rainbow walking

rw: Come on Thomas, how many times have we been over this. Your playground example isn't analogous. Your partial intervention is only going to affect a few kids. God's partial intervention could affect all kids in all playgrounds for all time. Big difference.



thomas: Huh? Why is the fact that humans could do that enough to show God shouldn't? The playground kids could learn to get along with themselves, but it's still good to intervene sometimes.

rw: God is not obligated to do for man what man can do for himself.


thomas: Again, you're just saying over and over again that full intervention is required by moral perfection. Just saying it over and over again doesn't make it true. Find a way to answer my "playground" example.

rw: See above...

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

You've already agreed, then, that partial intervention is sometimes okay. So why is it different for God? What is it about the fact that it's on a grander scale that makes partial intervention not justifiable?

rainbow walking

rw: Because we can predict probabilities on a small scale playground scene with far more likelyhood of accuracy than on a worldwide scale with all the different social customs, environments and political climates as well as religious and racial differences.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

God knows all the larger effects, so he can intervene just as much as is obligatory, and not one iota more. I've already shown that some intervention is justifiable for humans. You say we can't make the jump to God because we don't know all the probabilities involved. But God does, so God can intervene just enough as not to have the danger of going too far. I've already shown that sometimes, people are obligated to do for someone else what that someone else can do herself. There's nothing incoherent about that. So you're going to have quite a time showing that God can never be obligated to help anyone, because you don't have the moral principle "One is not obligated to do for someone what she can do for herself."

Humans have moral obligations to intervene. Why doesn't God? He may know about further long-term effects and probabilities, but what reason do we have to think those will weigh against intervening?

rainbow walking

Thomas: God knows all the larger effects, so he can intervene just as much as is obligatory, and not one iota more.

rw: Sure can, now let’s explore why he is obligated to do so.

Thomas: I've already shown that some intervention is justifiable for humans. You say we can't make the jump to God because we don't know all the probabilities involved. But God does, so God can intervene just enough as not to have the danger of going too far.


rw: And this obligates him to do so…how?


Thomas: I've already shown that sometimes, people are obligated to do for someone else what that someone else can do herself. There's nothing incoherent about that. So you're going to have quite a time showing that God can never be obligated to help anyone, because you don't have the moral principle "One is not obligated to do for someone what she can do for herself."

rw: Nope. Showing that people are obligated to do for others, even if they can do for themselves, falls under man acquiring his own GG. This excludes God from this principle.

Thomas: Humans have moral obligations to intervene. Why doesn't God?


rw: Because to do so negates man’s moral obligation to work towards the acquisition of his own GG. Human intervention has nothing to do with obligating a God to do so. Human intervention is part of man’s acquisition of his own GG, and thus morally necessary.


Thomas: He may know about further long-term effects and probabilities, but what reason do we have to think those will weigh against intervening?

rw: Since he hasn’t intervened, according to your observations, and we have allowed one of his attributes to be omniscience…we are forced to probably lean towards his discretion more than yours. If you and I take my car to a mechanic and after he examines it tells us it can’t be repaired…and you tell me that it probably could be fixed but he just doesn’t want to fool with it…and you’re not a mechanic…who’s word has the likeliest probability of being true, yours or his?

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

Because intervention is sometimes justified for us, and we have no evidence that he has reasons not to intervene that we don't know about. It would have to be a contradiction to say humans have a well-developed science, history, culture, and knowledge, if God intervened once. And it's not.

I don't believe this moral obligation exists, so show me that it does. And even if it did, it can be outweighed sometimes, if it's really important. If not, show me why Divine intervention is necessarily always impermissible; show me why God would be making a moral error any time he intervened. And remember that it's not a contradiction to say humans have well-developed history, science, culture, knowledge, etc., and God has intervened once.

Only if we already knew he existed could we use that fact as evidence to say that probably, he has intervened enough. Sure, if he exists, then enough intervention has taken place, but whether he exists is precisely what's at issue.

rainbow walking

Thomas: Because intervention is sometimes justified for us, and we have no evidence that he has reasons not to intervene that we don't know about. It would have to be a contradiction to say humans have a well-developed science, history, culture, and knowledge, if God intervened once. And it's not.

rw: And this obligates God…how? To do what? I see no specific example here so we’re out in the hypothetical realm discussing what? This is an evidential PoE, isn’t it?



Thomas: I don't believe this moral obligation exists, so show me that it does.

rw: You don’t believe you’re morally obligated to pull a burn victim out of a wrecked car?

Thomas: And even if it did, it can be outweighed sometimes, if it's really important. If not, show me why Divine intervention is necessarily always impermissible;

rw: Isn’t necessary. It’s your CP so you are the one obligated to show moral culpability.

Thomas: show me why God would be making a moral error any time he intervened.

rw: I have in every case you’ve submitted thus far.

Thomas: And remember that it's not a contradiction to say humans have well-developed history, science, culture, knowledge, etc., and God has intervened once.

rw: Intervened once to do what? If he intervenes once, moral perfection demands full intervention, else he isn’t morally perfect. It’s all or nothing.



Thomas: Only if we already knew he existed could we use that fact as evidence to say that probably, he has intervened enough. Sure, if he exists, then enough intervention has taken place, but whether he exists is precisely what's at issue.

rw: Sorry Thomas, you’ve already assumed his existence at the outset, so you don’t get to declare non-existence until you complete the connection and PoE obtains. I can work off of your assumption but you don’t get to work off of your conclusion until you actually get there. That’s one of the disadvantages of PoE. And I’m just basing my argument on your observation of non-interference.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

Oh, I am, the same way God is. I'm also obligated to help someone by pulling them out of a wrecked car even if someone else is in a position to do it too. Am I negating this someone else's greater good? Have I done anything wrong? Have I gotten in the way of this someone else fully developing a knowledge of consequences? Will her science be limited because I stepped in and helped the burn victim instead of her?

Here's a reason God is obligated to help people: It reduces their suffering. Now, you're proposing an outweighing reason: "It is logically impossible for humans to have a well-developed science, culture, history, and knowledge, and to meet their moral obligations, if God intervenes even once." The problem is that your outweighing reason has never been supported.

Sometimes some intervention is okay when more intervention is too much. Do you agree or disagree?

Not at all. It's only a conditional. If God existed then there would be a different amount of prevention, because there'd be a different amount of intervention, because we're probably not at the right level right now, because the chances that we are are one divided by the number of possible levels. You can't say "Look, it's not the case that there's not enough prevention now, because God exists," unless you can provide independent evidence for God's existence. It's the G. E. Moore shift, showing that there's probably no gratuitous evil because God probably exists.

1. Most levels of suffering are not the right level.
2. Therefore, the chance that any particular level is the right level is very small.
3. Therefore, the chance that this level is the right level is very small.
4. If God existed, then this would be the right level.
5. Therefore, the chance that God exists is very small.

Deny 1, 3, or 4. (2 and 5 are indisputable.)

rainbow walking

Thomas: Oh, I am, the same way God is. I'm also obligated to help someone by pulling them out of a wrecked car even if someone else is in a position to do it too. Am I negating this someone else's greater good? Have I done anything wrong? Have I gotten in the way of this someone else fully developing a knowledge of consequences? Will her science be limited because I stepped in and helped the burn victim instead of her?

Here's a reason God is obligated to help people: It reduces their suffering. Now, you're proposing an outweighing reason: "It is logically impossible for humans to have a well-developed science, culture, history, and knowledge, and to meet their moral obligations, if God intervenes even once." The problem is that your outweighing reason has never been supported.

rw: This is still just your subjective opinion. There are two factors in my argument that mitigate against this opinion. First, man is not on the brink of extinction. Second, he has progressed; climbed up out of the caves to the 21st century. This progress has been made primarily in response to pain, suffering and death, as man is forced to seek resolutions. All I have to postulate is a God who created this meta-path and show that man has responded accordingly. This negates any subjective claims that he is obligated to do anything more. Of course, this does nothing for the Christian who believes in a personal interfering, prayer answering God. The second you introduce an interfering omni-benevolent God you’ve got problems. Moral perfection demands such a God interfere in all cases where suffering or death could obtain…if suffering or death was what initially motivated that first intervention. If such a God partially intervenes and allows suffering or death to ensue later then he loses his claim to omni-benevolence. The Christian God allegedly intervened to introduce a law whose consequences was death, so such a God cannot be omni-benevolent.

The only way you can defeat my argument is to trap me into a case of interference or show that the meta-path has not worked because man has not progressed. Neither are possible.



Thomas: Sometimes some intervention is okay when more intervention is too much. Do you agree or disagree?

rw: Not if you’re morally perfect and especially if your non-interference hasn’t hindered progress but has probably allowed it to move forward.



Thomas: Not at all. It's only a conditional.


rw: You still can’t abridge the conditional before you get to the ~

Thomas: If God existed then there would be a different amount of prevention, because there'd be a different amount of intervention, because we're probably not at the right level right now, because the chances that we are are one divided by the number of possible levels.


rw: That’s what you’re trying to establish as probably true.

Thomas: You can't say "Look, it's not the case that there's not enough prevention now, because God exists," unless you can provide independent evidence for God's existence.


rw: I’m not saying that. But you can’t say god probably doesn’t exist half way through your “if/then conditional either. I’m saying “if/then” with different conclusions. We’re both committed to our “if” until we reach our respective conclusions. I’m affirming the consequent while you’re denying the antecedent. Neither of us can assume our conclusions during the course of the inference, which is what you’re trying to do now.

Thomas: It's the G. E. Moore shift, showing that there's probably no gratuitous evil because God probably exists.

1. Most levels of suffering are not the right level.
2. Therefore, the chance that any particular level is the right level is very small.
3. Therefore, the chance that this level is the right level is very small.
4. If God existed, then this would be the right level.
5. Therefore, the chance that God exists is very small

Deny 1, 3, or 4. (2 and 5 are indisputable.)

rw: No it isn’t because I’ve submitted a counter-argument that does more than just denies but replaces with postulates that mitigate against. However you define it your claims do not evoke the conclusion you’re seeking.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

No, because that's not enough to show moral perfection. Humans have to be in the best position now they could be, not just a good position. My opinion about whether God should intervene is just as subjective as yours, so you're going to have to look for a different criticism.

No, look: If it's obligatory to do X, then it's obligatory to do X whether or not you're morally perfect. If there is some correct level of intervention, then you're obligated to attempt to reach that level whether or not you're morally perfect. And I've already shown that sometimes, some intervention but not complete intervention is obligatory. So your "all or nothing" claim is obviously false. Think about it this way: Suppose God's the only person in a position to intervene on the playground, where some intervention is justified but complete intervention would have bad effects. Do you think God would be obligated to attempt to reach those bad effects, just because he's morally perfect? Why would moral perfection change what the right thing to do is?

Your claim that God's refraining from interfering is what has allowed humanity to move forward is also obviously false, because God is omnipotent. There is no contradiction in saying "humanity moves forward at least as far as it is in the actual world and God interferes once more than he does in the actual world."

Do you understand what an argument is? You have to find a way to deny my argument, unless you want to accept my conclusion. Show me which premise you deny. Just name a number.

While you're here, show me your counter-argument, in a form with its premises numbered the way I've done the courtesy of providing for you.