Jesus Tap-Dancin' Christ

Not really. I would be gratified to make certain moral choices (i.e. feeding a starving child when I could just ignore the poor kid), and I would be gratified to make many immoral choices (i.e. killing all the people that I hate in appropriate means). I, however, never consider whether or not I am gratified by an action. Helping those less fortunate then myself makes me feel sick inside, but I help them because I SHOULD do it--even if thoug it makes me suffer more than I do now. Nor do I torture those who tortured me mercilessly in my childhood, though I greatly desire it, and would be indeed quite happy to see their blood spilt upon the ground. It is wrong for me to do that.


Gratification is not immorality, nor is gratification morality. They come with both. At least, in my experience.

Jesus Tap-Dancin' Christ

"Sometimes I do what I want to do. The rest of the time, I do what I have to do." Bonus for naming the quote source.

I do not act in accordance with my desires--I would be far happier than I am. No, I do what I feel is right, regardless of whether or not I desire to. Usually, I desire not to be the moral man.

Transworldly Depraved

What makes something perfect?

Supposing that God's purpose was to create beings capable of choosing between good and evil then any beings he made which did not have that ability would be imperfect. God's purposes would not have been fulfilled.

(A side note: The quote in the last post was from Maximus' servant, Cicero, in the movie Gladiator.)

Brad Messenger

If you do what you feel is right, you must desire to do what you feel is right. By desire, I don't mean natural impulses but all kinds of wants. Doing the right thing is something people want to do, and I see you are no exception. Even in the case when a person points a gun at you to do something terrible, you are still doing what you desire. You are choosing your desire to live over your desire to not commit a horrible act. This is what I mean by the strongest desire always wins.

Unless you define desire more narrowly than I do, all actions are based upon following one's desires. Moral difficulties arise when desires of relatively equal value (in the person's conscience) conflict with each other and force one to choose one over the other.

Jesus Tap-Dancin' Christ

I do not desire to do what is right. Usually, justice conflicts with my desires. I have no "just" desires--only evil ones. Threats of punishment do not deter me from actions, not death, not imprisonment, not hell.

Plato held that there were three parts to man's soul-appetites, passions, and reason. Reason held sway over man's appetites and passions to the necessary extent. Reason had a duty NOT to indulge in appetites that were morally wrong.

Since I haven't read any psychology, I have no clue on how dated that information is, but that pretty much is the way it is with me. I have appetites, or desires, and I quite often am forced to deny them for no reason other than it is wrong to act upon them. I do not wish to be good. I would rather not be, for I would have far less stress and pent up rage, leading me to be healthier.

Brad Messenger

If you are good and don't want to be good, what is it that makes you good? If it is justice (however you define it) that makes you do it, then you must have a desire to follow justice moreso than your desire not to do good. You say reason has control over people's appetites and passions, yet if a person does not want to follow reason, I don't see how they are going to.

Like I stated, there are natural desires that we have such as eating, sleeping, sex, and other biologically rooted impulses, but this is not the full extent of desires. If I want to eat some fatty food badly but know that I need to refrain from such food to remain healthy, I am denying the desire to eat the food because I have a stronger desire to remain healthy. I see this as one of the example used when one is forced to deny their appetites or passions, and yet this denial is due to a stronger desire. So, once again, I think you are defining "desire" too narrowly.

Albert Cipriani

Dear Jamie,
You of all people do not need to apologize to me.

Your question betrays a misconception of "nature":


Their nature did not lead them astray. "Nature" in this context can best be conceived of as "design." For example, the nature of a car is to be driven on roads. But not if we don't fill the car with gasoline.

The nature of man is to freely give glory to God. But not if He didn't supply the means (grace, free will, whatever) that made that possible. Ergo, Adam and Eve had the means of resisting temptation.

You counter with:


This speculation betrays a misconception of "willpower." God cannot create willpower. That's something we can develop like a muscle by utilizing the free will God does create in us to cooperate with God’s will and graces. Ergo, God's choice in the matter was binary: create Adam and Eve with free will or without free will. Creating them with willpower was not an option. Sincerely, Albert the Traditional Catholic

matty j

This is in response to the original question. I don't think this response has been raised yet, although I haven't read the entire post.

It's an almost unfair question, because it is, after all, what *we* want, not what any god would necessarily want (and it's fairly clear that people can be conditioned to want the most destructive of things even when they fly in the face of their own well-being). But, let's consider what things are bad -- violence, theft, rape, murder, etc. -- and why they might be desirable. I think, to address the dilemma, you have to look at what is considered bad, and why.

Firstly, I think it's unfair to say we want "bad" things. That's a very broad statement, and one that I don't find justified. Unless you're talking about someone purely evil, like out of a fairy tale, there's a combination of motivations that do not sum up to being intentionally "bad". I have never intentionally, for the hell of it, desired to be 'violent'. I'd be lying to say I haven't desire being violent before, but it has always been as a result of other factors: my dislike for another person; my fear of another person; how they treated me; etc. From my perspective, it's not as simple as to say we desire "bad" things. We desire things that are better for ourselves. That bad occasionally results from these things is not necessarily a matter of desire. I mean, sure, it would be nice if the sexual desires that have led people to rape other people weren't there, but without those same desires, human beings as a species wouldn't have survived. There's a lot of (rather arbitrary) give and take.

Matty J

Jesus Tap-Dancin' Christ

I don't even want to follow reason. Shit, you have any idea on how much I've been screwed over by that? It's one of the many, many, reasons that I am unhappy today.
Perhaps. I still desire not to be just. I just am, despite my desires, despite my reason, despite, well, everything. I want to kill, maim, bathe in blood spilt by my hand, torture, kill, and other things, but I don't-not because I fear the consequences (indeed, I fear nothing, really), but because I can't do it. I don't want be just. I really cannot explain my moral behaviour. Soperhaps I am defining desire far to narrowly. But...

CodeMason

I think the modal state of perfection (which I might argue is different from the subjective quality of perfection) requires a full temporal range of perfection as well. This is because modal perfection is a qualitive and not quantitive property. You either are or aren't. And since time is a dimensional aspect of you, being perfect entails that in no point in the time can you be imperfect. Therefore, Adam and Eve cannot be created perfect, then made imperfect.