John Page

Perhaps, but could you kindly answer me question, sire:

".....perhaps you could clue me in, how is everything beyond actual experience not intellectual knowledge?"

Cheers, John

Keith Russell

John asked:
".....perhaps you could clue me in, how is everything beyond actual experience not intellectual knowledge?"

If a claim has not been evaluated to correspond to the available, independently verifiable, non-contradictory evidence, it remains only a claim, and (IMO) should not be called 'knowledge'.

Keith.

John Page

Keith:

I would say what you are referring to is the common definition of a fact, which comes by way of testing our knowledge in the kind of ways you suggest.

Cheers, John

gumb

I'm having a lot of trouble distinguishing between the "a priori" and the "analytic" (the disjunct of "synthetic?) . how do they differ? how does nececessity relate as well, i.e. "necessary"? do these relate to different philosophical spheres?

I'm confused again

John Page

I'd like others to chime in but I think one cannot be analytic without a priori assumptions, the latter being necessary for the former.

Witt

gumb:
I'm having a lot of trouble distinguishing between the "a priori" and the "analytic" (the disjunct of "synthetic?) . how do they differ? how does nececessity relate as well, i.e. "necessary"? do these relate to different philosophical spheres?

Me too.
Imo, apriori-analytic-necessary-deducible, all mean the same,
and
aposteriori-synthetic-contingent-factual, all mean the same.

p is analytic means it is not synthetic.
p is synthetic means it is not analytic.

If p is tautologous or contradictory then it is analytic.
If p is factually true or factually false then it's factual.

No analytic proposition is factual.
No factual proposition is analytic.
No proposition is both.

These considerations imply a 4-valued logic as opposed to the conventional bivalent (2-valued) logics.

P is analytic implies there is some system in which it's truth is decided: deducibly, necessarily, tautologously.

P is factual implies there is some system (eg. scientific method)
which will confirm the one to one correspondence of things and their names.

Atomic facts show themselves.

What do you think about this stuff?

Witt

gumb

hi witt,

I'm reading "A defense of pure reason" this afternoon by L. Bonjour. It's a very good book, but I think very difficult and might take me a few weeks to understand.

He argues that the crucial notion underlying it all is the 'a priori', and charaterises this as you do- deducable, justified by reason alone.

he then says that the term 'analytic' has been devised by empiracists, who do not accept apriori justification about 'empirical facts' as an instrument to help them escape from having to accept that some empirical things can be known by pure reason. to sanitise empirical knowlegde from deductive justification.

you notion of a four-way logic appeals to this distinction I think. there should be one form of truth accounting for what is 'empirically', factually true, and another accounting for what is decuctively true.

I think this distinction is valid, but I'm trying to wresttle with bonjours chapter on quine. perhaps it seems like quine wants to say that apriori justification is not neccessary at all? quine seems to imply that deductive propositions cannot be true at all, and talkinf about truth or falsity in relation to them would be a mistake.

this is a very interesting subject, it's just a shame it is so hard!

Witt

hi witt,

I'm reading "A defense of pure reason" this afternoon by L. Bonjour. It's a very good book, but I think very difficult and might take me a few weeks to understand.

He argues that the crucial notion underlying it all is the 'a priori', and charaterises this as you do- deducable, justified by reason alone.

he then says that the term 'analytic' has been devised by empiracists, who do not accept apriori justification about 'empirical facts' as an instrument to help them escape from having to accept that some empirical things can be known by pure reason. to sanitise empirical knowlegde from deductive justification.

you notion of a four-way logic appeals to this distinction I think. there should be one form of truth accounting for what is 'empirically', factually true, and another accounting for what is decuctively true.
---------------------------------

Hi gumb,

It seems we can divise a heirarchy of truths.
1. Logic/mathematics accounts for necessary truths.
2. Science accounts for empirical truths.
.
.
Where each level introduces a different truth concept.

gumb: this is a very interesting subject, it's just a shame it is so hard!

Yes but, since consitency is the main criteria, it's anybody's ball game..ie. we can all try.

Witt

John Page

Witt:

I don't agree with this because you have created a contradiction by making an analytic statement about facts! (or a factual statement about your analysis).

My POV is that unless you deliberately want contradictions (which must surely arise under some circumstances if you have more than one way of telling the truth) you need one "system" for determining the truth. One is free to select one's version of the truth - which is basically why I am a relativist and I subscribe to a POV that embraces an (conceptually) infinitely valued logic.

Kant got tied up in the issue because he was thinking about his thoughts and (necessarily ) therefore must have thought his thoughts before thinking about them. Inevitable, then, one must understand the nature of thought in order to resolve the conundrum.

What do you think?

Cheers, John

Wiploc

I think it's cool. I particularly liked the ...

... part. That's helpful.

I'm not familiar with the way you use "tautology." I would use it to identify the fallacy of circular reasoning.


I'm not following here. We deduce facts, and we try to induce facts; I don't see how statements about facts can be a third category, neither deduction nor induction.

And I didn't catch what the fourth value was. Deduction, induction, facts, and what else?
crc