owleye

Synthesthesia...

"You claim that the fact that we know of no mental activity that can operate independent of brain processes doesn't even support the view that mental activity is brain activity? What else is there?"

I'd make the analogy with the hardware - software distinction. Software activity cannot "operate independent" of hardware activity, but this would not "support the view" that software activity is hardware activity. The two "operate" in different domains. The one according to logical laws, while the other according to physical laws. (This is not to say that I believe mental laws are to be identified with logical laws -- rather I'm suggesting that (some) mental life is analogous to the domain in which logic and rationality resides -- there they do not operate in accordance with laws of physics. Indeed, cartoon physics (if you are familiar with this) is a better characterization of how our mind works than what Newton's laws give us.

"The fact that brains are known to be able to do things (like talk, react, go to sleep, see, hallucinate) that we normally attribute to the mind is certainly suggestive to me."

This is where we part company. I can understand the brain being involved in all the above activity, but saying that the brain talks or sees is no more than an anthropomorphism.

"I personally think that the difference is more one of emphasis. It's obvious that our theories do actually indicate something real. Whether we think of a particle is real is directly proportional to the amount of other theories that can be covered by it's explanatory scope."

I'd assumed that excreationist would say that what scientists say about the existence of these theoretical particles (i.e., the so-called Standard Model which describes all of these particles) is true (and therefore accurately portrays what exists), because he would say (and did say) that these theoretical particles existed. He hedged on this, however, indicating that science provides only the best explanation we have at present. I found this, at least on the surface, to be inconsistent.

"Similarly, philosophers who 'deny that consciousness' is real simply emphasize that consciousness is built into theories that are likely inaccurate in important respects."

I'm not sure I understand this. Is this supposed to bear on the question of whether or not observation statements are (or can be) true. If so, I don't think philosophers who deny they are (or can be) would necessarily deny the existence of consciousness. They would, I assume, deny the existence of what consciousness is conscious of and instead suggest that it is exclusively a construction of the mind (which includes consciousness).

"To clearly distinguish what is real from what is 'merely' theoretical is to misunderstand the theoretical nature of our construction of reality."

I look forward to your straightening out this misunderstanding of the "theoretical nature of our construction of reality."

owleye

owleye

DRFseven...

"But all signal processing does not involve self-modulation."

I gather this is an additional requirement you would place on signal processing in order to regard it as having mental powers.


"We exist in our environments by detecting signals and transforming these signals into advantageous behavior."

This reflects a behaviorist view of living organisms.

"How does this transformation occur? We are "self-regulating" organisms in an open-feedback system (where extrinsic factors are part of the loop) due, it is becoming apparent, to neuromodulary effect. Various chemicals are triggered by stimuli to act on different receptor sites that combine to cause modification of input-output (threshhold) function as well as changes in afferent/efferent properties. An essential part of this modification involves modulation of memory function because of its role as intrinsic stimulator in the process of neuromodulation."

This is all very interesting, but I don't think it is particularly relevant to the issue of the mental of humans. Behaviorists, generally speaking, are not much interested in our mental life. Indeed, as Skinner has indicated, it can only be behavior that is subject to evolutionary pressure. The experiences of pain and pleasure, for example, can not possibly be biologically advantageous or disadvantageous.

owleye

Mr. Sammi

DRFseven,

The process of alteration is done through elements of change or processes that are specifically geared to facilitate change.

My best discription of this using "today's language", is topological operations. A topological operator and its data are married and the baby which is born assumes the identity of the altered data, information-knowledge in fact, construed from the initial data-information. The topological operator "wrests" information from the data based on the topological operation set. Just as a cute joke the grandaughter of this would be the topological-knowledge-operations, arriving from pure knowledge-information operations.

Now, I can assume we have basic topological operations engendered by the genetic code, these operators unless themselves alterable I consider part of the body or part of LowerBeing.

Topological operators which can be created, updated, modified, and so on, exist in "the mind" as part of ThinkingBeing. Some operators will be shared so to speak by being genetically stamped an unalterable part of the body VS. menetic operators which can be altered or recreated but has access to the same information set as the genetic topological operators. This I consider the John Page border. Is this adequate or are there more questions?

Sammi Na Boodie ()
Ps. As an amateur philosopher I am not actually concerned at this moment about physical processes, if this means anything.

[ July 09, 2002: Message edited by: Sammi ]</p>

owleye

John...

"Agreed we need a third person (i.e. more objective than first person) account of brain/body effects that explain how and why the first person account occurs."

An anesthetist is able to control the state of consciousness of a patient (at least most of the time). However, what it is controlling is not really understood. I can control the course a river takes by altering the river bed through which it flows, but what it tells me nothing about what its like to be a river (assuming here that the river has a mind of its own). Third person accounts of the experiences of others depends entirely on the ability to have shared experiences. I just don't see how it is possible to have an objective account of an experience without making use of one's own experiences. Moreover, even though we presumably share experiences, we have no way to describe (in language) that experience. You seem to think we can. I want to know how you think we can.

"I don't understand why you make such a definite statement that the mind will remain a mystery after we have a coherent explanation as above. I think it remains to be seen."

Explanations of this sort make use language. How can language get at how we experience things? Let's suppose the state of neuroscience is as advanced as it would have to be to solve the problem you think it is capable of. What sort of "explanatory statement" could be made that would explain a thought? Would it look something like this?

A thought is produced when XYZ has occurred in the brain.

How, then, would XYZ inform us about the content of the thought? What else would have to be known about the brain in order to answer this?

"You might be interested in this thread and the links contained therein Color discussion thread"

I might, but I would assume you would have something to say about how green is perceived and whether or not green is perceived by each of us in the same way.

"Yes, I do. As to a definition, that's why I started the thread. Based on responses so far I'm leaning toward properties that define a physical state that contains intrinsic information, thus giving rise to an abstract mental state."

It may be this will bring some satisfaction to you, but if you think it will lead you to understand the mind, I say you are living in a dream world.

"The intrinsic information can be derived from external sense data and from internal data such as memories or the results of other mind/brain processes. I know this isn't clear but I'm trying to arrive at a strict existential definition that excludes all anthropomorphisms, assumptions that there is a perceiving "I" and everything phenomenally external to the mind (since that is just "stuff" interpreted by the mind through the senses."

It is in the very nature of this objective orientation of mental activity that it will fail to provide any comprehension of what mental life is about.

"Yes, its tempting to go into the "maze" and that's why I want to stay at the very edge (philosophically). I think we should be defining the Mind/Body Border and I think it can be defined."

The use of "define" is inappropriate here. I think a better term would be "determine." Since from the beginning of this thread I have consistently objected to your use, I wonder why you persist. Perhaps its because its another of your private definitions of what 'definition' means, which, of course, doesn't endear me to what you have to say.

"If we cannot zoom in on the border then we have no ontological basis to be discussing the mind and mental properties at all."

I suspect you don't understand what ontology means.


"If you accept that we can perceive things in our environment isn't it just a question of finding out what is being perceived, what is doing the perceiving and how."

Hmm.. I gather it is not enough to say that the answer to the first question (what) is that the object of perception is what is perceived. And I gather it is not enough to say that we are doing the perceiving. On the last question, however, I may be interested in the physiology of sight, but having a physiological explanation would not be adequate to explaining perception unless it could tell me about its content.

"Unfortunately, beyond the sensory layer things get very complicated so we have to resort to the abstract for meta-explanations."

All explanations are abstract. Your problem is that you don't even know what it is that you are looking for.

owleye

DRFseven

Yes; a cogntive behaviorist one, as well. Transformation of incoming signals to behavior does not discount mental events in any way. In fact, the majority of our behaviors derive from the process of cognition.

You don't think memory is relevant to the process of thinking in humans? I think it is the whole schebang. For instance, my little granddaughter and my Golden Retriever are about the same age, three years, but the dog is unencumbered by some of the associations that bother the child. Just last week she put her arms around her grandfather's neck and said, "Pop, when you die, I'm gonna get you out of the skimmer." Now the dog adores Pop, too, but is seemingly untroubled by any thoughts of his possible demise, even though he sees the skimmer being emptied, daily, of its contents of dead bugs, along with the occasional baby bird or mole. Why does she think about what death means and why does she associate it with the skimmer? Memory.

John Page

This is what I have assumed, thanks for clarifying.
Pretty much agreed, although I consider the "picking out" as part of the generalized process of perception. This does not necessarily describe conscious perception, however, where the conscious mind seems to have the ability to select what it focuses on (i.e. a sophisiticated picking process). I believe we are perceiving and thinking whether we our consciousness apprehends or not - I think this is supported by much split brain experimentation.
While I am not a strict physicalist, I do believe existential evidence requires empirical space/time data. Maybe I'm a functionalist but I don't require everythng to be defined in terms of its function/purpose. IMO, while hypotheses are useful in projecting possible explanations, objective proofs cannot be obtained without relating theory back to real testable examples. This final step is the one that separates the pink unicorns from the girls, so to speak.
How else but through a comparison can we arrive at the differences and similarities between things? Admitted, there are many ways to compare the qualities of things - height, depth, distance, smell, distribution over time, relationship to other objects etc.
Surely there are instances of concepts that have location. These are what I am refering to. Here's an example. You have a concept of a zebra in your brain, I have a concept of a zebra in my mind. They are different IMO, there is no great zebra in the sky that we are jointly perceiving. The concept of the zebra may be treated like any other sense or sense derived impression. The concept of a zebra is retained in your brain through some process of learning/memorization. The concept of zebra is used in testing (comparing) incoming sense impressions to detect the presence of a zebra in the reality external to the mind.
Under this model, there is no need for any locationless concepts. However, the model could be flawed and if you have any evidence supporting the existence of the latter I'd be very interested to learn about it.
Not only do I propose to specify, I have specified. Here's a very brief summary. Truth exists only in the mind. A value "true" results from the comparison of two sets of information and the resulting assumption that they are identical. Consider the Law of Identity, if you apply this strictly how can anything be anything else? This explains why truth is only provisional, if entities were perfect copies of each other you wouldn't be able to tell the difference.
None, as far as I know! I am not proposing that the laws of logic are physical laws, just that they depend upon physical substrate for their operation. Contradictions are created through inconsistent interpretations of information about reality.
I think we're going round in circles here. With these definitions I go back to your assertion that if we perceive something its real and compare this with your other assertion of locationless concepts (which are therefore not real). I also seem to recollect that you have used two differing definitions of real, when I enquired about this your comment was "Interesting isn't it" At the end of the day, I don't see it is necessary for either of us to reconcile absolutely with dictionary definitions.

I would like to suggest that contradictions are features of the mind, of the mind's internal language and its results.
Which exemplifies possible inconsistency in the use of the word concrete - which is it? I drew up my reality diagram in an attempt to avoid such ambiguity.
Your last sentence is a misconception IMO which you arrive at my assuming that mathematical and logic laws have little or no dependence on the physical universe. On the contrary, they are merely expressions of relationships between things (some of which are abstract and others physical) that our minds have come to know.

Do you concur the universe existed before humankind invented mathematics? If so, this puts a whole in the "timeless" theory of ideals.

I would also observe that our "ideals" do vary over time - my concept of a chair today is different than when I first learned the meaning of chair.
Without you providing your view or a hypothetical view for debate I'm finding the dialog difficult.
The paper contains a generalized example for the operation of set membership ruels and a specific example for membership of the set of 3. Exactly how the brain deals with language rules - I can't offer that and suggest you look to neurological investigations that provide much insight into the physical implementation of perception within the brain.
Re objectivity. Yes, but that would require a more substantiated claim of objectivity ad nauseum.
Agreed - I'm not trying to make excuses for reality, just trying to understand it. I wish I could find it more clear cut.
Not independent. It is the domain/extent to which the truth is applied that is the issue. I guess that's why I'm making such a big deal about the border of the mind, in my perception the stuff outside the mind can be independently verified in a repeatable manner. The stuff of the imagination need not have an external correlate as in the case of Santa Claus (although I did see him last year...)
Yes, I think data, belief, opinion, knowledge etc. are all notches on a scale of relative subjectivity. The only way to know objectively where you are is to get more data and analyze it thereby increasing the domain in which the results are valid. This includes gaining an understanding of how we perceive what we perceive, this helping us to be more objective about our first person accounts.

In my book, knowledge is acquired through empirical experience, its not just something we've dreamed up. On the other hand, I have no difficulty with your Kantian explanation of knowledge because we experience reality in different ways.

History, for example, has a formal system for categorization of knowledge depending upon the record from which it is extracted e.g. eye witness account is a prime record. Then you can move through formal records to sheer myth and fairy tales (I'll leave god out of this)which gives some indication of the reliability of the information. Another aspect is taking into account, where known, the affiliations of the historian to account for possible bias.

Cheers, John

John Page

Yes, common physiology, reality and cultural references would be (some of the?) preconditions. I don;t see these as insuperable obstacles.
I go on a roller coaster. I go yahoooo! You do the same. Shared experience. Without shared experiences I doubt we'd have much to talk about.

Also, consider an experiment where the subject gives a narrative account of their experience. Later, information regarding the brain activity that went with those experiences is examined. Over time I think we'll discover the correlation between thought and brain activity to derive improved theories of mind.
I would say "An instance of a thought occurs when events XYZ take place in the brain." Thoughts are highly contextual, so you's need to know a lot more about the brain status to deduce or completely explain what the thought was about. The first person account "It is blue" needs location information, context for blueness, the identity of "It" etc.
Yes I do, did you follow the link? Did you also follow the link from the thread?. Here it is again <a href="http://faculty.washington.edu/chudler/eyecol.html" target="_blank">color vision link</a>
How so?
What leads you to make this prediction? I don't think your assertion stacks up against drug treatment of schizophrenia, the results of frontal lobotomies, chopping of limbs and the brain thinks they're still there, widowers who still think their spouses are alive. These examples do seem to relate to what mental life is all about. Where's the counter evidence?
Go check the dictionary, then. How can one express something one has determined unless one defines it? How is the definition meaningful unless one has first determined the facts? You are at liberty to raise semantic points if you wish but I think this one's minor - above I explain why and if you have a problem with it I'd be grateful for an explanation why instead of just your opinion and accusation.
Go check the dictionary. If you're still unhappy perhaps you could provide some reasoning behind your suspicion.
You really should follow the link I provided on vision. It goes beyond what you are probably refering to as physiology (mechanics of detecting light within humans). It provides an explanation of how human's mental activity results in the perception of colors and how they tell them apart from each other. The signals, if you will permit the term, within the brain convey the (encoded?)content. How we interpret these signals "consciously" is not clearly known.
So you can read my mind? Some explanations are at a higher level of abstraction than others, hence my use of the term meta-explanations. I would have thought that the straightforward title of this thread makes is crystal clear what I'm looking for. I'd be obliged if you quit the innuendo, especially as you don't seem willing to provide an alternative explanation or reasons why the mind/body border is a chimera (or whatever it is you wish to propose).

Cheers, John

crocodile deathroll

The tree is analogous to our life's acquired memories; sure you can destroy it you were to chop it down and cut it up into little pieces and destroy the original structure of the tree, but there are inherent in that tree many repeatable processes. You only have to take a cutting and the cutting will then regenerate in the a tree which is cloned and genetically identical to the parent. You could even grow a whole forest of those cloned trees if you are that keen.
Same if you destroy your brain sure you will destroy you life's memories, but the genetic information processes that made the morphology of your brain the emerge in the first place is boundaryless because before you exist it may it would be equally possible for yourself to emerge on another planet on the other side of the universe if the physical conditions were right.
I do not buy the theory that we are a mere accidental convergence of atoms, which when you consider the probability of that occurring given then vast number of atoms on the universe which need to converge on a certain place at a certain time of planet Earth would be so extremely improbable that I am forced to view that as an extremely improbable theory.
I treat "consciousness" as an emergent pattern that emerged the instance physical systems acquired a critical level of complex processes.



Not collective in the sense of mental telepathy between Darwin, Wallace and everyone else on this planet, but collective in the sense there is still a single unified process that underpins the generation of consciousness per se.
I feel there are true assumptions about consciousness:

1. Consciousness can be reduced down to the workings of neurons
2. Neuons reduced down to the workings of proteins
3. Proteins to the workings of DNA
4. DNA to the workings of chemistry
5. Chemisty to the workings of atoms
6. Atoms to the workings of particle physics
7. Particle physics to quantum entanglement
8. Quantum entanglement is a property of all matter in the Universe
9. Now we are going full circle, because neurons are made of matter
   

So if you reduce the mind to matter, which I cannot refute, then it is fair to say you will fall into a cycle of circular reasoning.
So how can consciousness have boundaries when even matter itself has no inherent well defined boundaries due to quantum entanglement?

[ July 09, 2002: Message edited by: crocodile deathroll ]</p>

John Page

croc:

Yes, but are all proteins involved in a conscious process? Is all DNA incorporated in conscious beings? I readily admit that without knowing how the phenomenon of consciousness comes about I'm fumbling in the dark here but is milk conscious because it contains proteins, is DNA itself conscious?

I take your point about ill-defined boundaries and accept that "complex" organisms composed of matter (or what we perceive as matter!) depend upon some hierarchy of biological/chemical/sub-atomic 'fabric'.

I need to think more about "genetic information process". I've proposed elsewhere that information is not (meaningful) information until its perceived by someone or something that can "use" or decode the information. I currently categorize "genetic information" as a repeating pattern in DNA chemistry cause and effect and therefore "mechanically" deterministic. I admit it could be more than this but I don't think DNA has a mind because it doesn't display the behavioral variety I associate with minds.

I concur with the emergent property viewpoint but am less troubled by the improbability of human existence. That the universe seems very large admits statistically that improbable things can happen. If only we could find a non-carbon based lifeform to chew this one over...

Cheers, John

excreationist

owleye:
I thought I'd reply now even though I'm tired - so that I don't put this off any longer. Note that I'm going to stop responding to part of this discussion soon - maybe about the discussion about the moon... or maybe about the brain (since I need to do research about it).

...The question is not an epistemological one. It is not a matter of how sure you are that observations are true. It is a matter of a systematic understanding of what is real and what is exclusively a construction of the mind. Note that one view of reality is that the object of perception could be real, but not as it is represented to us -- this being a pure construction. This could be what you are getting at.
Well I think that there is external physical reality and the current realities that we (our brains) perceive that we have based on our current beliefs (based on our interaction with the external physical world).
So I'm saying there are different types of realities. Maybe I've been confused about that...
Earlier I said that if something is real (physically reality) then it has to be a part of physical reality. (There is also what is "real" according to someone's beliefs... from their point of view) But I'll just assume "real" refers to physical reality. Physical reality involves physical matter, energy, gravity, time, etc.
I'll just reanswer those 3 questions:
Q1. Do unobservables exist? -- i.e., What is the ontological status of the class of so-called theoretical entities that comprise the standard model used in contemporary physics and chemistry?
If they really are part of physical reality (i.e. the theories are correct) then those unobservables exist. (Even if they are theoretical and non-existent, the *concept* exists in the scientist's brain as neurally encoded information - if no-one has conceived of those specific non-existent entities then they don't exist at all)

Q2. Are theoretical statements true? -- i.e., is what scientists say of the world really true of the world (or is it only what can be known of the world, or is it only the best explanation to date we have of the world)?
I think scientific observations/theories would have a high probability of being accurate but not necessarily have absolute accuracy. They would only be able to observe our physical reality... perhaps we aren't in the outermost reality. (Our universe could be in a computer, etc). But I think that within this physical reality, there is just physical matter - no other substances like human souls, etc.

Q3. Are observation statements true? -- i.e., Is the moon that is allegedly seen real, or merely a conventional construction?
Well I think there's lots of matter in the universe and there's some matter can makes up the Moon entity and some matter than makes up our brains. Using our eyes and brains we can detect and analyse the Moon structure/entity and label it "the Moon". The group of particles (that we indirectly refer to as "the Moon") exists. The particles exist, and so does the group.

Here's that brain picture again: (it will probably be updated soon)

With respect to your diagram about which I would have many objections, let me merely consider the box called Perception....Obviously this is terribly oversimplied, and fails to tell me how it is able to accomplish this feat given sensory input and what short term memory provides. The main difficulty has to do with any process that has two inputs to it. How are these inputs synchronized (if they are clock driven, or matched, if they are are data driven). Does Perception itself fetch the data from its two sources, or does it merely respond to the flow of data provided by one or the other input? Since it is called Short Term Memory, one way of making this work is to call it the data store (or the holding register) so that the other input becomes the data flow. It is then the responsibility of Perception to retrieve what it needs so as to provide its output (presumably in near-real time).
You seem to be using proper flow-chart jargon... BTW, in that diagram, the short-term memory is half-data-store and half-process - it's not a proper flow-chart.
"Perception" should be called something like "Basic Sensory Feature Extraction".
As far as synchonization goes, that "Perception" box could take in its inputs first, then generate its output. (It needs both inputs to generate the output) Note that I'm going to be reading a lot about the brain soon and this diagram will probably be heavily revised.

Whereas you began with photons as input to "Sensory Inputs" presumably they being the carriers of information, the diagram doesn't provide any clue as to how information is carried beyond that. If you decide that the information is somehow embedded in our neural network, it will remain unclear how this gets translated to our experience (of color, location, etc.)
Basically the short-term memory (should be renamed "working memory") is a process and a data store that uses emotional data to formulate goals and learn, etc. Since it uses processes sensory information to weigh up the options, etc, it "experiences" the colors, etc. Basically the working memory part is what "we" are conscious of. The "Perceptions" are areas like the visual cortex and "long term memory" involves the outer parts of the brain. I'll revise this diagram in the near future.
BTW, maybe <a href="http://nivea.psycho.univ-paris5.fr/ASSChtml/ASSC.html" target="_blank">this article</a> will help explain things a bit. Part of its title reads "Experience is not something we feel but something we do". So basically the working memory *does* things, like use problem-solving patterns from long-term memory to work out what future action to take. (What new thoughts to generate or what muscles to move, etc)
I'm just explaining this really badly at the moment but I thought I might as well try and answer this anyway.

In any case, it is possible that babies aren't really aware of anything until this point. At what point would your theory of mind say that babies are aware?
Well earlier in this thread I had a definition of aware systems "...receive input and respond according to its goals/desires and beliefs learnt through experience about how the world works
(self-motivated, acting on self-learnt beliefs) ["self" refers to the system as a whole]"
A baby would probably fulfil this definition... I haven't really seen babies much so I don't know for sure. Anyway, *consciousness* is a different thing - I'd say that you have to reach Piaget's later stages to be considered conscious - so therefore babies don't possess consciousness.

Do you mean specific goals and specific beliefs? Surely some goals (such as those associated with reproduction) are genetically programmed.
Yes an aware creature might have *some* genetically programmed goals, but it also needs to have goals that it has learnt (as the definition said).

"A brain has its own beliefs/expectations, goals, problem-solving strategies, sensory data, etc. Anyway, to be capable of expressing a first-person account, the brain needs to summarize its "train of thought" - probably using language. And this becomes sensory data for itself (it can detect its own commentary - the "voice in its head"). The brain is generating that commentary and that brain forms explicit beliefs that it is continuously generating thoughts and solving problems. So that individual brain has explicit beliefs that it is "conscious" (i.e. it possesses self-consciousness)."

I take this to be your theory (or thesis). Do you have any support for it at all?
Well it's based on lots of New Scientist articles and lots of tid-bits I've picked-up over the years (off of TV, or in books, etc). Most of it is based on intuition and seeing if other books from different disciplines (psychology, etc) agree. NLP has been very influential is this.

Actually, I think this would refer to what is called "physicalism," and not "materialism." In any case, I suspect you haven't really given it much thought. Based on my interactions with you I had originally assumed you were familiar with David Chalmers' analysis of what he calls the hard problem of consciousness and that you were taking the position held by Paul Churchland called "Eliminative Materialism" which essentially denies the existence of the mind altogether. I'm no longer convinced that you are aware of their work.
No I haven't read any of their books. Maybe I'm a functionalist... I don't know. I'm just rattling off here.

What do you mean by the experience of "the pain signal?" This seems a distortion of language. We may be experiencing pain or we may be experiencing heat, the heat of the flame. Undoubtedly there are several lines of neural connections leading to a pain generation center in the brain and a center which generates the feeling of heat in the brain, among other things. Signals radiating from these centers might possibly trigger the experience we have, but it is a distortion to say that we experience the signals.
The brain would be forced to take action to avoid the pain signal, based on its intensity. It experiences this process of avoidance. My main theory is that "we" are the part of the brain that compares all the emotional signals together and works out what to do, relying on learnt problem-solving strategies. And it can direct new things to be learnt... negative emotions create a problem-solving strategy where the contents of working memory are avoided (depending on the intensity of the pain signal) and positive emotions create a problem-solving strategy where the contents of working memory are sought.
Anyway, according to my theory, anything this working memory processes, "we" experience - and it uses the pain signal to discourage us from doing something, so we are "experiencing" the pain, as well as the pain signal. BTW, apparently some people with damaged limbic systems can sense the pain signal but not the compulsion to react to it. It is my guess that they can still experience negative things like rejection - they just don't feel that bodily pain is a negative sensation... I should really find out more information about this...

More distortions. (Under the rewiring scenario) -- I would not seek/repeat the pain signal. Rather, I would expect to seek/repeat what the pain refers me to. Thus, I would seek the pain from the hot flame. Or I would seek the hot flame.
No I'm saying that if you seek/repeat something, it is *pleasure*, even if you are seeking the *former* pain signal. (Assuming that this compulsion was

"I'm talking about a particular structure which has an arbitrary name - in this case the name is "the Moon". I'm emphasizing how arbitrary the label for that structure is."

When I talked about seeing the moon, I'm not referring to the name I give to what the moon refers to.
Ok, so that thing exists then.

[b]It boggles my mind that you would even think this is a consideration. Despite this, however, it is possible you are a nominalist about the moon (i.e., the moon exists in name only).
No I'm not a nominalist... I think. The moon exists as a name as well as a collection of particles. It is different things simultaneously rather than only one thing.

Then it would confirm that you do not take a realist position about the moon. However, you've danced around this.
I think it would be less confusing for me if you just pointed to something and said "that thing over there" rather than give it a name. I hadn't been clear that you're talking about the thing that the phrase "the moon" refers to rather than the words "the moon". It is just that there can be many levels to statements - if you're talking about philosophy.

What I was saying was that the world we _see_ is already 1/2 second behind the actual state of the world. It is not the delay between stimuli and response. The Lebec experiments have confirmed this, though in the world of real-time piloted simulations (one of the areas I worked in during my stint at NASA), the researchers were already familiar with the time lag of conscious experience (of about .4 seconds) that has to be accounted for when a pilot flies the aircraft (as opposed to a robot, for example, which does not need consciousness).
Actually I think about <a href="http://members.ozemail.com.au/~wenke/brainscience/reactiontime.htm" target="_blank">.2 seconds</a> is involved seeing something, and .2 seconds is involved making a binary or more complex decision. So it takes about .4 seconds if you need to choose between two options (e.g. press on button or another depending on the visual stimuli) and about .2 if you only have one button to press. I haven't got an applet to show that at the moment though.