Laurentius

excreationist

I find it difficult to decide where this line should be drawn; my background does not have much to do with science, plus I'm quite subjective in my assessments. For instance, now, I would say that only mammals can be said to really show volition (all others act instinctively or to satisfy momentary needs, but if this is true most of living things do act like little biological machines.

Indeed, this is my intuition too. A certain degree of awarness and detachment from the environment and individual needs is required for volition to appear, but who knows.

On the one hand, this "newness" desire is too abstract to make a basic drive. I think it is an urge to control the environment, to make the best of one senses and mobility in order to get as much control as possible. The slave, on the other hand, is a human, and with humans is so much harder to say - one could seek fulfillment in free self-expression, another might hate the master. Most of them would feel humiliated by the irrationality of the concept of race superiority. If "newness" had been such a strong pre-determinator, I doubt that the mankind would have developed such strong traditions as we can still see today.

What I mean is that the moment self-preservation was launched it was only a matter of time and refinement for living things to develop other inner capacities that evolutionarily ended up in the complex that you call Brain, and I, Mind.
AVE

[ March 21, 2002: Message edited by: Laurentius ]</p>

excreationist

Laurentius:
For me "volition" just involves a self-motivated learning system that has learnt to be sufficiently intelligent. The potential for intelligence would be determined by their brain, so mammals would be able to learn to be more intelligent than non-mammals. And maybe birds could have "volition" as well.

Well basically it is about seeking mental stimulation and excitement. I think kittens may have this craving. It is about finding *different* experiences. That's all newness is - rather than recognizing things, it is about failing to recognize something. - It is new. Connectedness on the other hand involves recognizing things and having coherent set of patterns. I think babies get pleasure from newness (they are human as well) - apparently they laugh with pleasure at non-threatening surprising things.
So newness is about surprises, thrills, adventure and excitement.
To crave it doesn't mean that the baby has to explicitly think "I need some newness!". Instead, they could see a surprising cartoon, and the newness pleasure signal would be triggered. This means that this situation must be repeated (depending on the signal's intensity). So the baby seeks to repeat that situation. And they might see a kitten running around and find it very surprising. So their motivational system can cause them to want to seek and repeat those situations even though they haven't abstracted the common element out of it.
So I think newness is a basic drive, even in other animals. (Chimps probably like new things - though they wouldn't say in sign language "I like new things")

This is basically about seeking pleasures and avoiding pains such as bodily pain and frustration. "The urge to control the environment" is obvious really. I think that we are incapable of learning unless we can interact with the environment to test our beliefs and problem solving strategies against reality. Interaction involves some control over the environment. If we had total control then there would be a problem of finding "newness" - this is a problem that rich entertainers can have.

Yeah, slaves would want some kind of free-expression. (e.g. have their own family or something)

Well why did hundreds of explorers risk their lives to find new lands? Most of the time it wasn't because they wanted more money for themselves - they would have been instinctually motivated to explore. And why did people bother to climb Mt. Everest and continue to do it today? And people still die sometimes trying to climb it - this is where people had very strong desires for newness. Something that was fundamentally different from their ordinary everyday lives. Or maybe it was about seeking connectedness with the ideals of bravery or the relief of survival. And if you are in touch with the entertainment industry, people are constantly trying to find new things. Even toddlers want newness as I said earlier. I bet if you said exactly the same things to your toddler and reactly exactly the same way all the time, the toddler would get bored. I think "playing" is just about them trying to experiment and generate newness themselves. I think playful social interaction involves seeking that pleasure as well. I think another synonym for it is "fun".
So basically we are motivated to newness to some degree, but as I said earlier, there is also the "connectedness" pleasure. This involves the brain wanting to make our experiences fairly coherent and predictable. It is about security, harmony and completeness. Different people develop or begin with different emotional makeups though. So thrill-seekers (newness-seekers) who compulsively break the law would have weaker connectedness pleasures associated with society. (I think people's "conscience" or empathy comes from their connectedness with society feeling violated)
So anyway, connectedness just keeps some order in the place. But probably the main reason is that genuine newness (the kind we seek) is in limited supply. I mean if you have spent much time watching TV or following fashion you would have heard people complain about the lack of genuinely new ideas. That's mainly what people are looking for - new ideas. It doesn't mean that society must be reinvented every month. That threatens our connectedness. I think that older, more conservative people have their lives ruled by connectedness a lot more. Younger people would be ruled more by newness. This would have been useful for our ancestors because it would mean that the younger people would learn and explore and discover things while they were able-bodied, while the connectedness would make them fairly loyal. The older people's urge to explore wouldn't be as great and they would become more stable and wise for society's sake.

I think self-preservation just involves maintaining connectedness with the "self" - our earthly body or brain - and also avoiding bodily pain.
Death is often painful, and we are compelled to avoid bodily pain (depending on the expected intensity). We learn to avoid pain in advance. Even pets can do that. e.g. you could train it to sit by punishing if it doesn't sit.
So it partly involves avoiding expected pain and partly involves not wanting to destroy our connection to our earthly life. For materialists, this loss of consciousness is permanent.

[ March 22, 2002: Message edited by: excreationist ]</p>

owleye

Synaesthesia...

Davidson wants to say that what makes humans intelligent, as opposed to non-human animals (with probably few or no exceptions) is the ability to deal expllicitly with abstract concepts apart from their use in discriminating objects of experience implicitly, such that humans can be said to know they have genuinely made an error, when they do.

He cites a number of requirements that this entails, particularly the possession of propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, hopes, etc.), and more specifically, a language capability (having certain logical constructs) having semantic content and a basis in decision theory. He further believes it is possible to test for this (in animals), by regarding their behavior to determine whether they recognize their own errors, where Davidson thinks that "triangulation" from a third party is required representing the "standard" (in the usual case, passed down through generations by a cultural transmission process).

In any case, he does think a science of thought is possible on this basis. (However, there is a problem with this, in that the "laws of thought" would not be reducible to physical laws.)

Now, since most of the above can be programmed, I asked him (following a talk he gave on the paper which discussed all this), what would be the missing ingredient. He responded with the brief reply: "perception." If I understand perception to be that capacity in humans (and animals) that represents what is given to them in sensory experience as phenomena (in space and time) abstracting out any contribution from the "higher" cognitive structures, but including the magic of consciousness which somehow lets us experience it, computers that have this capability along with the required cognitive ability, will have human intelligence.

I think, then, that what you are referring to as the "impossible task" for computers, is what is called by David Chalmers, the hard problem of consciousness. It is not so much that the world cannot be represented through capabiltiies programmed into some robot, but that "'there would be something it is like' to be a conscious organism." (the inner quote is from Nagel).

Chalmers, however, doesn't understand why this feature is needed -- or, rather, that all functional accounts of mental activity are such that they can be understood from a third person ontology (i.e, physically). It is the first person experience that cannot be explained functionally (or at least not yet).

As a result, Chalmers thinks a new approach to consciousness is required and he thinks a good beginning is to say that consciousness is an irreducible entity, different in kind from all other, physical, entities. (To support this move, he makes an analogy with the adoption of a new force (charge) during the 19th century by scientists to explain electromagnetic phenomena. Prior to that, gravity was the only known force.)

owleye

Laurentius

Owleye

The sense of space would trigger a sense of time, which in turn would trigger a sense of cauality, and then unity and multitude, and so on. I don't know, this may be already over my head. My real interest in philosophy started with my encountering Camus, whose writings mirrored my preocupations, although not fully satisfactorily.

An electronic-mechanical cat can be programmed to purr when stroked, let's say, but I'm sure that even babies would notice that it is just faked. An infinite variety of reactions to an infinite range of stimuli characterizes living things, and especially conscious ones. I know that we can expect "miracles" from scientists, and I'm sure that robots will be one day programmed to simulate human behavior, showing happiness, disappointment or curiosity, but I don't think that they'll ever really feel happy, disappointed or curious, unless biological material is used to manufacture such super-sophisticated machines.

At a first sight, the idea seems attractive, but evolution in that case allows leaps, significant leaps. Evolutionsts may have a problem here.
AVE

[ March 22, 2002: Message edited by: Laurentius ]</p>

Laurentius

Synaesthesia

I should be looking stubborn and narrow-minded to you, I know the feeling; I don't deny the materiality in the Brain's function or preception - I only emphasize the mental specificity of the Mind. Math may have started from the aspects of the real world, but it can now develop folowing its own principles and ignoring materiality. Or, nested in the same physical spatiality, different communities can bring about different cultures. Traveling monks in Himalaya sleep at night on the bare rock in a cold that would freeze to death any of us. These are different examples that may hint at the reasons why I cannot reduce the Mind to the Brain, although I seem unable to convince you of the justifiability of my stand.

By accepting that the physical description is not comprehensive, you allow that there is more to learn about how things work. Your faith tells you that in the end there will be physical mechanisms (no matter how complicated) that will explain everything; perhaps, but they will still make only the support of an activity (the mental one) that will show a degree of independence from other categories of reality in the sense that it will allow resistence to material conditions (such as the resistance of the himalayan monk's mind to the cold).
AVE

Laurentius

excreationist

I for one dislike birds exactly for this reason: they seem purely instinct-driven, nothing but feathered reptiles. I think I have such a limited instinctive definition for intelligence that I find it hard to grant it to many.

I still think they wonder about in order to get full control, feel secure, find food etc.

Non threat is ensured through the participation of non-newness. Newness and otherness are causes of stress and axiety. Frankly I think newness is not a main drive. However, there is a need for newness due to the presence of senses - excitability should trigger a demand for excitants.

These guys look for personal fulfillment - this has a complex psichological explanation, it is not just a desire for newness (one may have lived in the mountains all his life, another may have failed to adjust to New York's bustling life, etc.).

Newness as value, even in art, is quite a new concept, about 500 years old (okay, let's admit 1000). The match "originality vs sameness" has not yet been won by originality. There are tons of popular shows full of non-original stuff, that aim at addressing many other psichological needs of the average viewer.

I bet that if they had to deal with different things and different reactions every time, they would end up frightened out of their wits. But this is already too specialized for me, I'm afraid.
AVE

[ March 23, 2002: Message edited by: Laurentius ]</p>

Ierrellus

One question--

Where, in postulates of evolutionary development, lies the enigmatic engram?

Ierrellus

Synaesthesia

Evolution, if anything, indicates that the mind is not a single irreducible ingredient. This belief has been massively counter-productive in our attempts to understand the mind.

By the way, you are not an “evolutionist”? We will never understand the mind if we cannot appreciate it’s history, one can only expect epistemic dead-ends if they deny basic biology.

Laurentius,
I have yet to understand your position. That a monk can sleep on cold rock is conditioning and has nothing to do with anything but physiological and behavioral responses to the cold. That formal mathematical systems can be devised does not falsify the contention that everything in our comprehension of them is a purely physical process- you simply assume that it is.

Any physical description of a system is going to be incomplete for only one reason: It's just too much bother to deal with. Why track the course of trillions of electrons when you can simply track the course of turning wheels and still gain a reasonably accurate prediction?

Our belief that car engines provide the mechanical impetuous that drives our cars can hardly be called faith, even for those of us who do not understand exactly how engines work.

The himalayan monk's ability to go on functioning in cold conditions is itself a material process. Colloquial talk of "mind over matter" notwithstanding, a tough person with no mental training can do the same, just as a normal person with no mental training can walk on hot coals.

Regards,
Synaesthesia

owleye

Laurentius...

"The sense of space would trigger a sense of time, which in turn would trigger a sense of cauality, and then unity and multitude, and so on."

What do you mean by "sense of space?" You don't mean "sensation" do you? In any case, how does a sense of space "trigger" a sense of time?

No matter, the above assertions need lots of support. Space and time are among the most difficult of concepts we deal with.

I'm afraid I'm not very familiar with Camus. When I get some time, I hope to get more acquainted. Right now, I have my hands full with Kant.

"An electronic-mechanical cat can be programmed to purr when stroked, let's say, but I'm sure that even babies would notice that it is just faked."

The idea that behavior can be programmed is not intended to say it would be easy. Indeed, the animated versions that we are familiar with from Pixar (I think) (as opposed to others which are constructed from human behavior) have a long way to go to achieve anything like "realism", but I have to say that (from my past experience with real-time piloted flight simulation research at NASA -- and where the technology of the "gamers" is fast closing on this technology, if it hasn't surpassed it in some areas), teaches me that it may be just a matter of time when we get behavior right.

However, what you may be directing your criticism to is that portion of behavior which is linguistic (including gestures, intonations, and other "body language", subtlely imparted). That is, some behavior is meaningful, to the extent that it conveys "real" intention (and not purpose). If we can determine the intention of behavior, we can presumably interact with them, using language.

On the other hand, the ritual behavior of the bull when faced with a waving red cape might be considered a possible indication of a linguistic act. It is unclear, however, whether or not this is sufficient to conclude that the bull is communicating an intention (though, of course, it may serve a purpose). (The difference between an intention and a purpose is such that while both are directed activities, the former represents a "policy" or "plan" on which one is acting, while the other is more generally something that serves the interest of the actor.) In any case, since at least one of the purposes of language is to communicate, we need more than just one candidate intelligence to measure whether their acts are the result of actual intelligence. This is part of Davidson's point and why the Turing test as it stands is inadequate. It was also why I thought your chimp obvservation was a candidate. (Note the two programmed intelligences have to be independent in some significant way, and we should be able to detect this.)


"An infinite variety of reactions to an infinite range of stimuli characterizes living things, and especially conscious ones."

Well, I think it has been argued that human language is capable of conveying an infinite variety of separate thoughts. For this reason, artificial intelligences would have to have a language capabiltiy that would match this. I'm not that familiar enough with the stage of language capability using computers, nor do I recall how human language is capable of expressing an infinity of thoughts, so I can't say where we are. In any case, the behavior of most if not all other animals is rather limited by comparison.

"I don't think that they'll ever really feel happy, disappointed or curious, unless biological material is used to manufacture such super-sophisticated machines."

Now your just being maudlin. Actually, I don't think artificial intelligence will ever be achieved for a different reason. Namely that we, as a species, would destroy it before it got too far along. If AI were possible, as autonomous creatures, they would soon displace us on the planet. Programming them to serve us, would displace their autonomy sufficiently to mean that they would no longer have minds. Mind (consciousness) requires a self in which objects are "for it."

"At a first sight, the idea seems attractive, but evolution in that case allows leaps, significant leaps. Evolutionsts may have a problem here."

Actually, Chalmers thinks that consciousness could be fairly pervasive and he would certainly allow it to have emerged in the process of evolution by natural selection. That there is a strong association between the physical and the mental is not prohibited in his thinking.

owleye

excreationist

Laurentius:
What do you mean?

This would be because of *excessive* newness and a breaking down of established connectedness habits.

So why do people choose newness rather than repetition?

But this comes from newness. I mean a rollercoaster ride is exciting if you've done it before, but what if you rode the same ride dozens of times a day for years? It would lose its excitement, thrill and surprise - it is no longer such a new experience. And commercials can be exciting. But what if you watched the same "exciting" commercial thousands of times over a course of a year (during ad breaks)? I doubt it would be as exciting as it used to be. Excitement is about the unexpected. That's basically what newness is about - the unexpected. And humour is in the same category really - it involves unusual things happening. Connectedness is about the familiar. And too much newness (unexpectedness) is threatening since it threatens our craving for some familiarity. So I think we all crave some unexpectedness and some familiarity. And genuine unexpectedness is when something is completely new rather than a random variation on something familiar.

I'm saying that the desire for newness is the main thing driving many activities such as exploration. "Personal fulfilment" is incredibly vague! And as I said earlier, of course a complex thing is going on. I said that there are other reasons that may be involved to motivate people to climb Mt. Everest, etc.

I'm saying that fun, thrills, surprises, adventure, excitement and novelty are all kinds of newness.
What about how in Greek times they had plays - why did they make more than one play? Maybe the audiences got bored of seeing the same play being repeated endlessly?

I didn't say that newness was our only craving! We also crave some familiarity. This allows us to tie those new experiences in with the old ones so that the new experience is meaningful. If it didn't relate to our lives or knowledge in any way, it would be totally original, but also meaningless.