dk

dk: I apologize for misrepresenting your statement. I was perplexed by “answers fall roughly into the categories of moral realism (e.g., Platonism, divine command theory), moral relativism, emotive and imperative theories, and moral nihilism. ” There exists no ‘divine command theory’, that I can find, seems the divine command theory is a criticism mentioned by Ockham, Locke, Berkley,,, etc. to supplant priori principles and metaphysics with inductive methods.
I resist narrow Metaethical views for three reasons.
1) Nobody has sufficient authority to impose standard terms, syntax & semantics and signs upon moral language. For example Hume defines as the natural virtues charity, generosity, meekness and benevolence, but what Kant, Hegel, Marx, Williams or Sartre mean by natural virtues is something else. The Holy Grail is a language of the mind, but short of a mind reading machine the exercise becomes deconstructive.
2) How judgments or criterion are interpreted to be -subjective or objective, -subject or predicate, -priori or posteriori, -sensual or intellectual is a reaction to more general theories of psychology, anthropology, origin theories, psycho-neurology, computers science, logic, consciousness, agency, action, causality, genetics, intentionality, emotiveness etc... I read somewhere there are over two hundred definitions for logic alone, some definitions being very open and far reaching, others very closed and narrow. Even more acute is the total absence of an empirical form or definition of consciousness, self-consciousness, sub consciousness, awareness, intelligence etc...
3) Aesthetics, art, eloquence and beauty defy empirical analysis. For example from a utilitarian perspective many lower life forms benefit from a polluted river, and pound per pound, cell for cell overwhelm the proportions present in a pristine diverse ecosystem. Who are we humans to deprive sewage dwellers of such great happiness, for the benefit of few deer, birds and trout.
dk: - In a philosophical context idealism is a metaphysical explanation of reality like empiricalism and rationalism. I used idealism in a philosophical context. I’ll offer two definitions from two reliable sources, but don’t expect them to mean the same thing.
1: Idealism : Platonism is the oldest form of idealism, and Plato himself the progenitor of idealists. It is usual to place in contrast Plato's idealism and Aristotle's realism; the latter in fact denies that ideas are originals and that things are mere copies; he holds that the essence is intelligible, but that it is immanent in the things of nature, whereas it is put into the products of art. It is more correct, therefore, to call his teaching an immanent idealism as contrasted with the transcendental idealism of Plato.
----- <a href="http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07634a.htm" target="_blank">Catholic Encyclopedia</a>
2: idealism, philosophical
Philosophical idealism is not the same as idealism considered as an attitude to be observed in life; it is not the pursuit of an ideal. It is, rather, a metaphysical theory about the nature of reality, and thus presupposes a distinction between appearance and reality, drawn in an other than common-sense way. It maintains in general that what is real is in some way confined to or at least related to the contents of our own minds. Plato's theory of Forms is sometimes said to be a species of idealism on the grounds that his Forms are also called Ideas. But those so-called Ideas were not merely contents of our minds; indeed Plato explicitly rejects that supposition in his Parmenides. It has been argued by Myles Burnyeat that idealism proper could not appear before Descartes had argued for the epistemological priority of access to our own minds. Although this has been disputed, there is much to be said for the thesis. At all events, whether or not there are to be found any indications of belief in philosophical idealism before Descartes's time, it certainly needed his argument to provide it with any basis. Yet Descartes was not himself an idealist.
----- <a href="http://”http://www.xrefer.com/entry.jsp?xrefid=552363&secid=.-“" target="_blank"> The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, © Oxford University Press 1995 </a>
The context is essential to what “X should do Y” means because in modern philosophy the meaning of a proposition or sentence follows from the consequence of being {T, F}, not validity or soundness. For example in a practical logic, two competing assertions are evaluated to maximize some factor(variable) independent of soundness or validity of the proposition. The best solution assumes meaning, absent soundness, from an inductive description of the distribution.

Clearly Plato was an Idealist, that asked, “In an ideal world what “X should do Y”. I will grant you the semantics are confusing, but that was the point. As a priori, communication succeeds when people can understand what is said, and verbal gymnastics has in many respects turned philosophy into a Tower of Babel.
dk: It seems to me, you’re interested in a specific form of metaethics that is a conundrum of intellectual diarrhea.
For example: The principle of insufficient reason (Keynes) states that equal probabilities must be assigned to each of competing assertions if there is no positive reason for assigning them different probabilities. Therefore, When the treatment of priori, absent positive reason, is equal, the possibility of learning by experience is excluded (irrational). This doesn’t bode well for priori of consciousness, string theory, Strong AI etc.. or for that matter Ockham’s Razor.

[ August 07, 2002: Message edited by: dk ]</p>

Marz Blak

Originally posted by 0n0w1c:
0n0w1c: objective reality exists
MarzBlak: OK…

0n0w1c: earth is a part of reality
MarzBlak: OK…but an infinitesimal, cosmically insignificant part AFAWK

0n0w1c: life exists on earth
MarzBlak: OK…so? In reading your argument top to bottom and back again, as it were, I can only assume that you are making some implicit statement about the objective value of life; that is the only way I can begin to make sense out of your argument as a whole. If this is indeed the case, then I would say that this assertion is not supported in your argument, and so your argument fails right here.

0n0w1c: survival is innate with life's existance [sic]
MarzBlak: Hold on here! Non sequitur! What does the survival of life have to do with the existence of the earth? The only way I can make sense of this, again, is to assume that you are making an implicit assertion that Earth WITH life is in some objective sense superior to earth WITHOUT life. I see no support for such an assertion; in fact, I am not sure it is truly intelligible. Your argument fails right here, again….

0n0w1c: societal life exists
MarzBlak: Same as above. There seems to be an implicit assertion here that societal life is in some objective way _superior_ to non-societal life. Presumably, if societal life (humans, birds, zebras) didn’t exist, there’d still be non-societal life (sponges, bacteria, slime molds). Your argument again fails…and continues to fail at every step going forward in similar manners….

In fact, being new to this forum and unschooled in formal logic and philosophy, I'd appreciate the assessment of someone else with more training of 0n0w1c's argument. I'd be interested in the opinion of someone with more grounding as to whether it's as frankly unsound, unintelligible, even, as it seems to me, or if I am just missing something....

[ August 14, 2002: Message edited by: Marz Blak ]

[ August 14, 2002: Message edited by: Marz Blak ]</p>

99Percent

Marz Blak - did you respond to the correct thread? Your response does not seem to belong here.

[ August 14, 2002: Message edited by: 99Percent ]</p>

Marz Blak

This was the post to which I replied....

Agnos1

I've been reading your posts regarding subjective and objective morality. Very interesting and compelling thoughts from both sides.

Obviously, morality and ethics exist solely within the mind. But the mind (brain) is objectively real and consequently is subject to the same environmental selection that any other objectively physical attribute might undergo over time.

An amoralist will say that an objectivist is as incorrect as a religionist when claiming moral "truths," that they are as mystical as "God." Yet an objectist can say as easily that the amoralist is considering Behavior to be a mystical entity, when in fact it's firmly imbedded in physical reality, and subject to scientific inquiry and understanding (behavioral psychology as an example).

IMO and from discource with an amoralist and an objectivist we are all hardwired from birth with emotions and desires with which to interact with our surroundings and these sensory guides are universal in the sense that although one can say they are "subjective" they are also "inter-subjective" and therefore have this objective appeal. These traits have evolved like everything else. True, they are dynamic and as human beings change and the environment changes certain ethics may change as well. Think about this: Are scientific principles less real than religious doctrine because science is dynamic and religion is static?

To reduce everything to the point where we claim there is no intrinsic good or bad might be the same as saying 1+1 does not necessarily equal 2 and thus we are engaging in irrational argument, which is something I expect most Atheists are unwilling to do.

99Percent

Thanks for reviving the thread, hehe

I kinda have guilty feelings for not responding to my adversaries in it. But now that you resurfaced it I think I should reconsider responding to them now.

Oh well, maybe tomorrow...

The AntiChris

Agnos1

Interesting. I may be misinterpreting what you're saying but you appear to be equating subjectivism to amoralism. Do you see them as one and the same?

Chris

bd-from-kg

Agnos1:

Welcome to II.

Since you’re new here, I come to your post with no knowledge of your general philosophical outlook. My main reaction is puzzlement: I’m not at all sure that I understand where you’re coming from, and hence what you’re trying to say.

You need to be a little clearer about what you mean by this. In a sense mathematics (for example) also exists solely within the mind, but that doesn’t mean that “1 + 1 = 2” is only true in a subjective sense. My headache exists only in my mind, and so is subjective in one sense, yet it is objective in the sense that I really do have it regardless of what anyone may think, and I can’t get rid of it merely by managing somehow to believe that it isn’t there. Finally, my preference for oranges over watermelons is what most people would call purely subjective. Where do morality and ethics fit in?

Yes, strictly speaking, moral statements aren’t true or false. Trying to make sense of them as propositions in the ordinary way tends to lead to ideas like the existence of a mysterious (mystical?) intrinsic property of “ought-to-be-doneness”. But then, Occam’s Razor isn’t true or false either, nor is the statement that one should believe only what makes sense, or believe only on the basis of evidence sufficient to justify rational belief. But, like these, I think that there are valid principles of action that commend themselves to any rational being, and others that commend themselves to any rational human being, and that some of these are recognizable as moral principles.

However, it doesn’t seem to be abusing language too badly to refer to a valid moral principles as “true,” so long as we keep in mind that this is a fundamentally different sense of “true” from the senses in which “1 + 1 = 2” and “I have two hands” are true.

Here you’ve lost me. What is an “amoralist”? Are you referring to moral subjectivists or to ethical noncognitivists, or both? In what sense does an “amoralist” consider “Behavior” to be an entity, much less a “mystical entity”?

Again I don’t follow you. First, you start by talking about being “hardwired” with “emotions and desires” and then unaccountably segue into “ethics” that may “change”.
How did you get from A to B?

Second, if whatever it is that underlies our ethical concepts is “hardwired,” the rate of change isn’t fast enough to be of much practical interest. Evolutionary change occurs on an extremely slow time scale compared to ordinary human life. No changes in “human nature” (i.e., our genetic heritage) are apparent in the entire course of human history. Even religious doctrine is extremely dynamic compared to this.

It seems to me that you need to explain what you mean by “intrinsic good and bad” before one can really make anything of this statement. I suspect that I understand pretty well what you mean by “1 + 1 = 2,” but I’m not clear about what you mean by saying that something is “intrinsically good”. It’s not even clear whether you’re referring to states of affairs or actions.

Agnos1

Antichris, I believe subjectivism is part of amoralism but not necessarily the reverse, but I've only recently begun understanding amoralism.

Although I can be persuaded by compelling evidence, I'm at present what many call a consequentialist, in that this is my focus when arriving at moral principles.

bd, I wish to respond to your post. I realize I threw a bunch of stuff out there at once, and it may not hang together. I'm always in a hurry, you see, so I rush my thoughts onto the internet like seeds thrown into the wind.

You said you were puzzled and then actually said something which stated my thoughts more clearly:

If I used this argument against the amoralist I've been going back-and-forth with lately I might have gotten my point across better. Let me see if I understand you: physical laws exist independently of the human mind which then discovers these laws and interprets them in mathematical terms, would you agree with this?

Where does morality and ethics fit in? The question of the century. I'm trying to justify (in my mind as well as others) the idea that morality is much like your 1+1=2 analogy, and have used some examples to bolster this view. Comparisons in the animal world, for instance, show that morals and ethics are even more universal than previously considered, since many species have been experimentally shown to display morality.

If certain moral principles can be said to "exist" universally across species, then I say they're as good as "objective," and can be relied upon (evolutionarily for at least a million years as you observed) as long as social beings are in existence.

My confrontations with the aforementioned amoralist seems to revolve around his contention that because ethical systems are not "real" as in "gravity is real," independent of human thought, that it is incorrect to use them as a reference or REASON for such emotions as "guilt," or "regret." That a person should not "judge" a person's behavior as immoral, to label a person based on a subjective principle such as morality.

So maybe I'm looking to this board for some extra thoughts. What "good" or benefit comes from changing one's understanding of morality and to say it's subjective? Do we suffer from the same delusion as religionists when defining morality as Objective, knowing it's NOT exactly like gravity?

This next statement of yours clarifies my thinking even more:

Can we therefore not come up with some basic and objectively sound moral principles, such as rational behavior as well as thinking is "better" than irrational? Turning morality on its head by saying these are purely subjective principles embraces irrationality. And since irrationality is totally unproductive, is calling it subjective really an option? (like deciding 1+1=4) Social beings need a fundamental framework, such as preservation of happiness and applying rational thought to survive.

You said I lost you with the following comment:

I meant that someone who considers the mental condition and behavior to be as vaporous as mystical beings and not real in a physical sense may be wrong; that consciousness exists within the physical world, not apart from it. This is an important distinction, I think, because it allows us to inquire/experiment with the concept of morality just like any other phenomenon in nature.

Regarding being hardwired, I meant that we are hardwired for certain emotions and reactions to environment which then extends later on to the level of morality. Morality itself may change (I agree with you that it's not fast, but possibly over millenia) but not the hardwiring.

Is there intrinsic good or bad? If we cannot say there are ultimate value judgements to depend on then we might as well say that reality doesn't exist. How about this--Life is a state of affairs. A happy life can be considered intrinsically good as a first premise. Actions that promote the most good or do not hamper good can themselves be called good.

It is through reductionism that these fundamentals are questioned and I say it's not appropriate to do so. The rational belief in objective moral principles is NOT the same as the irrational belief in the supernatural. The former inspires rational thought. IMO, subjective anarchy remains after abandoning the fundamental principles that religionists are all too happy to co-op and then attribute to their deity. Why give them ammo by saying that not only does God not exist, but morality doesn't either?

Hopefully this isn't too much of a barrage of thoughts, and there is some coherancy.

In summary, social animals MUST treat morality as objective for there to be any useful purpose in living.

[ September 09, 2002: Message edited by: Agnos1 ]

[ September 09, 2002: Message edited by: Agnos1 ]

[ September 09, 2002: Message edited by: Agnos1 ]</p>

Keith Russell

Greetings:

'Objectivity' doesn't exist independent of the mind.

The characteristics of things that exist independently of the mind are said to be 'intrinsic'.

'Objectivity' is when mental concepts correctly correspond to reality; objectivity requires both reality, and a mind to observe reality.

Objective moral principles are not 'intrinsic' to reality or nature. They are instead derived by the mind, from principles observed in reality, which the mind then evaluates using a process of reason.

Keith.