopting this meaning, it's obvious that values exist in reality. Namely, subjective values exist, and since they're nothing more than affections, etc., they're subjectively real.

No one disputes this, so far as I know. The tough question is whether objective values exist. The question is tough in part because it's unclear what a value is, if not just an affection (or whatever). But if we say that's all values are, then we rule out the possibility of objective values by definitional fiat. And that merely moves the controversy to objective schmalues. That's no way to settle a controversy.

LENGTHY DETOUR

Here is one popular account of what a value is: it's something for which agents ought to act. But if this is a correct account of values, then subjective values must be something for which agents ought to act. Consequently, subjective affections are something for which agents ought to act, by seeking to satisfy them. Then Joe ought to seek the satisfaction of his own affections. This is extremely plausible, but it is obviously a substantive normative claim. An equally substantive normative claim is that Joe ought to act to help the needy. This claim is just as plausible as the other. But notice that in this case the value pursued has an objective character. So we have two equally plausible claims about goals for which agents ought to act, and one of the goals is subjective and one of them is objective. I see no flaw in this argument, which seems to establish objective values. So, inasmuch as we believe that subjective values exist, we should believe that objective values exist.

But this is only on that particular account of what values are. You can reject the account and avoid the conclusion. Perhaps that's a good idea. For the account suggests the following description of the dispute between so-called 'subjectivists' and 'objectivists':

Subjectivists and objectivists both agree that there are things for which agents ought to act; but subjectivists hold that agents ought to act for the sake of only subjectively real things, whereas objectivists hold that agents ought to act for objectively real things also. Subjectivists think that affections, desires, etc. are the only proper target of action, while objectivists think that agents should act for the sake of things besides subjective feelings.

This doesn't sound like the subjectivist-objectivist dispute you and I know. The 'subjectivists' of this above dispute sound a lot like hedonic utilitarians, who claim that agents should act so as to promote the maximization of pleasure (itself a subjective reality). But the subjectivists of real life don't want to sign on to any ethical doctrine, as they reject the entire enterprise as socialized hokum. Real-life subjectivists don't think there IS anything for which an agent ought to act, because the notion of something that somehow deserves to be promoted by our behavior doesn't make any sense. And therefore, on this account of values, they should reject the reality of values altogether, subjective and objective.

But I should note an inconsistency in the claims of many (most?) real-world subjectivists: They start by denying that agents ought to act for the sake of some objective value. After all, they claim, it doesn't make sense for there to be some thing -- a value -- that somehow deserves to be promoted by our behavior. But they also claim (or presuppose) that each agent ought to act for the sake of his own personal affections, desires, etc. They treat this -- practical rationality or prudence -- as common sense. But the idea that our affections deserve to be promoted by our behavior is exactly as weird and unintelligible as the idea that, say, the elimination of poverty deserves to be promoted by our behavior. More interestingly, perhaps, the idea that OUR affections are 'worthy' is exactly as weird as the idea that EVERYONE ELSE'S affections are 'worthy'. Self-interest and Altruism are suddenly (in this respect, anyway) on a level playing-field.

Illustration: Many a real-world subjectivist might say, "It's my subjective desire to eliminate poverty, and I wish that other people shared this desire. But if someone really doesn't have that desire, there simply is no reason for him to join me." This suggests a contrast: if you don't desire to eliminate poverty, then its elimination does not merit your attention; if, however, you DO desire to eliminate poverty, then its elimination DOES merit your attention. But no subjectivist should say this latter claim, for it is a full-fledged normative claim about things that deserve to be promoted by our behavior. It's no less weird for something to be 'worthy' by virtue of some relationship with our affections, than for something to be 'worthy' by virtue of something else. 'Worthiness' -- deserving to be promoted -- is just plain weird.

Now, to be sure, we are programmed by nature to act for the sake of our own personal affections. If we observe someone acting in a certain way, we will explain his action in terms of some subjective affection he has. If we don't know of any such affection, then we'll invent one. If the action would frustrate the affections and desires we ascribe to the agent, then we will conclude that we must have been wrong to ascribe those affections and desires. In explaining an action, we will do anything to get the agent's affections involved in the explanation. Any other kind of explanation is almost unthinkable.

But just because we always DO act for the sake of our own personal affections doesn't mean that we ought to. It doesn't mean that our personal affections have a claim on our behavior. A consistent real-world subjectivist should say the following:

"Whether or not you have a subjective desire to eliminate poverty, its elimination does not deserve to be promoted by your behavior. It's true that such a desire will IN FACT motivate you to act for poverty's elimination. But that's just the way we're built by nature -- we act as to promote our desires. There is such a natural link between action and affection that we assume that our affections have a claim on our behavior. But in fact there isn't anything at all with a claim on our behavior, not even our own personal affections, desires, etc."

END DETOUR

So what about religion? Mystical experiences, "hearing God's voice", feelings of joy, feelings of guilt, these are all part of reality -- subjective reality. Everyone agrees with this. The question is what causes these subjectively real experiences. We infidels tend to chalk them up to naturalistic psychological explanations; theists tend to chalk them up to God's involvement in believers' spiritual lives.

Another question concerns religious beliefs. Beliefs DO have a feel to them, a subjective component -- it feels differently to believe one thing rather than another. But they also have a cognitive component that aims to accurately represent reality. Now sometimes, beliefs aim to accurately represent subjective reality: I can believe that I have a headache, and consequently have the feel of the belief, have the aiming to represent my subjective reality, and if I'm right, have the feel of the headache. But religious beliefs usually aim to represent objective reality (maybe Paul Tillich is an exception!). There's no First Church of "I'm Hungry". So the question is, do such religious beliefs accurately represent objective reality? Does the world really contain spirits, fine-tuners, resurrected corpses, and the like? We say No, they say Yes. Well, sometimes we say Beats Me.

So, the distinction between values and religion? Subjective values (understood, uninterestingly, to designate affections, desires, etc.) are, obviously, subjectively real; so are religious experiences and the feel of religious beliefs. But religious beliefs aren't content to concern subjectively real experiences. They aim to accurately represent the objective world, and whether they do is a matter of ongoing dispute. Whether values are real in any philosophically interesting sense is uncertain. The candidates, at least, for subjective and objective values are both obviously quite real -- e.g., desire-satisfaction is a real phenomenon, as is poverty relief. Whether these obviously real candidates are, in fact, values is another matter. On a popular idea of what values are, subjective values and objective values tend to stand or fall together, depending on whether it makes sense for anything to be worthy of pursuit. The only plausible way to affirm one and not the other is to sign on to substantive ethical doctrines about what sorts of things are worthy of pursuit. Real-world subjectivists should reject both.

John Page

Hey dillcat:

Is this damning with faint praise?

IMO this just doesn't hang together. We perceive form and form is a real attribute that we ascribe to objects that fit the forms "pattern". Just because we can arrange many substances in reality to form circles, it does not follow that form and substance have "properties" in the same way. Indeed, form is a property of substance but not necessarily vice versa.

Values exist as part of reality but participate as abstract (imaginary) things. Not all imaginary things have a physical corollary. Here's a<a href="http://www.reconciliationism.org/reality.htm" target="_blank">Link to Chart of Reality</a>.

Cheers, John

John M3

Values are colors. Some people are blind.

picklepuss

Hi John;

How do you distinguish "form" from "pattern"? Or "shape", or "mode of existence", or "way of acting or behaving", or "structure" or "design"?

To me "form" is that which confers "thingness" upon "no-thingness", and I equate "thingness" with "identity". That which is without "identity" is "no-thing".I believe identity is that which an entity conserves/preserves throughout its temporal existence. Form, therefore, is "that which imposes and maintains stability and continuance of certain properties long enough for an entity to be distinguished from other entities and its identity recognised".

Thus 'form' is "relational", that is, it describes the relation of identified entities to other identified entities. So I am saying that the relationship that entities have with one another is every bit as "objectively real" as any "substance" possessed by individual entities.

Here is where we most seriously differ. I maintain the contrary, that is, that substance is a property of form, since any 'substance' that lacks 'identity' is 'no-thing'. Substance is the result of 'formation', not its cause.

I do not conceive of values as 'imaginary', no more than I conceive of 'knowledge' or 'belief' as 'imaginary'. Imagination, knowledge and belief are all mental phenomena that may or may not impinge upon one another. Values may be part of knowledge, or beliefs, or imagination (John Lennon comes to mind), but that is not a statement that confirms or denies their objective reality apart from knowledge, imagination, or belief.
Just because these barrels contain apples, that does not mean that the apples were produced by the barrels, and that there is no such thing as an orchard.

If values possess identifiable characteristics that persist over time, then they have form, then they have identity, then they are mental entities every bit as real as any material entity. They are 'formed' out of mental substances and forces--empirical observations, experiences, memories, knowledge, imagination, intelligence, consciousness, emotion, reflexion, intuition, etc., etc., just as the physical world is formed out of material substances and forces. That is their only difference. Can you demonstrate that "matter" is any more "real" than "mind"?

John Page

Well, reality includes everything so the term "more real" is somewhat ambiguous. We seem to part ways because I'm poking at the "distance" or "remoteness" between our experiences and the reality that causes that experience.

So, to repeat, physical substance is the actual reality we're experiencing (through our physical senses and our minds). A 'value" is simply a measurement of the reality were experiencing and form is implied/conjected by the analysis of the mind.

My favorite example is "Are there any lines in reality?" The dividing line is a phenomenon within the mind, I don't think anyone has drawn lines around the trees to delineate them from the rest of reality.

I do agree with you that our minds seem to seek relations between experiences, apprehending the constancies within such relations to provide us a subjective experience that is useful in our evolutionary development.

Summary: We may be playing semantics but for me the substance of what is out there is reality and everything else, including form, is mere mental interpretation.

Cheers, John

Ms. Siv

Sorry for the delayed reply ... I have been a member of II for a while now but haven't been able to post for a year or so because the site was firewalled at work. Now I've changed jobs (not for this reason ... but because I'd been in the old one for nearly 6 years ) ... and the site is not (yet) firewalled at the new place ! Ok ... to get to your questions .

The myth of beauty being in the eyes of the beholder alone is now being dispelled . Would request you all to read Nancy Etcoff's "Survival of the Prettiest". There have been a few programs covering this topic on Discovery and National Geographic also.
What we find beautiful ... in humans, landscapes etc is, to a large extent, genetic. Based on good genes, preferable landscapes for survival, food, rearing offspring etc.
The rest is, of course, cultural and subjective.
So it is very much "real".

Like I explained ... there's nothing imaginary about what we consider "beautiful" in people/landscapes .... even, to an extent, art.

Religion also, to a large extent is hard-wired into us. The 3 core aspects of most, if not all, of all the world religions are ....
- objectification ... the reduction of reality to images, symbols and definitions that are easily understood and cannot be refuted
- commitment or surrender ... commiting or surrendering oneself to a cause through faith
and
- myth ... the narratives that explain the group/clan/tribe's favored position on the earth - often incorporating supernatural forces

As with all other genetic traits, some have more of it, some have less.

- Sivakami.

[ November 07, 2002: Message edited by: Sivakami S ]</p>

Adrian Selby

I disagree that we find the same things in humans beautiful, wasn't being overweight in the middle ages considered beautiful because it meant one was well off and well fed, whereas now those film stars and others in a fitness oriented culture are admired because they are rich enough to spend hours in the gym instead of dead end jobs honing their bodies. Supermodels are now waif like.

Strength in men was always admired, but now its role is superseded by money far more than it was, though the 'was' here is going way way back, its money and power usually gained through cunning and other mental faculties that secures the attraction of potential mates.

Well, you get where I'm coming from anyway I hope.

Kharakov

Are you saying that our standards of beauty are decided by the ability to gain that which is hard to obtain (fat in the middle ages / fitness in the sedentary ages (for women); great strength in the ages of war / great money (power) in the capitalist ages (for men))?

Adrian Selby

broadly, yes. Fat was admired, or rather, fat women were admired, now they aren't.

Physical prowess in primitive tribes is valued and admired, now it is not, well, not like it was.