Primal

Well then you are at odds with the said article. As well as many conceptions of what relativism is.


How then are the vindicated at all? Again lies the problem with saying "there are no absolutes" as it implies an absolute.



How is logic then to be taken seriously if it is arbitrary?


Yes they can. A relativist can embrace anything he or she feels like. I have actually written about this in previous posts. However given relativist premises logic cannot be taken seriously, only viewed as arbitrary. That is what it means to say a logical argument is as equal as an illogical one i.e. it suggests no one is closer to the truth. That each one is only a given prejudice. Hence the relativist can accept logic when conveniant, and abandon logic when conveniant.

This is why I don't like getting into relativism. They can even deny what relativism is, if someone else defined it as the position that "there are absolutes"....then so what? A relativist can even embrace contradiction, a relativist for example can say 2 plus 2 equals 5, why then can they not say "I am a relativist but I accept absolutes"? And if they can do that, why even bother debating with them?

Merely invoking relativism because you are afraid of believing in God is bad argument indeed. And if anything such a viewpoint discredits secularism more then it supports it, as it makes secularism look whimsical.

Also it can backfire, as then a christian relativist can then say they "Believe in God" and the Bible "counts as rational proof"....and what can a relativist really say to him or her besides "It isn't"? As both are ultimately just conveniant tools, none being better in some real "absolute" sense then the other.

Dominus Paradoxum

quote:____________________________________________ _____To make an analogy to a blind person a computer has a certain feeling to it. This feeling the blind man identifies as a computer. Now someone states there is a certain look to the computer as well, but the blind man insists "well it cannot be,one is identified by a certain feeling another by how it looks." If it is the same computer how come he cannot see it? Is it because they are two different computer or the computer has two fundamentally different aspect to it with the computer seen not being the same as the one felt?

No, the answer lies in the fact that the blind man merely cannot see. It's a problem with processing certain aspects of the enviroment not any difference in the enviroment or object in question itself.

I imagine had I the wiring too more or less link up to another brain, I'd see exactly what they were seeing, feel exactly what they are feeling.

The neurons are equivalent to mental activity, the difference then between seeing mere neurons and seeing through the eyes of another, so to speak, is how the information is processed exactly. In one sense they are done so via the eye, in another by the mind directly. The difference is thus one of processing only.
__________________________________________________ ___

Processing is certainly a necessary condition for vision, but it does not follow that it is *identical* to it in the Leibnizian sense. The view you seem to be taking, wheter you realise it or not, is not materialist in the *strict* sense of that term. If I am not mistaken, you believe in double aspect theory; that mental events are neural events, as the brain sees them "from the inside". In other words, mental properties are just certain high level properties of neural events, so together they make up one entity, as space and time are unified in spacetime. Thus, a philosopher would classify your view as "physicalism", the term "materialism" is usually reserved for those who deny that neural events have any qualitative, experiental aspect, in addition to their 'functional' properties. As for the second part, rationalism is an epistemological thesis about the kind of knowledge we can have about the world. The view you advocate is empiricist, not rationalist, unless by 'rationalist' you simply mean someone who is a freethinker.

AnthonyAdams45

This is the bedrock of our discussion. You may certainly posit matter instead of mind. I may posit mind instead of matter (coincidentally, I don't). In fact, at the last, posit we must, for on empirical grounds alone, we cannot choose between idealism and materialism. Observationally, they are identical. I think most adherents of either view say exactly the same things in their attempts to describe the world, except where one says "matter," the other says "mind."

But not "my mind." Never "my mind." That is solipcism, and idealists do not want to be solipcists. I grant you, I don't think subjective idealists can escape that slide, but objective idealism cannot be swept out so easily as all that. The difficulties they face are largely faced by materialists as well, as Dominus is trying to suggest.

Other minds are not other substances any more than aluminum and helium are differing substances, metaphysically speaking. If an object is defined by its properties, then there is no difference between knowing it and its existence. "To be is to be perceived" remember?

And what's so wonderful about parsimony anyway? I had a professor who proposed the principle of generosity, suggesting that the world may not be all that simple, so why not posit what you need to make sense of it.

Primal

Yes, the problem lies with the blind man, not the computer. Not seeing is merely not being able to process information a certain way.



What is the Liebnizian sense here?


Actually it is.

Actually the term physicalism often times includes other things and only refers to philosophy of mind. It often times does not imply that neural activity is purely material whereas I think it is. In reality your just defining the term "materialist" far too narrowly.
My theory only involves a "double aspect" in as much as "hearing" is a different aspect from seeing. I propose no actual, physical, divide, the divide is only a matter of perception.

No actually the view I take is rationalist because I do not think knowledge is strictly a matter of observation and hence always provisional.

An empricist thinks the mind starts tabula rasa and knowledge is only gained through sense experience. I do not think the mind is tabula rasa and believe certain types of knowledge can be arrived at through sense experience not just observation.reflections of observation.

It seems that you wish to label me something I am not. "You are not really a materialist" or "you are not a rationalist" however you often times fail to give a good reason why. Please confront my arguments as they are instead of trying to label me something I am not.

Primal

Yes, I agree here. This is why I am not apeal to empirical but conceptual and semi-conceptual grounds.


Yes, it is a matter of interpretation but not all interpretations are equal.

Yes I agree. But objective idealism then suffers some problems:

1) It has to posit some sort of over-arching or super mind: for Berkley this was God. However such a mind is superfluous.

2) The original idealist argument stems from "why presume there is something beyond which I can see...like matter?" However they then at this point, posit the existence of an external over-mind, a sort of God. This creates a sort of contradiction in the system, and creates a vicious circularity. As then the existence of the other must be dependent on someone's mind however that some one would then be dependent on the God's mind.

3) It still creates many problems concerning how the mind operates. Like I said causality in the materialist perspective is "blind" and in no need of further explanation. However causality in the idealist viewpoint is "guided" and thus in need of further explanation and assumptions.


No because the materialist need not posit any sort of God or supreme consciousness to adhere to any sort of objectivism. They need but posit a different interpretation i.e. a different substance.

Yes but in that sense definition, in the sense of what the object *is* or the object's identity would require no perciever. Do not confuse this with "defined" in the sense of human identification. If "to be is to be percieved" the viewpoint mus either collapse into a sort of solipsism or a sort of supernaturalism.

It is preferred because if people were allowed to add as many assumptions as they wished to a theory, literally any could be advocated.

Also because the more guesses you make the more chance one has of running into error. As one goes away from the raw data one's guess becomes but one among an infinite amount, all of which have an equal chance of being true. Parsimony is thus used to filter the theories and to stay as close to the raw data as possible.

Yes I agree, the world is not simple. I do not propose the principle of parsimony of existential ground but epistemic grounds. Anyone who thinks parsimony works because the universe is actually "simple" is mistaken. The principle works because human beings are fallible, and without certain restrictions are likely to delve into flights of fancy.

Without parsimony for example creationism would be on equal ground with evolution, as would geocentrism with modern astronomy. This is because given enough room, supporters of either geocentrism or creationism could make enough assumptions to make their viewpoint fit the data. However when parsimony is invoked it cuts away the chaff theories and leaves only the best ones behind. The theories that now fit the data while making the fewest assumptions (evolution and modern astronomy).

AnthonyAdams45

And why is that? To explain why we all agree? But we don't. To explain why the world doesn't blink on and off like a strobe? How would we know? And what difference would it make? And even if idealists posit an over-mind, that over-mind is not different in kind, but only degree, and so remains a monism. And if you literally are worried about positing any more entities than necessary, surely solipsism is the way to go: just one entity.

How so? Mental properties are not the products of intentions. Are you conflating claims about substance with claims about psychology?

But flights of fancy sometimes get the job done.

Addendum

Parsimony leaves only the best theories behind? According to what standard? Parsimony's?

AnthonyAdams45

Maybe. But most definitions of relativism are provided by non-relativists, so it doesn't worry me. I think my characterization is a fairly even-handed condensation of what most relativists would agree to. (For all that's worth.)

Relativism seeks no vindication, provides no rest, takes nothing seriously, except the agon, the game, which by its very nature is not serious.

Truth is the outcome of the game. You and I play according to the same set of rules, we can judge who has won and who has lost, even though the rules of the gane are arbitrary. If we are playing two different games, no judgment can be passed, but so what, we're playing two different games. To require different games to have the same outcome begs the question for absolutism.

Primal

The difference is without it, we wouldn't have what you call an "objective" world and hence no objective idealism. That would make the existence of other minds for example, dependent on my own mind, and hence the system would sink back into solipsism.


Never said it wasn't, though it seems the over-mind would be different in kind.


Because solipsism has many problems(remember the principle is: posit no more entities then is necessary not posit no entities at all). Among which is the inability to maintain Occam's Razor itself, which relies on the idea that people can "make stuff up", something utterly impossible for a solipsist to do.


According to observation and what we know of human nature, along with its fallibility. Parsimony reduces chance of error made by being too fanciful. Meaning that those theories least likely to error(by making fewest assumptions) make it.


Which is why I don't take relativism seriously.

Do we now? That's presuming the same rules apply to both of us, but if I was a relativist I can merely say your wrong because the Bible says so and be over it. Remember even the above argument with its standards(that absolutism requires two different games to have the same outcomes) and (that if we are playing two different games it doesn't matter) and (the same game involves the same rules) are all just arbitrary. I can likewise say the opposite, without any trouble save for arbitrary objection. I can even declare my POV asbolute and not be "wrong" in any concrete sense.Hell I can just declare myself infallible and just get it over with(which every relativistic system does by the way, perhaps not literally but nonetheless).

This is why I simply see relativism as fundamentally irrational and wrong. You cannot argue with a guy who will claim to see no tree when one is right in front of his face and you know he can see.

You cannot start with the axiom "all statements are arbitrary" and end up with the conclusions "thus statement x is objective/true/absolute."

Likewise I cannot start with my own belief "some axioms are true and self-evident" and end up with the conclusion "thus all beliefs are arbitrary". There is no valid way to do this.

Hugo Holbling

I try to be civil to you and this is what i'm faced with. I'd ask you to point out where i acted "childish", but what's the point? Nothing gets through... :banghead:

... but the article says, quite clearly:

It then goes on to describe relativism rather differently:

You could perhaps have attacked these claims, as i asked, instead of embarrassing yourself at the outset. In any case, your objections are easily dealt with.

You said:

One word suffices to deal with all such arguments: intersubjective. You and i could agree that no vocabulary is more or less valid than any other and still use one on the basis of intersubjective agreement as to how we shall decide between ideas and courses of action, for example. Unfortunately this is evidently well beyond you. I've given up hope of your actually answering the points i put to you or reading what i've written or linked to, so i leave you to your nonsense.

In answer to your question, you could find understanding if you weren't so keen to dismiss ideas beyond your narrow and superficial reading of them.

What a waste of time... :banghead:

AnthonyAdams45 wrote:

This is a nice explication, AA. I'll be glad to discuss relativism with you some more, if you're interested. To begin with, wouldn't you say that your passage is summed up just nicely with that word "intersubjective"?

Keith Russell

Hugo:

1) They all assert that one thing (e.g. moral values, beauty, knowledge, taste, or meaning) is relative to some particular framework or standpoint (e.g. the individual subject, a culture, an era, a language, or a conceptual scheme).

2) They all deny that any standpoint is uniquely privileged over all others.

If all forms of relativism agree to the above, then how does one choose a 'standpoint', when one first must acknowledge that no standpoint is 'uniquely prviviledged over' any 'others'?

Wouldn't such a relativism reject reason, since reason asserts that rational positions certainly are priviledged over all others?

And, sans reason, how can any standpoint be defended?

Wouldn't they each be as arbitrary--as equal--as any other?

Keith.