The AntiChris

Ok, let's get down to basics.

Presumably you were alluding to (1) above when you said this:In other words, these "types(?) of premises" (A) do not imply "stronger conclusions" (B).

As an example of "stronger conclusions" (B) you cited:
Since we both agree (despite your comment which suggests the contrary) that:

Is not an inconsistency, I'm left with the only possible conclusion, which is that you believe that the subjectivist's tendency to "arrest, imprison....etc" is an example of "(2) A, therefore B".

So I'll ask you once more - why do you make this assumption?

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

Because it is what they say. When asked why they are in favor of punishment or imprisonment or whatever, they don't say things like, "Oh, I don't know. No reason really. I just like it," or "I thought it would feel good," or "Because it gives me a rush."

And, in fact, they tend to have all sorts of harsh words for anybody who DOES give this sort of answer, saying that it is somehow insufficient.

When, for a subjectivist, this is exactly the type of response they should be giving, because what justifies harming another person is exactly nothing more than "I like harming that type of person."

Instead, they give answers like, "Because he deserves it," or "Because of what he did," or "Because somebody who would harm others for no better reason than that he gets off on it is sick and should be put away."

In short, they keep pointing to properties of the object to justify their actions and their evaluations -- which is the objectivist form of argument, -- rather than pointing to properties of the subject to justify their actions and evauations -- which is the subjectivist form of argument.

I mean, when is the last time you sought to "justify" having a particular topping on your pizza by any form of argument other than by saying, "I like it"?

dk

Posted by Alonzo Fyfe:
” This leaves the conclusion that 'ought' is a part of the world of the 'is' -- it is a necessary part of the explanation and the prediction of real-world events. However, once we accept this option, we are forced to deny a great many platitudes that surround us about the nature of 'ought' -- claims that many people take for granted.
We must admit, at the start, that somewhere out there exists a bridge across David Hume's is/ought (fact/value) chasm. To Hume, the existence of such a bridge seemed 'inconceivable'. But to agree with Hume on this, forces us either into the dualist or eliminativist views rejected above. It may well be difficult to imagine where we may find such a bridge, but that such a bridge exists is entirely conceivable once we consider the alternatives.” ----- Ethics without God : Part III

I would like to address what I find the fundamental flaw in your thesis on morality. As you’ve suggested the issue hinges on the chasm between “is” and “ought”, or, “how can people know (judge) what they ought to do, unless they know what their actions or inactions entail?” The argument dates back to the Trial of Socrates, accused of 1) undermining religion and 2) corruption of youth. In my opinion the question has never been posed more eloquently... 1) ought Socrates to abandon morality to be acquitted of all charges, or, 2) ought Socrates to assume the appearances of guilt in pursuit of truth and moral excellence, even though such a course meant a certain death. Obviously, if the outcome hinges on the consequences, at least from Socrates perspective, Socrates ought to pursue appearances, act immorality, and save his life. Well, as it turns out Socrates took the high road, he forsake appearances and consequences to pursuit truth in spite of himself i.e. circumstances. The effect of Socrates unwavering pursuit of moral excellence forms the basis of truth to this day, so he judged rightly. In effect when Socrates sacrificed his life in pursuit of truth, his life became meaningful. So the question reduces to, “Does life become meaningful on appearances, associations or consequences? The answer is objectively, “No”. Life becomes meaningful in pursuit of truth, and degenerates into the banality of meaningless tripe in pursuit of anything else. I really haven’t answered the “ought” v. “is” question, but negated its significance as banal. The irony of post-modern world is that we rationalize “subjectivism and relativism” the only reasonable basis for a good life to escape the consequences of truth that make a good life meaningful.

Alonzo Fyfe

The latter part does not seem to be to be an accurate restatement of the former part.

My actual argument is that, if morality is a part of the explanation for any action, because that action involves the motion of matter through the universe, "morality" must either:

(1) Refer to something capable of influencing the motion of matter through the universe -- something real in the material world.

(2) Refer to something immaterial but capable of influencing the motion of matter in the real world -- an immaterial "ought stuff" outside of the realm of normal physics.

(3) Nothing at all, and all claims that morality is a part of the explanation of any action at all are false.


I rule out (2) fairly quickly because metaphysical dualism is just begging for a whack from Occam's Razor.

Against (3), I raise no objections against moral-eliminativism in specific, but suggest that value-eliminativism leaves huges chunks of the experienced world unexplained.

And I argue that this leaves (1), that the gap between "is" and "ought", or between "fact" and "value" must have a bridge across it somewhere. It is across this bridge that value has the capacity to move matter in the real world.

The AntiChris

Alonzo Fyfe
Thanks. I only wanted confirmation that when you implied earlier in this thread that certain behaviors indicated "logical inconsistency" on the part of the subjectivist, what you really intended to say was that it is the language they used to justify such behaviours which implied logical inconsistency.
So when I say Guinness is "really good", I'm erroneously talking about an intrinsic property of Irish Stout and I should, if I want to be consistent with reality, cease using such language immediately?
Your constant use of the "pizza topping preference" example as the standard to which all expressions of subjective preference must adhere, is not only foolish but it's a clear appeal to emotion which betrays your personal prejudices. The fact that all values are subjective doesn't mean all values are equal.

Chris

dk

Originally posted by dk: As you’ve suggested the issue hinges on the chasm between “is” and “ought”, or, “how can people know (judge) what they ought to do, unless they know what their actions or inactions entail?”
The latter part does not seem to be to be an accurate restatement of the former part.
Posted by Alonzo Fyfe:
My actual argument is that, if morality is a part of the explanation for any action, because that action involves the motion of matter through the universe, "morality" must either:
(1) Refer to something capable of influencing the motion of matter through the universe -- something real in the material world.
(2) Refer to something immaterial but capable of influencing the motion of matter in the real world -- an immaterial "ought stuff" outside of the realm of normal physics.
(3) Nothing at all, and all claims that morality is a part of the explanation of any action at all are false.
posted by dk:
The explanation for morality rests on the object rationally chosen by a deliberate act of will; hence has nothing to do with the motion of particles. The object of a moral act is therefore independent of the physical order, or even the ability of the actor to bring about the desired state of affairs. The morality of an act rests upon the perception and knowledge of the actor, not the consequences. For example if I pick a gun, accurately aim the gun at the person I want to kill in cold blood, then pull the trigger but the gun misfires I’ve still committed an immoral act. So morality may or may not be part of the explanation. The premise you provided is inadequate, unreliable and irrelevant in many instances.

Alonzo Fyfe

Typically not. When people talk about food (beer, pizza toppings) they tend to talk in a way that is very consistent with agent-subjectivism. A good pizza, or a good beer, is that pizza (or beer) that the agent likes, and that is as far as it goes.

Now, if you were to take this "Guinness is really good" and infer from it that I ought to like it as well, that there is something wrong with me if I do not like it, that as a result of this defect I ought to seek some sort of professional treatment, that I may legitimately forced into rehabilitation in order to acquire a taste for it, and punished if I do not at least ACT as if I like it, then you are making a mistake. These implications would follow if the goodness of Guiness is intrinsic, but not if "Guiness is really good" is just a different way of saying "I really like Guiness."

Somebody who makes the mistake that their liking something is caused by perceiving some sort of intrinsic value property CAN get all of these conclusions very easily. It is the ease with which a false assumption of intrinsic value explains all of this behavior that justifies, I think, the conclusion that most people make this mistake. The easiest solution is the best.

Now, there are a number of ways that a subjectivist can get to all of these other conclusions. It may be the case that, in addition to finding enjoyment in drinking Guiness, the individual also finds enjoyment in causing pain and suffering to those who do not like Guiness. However, these two likes are not related. The fondness for causing pain and suffering to such people has nothing to do with the goodness of Guiness. The goodness of Guiness is irrelevant. The ONLY thing that is relevant is the fondness for causing harm to such people.

Note: Even a desire of the form "I want you to like this, too" does not justify all of these extreme conclusions. In the absence of any type of objectivist assumptions, the only types of propositions that entail these types of conclusions are propositions like, "I enjoy harming those who do not like Guiness."

And even here, a fondness for wanting to harm people who do not like it does not justify conclusions of the form "there is something wrong with you." Such conclusions say that the value resides in the object.

Adding all of these other desires in order to get to the same conclusions is, in my mind, like geo-centric theorists adding epicycles upon epicycles to their theory that all things revolve around the earth to make them consistent with the observed motions of planets. Eventually, this complexity has to give way to the simplest theory. And the simplest theory is that people get to these concusions through the mistake of intrinsic values.

In short, for the subjectivist to get even close to all of the same concusions that one gets to with a false assumption of intrinsic value requires a huge and convoluted network of likes, dislikes, and other relationships. It is very complex. So, I hold, subjectivism does not explain the way people actually speak when they talk about moral value. It utterly fails to provide the simplest explanation for this phenomena.

Gurdur

Wouldn't you be better off doing an academic course on philosophy, aesthetics and philosophy of morality ?
While attempting to do it all off your own bat may be tempting, you're not getting anywhere very fast.

Strawman.
Subjectivism is not an attempt to explain either morality or the way people speak about morality.
Subjectivism is actually the result of philosophical explorations, and evolutionary biology, with a healthy dose of comparative anthropology and history. It is not their explanation.

You want an explanation ?
See evolutinary biology, discourse theory, linguistic semantics and cognitive psychology instead.

The AntiChris

Suppose we replace "Guinness" in the above with "not being raped". Would you still accuse me of appealing to the intrinsic goodness of 'non-rape'?

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

Another one?

12 years as a full-time student with a Moral Philosophy major is not enough?


First, a reminder, I am raising my objections to only one type of subjectivism. Individual-subjectivism (in the form of agent-subjectivism, assessor-subjectivism, and egoistic-subjectivism).

I have argued elsewhere that other types of subjectivism (universal subjectivism) avoids many of these problems.

Second, all types of subjectivism has to deal with relationships between premises and conclusions. If those arguments are invalid, then it does not matter how we may explain our tendancy to use those relationships, they remain invalid.

Individual-subjectivists cannot get to all of the conclusions they claim to be able to get to using the premises that they claim to accept. That is a problem. And no study of evolutionary biology or comparative anthropology can make an invalid inference valid.

Universal subjectivism CAN reach all of these conclusions quite easily. (As can intrinsic value theory, but it has its own problems.) Plus, it is compatible with subjectivism.