The AntiChris

Sorry Alonzo but this looks like deliberate evasion and obfuscation.

Thanks anyway.

Chris

Wiploc

crc:
> > Would you accept this phrasing: The agent
> > subjectivist commits a logical contradiction
> > when he says both
> >
> > a) the individual agent (discriminator/
> > nondiscriminator) is the only source of morality
> > for himself, and
> >
> > b) other agents ought to agree with me that
> > it is wrong to discriminate.

anti-Chris:
> This would only be a logical contradiction if the
> ought to was used with reference to some
> objective moral 'truth'.
>
> Since, by definition, an agent-subjectivist would
> not be using ought in this sense, there is no contradiction.
>
> Chris

I don't think we're on the same page. You are saying, I think, that if there is no objective moral truth, there is no morality at all, that is, there is no way you "ought" to behave. But people who believe that are not agent subjectivists. An agent subjectivist believes that he ought to do what he wants to do. Thus, as Alonzo pointed out, if agent subjectivism is true, then if someone wants to commit rape he ought to commit rape.

So, we aren't talking about subjectivism as viewed by objectivists; we're talking about subjectivism as viewed by subjectivists, and asking what it takes for someone to be logically consistent within that framework.

An agent subjectivist can logically say, "I want olives on my pizza, therefore I am morally obligated to put olives on my pizza." But she cannot logically say, "I want olives on my pizza, therefore you should put olives on your pizza." The latter would violate her premise that rightness, morality, behavioral obligation, is determined only by the pizza-eating agent.

crc

Wiploc

Let me give it a try then.


Agent subjectivism isn't true, okay. Let's agree on that.

But what if it were true? If it really was true, then someone who wanted to commit rape would be morally obligated to commit rape, right? That's the theory of agent-subjectivism. That's how it works.

When we talk about moral truths, we don't talk about moral truths "in the mind of" a particular agent. If agent-subjectivism is really true, then an agent is really supposed to do what he wants. Someone who wants to commit rape may believe in objective morality; he may believe rape is objectively wrong; he may believe in his own head that all rape is morally wrong, but --- if agent-subjectivism is true (which it is not) --- then he is supposed to commit the rape anyway.


There is no logical inconsistency between agent subjectivism and physically coercing the would-be thief. If agent subjectivism is true, then somebody should steal if he wants to steal; and if somebody wants to use force to stop him from stealing, then he should. Each agent's desire is what determines what is moral behavior for him.

Here's what would be illogical: If an agent subjectivist says, "I don't want you to steal from me, therefore you shouldn't steal from me," she is not being consistent with her agent subjectivism. It is however perfectly consistent for her to say, "You want to steal from me, so you should; and I want to stop you, so am going to hit you with this baseball bat."


Again, this is off base. If I am an agent-subjectivist, and I see you wanting to stop a thief, I don't care what your motives are. According to agent-subjectivism, your desires are the only determinant of how you should behave.

Does any of this help?
crc

The AntiChris

I agree that if an agent-subjectivist used "ought" in this sense that it would be inconsistent with agent-subjectivism.

All I was suggesting was that there are alternative senses in which "ought" can be used. For instance I could suggest, knowing your particular predilection for seafood and ice cream, that you ought to try some of my freshly prepared monkfish sorbet.

Chris

The AntiChris

wiploc

Actually, I am in fact rather drawn to the idea of some form of individual subjectivism.
This seems perfectly reasonable to me.

The problem here is, it seems to me, that Alonzo has suggested that coercion of others (amongst other behaviours) is an indication of logical inconsistency on the part of the subjectivist. When pressed for evidence of this inconsistency, Alonzo responded with:
However Alonzo now appears to be saying that I'm mistaken in taking this to suggest that he believes coercion indicates a logical inconsistency on the part of the subjectivist.

My most recent exchanges with Alonzo have been an attempt, albeit futile, to understand what he really did mean.

Thanks for your help.

Chris

DRFseven

No, because we know that many others have the same goals in mind. In other words, "It is presumed that others want to live as well as possible, which requires cooperation; therefore, others ought to oppose discrimination." In actual fact, "others" might conclude that discrimination is necessary for survival, but this doesn't matter; it is our perception that determines what we think.

In addition, the subjectivist is usually aware that the source of morality is socialization, not a spontaneous generation of beliefs within the individual, and so, would not think that the individual is the only source of morality.

Alonzo Fyfe

Yes, you are mistaken, because such a conclusion requires one additional premise that "this way of justifying coercion is the only method available to the subjectivist."

Which, you and I both know is incorrect.

I assert that the subjectivist cannot argue "A implies B". However, "it is not the case that A implies B" does not mean that B is false.

Nor does it follow that "anybody who holds A does not imply B, and that B is true, is thereby guilty of a logical inconsistency."

B might well be true, and a person may well have different and fully justified reasons for believing that B is true.

What IS logically inconsistent is for a person to hold.

(1) It is not the case that A implies B.
and
(2) A, therefore B.

This is the inconsistency that I am talking about.

You are accusing me of charging the following inconsistency:

(1) It is not the case that A implies B.
and
(2) B

But this is NOT an inconsistency and it is NOT an accurate description of my charge.

Also, the inconsistency that I am talking about is not a necessary part of subjectivism. Subjectivists do not have to make this mistake, yet most of them do anyway. It is possible to be a consistent subjectivists, it is just that very few subjectivists actually are consistent.

Ultimately, the problem with the various individual subjectivisms is that, even though its propositions can be true and consistent, they end up not being very important -- as unimportant as individual preferences for pizza toppings. The inconsistencies that are made in the various types of individual subjectivism is to try to infer more importance from a moral claim made within the context of individual subjectivism than the claim actually justifies.


[Note: There is a second inconsistency that I sometimes talk about that takes the form:

(1) C implies D
and
(2) C and not-D

But that is not the inconsistency under discussion here, I think.]

DRFseven

It's kind of important, though, because we're talking about reasoning, which is not involved in the internalizing, emotionalizing initial phase of moral acquisition. The reasoning comes after the fact, and, faulty or otherwise, serves to justify the way we feel, as well as to provide a context for social dilemmas that fall under the realm of morality. In addition, through reasoning, we modify and hone established moral codes, and pass these codes along to the next generation. So reasoning is involved, not in the basic inculcation of moral values, but more in the changing face of the moral code over time. The gut reaction may not seem the major point to you, in this discussion, but it is the major point in the acquisition of morality. It is what makes opinions seem like moral opinions instead of trivial preferences.

The correct interpretation would be more like "For society to run, X must occur, so that is what we both should want. If you don't want it, you are mistaken or crazy, and I hope my view prevails."



The inferrence that others ought to share the opinion stems, not from the specific moral question, but from the presumed objective that morality serves in the first place - the outcome. We presume that others want, NOT the same specific moral rules as we, though often in similarly socialized groups they are the same, but that they want a similar outcome, such as survival or happiness, etc., even if they don't consciously realize they want it.

I hope from this you see that subjectivists are not saying "You ought to have been socialized to like the same things I like", but, instead, are saying, "Since we both really want peace (or happiness, properity, longivity, survival), we should like X, because liking X is the key to that ulimate goal, even if you don't know that."

Quote:

Yet, people often do draw this inference. They do it all over the place when they talk about moral value. I had a conversation once with a racist who was very much repulsed by interracial relationships. It was not just that he disliked such relationships, he felt that all others ought to disapprove of them as well and could not understand how others could see this as acceptable.

That is because some way he wants things to be is perceived by him as not served by interracial relationships. It, of course, IS logical to him.

Yes, and if you take your subjective disapproval of homosexual acts to be a key factor in determining survival of the species, it DOES follow that you would think others should disapprove as well, or else that they are crazy, incompetent, etc.



Many claim it is wrong because it leads to things that cause the collapse of society, etc. It encourages perversion, goes "against nature", plays havoc with procreation, causes diseases, corrupts youth; all of which are thought to impact negatively on society. Of course there are the "God said it; that's it" variety, but I hear just of many of the other type. Regardless, they all learned to feel it was wrong and then learned to justify that opinion.

Even if we think the idea of intrinsic values is incoherent?

Quote:

I have not said anything about what the subjectivist ought to feel. I have argued that the subjectivist is not justified in INFERRING anything from his or her own moral feelings that he would not infer from his preferences for a particular type of pizza toppings. That if the INFERENCES he draws from one type of sentiment extend further than the INFERENCES he draws from the other, that he needs to say something about what justifies these additional inferences.

Well, "he" already has, when he mentioned his mama.

Alonzo Fyfe

DRFSeven

I really do not think that there is much room for disagreement between us.

I have elsewhere described a range of subjectivisms, extending from various forms of individual subjectivism on one side (agent subjectivism, assessor subjectivism, egoistic subjectivism), to universal subjectivisms on the other side (some forms of utilitarianism, social contract, and impartial observer theories).

The closer you get to universal subjectism the fewer objections I am going to have.

Your mention of "for society to work" and descriptions of individuals agreeing to rules that are to their mutual advantage push your claims away from individual-subjectivism and toward the universal subjectivism side of the spectrum.

And, since that is the side that I am camped in, again I see this as reason to believe that there is not much difference between us.

I would give a very specific meaning to the phrase "for society to work" that you might disagree with in detail. And I have some objections to social-contract versions of universal subjectivism to raise. But, again, these are differences in detail, not in overall substance.

Alonzo Fyfe

I do not think that the idea is incoherent. I think it is false.

In the same way that I do not think "my car is red" is incoherent. I just think it is false.