Philip Osborne

"Rw: Depends on how you define “true” proposition. The proposition that the sun will rise and set at specific times is a true proposition based on...."

The proposition that the sun will rise and set at specific times is true, but our evidence for believing it to be true only renders this proposition highly probable; it does not necessitate the truth of this proposition. What I mean by deductive arguments guaranteeing their conclusion is that for any deductive argument, if the premisses are true, it is conceptually impossible for the conclusion to be false. For instance, given the truth of "Fido is a dog" and "All dogs have four legs," it is conceptually impossible for Fido to not have four legs.

"Rw: Or that W is a part of X. So it is logically impossible to create a glass enclosed ant farm without doing so from within?"

Ex hypothesi, there can be nothing "outside" of a possible world; possible worlds include everything. For any possible world, if that world is actual, then there can be no actual object that is not a member of that world. That is a conceptual truth.

"Its action of creating a world necessitates its actual existence rendering it contingent upon said existence to freely act. A contingent being cannot be both contingent and Necessary."

What does this mean? What is "greater" or "lesser necessity?" Are you saying that God is contingent because He is contingent upon His existence? That merely means, "God's existence is dependant upon His existence." But that is trivial.

-Philip

rainbow walking

Phillip: The proposition that the sun will rise and set at specific times is true, but our evidence for believing it to be true only renders this proposition highly probable; it does not necessitate the truth of this proposition. What I mean by deductive arguments guaranteeing their conclusion is that for any deductive argument, if the premisses are true, it is conceptually impossible for the conclusion to be false. For instance, given the truth of "Fido is a dog" and "All dogs have four legs," it is conceptually impossible for Fido to not have four legs.

Rw: Yabut Philip, pray tell how ever does one come upon the notion that a dog has four legs except by observation? Methinks you’ve never had the mis-fortune of happening upon a three legged dog. Your propositions in the four legged dog example are not exempt from probability either.

"Rw: Or that W is a part of X. So it is logically impossible to create a glass enclosed ant farm without doing so from within?"

Phillip: Ex hypothesi, there can be nothing "outside" of a possible world; possible worlds include everything. For any possible world, if that world is actual, then there can be no actual object that is not a member of that world. That is a conceptual truth.

Rw: All concepts are perceptually founded and just as subject to probability. One does not stumble upon such concepts as “world”, “outside”, and “everything” without some perception making these concepts meaningful. In quantum physics even nothingness contains something: virtual particles. There is scientific evidence to generate the hypothesis that something can arise out of nothing.

rw: "Its action of creating a world necessitates its actual existence rendering it contingent upon said existence to freely act. A contingent being cannot be both contingent and Necessary."

Phillip: What does this mean? What is "greater" or "lesser necessity?"

Rw: That isn’t the conceptual delineation being applied here, Phillip. It is simply a matter of Necessity. Anything capable of doing anything must exist to fulfill this capacity. Therefore its capacity to do anything is contingent upon its existence. Existence isn’t the default condition and non-existence does exist as a meaningful concept.

Phillip: Are you saying that God is contingent because He is contingent upon His existence?

Rw: Precisely.

Phillip: That merely means, "God's existence is dependant upon His existence." But that is trivial.

Rw: No, Phillip, that means God’s ability to do anything is contingent upon his existence therefore god's existence is necessary to doing anything even remotely creative. A god who doesn't exist is hardly a god therefore existence is a crucial necessity to his godlikeness. God is contingent upon existence for his godlikeness. If he is contingent he is not necessary. That is not a triviality. It is a conceptual truth and a deductive conclusion. The OA puts the cart out front of the horse in assuming his existence and arriving at Necessity in his creative responsibility for the world. You cannot establish existence out of necessity, (unless, of course, you happen to have some emotional connection for doing so).

[ August 30, 2002: Message edited by: rainbow walking ]</p>

HRG

Just a few remarks´.

1+1=2 is a different kind of truth than "Jupiter exists".
Not so. If Joe can prove that the claim is logically impossible, then this modal claim is more rationally supported than if its impossibility was only supported by Joe's incredulity.
I guess that's where the difference between a philosopher and a mathematician comes in. For the latter, all properties are equal, while the philosopher adds the proviso "but some properties are more equal than the others". IMHO the set of properties is closed in the sense that if P and Q are properties, then "not-P", "P and Q" and "P or Q" are also properties.
You have the special metaphysical property of not belonging to the set of computers. What's wrong with that ?
No, we don't say anything about "nature" or "preclusion". We just say that x is totally powerless. Period.

Regards,
HRG.

Philip Osborne

"Not so. If Joe can prove that the claim is logically impossible, then this modal claim is more rationally supported than if its impossibility was only supported by Joe's incredulity."

But this contradicts your statement that modal claims reflect only the beliefs of philosophers. If modal claims can be rationally supported, then it seems that there are objective truth values to them.

"I guess that's where the difference between a philosopher and a mathematician comes in. For the latter, all properties are equal, while the philosopher adds the proviso "but some properties are more equal than the others". IMHO the set of properties is closed in the sense that if P and Q are properties, then "not-P", "P and Q" and "P or Q" are also properties."

The reason I say that "not-computerness" is not a real metaphysical property is that it adds nothing substantive to a thing's nature. Suppose I take a three dimensional box. If I give it the property of redness, it becomes a red box. If I give it the property of smallness, it becomes a small red box. If I give it the property of not-computerness, it is still a small red box. We already knew that since no computer is nothing but a small red box, this box cannot be a computer. The properties we already know about this box are such as to make it false to say that this box is a computer. So by adding the new property not-computerness, we are not really adding anything.

We can apply this argument to being totally powerless. If I predicate total powerlessness of something, either the other properties of that thing entail that it has causal power or they do not. If the former, then there is a contradiction. If the latter, then there is no need to postulate that the thing is powerless in virtue of its special property total powerlessness. It is powerless in virtue of the fact that its properties do not give rise to causal power. In both cases, there is never a need to postulate the special property of total powerlessness. If something is powerless, it is because the other properties of that thing are such as to not give rise to causal ability. I repeat my original statement; it is plausible to suppose that any nature giving rise to powerlessness would contain limited properties.

"Rw: Yabut Philip, pray tell how ever does one come upon the notion that a dog has four legs except by observation...."

The soundness of my premisses is not the point. Assume that the premisses are true (even if you have seen three-legged dogs; that is irrelevant). The point is that it is logically contradictory to accept the premisses while denying the conclusion.

"Rw: All concepts are perceptually founded and just as subject to probability. One does not stumble upon such concepts as “world”, “outside”, and “everything”...."

Our concepts may require observation to come to an understanding of them, but this does not mean that conceptual truths are subject to falsification by empirical evidence.

Here seems to be your argument:

1. If something is contingent upon its existence, it is contingent.
2. God's causal action is contingent upon His existence.
3. Hence, God is contingent.

The problem is that your argument equivocates on the meaning of "contingent." In the first sense, a fact x is contingent upon a fact y if x necessitates y. That seems to be what you mean; God's causal action necessitates that He exists. But the second sense is different; x is contingent iff its non-existence is possible. These two meanings of contingency are unrelated, so I submit that your argument is unsound.

Sincerely,

Philip

rainbow walking

"Rw: All concepts are perceptually founded and just as subject to probability. One does not stumble upon such concepts as “world”, “outside”, and “everything”...."


Phillip: Our concepts may require observation to come to an understanding of them, but this does not mean that conceptual truths are subject to falsification by empirical evidence.

Rw: It doesn’t? That claim seems counter-intuitive to me Phillip. To use your example of four legged dogs, if I observe 50 dogs with four legs and develop a concept of all dogs requiring four legs to be conceptually identified as a dog, and then I discover an animal with all the characteristics of a dog with the exception of only having three legs, haven’t I just negated a conceptual truth empirically? I must then alter my original conception by concluding that the number of legs an animal possesses is not an accurate means of determining classification. Any conceptual truth that is not subject to falsification is also not possible to verify which immediately eliminates it from classification as a “true” proposition in any argument.

Philip: Here seems to be your argument:

1. If something is contingent upon its existence, it is contingent.

2. God's causal action is contingent upon His existence.

3. Hence, God is contingent.

Rw: Yes, but remember I qualified this by defining existence as an act of resisting nothingness. So number 3 should read: God’s existence is contingent upon his causal action, followed by number 4: Hence, God is contingent.

Phillip: The problem is that your argument equivocates on the meaning of "contingent." In the first sense, a fact x is contingent upon a fact y if x necessitates y. That seems to be what you mean;

Rw: Yes, so far so good…

Phillip: God's causal action necessitates that He exists.

Rw: Agreed. But also, god’s existence necessitates that he act causally.

Phillip: But the second sense is different; x is contingent iff its non-existence is possible. These two meanings of contingency are unrelated, so I submit that your argument is unsound.

Rw: Ah but Phillip, you have provided no argumentation that leads us to a conclusion that god’s non-existence ISN’T possible. And furthermore, the two are not different conceptually but only in scope. Your first listing of the argument implies non-existence as a possibility, which is the basis of my rebuttal of the OA. Because I have qualified the definition of existence with an “act” I have covered both bases.

1. If a god did nothing he could not be said to exist.

2. If a god does something he must exist to do so.

3. If he is said to exist in order to have done something then his existence becomes contingent on his doing something and his doing something becomes contingent on his existing to do it, thus:

4. If he does nothing he cannot be said to exist and if he does not exist non-contingently he cannot be said to be Necessary.

The OA is founded on an assumption that this world is a result of a god having done something but, in the case of a god, any argument will require more than a modal quantifier to become a convincing argument.

The OA does not lead us inexorably to a god dunnit conclusion or even a possibility of such a conclusion. I have committed no equivocation fallacy here and the argument still stands as a conclusive that such a being is not Necessary because he must exist to have been a causal agency and existence implies non-existence as a possibility which effectively negates non-contingency. Without non-contingency, Necessity fails. The OA does not escape the contingency of existence by simply assuming it as a property of Necessity in one of its postulates. The non-existency hurdle remains to be cleared.

Philip Osborne

"It doesn’t? That claim seems counter-intuitive to me Phillip. To use your example of four legged dogs, if I observe 50 dogs with four legs and develop a concept of all dogs requiring four legs to be conceptually...."

No, you have not negated the conceptual truth "All dogs have four legs." What you have negated is that the beings which you have labeled as referents of the term "dog" actually aren't referents of that term. The fact that the fifty beings you previously observed are not dogs does not negate the proposition that all dogs have four legs (It is actually not analytically true that dogs have four legs; that is not the point, however).

"Any conceptual truth that is not subject to falsification is also not possible to verify which immediately eliminates it from classification as a “true” proposition in any argument."

You seem to be using the outdated "verification principle" of the logical positivists. But even they accepted that there are analytically true propositions. Analytically true propositions are true either by conceptual containment or by being an applied logical truth. They are necessarily true.

"Yes, but remember I qualified this by defining existence as an act of resisting nothingness."

If this is so, then you are defining necessary existence out of existence (no pun intended).

"Agreed. But also, god’s existence necessitates that he act causally."

I'm not so sure about this, although I could be wrong. I think it is based upon a mistake often made by atheists that it is an essential property of God that He create the universe; this is not so. It is only required that God create the actual world. Theists typically hold that this is a free action of God.

"Ah but Phillip, you have provided no argumentation that leads us to a conclusion that god’s non-existence ISN’T possible."

Actually, I have. I assume that for any contingent being, possibly, there is some cause of its existence. As I've stated many times before, this cause need not be a sufficient condition for bringing about this being. By contraposition, any being which cannot possibly be caused is not contingent. It is analytically true that God, as an unlimited being, cannot be caused to exist. Hence, God cannot be contingent; if He is to exist at all, His existence must be necessary.

"Your first listing of the argument implies non-existence as a possibility...."

I don't see how this is so. Could you clarify?

"And furthermore, the two are not different conceptually but only in scope."

The two senses are absolutely unrelated. It is by a mere linguistic coincidence that we can say "a necessitates b" as "a is contingent upon b." If a is contingent in this sense, a can still be necessary in the sense that its falsehood is impossible, so long as b is necessary. But the second sense of contingency rules out necessity from the very beginning.

"....existence implies non-existence as a possibility which effectively negates non-contingency."

This premiss by itself is enough to entail the conclusion of the argument; in fact, it practically is the conclusion of the argument. Why make reference to God's causal power? Your assertion that non-existence is always and everywhere a logical possibility is, I think the crucial point of your argument. The only defense you have provided for this premiss is that every existent which we have seen is contingent; but as I've mentioned before, this is an inductive, not deductive argument.

Sincerely,

Philip

[ August 31, 2002: Message edited by: Philip Osborne ]</p>

Synaesthesia

Philop Osborne,
Modal logic doesn’t establish the analytic truth of “square circles are impossible”, that is a product of the geometric system in which the shapes are defined.

The point that I think was being made is that modal ontological arguments (as with others) derive the whole of their force from the assumptions that a modally necessary intelligent being (with properties A...Z arbitrarily tacked on) modally possibly exists.

The conclusion of such arguments, in other words, has nothing to recommend it in addition to other reasons for believing their conclusion is correct.

Postulating the greater rationality of your assumption (which is also your conclusion) is a far cry from actually establishing a viable truth-preference.

Although we can rationally speak of a fictional character in motivational terms, it is not necessarily the case that there is a fact of the matter as to that character’s motivations.

You have evidence that your mental state is describeable as a belief that it is cold. How one could possibly have a belief without any evidential connection to the parts of our state characterizable as belief?

Well the cats, horns and pink we see have evolved on earth. They are about as contingent as things get, I’ll agree. Yet the same applies to intelligence. Babies don’t come from nowhere you know, there is an embryological and evolutionary history behind intelligence.

Since it is manifestly obvious that you think that intelligence can be non-contingent, you have still provided no consistent or principled reason to reject the infinite number of ontological parodies.

This framing is generating a lot of confusion. You can’t demonstrate the impossibility God anymore than you can demonstrate the impossibility of a necessary cat.

I can rationally conclude that God is just a mythological anthropomorphism and that necessary cats are just atheist’s parodies - modal has nothing to do with either conclusion. The mere possibility of modal possible necessity is not in the least relevant to a rational judgement of whether either one exists.

Regards,
Synaesthesia

Philip Osborne

Interesting objections. I'll answer them all here:

"Modal logic doesn’t establish the analytic truth of “square circles are impossible”, that is a product of the geometric system in which the shapes are defined."

I am not arguing that modal logic in itself establishes the truth of all modal claims; the point is that "square circles are impossible" is a modal claim which can be rationally supported.

"The point that I think was being made is that modal ontological arguments (as with others) derive the whole of their force from the assumptions that a modally necessary intelligent being (with properties A...Z arbitrarily tacked on) modally possibly exists."

Actually, the point that HRG is attempting to make is that modal claims reflect nothing more than the beliefs of philosophers. It did not specifically relate to the ontological argument.

"Although we can rationally speak of a fictional character in motivational terms, it is not necessarily the case that there is a fact of the matter as to that character’s motivations."

If modal claims can be rationally supported or refuted on grounds other than what our knowledge of our beliefs is (i.e. If I can rationally defend "x is possible" without having to make reference to "I believe that x is possible"), then it seems that modal claims are not a simple matter of what our beliefs happen to be. This was the original objection to modal logic, and this is what I am trying to refute. Perhaps you are correct that there are other reasons for thinking that modal logic has no objective truth values; however, my contention remains that it is not a matter of the beliefs of philosophers.

"You have evidence that your mental state is describeable as a belief that it is cold. How one could possibly have a belief without any evidential connection to the parts of our state characterizable as belief?"

I am not suggesting that beliefs about one's mental states have no evidential support whatsoever, although my wording may have suggested otherwise. I apologize if I was unclear with my meaning. The point I am making is that the kind of justification that claims of the form "I believe that my mental state is telling me it is cold" receive is very different from the justification that claims such as "It is raining" or "1+1=2" receive. My argument is that modal claims can receive evidential support of the latter kind; this would exclude them from being mere subjective beliefs.

"Well the cats, horns and pink we see have evolved on earth. They are about as contingent as things get, I’ll agree. Yet the same applies to intelligence. Babies...."

This is probably your strongest objection to the argument. However, I think that it may be the fallacy of projection to assume that since all forms of intelligence we have observed have evolved, all forms of intelligence must have a biological history. For instance, all rational animals we have observed do not have blue skin. It is not therefore impossible for there to be a blue-skinned rational animal.

You might raise the legitimate question that my argument commits the same fallacy. However, I think that there are additional reasons for thinking cats and dogs contingent outside of our observation. Take the properties of a cat; it is coherently conceivable that for any given cat, it may have had its properties to a degree slightly more or less than it has. For instance, it might have had a few additional strands of fur, or it might have been slightly bigger or smaller. And when this is so, it seems rational to assume such things are possible. But necessarily instantiated properties are necessarily the way they are. Since the properties of things we observe in the world are not this way, it follows that they cannot necessarily obtain.

Sincerely,

Philip

rainbow walking

Phillip: No, you have not negated the conceptual truth "All dogs have four legs." What you have negated is that the beings which you have labeled as referents of the term "dog" actually aren't referents of that term. The fact that the fifty beings you previously observed are not dogs does not negate the proposition that all dogs have four legs (It is actually not analytically true that dogs have four legs; that is not the point, however).

Rw: Well, this is confusing indeed Phillip. Previously you said:

Our concepts may require observation to come to an understanding of them, but this does not mean that conceptual truths are subject to falsification by empirical evidence.

rw: Now if we derive our conceptual understanding from observation and observation provides us only with probabilistic reference, then any truth value we ascribe to a concept is equally as probabilistic as the observational integrity invested in the development of it. You appear to be ascribing a greater value to classificational terminology than the observational integrity invested in arriving at that terminology. We cannot assign absoluteness to any concept that was derived observationally and we cannot divorce conceptualization from observation so any attempt to negate a rebuttal based on a delineation between induction and deduction is essentially fallacious. All inductions are extrapolated from conceptually derived deductions.

If I find one three legged dog among 50, that doesn’t negate the concept of a classification of a particular species of mammal, what it negates is the truth value of my proposition that “ALL” dogs have four legs. If I based my classification on the property of number of appendages, a three legged dog falsifies the basis of my classification thus my proposition “all dogs have four legs” has lost its value as a true proposition and I am forced to re-evaluate the properties of classification I used to arrive at the classificational conceptualization of “dog”. Obviously, based on observation, not “ALL” dogs have four legs. “Dog” is just a term that has been assigned to a particular creature that has been classified as a species of mammal with specific properties. 4 legs is one of the common properties observed to be an attribute of this species but not a Necessary property.

It is conceptually true that a creature, (in this case, a dog), exists requiring classification. This conceptual TRUTH is arrived at via observation. If I ascribe an incorrect classification the creature doesn’t cease to exist, it just eludes classification. It is not conceptually true that such a creature is Necessary. It is conceptually true that iff such a creature is conceptually verifiable then we can assume it is but a copy of an original that came to exist by some means, which is Necessary. This is as far as modal logic can rationally take us. Unfortunately, no god has ever been conceptually verified to exist outside of human imagination so ascribing a Necessary causal agency to such an imaginary creature is no more “conceptually true” than ascribing said causal agency to aliens. God is still an assumption among many possibilities.

It is conceptually true that the “actual” world invokes a necessary causal agency.

It is NOT conceptually true that said causal agency Necessitates a god.

It is NOT conceptually true that the “actual” universe invokes a Necessary causal agency.

It Is conceptually possible that it does, just as it is conceptually possible that said causal agency may “actually” be an intelligent being classified as a god. But these are not conceptual “truths”, just possibilities. Indeed, the conceptualization of this possibility is both vague and meaningless due to the contradictory properties associated with the classification of such a being.

Phillip: You seem to be using the outdated "verification principle" of the logical positivists. But even they accepted that there are analytically true propositions. Analytically true propositions are true either by conceptual containment or by being an applied logical truth. They are necessarily true.

Rw: There is nothing “outdated” about verification in reference to causal agencies and existent or non-existent entities.

Phillip: If this is so, then you are defining necessary existence out of existence (no pun intended).

Rw: Not at all. It is true that the existence of a particular thing necessitates a Necessary first of such a thing. This further requires that we establish that a thing exists and in what order, that is to say, if it is the necessary first thing or just a generational copy. The OA does not establish that a god exists and in what order his existence entails, whether he is the first and only of his kind or just a generational copy. To say that causation establishes the Necessity of an original causal agent does not establish said agency as a god, nor does the argument take non-existence into consideration, thus allowing the inclusion of non-contingency where it does not logically apply. My argument does not eliminate Necessary existence, just non-contingency. It does so by re-establishing the necessary existence of non-existence in all cases. In correctly defining existence as the act of resisting non-existence, it goes towards establishing non-existence as the baseline motivational contingency of all existent things, entities, or properties. Thus non-existence is the only true Necessary, non-contingent existent.

Phillip: I'm not so sure about this, although I could be wrong. I think it is based upon a mistake often made by atheists that it is an essential property of God that He create the universe; this is not so. It is only required that God create the actual world. Theists typically hold that this is a free action of God.

Rw: There are no “free” acts available to any existent entity as long as non-existence remains the motivational contingent to actual existence. Some action is Necessary. Correct action is preferable. If such an entity as the Christian god exists with the properties assigned, creation would be the only Necessary act that would secure his continued existence. Something that would entail his continual activity to sustain and maintain.

Phillip: Actually, I have. I assume that for any contingent being, possibly, there is some cause of its existence. As I've stated many times before, this cause need not be a sufficient condition for bringing about this being. By contraposition, any being which cannot possibly be caused is not contingent. It is analytically true that God, as an unlimited being, cannot be caused to exist. Hence, God cannot be contingent; if He is to exist at all, His existence must be necessary.

Rw: “Necessary” existence doesn’t negate non-existence when Necessary is based on past events. The OA does not argue that present and future events are contingent on the CONTINUED existence of the one Necessary causal agent. Only that a causal agency was required for the instantiation of subsequent existent things. And so, if such a being is subject to non-existence at any point in time, said being must be subject to non-existence at all points in time, just like all other existent things, entities, or properties.

Phillip: The two senses are absolutely unrelated. It is by a mere linguistic coincidence that we can say "a necessitates b" as "a is contingent upon b." If a is contingent in this sense, a can still be necessary in the sense that its falsehood is impossible, so long as b is necessary. But the second sense of contingency rules out necessity from the very beginning.

Rw: I have lumped both responses above together because this responds to both.

The problem here Phillip, is that neither you or the OA have any logical grounds to assert that “a” (existence) is Necessary. It is simply assumed so in the broader assumption that the causal agency is a god. So long as non-existence remains a viable possibility existence can never be a Necessary non-contingent state of being, especially when ones argument is based on previous, rather than present tense, application. It is not Necessary that there be an existent causal agency so long as non-existence exists as the primary motivational factor of all acts committed by existent things. As I’ve said before, non-existence is the only Necessary non-contingency that can logically and analytically be substantiated without contradiction.

What you could argue more effectively (IMO) is that such a being encompasses the entire state of non-existence in its totality as the primary causal agency and motivational faculty of all existent things whose existence depends on their resistance. From this perspective it could be said that any act of this god to draw any existent being to him can be interpreted to be a drawing towards non-existence. Of course, this might not be palatable to the religious mind but it would be true none-the-less.

Phillip: This premiss by itself is enough to entail the conclusion of the argument; in fact, it practically is the conclusion of the argument. Why make reference to God's causal power?
Rw: Because it is the basis of the OA’s commitment.

Phillip: Your assertion that non-existence is always and everywhere a logical possibility is, I think the crucial point of your argument. The only defense you have provided for this premiss is that every existent which we have seen is contingent; but as I've mentioned before, this is an inductive, not deductive argument.

Rw: Regardless of how it is argued, the conclusion remains the same.

Philip Osborne

"Now if we derive our conceptual understanding from observation and observation provides us only with probabilistic reference, then any truth value we ascribe to a concept is equally as probabilistic...."

The fact that we must use observation to come to an understanding of something does not mean that thing is subject to empirical falsification. What I meant by saying observation is required to come to an understanding of concepts is that, for instance, a person who has never seen the color red will not understand what red is. However, this does not mean "Red is a color" is subject to empirical falsification.

"If I find one three legged dog among 50, that doesn’t negate the concept of a classification of a particular species of mammal, what it negates is the truth value of my proposition that “ALL” dogs have four legs...."

Suppose it is analytically true that all dogs have four legs. Suppose you have found this creature, x, which is similar in all respects to a dog, except it has three legs. What you have actually refuted is not that "All dogs have four legs," you have shown that x is not a dog. You might use a different term to describe x, such as dog*. Or perhaps, you might decide to use a new term, dogs**, that encompasses both x and all dogs.

"It is conceptually true that a creature, (in this case, a dog), exists requiring classification."

Existential propositions are never conceptual truths. Conceptual truths involve what Kant called "conceptual containment." For instance, "All bachelors are unmarried men" is a conceptual truth, because that is the way the concepts "bachelor" and "unmarried man" are related.

"Rw: “Necessary” existence doesn’t negate non-existence when Necessary is based on past events. The OA does not argue that present and future events are contingent on the CONTINUED existence of the one Necessary...."

The OA does not make any reference to causal agency or anything like that. Also, according to my usage of the term, there is only one sense of "necessary"; truth in all possible worlds. If a is necessitated by b, a can still be contingent if b is contingent. Neither one is necessary, although one necessarily follows from the other. According to this sense of necessity, necessary existence, if true of some being x, is such as to entail that the non-existence of x is impossible under any circumstances.

At any rate, I think you might have made your argument needlessly complicated. My impression is that you are arguing that the non-existence of any given thing is always and everywhere a logical possibility. I don't think your arguments are strong enough to substantiate that conclusion.

"As I’ve said before, non-existence is the only Necessary non-contingency that can logically and analytically be substantiated without contradiction."

Are you suggesting that it is analytically true that nothing whatsover exists? Not only is this false, it is a synthetic proposition. If you are suggesting that the possibility of non-existence can be substantiated logically, then it would seem to follow that there is some logical argument to demonstrate this conclusion. I know of no such argument, and I'm not convinced you have provided it.

"Rw: Regardless of how it is argued, the conclusion remains the same."

No, the conclusions of an inductive and deductive argument will be different. A deductive argument with true premisses will take as its conclusion, "x is true." An inductive argument's conclusion will be "Probably, x is true." So the conclusion of your argument is not that necessary existence is an impossibility, but that probably, nothing with necessary existence obtains. Perhaps this latter conclusion is acceptable to you, but the difference ought to be noted anyway.

Sincerely,

Philip

[ September 02, 2002: Message edited by: Philip Osborne ]</p>