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Freethought & Rationalism ArchiveThe archives are read only. |
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#21 | ||||
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Dr. Retard:
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So physical regularity would just be a presupposition of naturalism and not something the naturalist feels the need to explain. The theist might similarly wish to claim that theism just means at least that "There is a rational being beyond the natural world." You said: Quote:
"Now we take it as a given that the physical world exhibits regularity. The question is: which hypothesis better explains this regularity, is it theism or naturalism? My claim is that, prima facie, theism does better. This is because theism implies the effects of a rational being beyond the physical world. In contrast, naturalism implies nothing that would lead one to expect physical regularity. So, on this score, theism is superior." Later you said: Quote:
Then you said: Quote:
Is it more "bizarre" that a conscious being would simply exist and not be dependent upon physical systems than that a physical universe would simply exist and not be dependent on anything? You gave one argument for accepting that the former is more bizarre. You basically appealled to the same reasoning I mentioned above with regard to Michael Martin. You said "every personal agent with which we are acquainted is causally dependent upon natural laws for its behavior". This seems initially to be a strong argument but I am not so sure. First of all, we currently have no theory of consciousness and are completely in the dark about how a physical system gives rise to conscious states. All we really have are lots of correlations between conscious states and the brains of higher animals. Secondly, we have no reason to believe that our sample of conscious agents is representative of conscious agents in general. If we had a theory of consciousness we might be able to argue that there cannot be a conscious being unless it is dependent on a physical system. How could we know if there was such a dependence unless we had a theory of consciousness? So it seems that such an inductive argument as you suggest appeals to a class of things for which we may not be justified in believing is representative. So we are back where we started. Is it more reasonable to believe that all minds are dependent upon matter or not? If God exists then at least one mind exists that is not so dependent. And if materialism is true then all minds are dependent upon matter. Why would it be more unusual to say that a mind simply exists uncaused than to say that matter simply exists uncaused? |
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#22 | |||
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Synaesthesia:
You said: Quote:
My argument was that solipsism is superior to naturalism just as naturalism is superior to theism with regard to Occam's razor. Since solipsism is absurd and Occam's razor implies we should accept it when determining our metaphysical scheme, I assume that Occam's razor does not apply to metaphysics and is only useful in science. You also said: Quote:
Lastly you said: Quote:
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#23 | ||
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TD,
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Yet, what stops us from postulating a brute fact that the sun "just rises from the east and sets in the west"? Or that "computers just work"? The problem here is that the premises themselves are too complicated when explanations exist to simplify them, hence Occam's Razor can effectively cut the former brute facts and replace them with the latter ones. For example, hence I can explain the motion of the sun via rotation of the earth, I did not set the motion of the sun itself as brute fact; the alternate explanation is much simplier. I think the crux of the matter lies in the idea that even axiomic principles can be evaluated. Just because you can label something as axiomic does not mean that it's immune to tests, especially with Occam's Razor and its requirements of simplicity. Saying that one's observations are brute facts is good, but giving a set of well-defined laws that coincide with those observations precisely yet are vastly simplier is even better. |
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#24 |
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Kenny:
The first question in my first post should have included the term "merely" and it greatly alters what the question seems to imply. I apologize for that confusion. I was not suggesting that theism does not add another being to our ontology. Clearly it does. I was just pointing to a way of conceiving of God that seems to capture what sophisticated theists have meant by the concept. Theists are making a claim about the fundamental nature of reality. They are saying that at the ground floor there is a personal being of great purposeful power and knowledge. Everyone stops somewhere with their explanations. And for that person that stopping place just is the ground floor. The ground floor is conceived of as that which simply is. (ie. that for which there is no set of necessary and/or sufficient conditions for it to obtain or be the case; that which is the case unconditionally and independently of every other fact). The theist might claim that his view is more parsimonious since he believes that only one entity has that status. The naturalist seems to believe that there are billions of brute facts that correspond to each fundamental particle and field of force. Of course the atheist can simply reply that we know the universe exists and see no good reason to go beyond it. But maybe there is an ambiguity here. "I do not believe there is anything beyond the physical world" is not the same thing as "I believe that there is nothing beyond the physical world." Does Occam's razor support both? At any rate, I personally believe there are good reasons to believe there is no god and I am not particularly interested in trying to apply Occam's Razor to the issue. |
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#25 | |
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Datheron:
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Also, the solipsist has no problem with accepting scientific theories. He will simply say the entities in scientific theories are useful fictions. To him, they do not refer to things that actually exist. To him , they are mere abstractions. They are mathematical models in his mind that allow him to predict future sensations. He will want to know why he should reify them. |
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#26 | ||||
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TD,
I've had this discussion with The Loneliest Monk, so let's see if we can go further with this one. Quote:
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#27 | |
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Transworldly Depraved,
I quite agree that the application of Occam’s razor to metaphysical principles can be a slippery proposition. There is one point about it that I would like to clarify though. The principle is not simply a matter of cramming as few entities into your theories as possible, it is about ensuring that all of the entities that your theory DOES involve, actually support it in a meaningful way. The key point I want to make is that plurality should not be posited without necessity. Imagine we had a dualistic theory of matter. Every substance is actually the same non-discrete stuff. What gives various substances their different properties is some undetectable spiritual force. Although it involves only two entities rather than the dozens involved in the atomic theory of matter, occam’s razor would, interestingly, rule it out. I do not claim to be able to do anything so grandiose as explain existence, but I have not yet been satisfied that the god theory is necessary or even useful in understanding this world. Quote:
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#28 | |||
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Join Date: May 2001
Location: Vienna, Austria
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When I define good as the absence of all evil, evil becomes a positive property. Thus the greatest being of the Ont.Arg. becomes supremely evil. Why personhood and consciousness are basic properties of being - and not derived properties of particular physical systems of sufficient complexity - is another unanswered question. In short, I submit that the Ont.Arg. - and all similar arguments - makes sense only for those who already believe. Which excludes me. Regards, HRG. |
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#29 | |||||
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Datheron:
You said: Quote:
The reason is obvious. The naturalist postulates the existence of everything the solipsist does plus the existence of billions of fundamental particles, their properties, their relations to each other, and a sophisticated mechanism by which events in the physical world cause sensations. Both the solipsist and naturalist believe the solipsist exists and his sensations occur but the naturalist goes on to add in addition to this the complexity I just mentioned. The solipsist can believe that solipsism is as complex as he likes, however, he does not see a reason to add complexity by embracing naturalism. Further, you made the assertion that: Quote:
You quoted me and then said: Quote:
You also said: Quote:
Lastly, you said: Quote:
And, I do not see that the theist is committed to any claims about dinosaurs. |
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#30 | |||
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Synaesthesia:
You said: Quote:
Theism claims that the physical world is the product of the intentional action of a personal being. I find this meaningful whether or not it is true or false. You also said: Quote:
Lastly, you said: Quote:
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