Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Kenny · 01-17-2003, 12:11 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by mattbballman
Perhaps you could point me to Plantinga's information on the subject, I would be interested in checking that out.

matt [/B]

http://www.nd.edu/~ndphilo/papers/revdghn.htm

Philip Osborne · 01-17-2003, 03:50 PM

Maximal perfection means there's no possible (per se) more perfect being, no better being. There must be no possible universe with more good than the current universe. Yet if there is an infinity of possible...

I think we can still say that the only thing required of a maximally perfect* being is that on balance, there is more good than evil. On this construal, I think mattballman's analysis is a sound one.

I agree more with your second analysis of "nature" that you brought up. The first is unacceptable. The second, though crude, may be sufficient. And the best way to avoid controversy is to not think of God as only a collection of properties but, rather, as a being who necessarily has...

I think the first sense can be important, but it probably is not the sense of "nature" we want to talk of when we ask whether or not God is identical to His own nature. The consequence I was referring to is that since the nature of something is in some sense a property, it would follow that if a being is identical to its nature, it would be itself a property. But God is not merely a property; it is an individual with the property of being God-like. So it would seem to follow that God is not identical to His nature. Plantinga has a book which I have not been able to read, although I have read about it, called "Does God Have a Nature?" Michael Sudduth has an article about Divine Simplicity on http://www.homestead.com/philofrelig.../Aquinas2.htm.

The biggest problem of Divine Simplicity for me involves Wes Morriston's criticisms in his article, "What's So Good About Moral Freedom?" Let us suppose God has the property F, which is God's will that some state of affairs be instantiated. F is intrinsic, but F is also contingent, since God does not have to will that the state of affairs in question obtains. Since God is identical to His nature, it follows that any property which is to God is also intrinsic to His nature. So, F is intrinsic to God's nature. But the only properties which can be intrinsic to a nature are essential properties, in which case, F is essential. Since God exists in every possible world, it follows that all essential properties of God are instantiated in every world. In this case, F obtains in every world; that is, F is necessary. But this contradicts our initial assumption that F was contingent. Hence, if God is identical to His nature, He cannot contingently will that any given state of affairs be instantiated. This is certainly an undesirable consequence, so if the preceding argument is sound, I think it gives us good reason to doubt divine simplicity.

Sincerely,

Philip

SRB · 01-18-2003, 06:53 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Philip Osborne
Suppose John gives $20.00 to a person without a home or money, while Joe gives $30.00. Joe has made a morally better decision, but I do not think we would say that John has therefore made an error in moral judgement. At least, we would not see it that way in practical, everyday terms. Also, since we are defining "perfection" in terms of "error," we would not want to define error in terms of perfection.

Although it seems God cannot be maximally perfect, He might at least be maximally perfect,* where maximal perfection* is defined as being maximally perfect in all non-moral senses, and maximally morally perfect in the sense I used above. It seems plausible to suppose that a maximally perfect* being would be a suitable object of most theistic religions.

Suppose a builder constructs a house with crumbling walls and a leaky roof. He claims to be a maximally perfect builder. He defends himself by saying that since there is no such thing as the best of all possible houses, we shouldn't expect him to build one that has solid walls and a functioning roof! Such a defence would carry no weight at all. Whether the title "maximally perfect builder" is coherent is questionable. If it is coherent, we can expect a maximally perfect builder to be sufficiently competent to construct a house that protects its inhabitants from the elements.

Concerning the Argument from Evil, the No Best Possible World Defence is similarly a failure. Even if there were no best possible world, a loving deity would actualise a world considerably better than this one, where there is no pointless suffering. Eradication of pointless suffering is a basic aim of anyone who loves humans. The "defence" offers no reason at all for God to allow such suffering (e.g. the Holocaust, the events of 9/11 and the suffering of terminally ill children).

SRB

Philip Osborne · 01-18-2003, 03:52 PM

Suppose a builder constructs a house with crumbling walls and a leaky roof. He claims to be a maximally perfect builder. He defends himself by saying that since there is no such thing as the best of all possible houses, we shouldn't...

This argument overlooks the suggestion I made concerning what a maximally perfect* being would be. Suppose there is a maximally perfect* builder. Such a builder would, by definition, never make errors in judgement and action concerning how to build houses. But your builder clearly makes such errors. So your example does not address the issues involving a maximally perfect* being.

Concerning the Argument from Evil, the No Best Possible World Defence is similarly a failure. Even if there were no best possible world, a loving deity would actualise a world considerably better than this one, where...

Consider world w, which contains only God sans all creation. Such a world is good, but things would be better if God created something. So it seems plausible to say that the basic aim of God is to create a world significantly better than w. On this basis, one might say that to create such a world, one must create a world devoid of all suffering and evil. This is not necessarily true, however. Consider two sets of worlds, S and T. S includes all and only the worlds which contain at least one instance of evil; T includes all and only the worlds in which there is no suffering. The argument you are making requires that any given member of T is a better world than any given member of S; this assumption is false. As an extreme example, a world in which three people experience tremendous happiness and one person stubs his toe is better than a world in which there is absolutely nothing. So, it is not necessarily required that there be absolutely no suffering in a world which God creates. As mattballman mentioned, it seems that the only sensible requirement that can be made of God is that on balance, there is more good than evil. I don't see that there is any way to observationally determine whether these conditions obtain or not, so it seems that there is no way to know whether or not the argument from evil is sound. In that case, the argument from evil does not serve any purpose.

Thomas Metcalf · 01-18-2003, 04:10 PM

Originally posted by wiploc :

"I don't see the conflict. We call him free because he *can* be less than perfect; and we call him perfect because he chooses not to."

But He can't. There is no possible world in which He is less than perfect; if He chose to set in motion a chain of events that would result in Him being less than perfect, He would fail. I don't see how else to talk about capability.

Keith Russell · 01-18-2003, 04:22 PM

Greetings:

What is 'perfection'? What does it mean for something to be 'perfect'?

Is a tree perfect? When is it less than perfect?

The only things that we consider 'perfect' are those things which we imagine, and then create. When we cannot imagine them being any better, when they physically match our mental previsualization, then we say they are 'perfect'.

If 'God' is described as 'perfect', it could only possiblly mean that we believe that 'God' is exactly as we imagined 'Him' to be.

Which means we imagined 'God', before we created 'Him'--
--as I always suspected.

Keith.

Philip Osborne · 01-18-2003, 04:32 PM

But He can't. There is no possible world in which He is less than perfect; if He chose to set in motion a chain of events that would result in Him being less than perfect, He would fail. I don't see how else to talk about capability.

Perhaps what wiploc means is that God is not perfectly good in all possible worlds, but is perfectly good in the actual world. This is not, as Richard Gale would say, the "super-deluxe" God of Anselmian theism, but I think it is accepted by some theologians.

The only things that we consider 'perfect' are those things which we imagine, and then create. When we cannot imagine them being any better, when they physically match our mental previsualization, then we say they are 'perfect'.

To say that God is "perfect" is merely to say that God has certain kinds of properties, and these properties make God the appropriate object of traditional theism. For instance, God's perfection means that He is omnipotent, omniscient, etc.

SRB · 01-18-2003, 06:01 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Philip Osborne
Consider two sets of worlds, S and T. S includes all and only the worlds which contain at least one instance of evil; T includes all and only the worlds in which there is no suffering. The argument you are making requires that any given member of T is a better world than any given member of S; this assumption is false. As an extreme example, a world in which three people experience tremendous happiness and one person stubs his toe is better than a world in which there is absolutely nothing. So, it is not necessarily required that there be absolutely no suffering in a world which God creates.

You have misunderstood or misread what I wrote. I did not say that there would be no suffering in a world that God actualises. I only said that there would be no pointless suffering in such a world. That is, there would be no suffering that is unnecessary for the realisation of some greater good or the prevention of some worse evil. There are such evils in our world (e.g. the Holocaust, the events of 9/11 and the suffering of terminally ill children). If any of those things had been prevented, we know beyond a reasonable doubt that the world would be a considerably better place. From the fact that there are such instances of pointless suffering we can conclude that God does not exist.

SRB

Thomas Metcalf · 01-18-2003, 07:07 PM

Originally posted by Philip Osborne :

"Perhaps what wiploc means is that God is not perfectly good in all possible worlds, but is perfectly good in the actual world."

It seems to me that God would never cease being perfectly good, so if He's perfectly good in the actual world, He's perfectly good in all possible worlds. It's not perfectly good to choose to stop being perfectly good, and an omnipotent and omniscient God could never be forced to stop being perfectly good, or tricked into it.

Philip Osborne · 01-19-2003, 06:21 AM

You have misunderstood or misread what I wrote. I did not say that there would be no suffering in a world that God actualises. I only said that there would be no pointless suffering in such a world. That is, there would be no suffering that is unnecessary for the realisation of some greater good or the prevention of some worse evil. There are such evils in our world (e.g. the Holocaust, the events of 9...

I think we can make a very similar argument here. Suppose S is the set of all worlds which contain pointless suffering, and T is the set of all worlds which do not contain pointless suffering. Again, it is not true that any given member of T is necessarily better than any member of S. Going back to my example, the instance in which someone stubs his toe in that particular world may serve no purpose towards bringing about a greater good or preventing a greater evil, but the world in which that person stubs his toe and three people experience great happiness is still better than a world with nothing. I will assume that if it is appropriate for God to instantiate a world W, and Y is better than W, then it is appropriate for God to instantiate Y. I will also assume it is appropriate for God to instantiate any member of T. But since some members of S are better than some members of T, it follows that it is appropriate for God to instantiate some members of S.

It seems to me that God would never cease being perfectly good, so if He's perfectly good in the actual world, He's perfectly good in all possible worlds. It's not perfectly good to choose to stop being perfectly good, and an omnipotent and omniscient God could never be forced to stop being perfectly good, or tricked into it.

This seems to conflate nomological and metaphysical necessity, although I may have misread the argument. There may be worlds in which God never chooses to be perfectly good in the first place, and these worlds do not seem accounted for by your argument.

-Philip

01-18-2003, 04:10 PM	#25
Thomas Metcalf Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Boulder, CO Posts: 1,009	Re: Re: Maximal Perfection and Libertarian Free Will Originally posted by wiploc : "I don't see the conflict. We call him free because he can be less than perfect; and we call him perfect because he chooses not to." But He can't. There is no possible world in which He is less than perfect; if He chose to set in motion a chain of events that would result in Him being less than perfect, He would fail. I don't see how else to talk about capability.

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01-17-2003, 03:50 PM	#22
Philip Osborne Regular Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Cherry Hill, NJ Posts: 147	Maximal perfection means there's no possible (per se) more perfect being, no better being. There must be no possible universe with more good than the current universe. Yet if there is an infinity of possible... I think we can still say that the only thing required of a maximally perfect* being is that on balance, there is more good than evil. On this construal, I think mattballman's analysis is a sound one. I agree more with your second analysis of "nature" that you brought up. The first is unacceptable. The second, though crude, may be sufficient. And the best way to avoid controversy is to not think of God as only a collection of properties but, rather, as a being who necessarily has... I think the first sense can be important, but it probably is not the sense of "nature" we want to talk of when we ask whether or not God is identical to His own nature. The consequence I was referring to is that since the nature of something is in some sense a property, it would follow that if a being is identical to its nature, it would be itself a property. But God is not merely a property; it is an individual with the property of being God-like. So it would seem to follow that God is not identical to His nature. Plantinga has a book which I have not been able to read, although I have read about it, called "Does God Have a Nature?" Michael Sudduth has an article about Divine Simplicity on http://www.homestead.com/philofrelig.../Aquinas2.htm. The biggest problem of Divine Simplicity for me involves Wes Morriston's criticisms in his article, "What's So Good About Moral Freedom?" Let us suppose God has the property F, which is God's will that some state of affairs be instantiated. F is intrinsic, but F is also contingent, since God does not have to will that the state of affairs in question obtains. Since God is identical to His nature, it follows that any property which is to God is also intrinsic to His nature. So, F is intrinsic to God's nature. But the only properties which can be intrinsic to a nature are essential properties, in which case, F is essential. Since God exists in every possible world, it follows that all essential properties of God are instantiated in every world. In this case, F obtains in every world; that is, F is necessary. But this contradicts our initial assumption that F was contingent. Hence, if God is identical to His nature, He cannot contingently will that any given state of affairs be instantiated. This is certainly an undesirable consequence, so if the preceding argument is sound, I think it gives us good reason to doubt divine simplicity. Sincerely, Philip

01-18-2003, 03:52 PM	#24
Philip Osborne Regular Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Cherry Hill, NJ Posts: 147	Suppose a builder constructs a house with crumbling walls and a leaky roof. He claims to be a maximally perfect builder. He defends himself by saying that since there is no such thing as the best of all possible houses, we shouldn't... This argument overlooks the suggestion I made concerning what a maximally perfect* being would be. Suppose there is a maximally perfect* builder. Such a builder would, by definition, never make errors in judgement and action concerning how to build houses. But your builder clearly makes such errors. So your example does not address the issues involving a maximally perfect* being. Concerning the Argument from Evil, the No Best Possible World Defence is similarly a failure. Even if there were no best possible world, a loving deity would actualise a world considerably better than this one, where... Consider world w, which contains only God sans all creation. Such a world is good, but things would be better if God created something. So it seems plausible to say that the basic aim of God is to create a world significantly better than w. On this basis, one might say that to create such a world, one must create a world devoid of all suffering and evil. This is not necessarily true, however. Consider two sets of worlds, S and T. S includes all and only the worlds which contain at least one instance of evil; T includes all and only the worlds in which there is no suffering. The argument you are making requires that any given member of T is a better world than any given member of S; this assumption is false. As an extreme example, a world in which three people experience tremendous happiness and one person stubs his toe is better than a world in which there is absolutely nothing. So, it is not necessarily required that there be absolutely no suffering in a world which God creates. As mattballman mentioned, it seems that the only sensible requirement that can be made of God is that on balance, there is more good than evil. I don't see that there is any way to observationally determine whether these conditions obtain or not, so it seems that there is no way to know whether or not the argument from evil is sound. In that case, the argument from evil does not serve any purpose.

01-18-2003, 04:22 PM	#26
Keith Russell Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Overland Park, Kansas Posts: 1,336	Greetings: What is 'perfection'? What does it mean for something to be 'perfect'? Is a tree perfect? When is it less than perfect? The only things that we consider 'perfect' are those things which we imagine, and then create. When we cannot imagine them being any better, when they physically match our mental previsualization, then we say they are 'perfect'. If 'God' is described as 'perfect', it could only possiblly mean that we believe that 'God' is exactly as we imagined 'Him' to be. Which means we imagined 'God', before we created 'Him'-- --as I always suspected. Keith.

01-18-2003, 04:32 PM	#27
Philip Osborne Regular Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Cherry Hill, NJ Posts: 147	But He can't. There is no possible world in which He is less than perfect; if He chose to set in motion a chain of events that would result in Him being less than perfect, He would fail. I don't see how else to talk about capability. Perhaps what wiploc means is that God is not perfectly good in all possible worlds, but is perfectly good in the actual world. This is not, as Richard Gale would say, the "super-deluxe" God of Anselmian theism, but I think it is accepted by some theologians. The only things that we consider 'perfect' are those things which we imagine, and then create. When we cannot imagine them being any better, when they physically match our mental previsualization, then we say they are 'perfect'. To say that God is "perfect" is merely to say that God has certain kinds of properties, and these properties make God the appropriate object of traditional theism. For instance, God's perfection means that He is omnipotent, omniscient, etc.

01-18-2003, 07:07 PM	#29
Thomas Metcalf Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Boulder, CO Posts: 1,009	Originally posted by Philip Osborne : "Perhaps what wiploc means is that God is not perfectly good in all possible worlds, but is perfectly good in the actual world." It seems to me that God would never cease being perfectly good, so if He's perfectly good in the actual world, He's perfectly good in all possible worlds. It's not perfectly good to choose to stop being perfectly good, and an omnipotent and omniscient God could never be forced to stop being perfectly good, or tricked into it.

01-19-2003, 06:21 AM	#30
Philip Osborne Regular Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Cherry Hill, NJ Posts: 147	You have misunderstood or misread what I wrote. I did not say that there would be no suffering in a world that God actualises. I only said that there would be no pointless suffering in such a world. That is, there would be no suffering that is unnecessary for the realisation of some greater good or the prevention of some worse evil. There are such evils in our world (e.g. the Holocaust, the events of 9... I think we can make a very similar argument here. Suppose S is the set of all worlds which contain pointless suffering, and T is the set of all worlds which do not contain pointless suffering. Again, it is not true that any given member of T is necessarily better than any member of S. Going back to my example, the instance in which someone stubs his toe in that particular world may serve no purpose towards bringing about a greater good or preventing a greater evil, but the world in which that person stubs his toe and three people experience great happiness is still better than a world with nothing. I will assume that if it is appropriate for God to instantiate a world W, and Y is better than W, then it is appropriate for God to instantiate Y. I will also assume it is appropriate for God to instantiate any member of T. But since some members of S are better than some members of T, it follows that it is appropriate for God to instantiate some members of S. It seems to me that God would never cease being perfectly good, so if He's perfectly good in the actual world, He's perfectly good in all possible worlds. It's not perfectly good to choose to stop being perfectly good, and an omnipotent and omniscient God could never be forced to stop being perfectly good, or tricked into it. This seems to conflate nomological and metaphysical necessity, although I may have misread the argument. There may be worlds in which God never chooses to be perfectly good in the first place, and these worlds do not seem accounted for by your argument. -Philip

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