dk

Alonzo Fyfe, I agree. Subjectivism makes it impossible to distinguish between a reason and a rationalization. Murder and rape get rationalized all the time, by people into it.

Alonzo Fyfe

AntiChris: A different approach.

I shall use Agent-Subjectivism as an example of individual subjectivisms.

Agent subjectivism holds that right and wrong depend on the sentiments of the agent -- the person performing the action.

Now, within agent-subjectivism, one of the implications within the theory is that it would be possible to turn rape from a vicious action into a virtuous action merely by getting into the brain of the rapist and change the way it is wired. If you alter the rapist's attitude toward rape in such a way that he finds it valuable and no objection to it within his own heart, rape can become not only permissible, but even obligatory.

At this point -- and you can tell me if I am wrong -- you look at my argument and say, "When Alonzo reports that rape turns from a vice into a virtue he is telling me that I ought to approve of it. That I am, in fact, being inconsistent if I don't approve of it. But this absurd. I still disapprove, and I will continue to disapprove no matter what gets done to the brain of the rapist. When that idiot Alonzo says I must now approve of rape under these circumstances he just proves how pathetically poor his understanding of subjectivism is. Now, if I can just think of some way to get through his thick skull that I don't need to approve of rape just because somebody played with this guy's brain."

However, when I say that playing with the rapist's mind turns rape into a virtue I am not saying that you have to approve of it. We are speaking here within the context of agent-subjectivism. The only time that agent-subjectivism is identical to AntiChris-subjectivism is when AntiChris and the agent are the same person. But that is not among our assumptions.

It is quite understandable that you would take my claim that turning rape into a virtue means that you ought to improve of it, because in normal language "X is morally good" not only means "I like X," but it also means "You should like X too."

The latter part of this meaning is not captured within any type of individual-subjectivism. But we do expect it. We do hold that this is a part of the meaning whenever we hear the term. And this is one reason it is a mistake to hold that individual-subjectivism captures the use of moral terms in common speech.

While, on the other had, intrinsic value theory captures it quite well. Within intrinsic value theory, "I value X and you should too," follows because "X is morally good" means that "X contains an intrinsic value property that all properly functioning people should be able to perceive and respond to appropriately."

This is part of what I say that traditional moral language is objectivist (in the intrinsic-value sense).

DRFseven

What you're not getting, for some reason, is that WHEN wrongs are thought to be necessarily wrong they are thought to be wrong for a specific purpose. If I think it's wrong to discriminate against a group of people (and I do think so), my reasoning is that it has to do with the welfare of society; I don't just think it's inherently wrong. I understand that others may come to different conclusions, but I am going to push my agenda because I want them to agree with me. I want "my side" to win in a vote or an argument, because that is the way I want the world to be. Now, my actual motivation, when I see discrimination occuring, is gut reaction bequeathed to me by my fair-minded mother; "This is wrong!". but in my mind, it has practical, advantageous application.

Alonzo Fyfe

From what I read here, as I interpret it, I find nothing in it to object to. So, my question now becomes: what in this refutes or contradicts anything that I have written?

One "first guess" that I can draw out of your comments is that you have taken me to be saying somewhere that the motivation for doing the right thing must somehow be some external force. But I have explicitly argued against such a thesis by saying that the only desires that are hooked up in the right way to one's muscles to cause action are one's own desires. The motivation to do the right thing must come from the desires of the agent. Among the various ways to acquire those desires is innately and through experience/training/learning. Nowhere have I denied that the motivation to act must be internal.

DRFseven

But did you not insist that the subjectivist makes a "mistake" in wanting others to comply with his/her own moral opinions? Did you not say that the subjectivist ought to feel no more reason for others to comply than if the desire were for a specific pizza topping?

I don't know where you got the idea my explanation had anything to do with internal/external motivation.

Wiploc

Would you accept this phrasing: The agent subjectivist commits a logical contradiction when he says both

a) the individual agent (discriminator/nondiscriminator) is the only source of morality for himself, and

b) other agents ought to agree with me that it is wrong to discriminate.

crc

Alonzo Fyfe

From this: Now, my actual motivation, when I see discrimination occuring, is gut reaction bequeathed to me by my fair-minded mother...

But, that is not the major point.



No. The mistake is in inferring from the fact that "I want X" that "You should want X as well." (or "I don't like X" to "you ought not like X either).

It is well within the realm of possibilities that an agent can have two separate desires, a desire for X, and a desire that all others desire X. But these are distinct desires. They may exist together. Or each may exist seprately. And there is no link between them.

For example, I have an aversion to engaging in homosexual acts. But this does not entail that I also have a desire that others have an aversion to homosexual acts. Now, it is still possible that I have a second desire -- a desire that others have an aversion to homosexual acts. But this is a second distinct desire, with no logical connection to my own desire (or aversion).

What I am not justified in doing is INFERRING from the fact that I have an aversion to homosexual acts that FROM THIS others ought to have an aversion as well.

Yet, people often do draw this inference. They do it all over the place when they talk about moral value. I had a conversation once with a racist who was very much repulsed by interracial relationships. It was not just that he disliked such relationships, he felt that all others ought to disapprove of them as well and could not understand how others could see this as acceptable.

If I take my disapproval of homosexual acts to be caused by an intrinsic badness of such an act, it DOES follow that others should have an aversion to homosexual acts (or that those who do not are somehow defective, degenerate, perverted, etc.).

And if we look at the way that people who think that homosexual acts are immoral argue, it seems clear that they DO make this inference. That is to say, they argue that this type of behavior is disliked because it is wrong -- not that it is wrong because it is disliked.

Now, I hold that there is no such thing as intrinsic value -- goodness or badness. Yet, the fact that they do not exist does not change the fact that if you look at the way people talk about moral value that talk makes the most sense if we take it to be talk about intrinsic values.


I have not said anything about what the subjectivist ought to feel. I have argued that the subjectivist is not justified in INFERRING anything from his or her own moral feelings that he would not infer from his preferences for a particular type of pizza toppings. That if the INFERENCES he draws from one type of sentiment extend further than the INFERENCES he draws from the other, that he needs to say something about what justifies these additional inferences.

The AntiChris

Alonzo Fyfe

Thanks for your explanations although I have to admit that I'm finding it extraordinarily difficult to pin you down.
Fine so far.
Ok, but to be sure I'm understanding you, I'd like to clarify a couple of points.

When you say "turn rape from a vicious action into a virtuous action" you mean in the mind of this particular agent?

When you say "rape can become not only permissible, but even obligatory" you mean in the mind of this particular agent?
No, of course not. My interpretation is that you've told me that this particular agent does in fact approve of it.
No. You've been misunderstanding what I've been saying. What I've been objecting to is your apparent assertion (and this is where I'm finding you difficult to pin down) that it is "logically inconsistent" or "failing to observe the tenets of subjective morality" to use language or behaviour to express my disapproval, of another agent's activities, which goes beyond that "implied" by a preference for a particular pizza topping.

In an attempt to get to the root of what it is you're trying to say, can you tell me if either of the following represents your view:

1) The agent-subjectivist would be logically inconsistent in using physical coercion, with the force of law, to restrain a thief from stealing his possessions, because physical coercion goes beyond behaviour that would be justified by a mere preference for a particular pizza topping.

or

2) The agent-subjectivist would be logically consistent in using physical force to restrain a thief so long as he (the agent-subjectivist) understood that his motives for taking such action were morally equivalent to a preference for a particular pizza topping.

Chris

The AntiChris

This would only be a logical contradiction if the ought to was used with reference to some objective moral 'truth'.

Since, by definition, an agent-subjectivist would not be using ought in this sense, there is no contradiction.

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

Logical consistency only applies to relationships between propositions. Here, you are asking me to make a statement about logical consistency between a proposition and an action (using physical coercion).

An action is not a proposition, so I cannot understand how the concept of "logically consistent" applies in either of these two cases.

I hold that, within individual subjectivism, the types of propositions that one may legitimately infer from any given moral preference (a proposition about an agent having a particular moral preference being true) are the same as the types of propositions that one may legitimately infer from any given pizza-topping preference.

These are relationships between propositions, not relationships between propositions and actions.