owleye

James...

"We agree that a man is free to attach new meanings to a fact, such as the fact that he took someone's life in the past. But I don't think that this freedom is sufficient to overpower the meanings that others place on these facts such that those other meanings are of little consequence."

This I take to be your thesis.

"The man who took someone's life in the past cannot redefine that past in a contextual vacuum."

This would be an example of what you are getting at.

"There were facts that occurred both before and after the event."

Facts are facts.

"Did the man do it in self defense? Did he premeditate the murder? The man is free to rationalize, justify, explain, and attach whatever meaning he feels appropriate, but if his interpretation is radically different from how most people interpret those facts then this has grave consequences for him. "

I assume we are not questioning the facts.

"And I don't mean just the fact that if he is found legally culpable his free will is then reduced to whatever he chooses to do from within a prison cell."

Again more facts.

"I mean also the subjectivity of others regardless of physical confinement."

I assume these are also facts.

"As you well know from reading Sartre the sort of wide-open freedom you describe (the freedom of pure Subject) is routinely diminished by being an object for others."

I suppose this is a fact as well.

"The man may desire to be a pure subject in his own world but the "gaze" of others make him an object in their world."

Once again a fact, I gather.

"His action has real consequences in that how the others see and define him."

Once again I assume this is a fact (or like the others a fact-claim).

"Perhaps you would want to say that the man's angst from this objectification requires him (if he wishes to remain authentic) to break away from the others and embrace his own subjectivity once again."

Let's say this is the existential position you are arguing against.

"Maybe so, but this leads to some peculiar moral ramifications regarding our responsibility to the freedom of others."

Let me suppose this is another element of your thesis, or possibly a restatement of it.

"Also, I'm still not convinced that our past actions do not define who we are in the present, both in the eyes of others as well as in the eyes of ourselves."

Well, yes, but existentialists tell a different story. Your story appears to be that we are determined by the past, and not free.


So where's the support for the thesis? What you need to show is that the above facts overpower any possibility that I can redefine meanings. Here's what Sartre says of the burden of the situation (situé): (from the Family Idiot, quoted in the Cambridge Companion to Sartre, David Jopling's article on Sartre's moral psychology)

I believe that a man can always make something out of what is made of him. This is the limit I would today accord to freedom: the small movement which makes of a totally conditioned social being someone who does not render back completely what his conditioning has given him. Which makes of Genet a poet when he had been rigorously conditioned to be a thief.

"I do not mean that our right to hold beliefs is a legal right. I mean that it is an existential right; a right to exercise our free will to attach meanings to our subjective and contingent lives."

It doesn't really matter the origin of this right. What matters and what I object to is that it is being used at all to justify your actions. Rights are asserted when prohibitions are considered. No one was prohibiting the particular involvement. One might say it is morally permissible. However, this is no justification for your conduct.

"Necessarily the whole endeavor is subjective from the start."

Exactly so. Thus the question is what motivates your trying to convince others?

"Assuming you are correct in saying that for existentialism "can implies ought" (something with which I do not necessarily agree) then I think there is a limit. I must balance my obligation to alleviate suffering with my ability to do so in a way that does not bring harm to myself or others."

This tells me only that the obligation extends to what is capable of being beneficial. The question is, suppose I am able to alleviate suffering within my ability to do so in a way that does not bring harm to myself or others. Am I then obligated to alleviate suffering? Am I negligent if I don't?

"For instance, suppose I see a man trapped inside of a burning building and I have both the ability and the desire to go in and save him. Whether I ought to do so is complicated by such factors as whether the building will not collapse at any moment, whether the man wishes me harm, whether my death leaves orphans behind with no support, and so on. So I don't think it can be reduced to something as simple as "can implies ought." Context is important. "

Context is important to the ability to act to help someone who needs it without harming others along the way. The question for you is: given that you can act to help someone who needs it without harming others, should you?

Fell

James Still

If you wish to call it that although I am not developing a system here. I am having a conversation to exchange ideas, which seems particularly one-sided to me since you've put many questions to me but have provided precious little exposition on your part to help clarify your point of view.

I'm skipping down past of of the "facts are facts" statements.

I am not arguing against existentialism or that position; I was moving beyond it. I think my interpretation of existentialism differs from your interpretation -- which is fine since the movement is not well-defined and it would be foolish to claim that there is a rigid way to understand it.

I disagree. It appears to me, and perhaps I am mistaken and you will clarify matters, that your view is a lot closer to metaphysical libertarianism than the existentialism I know. You want to say that the past has absolutely no power to determine present choices. But even Sartre is not as radical as you. His classic essay "Existentialism is a Humanism" was in part a defense against the criticism that with existentialsm "everything was permitted" (per Dostoevsky). He writes:

"And, when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men. ...in choosing for himself he chooses for all men."

A little later he revisits this point by stating that we are "obliged at every instant to perform actions which are examples. Everything happens to every man as though the whole human race had its eyes fixed upon what he is doing and regulated its conduct accordingly." Thus, he finds it therapeutic that we ask ourselves the question, "Am I really a man who has the right to act in such a manner that humanity regulates itself by what I do?"

Sartre's essay drips with responsibilities, obligations, and duties to oneself as well as to the rest of humanity. Camus and Buber emphasize this point much more than Sartre. Existentialism is not just about making free choices in the present. These choices are informed choices. They are not determined but they are always made in the context of their ramifications and this necessarily involves historical contexts as well as immediate contexts. So I don't feel comfortable conflating the sort of radical libertarianism you seem to be espousing with existentialism. Probably the only thing existentialists can agree upon is that existence precedes essence. That is the core of existentialism and anything more than that ascribed to the movement should be done very cautiously.

Having said of all that I do not want to give the impression that I'm defining existentialism by fiat. If you have other ideas about what it means to you then I'm all for it. But I don't think it's useful to use those ideas as a hammer to shape some of the more mainstream views about existentialism. Just my 0.02 cents.

snatchbalance

Religion is often used as prop for various secular ideologies. It goes part and parcel with various political systems throughout the world. Whatever various elite groups around the world need from the religious dogma available, will be coopted for thier use. The rest will be surpressed.

If rationality could be turned into a rallying cry, the masses could be swayed towards atheism. Of course, most importantly, rationalism does not serve the purposes of political elites in most instances.

Maybe, instead of arbitrary geopolital boundaries, where people are forced into the service of various ideologies, there could be ideological entities. People could align themselves with the entity of thier choice.

Of course, crusader idealogs would force all others to take up defencive postures. Damn Xianity all over again.

SB

owleye

James...

>>>We agree that a man is free to attach new meanings to a fact, such as the fact that he took someone's life in the past. But I don't think that this freedom is sufficient to overpower the meanings that others place on these facts such that those other meanings are of little consequence.

>>This I take to be your thesis.

>If you wish to call it that although I am not developing a system here. I am having a conversation to exchange ideas, which seems particularly one-sided to me since you've put many questions to me but have provided precious little exposition on your part to help clarify your point of view.

A thesis is not a system. i could have substituted 'claim' or 'position'. If I understand it correctly, it is the point of this entire thread you opened up to develop the position you are grappling with. I believe the position is exemplified by the paragraph above that I offered as your thesis. It could very well be a thesis that you defend for your masters degree in philosophy. Who am I to prevent that. My main point, however, is that when you make a claim, a thesis, or develop a position, you should be prepared to defend it. I was trying to discover where it was that you were defending this position. I confess I couldn't find it. Note that it is not really my place to offer my own opinion on the matter. This is your topic and you should be willing to defend your position against all comers.

>>>Perhaps you would want to say that the man's angst from this objectification requires him (if he wishes to remain authentic) to break away from the others and embrace his own subjectivity once again.

>>Let's say this is the existential position you are arguing against.

>I am not arguing against existentialism or that position; I was moving beyond it. I think my interpretation of existentialism differs from your interpretation -- which is fine since the movement is not well-defined and it would be foolish to claim that there is a rigid way to understand it.

If you look at the language I used, I was not suggesting you were arguing against existentialism. Rather I chose to say that the existential position referred to is something you reject and need to make a case against. Otherwise why did you bring it up? In your response you say you are not arguing against it. Why not? You say you wish to move beyond it. How can you move beyond it if that which you are moving beyond is a perfectly adequate position to take on the subject? It seems to me you have to find some reason why that position is inadequate. As such I would expect you to come up with good reasons we should all accept for thinking this. This is the same thing as arguing against.

"And, when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men. ...in choosing for himself he chooses for all men."

This was (and still is) an important citation principally because he was making a significant point that many of us (and I think he was referring to the Americans) had been sitting on the sidelines while the mass rounding up and killing of the jews was going on, and in fact was known by Roosevelt and his advisors, and probably many others. (I could be wrong here, but this is my impression.)

I'd been attempting to stick with Sartre, since he was instrumental to the popularity of the movement in the U.S. during the 50s and 60s. I think it admirable that you wish to go beyond him. Merleau-Ponty, following Sartre, came to break with him over the issue of freedom and necessity, arguing that the split between the two is not so hard and fast as Sartre had thought it. Sartre, as i mentioned, is a Cartesian and this is probably the source of the difficulty. You may find that Merleau-Ponty is more to your taste.

owleye

Divide et Impera

I agree with pretty much the entire opening post. Religion is here to stay, though its form can and probably will change. Should religion in its traditional sense crumble, some new ideal of religious significance will take its place. It is not general human nature to constantly question one's own ideals; to truly look deeply at the intricate identity of our own patterns of thought is quite rare.

To find contradiction within your own psyche is disturbing, but:

"Thou shalt not kill." -but- "Onward Christian Soldiers"

"Murder is a felony" -but- "Join the Army" (and do as they say)

Ideological contradiction seems to sit unscathed by any critics what-so-ever. I can guarantee you there a millions upon millions of people in the United States of America who would classify the concept of murder as 'evil', yet wave our flag as proudly and fervently as can be, hellishly bloody history and all -- to go a bit further in this I will go so far as to say that, in fact, this is what is expected. A blindfold is required for this all too common psychological inconsistency: religious thinking (blind devotion).

There are quite a few religious ideals, and most are manufactured. Ideology is at the consent of the governed, yet the governed are already kneeling at the alter. In order for religion to fall, religion must fall.

Should religion fall, what will take its place?

Ism Schism

[ May 14, 2002: Message edited by: 1Time ]</p>

abe smith

{Your, individual} life's too short, to waste it diddling your brains w/ these. MyO, of course. Go smell the flowers.

The Admiral

Hello James;

"Religion won’t go away. Stalinism was an attempt to place a secular religion into the void of Lenin's atheistic state. We've seen how religion popped up right after the fall of totalitarianism and Communism in the former Soviet Union."

This is a matter that I have thought much about. Stalin blew it. He had the opportunity to, not eliminate religion, that can't be done given the innate credulessness of humanity, but by education of the young to greatly reduce the dependence on religion. Instead he chose to try to stamp it out by brute force. I think that history shows quite clearly that any belief that is persecuted thrives underground. Is there hope for us Atheists?

The Admiral

RyanS2

Greetings James, very good thoughts actually. Before I start, one quick question. On your debate with Glen Miller, it says "difference between a liberal Christian and a Conservative Christian". Pardon my ignorance, but does this mean you are a liberal Christian? Irrelevant to the discussion, but it just made me curious.

My question to you is it that religion won't go away, or is it that myth won't go away? Myths come in all forms, science, history, literature, romanticism, etc. For instance, Joseph McCabe, (Rationalist Encyclopedia) pointed out that we have almost no objective information about knights, yet people still hold the notion that chivalry, (sp?), was a great and wonderful thing that was wide-spread. In absense of evidence, and in taking into consideration the popular climate, and looking at past warrior class systems, it's more plausible that they were stuck-up and thought of themselves as above the common people. Yet the myth still survives. Another one is what Farrell Till points out in "Yes, the Origins of Human Sacrifice". Many of our great hero's that actually exist, (Wyatt Earp, Bill Hitchcock, etc.), were not the men we imagined them to be, and we have evidence contrary. So why does the myth persist but the truth fade?

All systems of totalitarian government, (Stalinism, Marxism, Communism, Nazism), incorporate mythical elements. Is it so much so that we have a need for religion, or a need for our myths?

Jung once remarked that we ignore our myths at our own peril, and I think that is true. However, haven't people like Jung, Campbell, Leemings, Eliade, etc. shown us how to turn myths into a positive force? Don't they, somehow, connect us to something deeper? Couldn't it be that this is the deeper thing which people are searching for within themselves, and apt to find in religion? As a suggestion James, have you read Richard Tarnas' "The Passion of The Western Mind"? It hits vaguely upon some of the subjects you are talking about seemingly, at least from my perception.

Gurdur

I would really like to write a huge amount for this, and I will, soon; howefver, first off my main theme expressed provocatively and shortly:


Secularism fails when it pretends to be a total "answer".

Secularism succeeds when it focuses on single issues and in doing so forms as broad alliances as integrity and occasion allow.

[ May 19, 2002: Message edited by: Gurdur ]</p>