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#11 | |||
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Hi Transworldly Depraved,
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Anyway, enough said! This thread is a good one, and I hope to see some good discussions come out of it by the time I get back from my holiday. Just for some insight, I'm just starting to think that perhaps presuppositionalism is unavoidable if someone holds that God is the most fundamental aspect of reality and the ultimate reference point rather than simply a powerful being. Because, if God is this "ultimate reality", everything is dependent upon his existence, including logic. Without God, there would be no logic, and therefore without implicitly "borrowing" from God, one cannot use logic. Note: I'm not arguing that this is the case, I'm just thinking that if this view of God is correct, maybe presuppositionalism is implied. I'm not sure, I'm just letting my thoughts flow without really taking them in or assessing their validity, so feel free to criticize! Quote:
Regards, - Scrutinizer [ January 02, 2002: Message edited by: Scrutinizer ]</p> |
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#12 | |||||||
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CodeMason:
Thanks for your response. You said: Quote:
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By claiming that God is at the ground floor of reality, I meant simply that given a hierarchy of causes in the world the theist must believe that a personal being is at the bottom in terms of causal dependence. Maybe the word "ground" and the appearance that I was denying that a god exists lead you to believe I was agreeing with Tillich. You asked the rhetorical question: Quote:
You also asked: Quote:
Then you asked: Quote:
Further, it is not clear to me that Occam's razor applies to anything other than scientific theories. Why believe it can be applied to metaphysical systems? If such a principle should be used to choose between metaphysical schemes then it seems that there are absurd metaphysical schemes that are better supported than naturalism. If applying Occam's razor leads to absurd results that is evidence it does not apply to this area. The reasoning would be that theism includes everything that naturalism includes except that theism adds one more being. The claim would continue by arguing that we do not have to add God to account for anything. But notice that naturalism includes everything that solipsism includes except that naturalism adds billions of fundamental particles and fields of force. So we have - personal observations, the physical world, and God. The theist includes all three, the naturalist includes the first two, and the solipsist includes only the first. For a solipsist only he exists and his "observations" are nothing more than visual, auditory, etc. sensations that are simply brute facts not in need of explanation. So if Occam's razor it to be the determining factor then you should be a solipsist. Next, you asked: Quote:
Lastly, you claimed: Quote:
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#13 | ||
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Tercel:
Thank you for your reply. You said: Quote:
(1) In terms of our experience, all created entities of the kinds that we have so far examined are created from preexisting material. (2) The universe is a created entity.[Supposition] (2a) If the universe is a created entity, it is of the same kind as some of the created entities we have so far examined. [Probably] (3) The universe was created from preexisting material. (4) If the Christian God exists, then the universe was not created from preexisting material. (5) Therefore, the Christian God does not exist. The kind of causal dependence the theist seems to require does not seem to be the kind we actually observe when we create things. And if Martin's inductive argument works then it seems to suggest that it is unlikely that an ultimate personal being exists. The reason is that we are not aware of ourselves as sustaining things in existence but rather observe ourselves manipulating what is already there. So the only uncontroversial examples of personal beings of which we observe their causal activity do not actually cause higher level properties. So we should conclude that any personal being we believe exists also merely manipulates what is already there. And you asked: Quote:
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#14 | |
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Of course, we can load solipsism with enough ad hoc epicycles to grant it the same predictive success as naturalism. But then it is unclear that, when brought in to decide between the competing theories, Occam's Razor would favor solipsism after all. |
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#15 | |
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Dr. Retard:
Thank you for your response to my thread. You said: Quote:
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#16 | |
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Dr. Retard,
Good doctor, I hope you don't mind me commenting here. TD, Quote:
But you're asking about the fundamental basis of which the worldview is constructed from, which has to exist in order to create that worldview. Note that anybody can ask an infinite series of "why/how did this come to be?" - the solipsist position and the theist position also face the same troubles. And just as a theist would claim that asking where God came from is meaningless, and how a solipsist believes that the origin of himself is meaningless, the origin of naturalism is also by analogy pointless and answerless. |
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#17 | |
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(1) "What justification can be given for the claim that naturalism implies that the world exhibits causal regularity?" The answer: Just an examination of what naturalism claims. And, the way I understood it, naturalism is the thesis that the world is governed by natural laws and that nothing exists beyond the purview of these laws. The questioned implication is then straightforward. (2) "What justification can be given for the claim that the world exhibits causal regularity?" This is a much harder question. Presumably the answer will appeal to our observations -- the thesis of causal regularity seems to explain our observations better than does the contrary. But really, the first interpretation is the only one directly relevant to my original point. In order to decide between two competing hypotheses on the basis of Occam's Razor, it must first be true that both hypotheses are otherwise equally good. Now we take it as a given that our observations, or perceptions, exhibit regularity. The question is: which hypothesis better explains this perceptual regularity, is it naturalism or solipsism? My claim is that, prima facie, naturalism does better. This is because naturalism implies causal regularity, and causal regularity renders likely perceptual regularity, given perceptual reliability. In contrast, solipsism implies nothing that would lead one to expect perceptual regularity -- the phenomenon is a complete surprise. So, on this score, naturalism is superior. So, unless there is some score on which solipsism wins, naturalism is a better hypothesis in general. And that would mean that Occam's Razor cannot decide between the two, as they are not equally good hypotheses. Your second question seems irrelevant to me. But in any case, I would suppose that it shall either remain a mystery or be seen as a bad question. We cannot say that a further natural law causes causal regularity, because then that further natural law would be part of the causal regularity that needs explaining -- a vicious circle. It is bizarre to say that a personal agent causes the causal regularity, for every personal agent with which we are acquainted is causally dependent upon natural laws for its behavior -- this, too, would be a vicious circle -- and the concept of a supernatural personal agent raises further embarrassing questions about how agency could arise completely independently of a causal order, much less a brain-like physical state for the realization of consciousness. So perhaps there is no explanation for the causal regularity. This might be made more palatable by noting that all explanations with which we are familiar presuppose causal regularity. Perhaps explanation cannot be given without invoking causal regularity and consequently the question "What explains causal regularity?" is nonsense akin to "What is the last natural number?" |
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#18 | ||||
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Transworldly Depraved,
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#19 | ||
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<a href="http://ii-f.ws/ubb/ultimatebb.php?ubb=get_topic&f=4&t=002293&p=3" target="_blank">here</a> Quote:
At any rate the above paragraph is just some ideas that I have been tossing around and have not fully developed yet. Regardless, I think you are right on the mark in your basic characterization of classical western theism and the theism of Christian orthodoxy. I think atheistic arguments that appeal to such things as Occam’s razor to argue against the existence of God or equate the concept of God with concepts such as the Invisible Pink Unicorn miss the mark terribly in this regard. God Bless, Kenny [ January 03, 2002: Message edited by: Kenny ]</p> |
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#20 | ||
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Datheron:
You asked: Quote:
Then you said: Quote:
What is it about sensations that demands an explanation that the physical world lacks? |
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