Pomp

luvluv,

It is not my intent to be rude, so please interpret this as charitably as possible: I really do not believe that you are reading my posts with the intent to understand them. Rather than address my attempts to demonstrate to you that you are misrepresenting the moral subjectivist position(s), you have chosen to focus on what I intended as an offhand remark about the use of shame as a manipulative tool. I am going to address your comments on shame, but first I am going to summarize my position in this thread for you in the hope that you will address it directly.

There are five salient points that I hope you will take home from my posts here:

• 1) Lewis was demonstrably incorrect to state that all “men” in all times and places have largely agreed on all significant moral questions. Cases have been provided where moral disagreement has been observed. You can admit that Lewis was in error, or you can attempt to claim that these differences are not significant, or you can attempt to weasel around the issue, as you have done with turtonm, by claiming that these cases were all caused by misinformation. He’s doing an admirable job of dissecting the misinformation defense, so I’ll restrain myself to pointing out that the question of whether or not these cases are truly significant is itself a moral question, so any disagreement there also defeats your case.
  
• 2) Values are beyond debate. We value what we value and no degree of persuasion can convince us not to. We can, however, be rationally persuaded to change the means by which we pursue the fulfillment of those values. In other words, although I cannot convince Hitler that Aryan purity is not worthwhile, I can, in theory, convince him that it is not in his best interest to wage war in the pursuit of that goal.
  
• 3) There are objective constraints on our actions. Subjectivist morality does not imply that we all follow our whim in any situation, nor does it mean that the “strong” impose their will on the “weak.” Turtonm has done an excellent job explaining the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma to you. I suggest that you review his posts and follow the links he has provided in order to obtain an understanding of why it is rarely in an agent’s best interest to choose non-cooperation. Once you understand that, you will understand why negotiation is almost universally preferable to force.
  
• 4) Repeat after me: ”it is possible for me to disapprove of another’s actions for no reason other than that those actions are detrimental to my values.” You do not need not prove that my actions are “morally wrong” in order to disapprove of my actions. You do not need any special “grounds” on which to object to anything that someone else does.
  
• 5) It is possible for individuals with no values in common to negotiate. In the hypothetcial case of A, who values his own survival, and B, who velues her own survival, both of whom are disinterested in the other's survival, it is certainly possible for an agreement of mutual non-violence to be reached.

Point 1 deals with one aspect of Lewis’s fallacious argument. Hobbs and turtonm have done an excellent job demonstrating why the rest of his argument fails.

Points 2-5 deal with the basics of subjectivist morality as I understand it (I think my basic interpretation is fairly uncontroversial among subjectivists, but anyone who disagrees is free to jump in). If you understand these points, you will understand why your criticisms of subjectivism are not valid. These three points are the core of what I have been saying to you.

On shame:

First of all, it should be noted that I am engaging in rampant speculation regarding the evolutionary origin of the emotion we call “shame.”

Having said that, it seems likely to me that shame, like any emotion, serves (or served) some purpose which would have given proto-humans who felt it some reproductive advantage over proto-humans who did not. If I had to guess, which I suppose I do for the purposes of this discussion, I would say that shame at violating normative principles is useful for giving those who are not insightful enough to judge the consequences of their action for themselves a powerful emotional incentive to go along with the social consensus. In the ancestral environment, which remained relatively stable for a long period of time, the normative principles that made up what I am calling the social consensus would have evolved over millennia and generally would have been the “best” way to live for any given individual.

Now, there are two reasons why shame is not necessarily valuable to a modern person:

• 1) Shame, if it serves any “purpose” at all, serves the evolutionary purpose of maximizing reproductive success, as described above. Most of us do not hold maximum reproductive success among our highest values, so there is no reason to assume that we ought to be guided by our shame in any case.
  
• 2) Unlike the ancestral environment where shame presumably evolved, the normative principles that make up our modern social consensus are changing rapidly as we grapple with new situations. Many of our “traditional” normative principles are very poor strategies for fulfilling our interests in the modern world, and a tendency to experience an emotion that makes us more likely to adhere to them is not to be encouraged.

It should be noted at this point that there is no argument over whether or not we should feel shame when we violate social norms. It is simply a fact that we do, to a greater or lesser extent. The degree to which we expect to feel shame upon committing a particular act is simply one more consequence to be factored in when determining whether or not that act is in our best interest.

Now, your argument seems to be that it is desirable to cultivate a tendency to feel greater shame upon violating a social norm. Presumably, you believe that people will be more likely to fall in line and do the “right” thing if the emotional consequences of doing the “wrong” thing are higher. To a subjectivist, however, what you call the right thing is merely a social norm that may or may not be the best thing one could do. Manipulative shaming, then, is simply an attempt to force compliance with social norms by raising the cost of non-compliance. I don’t necessarily have a problem with attempts to force such compliance (that’s what laws and criminal penalties do, after all), but the idea behind manipulative shame is to plant a seed in the head of the shamed so that (s)he will force him/herself to comply. It’s a form of brainwashing. I don’t like it. Note that, as explained above, I do not need any grounds on which to dislike manipulative shaming, except that it contradicts my own values.

Surely I don't need it, if I can analyze the costs and benefits of my actions. It would seem to only stop me from doing the things that I perceive through my mind that I can do without harm to myself.

As has been demonstrated by way of turtonm’s posts on the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is not always easy to analyze the costs and benefits of our actions. Shame may very well help many people make the best cost-benefit decision without actually having to think about it.

At any rate, the whole “shame” topic is a side issue. I’m not going to respond again until you demonstrate that you understand my five main points.

[ March 11, 2002: Message edited by: Pompous Bastard ]</p>

luvluv

Pomp, I want to kind of wrap this up, because we are circling around the same sort of opinions.

I do understand that you can disapprove of what you do not like as a subjectivist, but what is the exact make-up of this disapproval? What is the real difference between you saying that something is wrong and you saying you disapprove of it? Do you disapprove of it as you might disapprove of a man eating with his elbows on the table? The subjectivist argument in this case seems to me arbitrary and cavalier. Even if we were talking in an evolutionary since, wouldn't it be better for mankind to appeal to a general and clearly understood moral framework? I object to this idea on 2 grounds 1) It does not exist currently anywhere in the world. Most people do use the terms "right" and "wrong", at least in dealing with the deeds of other people. Many folks in the West have a tendency to be upset when these uncivillized words are used against them. Most of the world believes in a real right and a real wrong. They may disagree on some of the particulars, but they agree on absolutism. 2) Subjective morality inevitably leads to inferior results. The subjectivist framework for interpreting and responding to a moral dilema is such a long and drawn out, and as I stated before, arbitrary process that it frustrates the coalescence of a proper response. The men of Europe did not wait and see whether everyone disapproved of the action, they called it wrong. Everyone knew it was wrong, they knew it without complex moral calculus (of which the bulk of men know nothing), and proceeded to action. As you have said, it would seem the emotion of shame (and it's corallary, namely righteous indignation), has a real function even from your point of view. If God (or Nature or Selection or whomever) has seen it proper to outfit men with a moral alarm system, if you will, then it would seem to be necessary to admit it it's charge. And as much as you try to cover it over with semantics, that feeling of "disapproval" is just another you use for the same feeling that all other men call shame. You can no more turn off your moral compass then you could turn off your sex drive or your need for sleep.

As to whether Lewis estimates were wrong, I just have to disagree. Certainly men have not yet everywhere attained absolute morality, I have never said that. I said that they were all headed in the same direction, and they would all call that direction "progress". Now why call it progress unless it was going somewhere, and unless that place they were going was better than the place they left? Yes men have different values everywhere in the world, but many of those values do derive from colloquial traditions, customs, local economies, the percentages of men in the population. But again, if you will look at different sorts of humans in similar circumstances you will probably find a similar response. And again, I believe that if once a man who has entered a society in which women are honored as equals, and if he be in that society long enough to find the beauty in that arrangement, should that man return to a society in which women are beaten he will not simply "revert" to local standards. There will be a battle in his mind as to which standard is, after all, "right". He will not simply "Do as the Romans do". He will struggle out in his mind which of the two ways are really right. If he simply submits to his locality, that same cryptic haunt of Shame will return to him. It will call him a coward and demand he stake a position. This same sense of shame does not merely shephard the local standard, it forces the individual to compare standards, to choose and to progress. If a Southern man grew up steeped in racism grew to leave his locality. If he came to other parts of the country and there became acquainted with Blacks and Jews and formed lasting friendships. If this man were returned to the land of his youth, he would not simply revert back to a Klansmen and not have to face his conscience. This is what I mean by standards evolving to a point, of them not being a matter of locality. When a man must choose between two moral locations, he chooses according to a standard of a real right and wrong, not on the basis of "what is convenient for me here". I think the ideas you fellows have of the conscience is one that cannot be kept unless it is formed far in recess of the company of actual human beings. People do move through different sorts of moralities everyday. The morality of the people I work with is different from that of the people I play basketball with who are different from the people I go to church with. Who would not call me a moral coward if I simply adjusted my moral standard, 3 times a day, just to "be like the Romans". Of the three standards, I try to decide the best and live my life that way. Most men in most times do not have the benefit of coming into contact with many standards, but I believe if most men could go through these different standards, they would come to remarkably similar conculsions. Thus, the fact that there are in other places different local customs does not dissuade me from my belief that men, when they see real moral right, they recognize it as such, and they do not simply revert according to their current locale.

To a certain extent, I find the question as to whether or not people of incommon values can negotiate to be a non-starter. Men do have common values. No serious person who has worked for the betterment of mankind has ever doubted that all men, as Kennedy said, want peace and prosperity for their children above all else. What we are arguing is more than a hypothetical, it is fiction. There has never been a meeting of men in which both sides did not have certain core values in common. So if you wish to believe that two men who do not share a single value can negotiate, I leave you to that belief. I am convinced, however, that no two such men have ever met, nor ever shall meet.

I also do not see the lack for the need for shame that you claim to see in this modern world. As I type, Tonya Harding and Paula Jones are engaged in a prime Time boxing match on Fox. We ought to be ashamed of that. As I type, the nation has a 50% divorce rate, and despite our enlightened modern world view tells us, divorce is bad for children. Children born out of wedlock have a higher likliehood to experience every social pathology on the books. I think adults should be ashamed of the way in which they treat their children as the little valued remains of them pursuing their "enlightened self interest". I think we should be ashamed that we put our progeny at risk by exalting our needs over theirs, and by engaging in behavior that threatens to bring them into a world unprepared to receive them. We should be ashamed of our foreign policiy, a policy that treats people as expendable based on where they were born. We should be ashamed of the effect our massive and indulgent economy has on third world nations. We should be ashamed that our parakeets have diapers and our dogs and cats eat better than 75% of the people on the planet. As I look at this country, I can think of little we need more than shame.

I have much respect for you folks, but I cannot help but believe that you are far too scientific for your own good. If you would take your head out of your books and your social norms and your talk of evolution, you will see that the world we live in is going to hell in a handbasket not because people are setting too many standards, but because we have not set enough. A man I have much respect for said that moral relativism is the natural outgrowth of laissez fare economics. I totally agree. In the same way that this unplanned, greed first economy will eventually wreck life as we know it on this planet, a totally random, self-centered morality in which every human being acts as his own walking standard will eventually cause society to come apart at the seems. If you will look around you you will see it has already begun. The problems of fatherlessness, divorce, crime, military armament, all of the things tugging at our society are not the result of our adherence to a standard, but a result of our tearing down standards. The problems dealing with the family in America (and it is a real problem) do not stem from an overbearing commitment to religion, but from a total indifference to it.

Vorkosigan

Well, Luv, that's a long rant. All I can say is, the things you identify as "problems" are happening in the most Christian country in the industrialized world. So....what you've really described, in your own terms, is the failure of your own belief system.

Michael

Malaclypse the Younger

Pompous Bastard

Your definition looks good.

It should be noted that moral subjectivism, by definition, does not claim that any action is objectively wrong; by corrollary, it does not claim that one must establish objective wrongness to object to an action. To criticize subjectivism on this point is ridiculous.

Subjectivism claims, for instance, if the the predominance of people in a society believed that rape was right, it would be expected that even the moral objectivists in that society would tend to find "reasons" why rape was "objectively" correct. And indeed this behavior is observed in practice.

Moral subjectivism is fundamentally descriptive, whereas moral objectivism is prescriptive. This seems uncomfortable to moral objectivists, but it should be noted that objections based on discomfort are fundamentally subjective.

Moral subjectivism essenctially rests on a "no evidence" argument for moral objectivism. While the lack of evidence for objective moral facts does not prove that they do not exist, it is still the case that we are moral actors now, and until such evidence appears we need a basis for analyzing our moral choices.


luvluv

I'm not sure I understand this question. Do you not understand the emotion of disapproval?

The subjectivist claims that there is no difference between these two positions.

The difference is one of degree. I don't disapprove of it sufficiently to employ any but the mildest coercion (such as glaring or a rebuke). The threat to my values (of interacting politely) is very mild.

<a href="http://www.dictionary.com/search?q=arbitrary" target="_blank">Arbitrary</a> and <a href="http://www.dictionary.com/search?q=cavalier" target="_blank">cavalier</a> are subjectively loaded words; you are essentially making a moral subjectivist argument against moral subjectivism, which is obviously self-contradictory.

The denotation of "arbitrary" simply means subjective, and is obviously true--moral subjectivism obviously entails subjectivism. However, arbitrary carries the connotation of randomness (the dictionary lists synonyms as "capricious" and "whimsical").

However not all subjective values are capricious or whimsical--many are serious and consistent. So the use of "arbitrary" is attempting to "smuggle in" a factually incorrect rebuttal.

The characterization as "cavalier" also deserves a closer analysis. The moral subjectivist does indeed claim that every individual necessarily imposes his values (or their fulfillment) on others. This is "arrogant" (and would be contradictory) only if that imposition was one-sided--to philosophically claim that it was meta-morally permitted for me to impose my values on others but to categorically deny meta-moral permission for others to impose their values on me. But this is not the case. The moral subjectivist observes that people go around imposing their morals on each other--recognizing this fact, she seeks to find ways to make this mutual imposition efficient.

Look at it the other way--suppose you didn't claim the right to impose your values on others, even in the least. What then prevents you from being exploited? To resist exploitation entails that you impose your value against being exploited on someone who values exploiting you.

Indeed moral objectivism is, to me, the more arrogant and non-reciprocal position. By declaring one's own values "objectively true" and another's "objectively false", one is indeed claiming the unilateral right to impose one's values on another, while denying him the right to impose his values. Such a position is sound if and only if it is actually true that such a value is objectively true; the burden of proof--which has not yet been met--is on the claimaint of objective truth. The mere desire for such a state of affairs is insufficient to establish objective truth.

Sure it would be. However the subjective desire for such a framework is insufficient to establish objectivity. It is not yet proven that such a framework actually exists. To arbitrarily establish and objectify such a framework based only on the desire for it is fundamentally a subjectivist stance and thus internally contradictory.

However, moral subjectivists explicitly do negotiate practical moral standards and explicitly objectify the results of that negotiation as laws and customs. This is very explicitly embodied in the concept of democracy. So the desire for a clear objectively defined set of moral standards is achievable.

Your statements are somewhat imprecise, so I am forced to interpret; please forgive me if I interpret incorrectly.

I assume you mean by this that the concept of moral subjectivism does not exist anywhere. I would beg to differ. I claim that democracy almost perfectly establishes moral subjectivism. Values are imposed arbitrarily, specified in a constitution which defines (and does not prove) deontic moral values, established by a legislative process which again defines (as the result of negotiation between competing values) (and does not prove) pragmatic moral values, implemented by an executive which tries to determine effective strategies for those values, and a judiciary, which ensures that the implementation of those values proceeds rationally.

It should be noted that the only time "proof" enters the system is in the determination that the actions of the executive are consistent with the values arbitrarily established by the constitution and legislature, and that the values established by the legislature are neither internally inconsistent nor inconsistent with constitutional values--it does not seek to prove values themselves, but instead relies on the values arbitrarily imposed by the constitution and the legislature.

People do not appear to be by nature rational and precise. If they were, philosophers would be indistinguishable from linguists. It is possible for all of humanity (or most of it) to be wrong about something. This is why the argument from popularity is a fallacy.

Used in a moral sense, the subjectivists assigns real meaning to the terms "right" and "wrong", as strong approval and strong disapproval respectively. She notes that the statement "I stronly disapprove of X because X is objectively wrong" is logically fallacious, because it assumes an objective fact ("X is objectively wrong") not in evidence. The remaining part, however, is a fact (albeit a subjective fact): "I strongly disapprove of X", and we can use that fact.

I'm not sure what you mean. If subjectivism is true, then we have no evidence of actual moral objectivism to compare subjectivism to. All moral conflicts are essentially subjective, regardless of the fallacious objectification of those morals.

It is certainly arguable that when the fallacy of moral objectivism has been abandoned, such as in a democracy, a superior result ensues.

I would argue that the inferior moral results (to my subjective evaluation, of course!) of the middle ages and of existing theocratic societies (especially Islamic societies) result directly from the fallacy of objectification of values.

Since these values are held to be objective, they are unilaterally imposed on a society without regard to the subjective benefits of that society. It is important to note that moral objectivism becomes relevant only when there is a substantive difference between the subjectivist position--by definition, the relevant imposition of moral objectivism entails that people will subjectively disapprove of the result; if they all subjectively approved, the objectification becomes little more than a post hoc comforting fantasy.

Asserting that "the men of Europe" acted is to presume that they came to an agreement. And everyone did not know oppression of women was wrong--to establish equality of women (which is still not complete to this day) required both a long (and continuing) process of negotiation and conflict.

It should be noted that shame is a subjective feeling (regardless of its origin, which is a matter for psychologists, anthropologists and possibly biologists). The subjectivist merely notes this feeling as factually existing and goes from there.

The subjectivist does not dispute the existence of the "moral compass" or its subjectively compelling nature; it is an obvious subjective fact. The subjectivist deals with this fact as a fact, and does not attempt to objectify this "moral compass" without evidence.

First of all, I'm not sure this is true, and what you "think" is not particularly relevant. If you want to claim this statement is objectively true, you would need to create objectively determinable and falsifiable definitions of things like "moral direction" and look carefully at all the evidence to see how it supports or falsifies your definitions.

Secondly, moral convergence is not evidence against subjectivism. We are all of us in possession of largely similar brains, with largely similar physical and psychological needs. Secondly with the advent of global communications, we are all in negotiation with each other, with a strong pragmatic incentive to negotiate agreements with regard to the relative importance of certain values.

So this point is both insufficiently supported, possibly false and even if true does not act as evidence to support objectivism over subjectivism.

Again, this is not a point against subjectivism: people's subjective values can change, especially when the pragmatic benefit is clear.

Note that a "battle in [one's] mind" is very explicitly subjectivist language.

Subjectivism is different than social relativism. Social relativism is an objectivist theory (and an incoherent one at that).

This statement assumes facts not in evidence, and argues against a straw man. It is true that a person does indeed choose (a subjectivist position), but there is no evidence that he chooses according to a "real" standard. And to say that subjectivism devolves to mere convenience is simply false. People possess other values than convenience.

Again, this is simply false. Social interaction is a prevalent value--indeed moral strategies evolve to satisfy this value, which has important personal and pragmatic benefits.

First, subjectivism does not entail that you must adopt the moral standards of the people around you. That position would entail that your subjective values were necessarily inferior to those of the people around you. Rather, you negotiate your behavior--on an equal basis--based on similar or competing moral values with whom you interact. And, indeed, if you are a socially graceful person, you will indeed adjust your behavior based on the moral values of different groups with whom you interact.

Again, you are arguing a straw man. Subjectivism does not entail that all values are necessarily non-common. It is a matter of fact that both common and competing values exist.

You are also invoking a "no true scotsman" fallacy: "No serious person who has worked for the betterment of mankind..." is an attempt to exclude the values you disagree with merely by arbitrarily labelling them (by implication) unserious and unconcerned with the betterment of mankind.

And it is also a fact that not all people want peace and prosperity for their children. Some people do not. We simply have to deal with that fact as a fact.

Again, you are arguing a straw man. It is not the claim of subjectivism that people do not share common values. Subjectivism merely claims that the commonality of a value does not establish its objectivity.

Subjectivism does, however, note that two people with strongly conflicting values will tend to conflict rather than negotiate. And this prediction is obviously confirmed by a simple observation of history.

The subjectivist does not deny the existence of shame, he merely notes that it is a subjective feeling.

Why? Again, you are objectifying your values on nothing more than your personal authority. This is as fallacious with respect to morals as it is with respect to taste in art.

This point dies a hideous death on several different bases.

First, you are contradicting yourself. If, as you assert earlier, that people do indeed make actual choices based on real moral values, then one must assume that, because of the prevalence of divorce, it is based on the fulfillment of a real moral value.

Secondly, you are wording the claim in a subjectivist manner. "Divorce fails to fulfill the optimization of a value: benefit to children."

Last, the claim is factually false. First, many divorces do not involve children. More importantly, the optimal benefit to children is to be in an environment with strong and persistent relationships between the adults caring for them. However, in actual particular instances, divorce is often better than the practically available alternative. To compare children of divorce to children of happy marriages is to compare apples to oranges, because the circumstances are substantively different without specific regard to divorce.

All in all this is a very sloppy point, that is false, fallacious, subjectivist and internally contradictory to your argument.

I cannot help but believe your reasoning is far too sloppy for your own good.

It should be noted that "scientific" is fundamentally different than "subjectivist". Science is the most successful strategy for determining objective truth. If you are, indeed, a moral objectivist, then your claim would be that we are not scientific enough.

It should be noted that not all of us agree that the world is going to hell in a handbasket, and we believe that things were considerably worse when your religion was able to enforce its fallaciously "objective" morality.

I could equally charge you to get your head out of your self-righteous cult mythology that "cavalierly" allows you to claim moral truth based on your own or your cult leaders' authority and use reason and logic to figure out what's actually going on, instead of how you wish it to be.

Again, this is pure speculation, unfounded in fact--indeed to claim that subjectivism is "random" is simply false-to-fact.

This is again entirely unfounded in fact, and represents your own personal opinion, steeped as it is in dogmatism, submission to ideological authority and cult superstistion.

Your internally contradictory logic, assertion of your beliefs as fact, and your assertion of facts not in evidence is itself evidence of the sloppiness and subjectivity of your argument.

[ March 14, 2002: Message edited by: Malaclypse the Younger ]</p>

Pomp

luvluv,

Pomp, I want to kind of wrap this up, because we are circling around the same sort of opinions.

That’s fine with me. I pretty much summarized my stance already. I still think you’re missing the point of subjectivist moral theories, but I can only repeat myself so many times before I have to conclude that either I’m doing a bad job explaining or you’re just not understanding. I’m going to run through your post, answer your questions, and point out the instances in which you demonstrate a misunderstanding of subjective morality. After that, it’s up to you whether or not you want to keep discussing this.

I do understand that you can disapprove of what you do not like as a subjectivist, but what is the exact make-up of this disapproval? What is the real difference between you saying that something is wrong and you saying you disapprove of it?

There is quite a large difference. When I say that I disapprove of X doing Y, I mean that X’s doing Y has a detrimental effect on something that I value. In general, when I say that X is wrong to do Y, I mean that X’s ends would be better served by doing something other than Y. I try to avoid using the terms “right” and “wrong” whenever possible, as they are loaded and prone to misunderstanding. Do you understand the difference between how I use approve/disapprove and right/wrong?

Even if we were talking in an evolutionary since, wouldn't it be better for mankind to appeal to a general and clearly understood moral framework?

What does evolution have to do with anything? Who decides what that framework is?

I object to this idea on 2 grounds 1) It does not exist currently anywhere in the world. Most people do use the terms "right" and "wrong", at least in dealing with the deeds of other people. Many folks in the West have a tendency to be upset when these uncivillized words are used against them. Most of the world believes in a real right and a real wrong. They may disagree on some of the particulars, but they agree on absolutism.

As has been pointed out, “most people believe X, therefore X must be true” is not a valid argument. This is referred to as the argumentum" target="_blank">http://www.infidels.org/news/atheism/logic.html#numerum]argumentum</a> as numerum. Also, you continue to equivocate terms such as “real” and “absolute,” as Hobbs described earlier.

2) Subjective morality inevitably leads to inferior results.

Inferior as measured by what objective standard? Why should I (or you, or anyone) be concerned with that standard? Incidentally, this statement, if it does represent your real beliefs about morality, pegs you as a moral consequentialist, or one who believes actions to be right or wrong according to their consequence. Welcome to the club.

The subjectivist framework for interpreting and responding to a moral dilema is such a long and drawn out,

Not particularly. The justification may be a bit more complex than “it’s just right,” but as a practical matter subjectivists don’t stop and do complex ethical calculus before each and every decision. Like objectivists, we generally rely on a number of general principles (which we derive form our moral theories) to determine our everyday behavior and only resort to deep consideration and discussion for controversial or unclear issues.

and as I stated before, arbitrary process that it frustrates the coalescence of a proper response.

Proper according to what objective standard? Why should I be concerned with that standard? I apologize for repeating this question, but it seems that you are still failing to address subjectivist morality on its own terms. Your objection, in this case, seems to be that subjectivist morality is inferior because it leads to responses that are not proper under your own conception of morality, which you believe to be objective.

The men of Europe did not wait and see whether everyone disapproved of the action, they called it wrong.

Bunch of judgmental pricks, weren’t they?

Seriously, no subjectivist that I know of suggests that we wait and see if everyone disapproves of an action before deciding whether or not to disapprove f it ourselves. Further, as I explained above, there is no such direct connection between approval/disapproval and right/wrong under subjectivist morality. I will not call your actions “wrong” if I disapprove of them. I will simply express my disapproval and seek some way (negotiation, failing that, coercive force) in which to change your actions.

Everyone knew it was wrong,

Yes, as noted, they “knew” that things like women’s rights, homosexuality, and so on, were wrong.

And as much as you try to cover it over with semantics, that feeling of "disapproval" is just another you use for the same feeling that all other men call shame.

No, no it is not. You’re equivocating two different terms again. I feel no shame when you do something with which I disagree. I disapprove of your actions but I am not, in any sense, shamed by them. I can only be shamed by actions for which I am responsible; my own actions. In general, I do not disapprove of my own actions, except in the sense that I sometimes realize that I made a poor choice that turned out to be detrimental rather than beneficial to me.

As to whether Lewis estimates were wrong, I just have to disagree.

We will have to disagree then. It has been demonstrated to my satisfaction, although not to yours, that there are significant differences opinion across time and space as to what constitutes moral behavior.

Who would not call me a moral coward if I simply adjusted my moral standard, 3 times a day, just to "be like the Romans".

I wouldn’t. I might call you a bit confused, though. No subjectivist adjusts his or her moral standard based on company. I remain a contractarian if I’m at home, work, or wherever. We do, however, alter our actions to meet negotiated norms in different circumstances.

To a certain extent, I find the question as to whether or not people of in common values can negotiate to be a non-starter.

You brought it up. I was answering your objections. My point was that we can certainly negotiate the satisfaction of non-mutual values. The fact that Hitler values Aryan purity and I do not does not prevent us from reaching an agreement. As an aside, the fact that Hitler is a paranoid megalomaniac prevents us from negotiating. Also, that he’s dead.

I also do not see the lack for the need for shame that you claim to see in this modern world. As I type, Tonya Harding and Paula Jones are engaged in a prime Time boxing match on Fox. We ought to be ashamed of that.

Why? What on earth is so shameful about two women getting paid to box each other on television? Further, even if it is shameful. why should you or I be ashamed of it?

As I type, the nation has a 50% divorce rate, and despite our enlightened modern world view tells us, divorce is bad for children.

In general, yes. On the other hand, I’ve had friends who grew up in homes where the parents really should have been divorced. They were much worse off than those of us who were raised by single parents. A simple moral prohibition on divorce fails to distinguish between the two cases.

Children born out of wedlock have a higher likliehood to experience every social pathology on the books.

Nitpick: That’s a pretty broad assertion to make.

I have much respect for you folks, but I cannot help but believe that you are far too scientific for your own good.

In other words, we think too much. We ought to shut up, get in line, and submit to authority. We take pride in our ability to reason around here, because we realize that it frees us from arbitrary authority.

If you would take your head out of your books and your social norms and your talk of evolution, you will see that the world we live in is going to hell in a handbasket…

I disagree vehemently. The world is, in general and on balance, a better place today than it was 10, 20, 50, 100, or 1000 years ago. People live longer, healthier lives. They are freer to pursue their dreams and ambitions than they ever have been before. Terrible things can and do happen, but authoritarian religious morality did little to stop such horrors in the past and it out a severe damper on the positive things I mentioned.

The problems dealing with the family in America (and it is a real problem) do not stem from an overbearing commitment to religion, but from a total indifference to it.

Actually, it’s fairly well known that there is a higher incidence of both abuse and divorce in religious families than in non-religious families.

Thanks for the discussion. Feel free to continue it, or not. If I’ve been unclear about anything, please let me know.

Sojourner553

Allow me to jump in late...

Although many cultures SHARE some general rules of morality (such as NOT harming others, and respecting the property rights of others)--after one drills down further into the DETAILS, major DIFFERENCES frequently appear.

[and these differences are not just in the 'EXCEPTIONS':]

One dramatic example demonstrating the DIFFERENCES that exist between morality systems among distant cultures, was recorded by the Scottish officer Macpherson in 1905. He wrote how he could NOT persuade the Khonds of India
to discontinue their traditions of infanticide and human sacrifice--because they did not "FEEL" these to be morally wrong. Realizing that he could not persuade them on moral grounds to stop this practice, Macpherson instead determined to use reason on them. He asked them what evidence they had that sacrificing a human did indeed bring about a good harvest? He then proceeded
to demonstrate how this evidence was inadequate.

There are many other examples that could be given to further demonstrate
the absence of a universal system of morality. Take for example where early
Christian sects disagreed with each other whether various activities-- ranging
from dancing, drinking alcohol, and gambling--were "sinful". One can read
letters from the seventeenth and eighteenth century, where the author "feels"
intense moral outrage at what is often today considered mild and harmless--
such as seeing fellow Christians celebrating the "pagan" holidays of Christmas
and Easter. Again, one may look back at previous centuries, when there were
numerous wars waged by one religious group against another one--with each side
feeling PASSIONATELY that they were obeying the "Will" of "their" God.

This would seem to indicate that (at least to some extent), that it is our
CHILDHOOD UPBRINGING that instills in us what we grow up to believe to be
morally right or wrong. That is, our morality system is largely based on
the culture in which we are brought up in. Thus, before the Civil War, many
religious individuals did NOT "feel" slavery to be morally wrong! Nor was
child labor considered a social evil. There were harsh criminal penalties--
even death--proscribed for such petty crimes as stealing sheep or cattle.
Yet today, these past practices are largely perceived as inhumane and wrong.


What about sociopaths -- ie individuals that psychologists have shown have no innate feeling of right or wrong.

If morality is a value people are BORN with, why is it missing in a minority segment of the population???

"Psychologists and other researchers have documented cases
of individuals who apparently, possess NO moral sense or "feeling" of right
or wrong (eg sociopaths). Some individuals appear to have been BORN this way.
Others apparently have "lost" this sense of morality--after growing up in a
violent or otherwise non-loving home environment.

While under the influence of mind-altering drugs and alcohol, one's sense
of morality can be turned off. This has led some scientists to theorize that
there is some NATURAL internal mechanism within the human body, that has broken
down--as opposed to there being some external, SUPERNATURAL law-- that every
human can tap into for spiritual (moral) direction. There are case studies
where brain tumors and other disabilities have seriously impacted one's sense
of morality. "

<a href="http://mac-2001.com/philo/crit/ETHICS3.TXT" target="_blank">http://mac-2001.com/philo/crit/ETHICS3.TXT</a>

[quote]
A corallary to Lewis point, was that those people who had left societies with bad morals usually can be made to see that their societies had bad morals once they come to a society with better ones. If there was no such thing as a "real" right, society could not morally advance. [quote]

But I can show you individuals who went from relatively "good" societies to bad ones. Jane Fonda embraced the North Vietmanese during the Viet Nam War. John Walker denounced the US recently to become Muslim.

It seems to me LuvLuv you (actually CS Lewis, because you are just being a conduit here) are counting only the evidence that might prove your premise, why conveniently ignoring those points which disprove it.

So how do you reconcile this with the commandment "Thou shalt not kill". Wasn't this supposed to be absolute?????? It this absolute value supposed to be based on a "popularity poll"?

The universal value that people have is based on the principle of humanism -- that a person should be treated with the same dignity that they themselves want to be treated.

Most of the major religions have started with this humanistic principle -- only to add EXCEPTIONS to it. Usually the most important exception is to insist that following "God's Will" is more important than the dignity or worth of other human beings. This is why one sees the terrorists blowing up the WTC.


Do you pay attention to politics?? GW Bush is believed not to be a man of honor by Europeans nor Arabs. But they deal with him because of his POWER as commander of the US forces.

If moral principles are UNIVERSAL, then they should apply to all times, not just our current time. I think most people know that ancient Egyptian dynasties allowed kings to marry their sisters and have children. During the Victorian period in Europe, first cousins could be married within the royal families. And because of this hemophilia -- a recessive disease -- was common among European families of this time.

I like how you keep adding exceptions.

One reason for the universal disdain, probably has as much to do with scientific discoveries that intermarriage among relatives increases the risk of genetic diseases in the offspring.


He picked and chose in a way to prove his premise, without looking at the points that disproved his premise. I can "prove" fairies exist using this approach.


Sojourner

[ August 25, 2002: Message edited by: Sojourner553 ]</p>

Scorpion

Hi,

just wandered into this thread... first, a remark:

Please, use "intersubjective" instead of "objective" if you don't want to make a stronger case than that - saves you (and others) a lot of time discussing semantics.

I won't address the actual issues as others have made more than thorough job explaining subjective morality, but there is one thing that has caught my eye in several threads with the same topic.
In short, it is this:


Something like this seems to pop up often, i.e. the claim that we need objective morality. I will not touch the meaning of "inferior results" nor even the irrelevancy of this point (if one discusses the nature of the existence of morality, it's totally irrelevant if we need objective morality, or if subjective morality spoils the kids etc.) What I'm interested about is this:
What difference does it make if morality is objective or not? Why people defending objective morality think that it would make things better (I suppose this applies mostly to Xian objectivists)?

-S-

RogerLeeCooke

I'm getting into this debate rather late and haven't had time to read the whole thread, but since Lewis is one of my favorite writers, I'll sound off anyway. Apologies to anyone who thinks I'm copying what you already wrote. These are my own thoughts.

In giving his idea of "natural law" here, Lewis is sailing very close to the wind, and risks upsetting his entire world-view. But he seemed to be walled off from seeing the potential contradiction with his other writing. Let me explain...

In "Mere Christianity" he argued that there is a natural moral law that is universally recognized, and is the same across cultures, except for a minor differences of emphasis. He claimed that this law was imprinted on human beings by their creator, so that everybody "really" knew it. Oh, of course, he recognized that a few sociopaths appear not to know it, just as a few people are color-blind, but he thought all normal healthy people knew it. What he managed to keep himself from seeing was that the same situation is better described by saying that normal people get socialized by their relatives and neighbors at a very early age. What he took to be an endogenous aspect of personality is actually exogenous: our moral principles and beliefs have *causes.* The apparent consistency across cultures (a theme he developed at greater length in "The Abolition of Man") is merely a certain commonality: It is inconvenient for other people, here and everywhere, if someone steals, rapes, or murders. Therefore stealing, rape, and murder are universally condemned. We all internalize society's expectations, and the result is the complex of emotions we call our conscience. Most reflective people, of course, add a rational element, considering the ramifications of various possible courses of action and deciding which one best fits the kind of world they want to live in. But that point is the ground floor for ethical reflection: Does an action promote the kind of society you want? Then you will call it good. if not, you'll call it bad. Underneath the ground floor, in the basement, is the whole set of likes and dislikes you have in regard to human behavior, the result of one's early training and emotional bent. Like Kant, Lewis assumed that his conscience reflected some moral aspect of the universe. In "The Abolition of Man" he went even further and argued that artistic and poetic taste are part of what he there called the Tao.

As Lewis wrote elsewhere (I've forgotten where, perhaps even later in "Mere Christianity"), we soon cease to listen to a person's opinions---that is, we don't look for rational grounds for them---as soon as we know that the person's beliefs have causes. Had he realized that the natural law he believed in had causes---and he almost did, when he admitted that we learn the natural law from others---he'd have been in a quandary. Fortunately, he avoided facing that fact by taking recourse to an analogy (his favorite mode of argument), saying that we also learn the multiplication table from others, but that doesn't mean the multiplication table is subjective. True, the fact that something is learned from others is not proof that it is subjective. But the proof that it is *not* subjective remains to be given, and all Lewis' attempts to do that ended in failure.

To take just one of his attempts as an example, he rebutted the claim that the natural law is merely our "herd instinct" by pointing out that one could consider whether or not to follow the herd instinct when considering a course of action. Of course one could, but that still amounts to judging the action against the kind of society one would like to live in, and the society one would like to live in is very much the result of early training.

I could elaborate further, but this post is already rather long.

Sojourner553

Yes (like Kant) CS Lewis' natural law can be disproven -- meaning there are no moral absolutes except those defined by philosophical systems.

I believe there is one set of moral absolutes: That of treating others how I would like to be treated. This, in essense is the philosophy of humanism. Most religions are humanistic -- with one exception. When God gives a commandment -- how we treat our fellow humans is given a LOWER priority!!

That is why fundamentalists can justify (from their moral system) killing gays, torturing heretics, flying airplanes into crowded buildings, etc!!! You see, "God wills it."

Sojourner

[ September 08, 2002: Message edited by: Sojourner553 ]</p>

RogerLeeCooke

The difference is in the content of the action, but it can be a difference in degree, not kind. I like chocolate and loathe eggplant, I like Mozart and loathe Burt Bacharach, and I like freedom of speech and loathe slavery. The underlying approval or disapproval is a common element, but only the last of these falls into the class of ethical statements.

But the boundary is thin in some places. I also dislike bullies and people who put other people down. It would be absurd to try to get legal sanctions against such people, but I would try to encourage social disapproval. There is a whole descending scale of such things that I disapprove of, from not observing the finer points of etiquette (of essentially no importance to me) to rudeness (somwhat important) to abusiveness (very important) and finally to personal assault (a matter for the police).

As for subjectivism producing inferior results, I wouldn't say so at all. It depends on the situation. One advantage of subjectivism is that it brings the knowledge that the people I disagree with are simply opponents, not agents of Satan. Looking at the current "reverse crusade" engaged in by the militant Muslims and the original "forward crusade" undertaken a thousand years ago by militant Christians, I'd say subjectivism would have brought about a vast improvement in their behavior.

But that's just to say, it might have made them behave in a way I'd approve of.