Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Dr Rick :

The burden of proof is on the positive claimant. Therefore, when a theist asserts that some instance of suffering is necessary for a greater good, and it's not obvious how it would be, it's her job to provide reasons to think it actually is necessary for a greater good.

The atheist will say of any apparently gratuitous instance of suffering that it doesn't seem to be necessary for a greater good, and therefore, there's no reason to believe it is in fact necessary for a greater good.

Some theists have attempted to offer reasons why some suffering is necessary for a greater good; see, for example, the Free Will Defense, the Soul Making Theodicy, and the Contrast Theodicy. Yet if all of these and their relatives fail, the only position left is theistic skepticism, a.k.a. the Unknown Purpose Defense. But if the Unknown Purpose Defense is taken to answer the evidential argument from evil, it's not clear why a similar defense can't be used to justify skepticism about any empirical fact. Some philosophers have also argued that such a defense leads to a form of moral nihilism in which we cannot be sure we ought to intervene to prevent suffering.

K

Thomas:

This is an interesting point. I've thought along similar lines before, but I'd like to see how you take it further...

I'll try to give an overview. Please bear with me as I'm not really great at explaining things.

The proof of the existence of GC rests in the fact that existence is greater than non-existence. The Existence trait is therefore maximized (set to Exists) independ of all GC's other traits. That implies that the traits of GC are completely orthogonal (they can be set to any value without out any regard to values of the other traits).

Now we can look at the Benevolence trait. If it were maximized independent of the rest of GC's traits, it would clearly result in a universe with no evil whatsoever. However, we do live in a universe that contains a great deal of evil.

The defense always involves limiting GC's Benevolence because of another trait. For example, GC's wisdom prevents eliminating all evil because of a plan for greater good. This clearly demonstrates that GC's traits are not orthogonal. GC can not be infinitely wise and still reduce the amount of evil in the universe to zero.

If GC's traits are not orthogonal, then there is no reason to believe that the Existence trait can be set to Exists without taking the values of all other traits into account. This means that a GC candidate might have its Existence trait limited to Doesn't Exist because it also has an omnipotence trait. Another GC canditate might have an Existence trait of Exists, but that might limit its Potence and Benevolence traits to something far less than Omni.

I think I understand. If God were less wise, he would eliminate even the evil that's necessary for a greater good.

Exactly. His wisdom is limiting His ability to reduce the amount of evil to zero. Only by paring back His wisdom (and probably many other traits), do we reach a point where He can reduce evil to zero. Wisdom and Benevolence are not orthogonal for God. One can not be set arbitrarily without regard to the value of the other.

Then by "God's existence trait is maximized" you would mean "God exists", and by "God's existence trait is not maximized" you would mean "God doesn't exist."

Right again.

Of which particular argument are you speaking?

All of the arguments that have based on the idea that GC exists because existence is greater than non existence. If the traits of GC are not independent, then there is no reason to believe that a GC candidate that exists has any of the Omni-traits normally associated with it.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by K :

This is a very interesting response to the ontological argument. You go from the fact that his traits can't be maximized independently to the fact that one particular one may not be maximizable with the others. It's a useful way to look at the problem.

K

Thomas:

I guess I'd prefer to say that there is no reason to believe that the particular trait can be maximized without regard to the values of the other traits. Existence may be independent of all the other traits (I highly doubt it, but I haven't proven otherwise). But, since the proof of the existence of GC hinges on maximizing this trait independent of the values of all other traits, it must be shown to be true for the proof to have any merit. This is especially true when ED proposes that there is at least one trait that is dependent on the value of another. The value of the Wisdom trait limits the maximum of the Benevolence trait to something less than what it would be if the universe were to be made evil free.