John Page

Still confused. How about a generalized example: "There must be a sufficient force from the right side and a sufficient force from the left side in order to crush the object." Two sufficient reasons/causes and they are not in a chain, yes?

Again, I have this feeling that I'm missing your point.

Cheers, John

Frotiw

I am sorry I am not very good at explaining this. First of all let me stress again that the debate about nescessary and sufficient causes are are purely logical debate. Very similar to mathmatic. As a matter of fact it has been proved that mathematics can be reduced to logic.

Well a sufficient reason means something like this: A is a suffiecient couse for B if B occurs whenever A occur.

This means that B cannot occur unless A occurs. This is a funamental law in e.g. physics. Simply that any effect has a cause and just one cause. When an apel fall and hit newtons head there is a reason for this. The general views is that this particular cause is gravity(whatever that is). When a eightball moves on a pool tables it is most likely because it has been hit by another ball. The ball can move for varius reason but the is just one single cause that has actually made it move. You may have pushed, it might have been hit by another ball, it might have been the wind but in any case there is just one single reason that it actually did move. How could e.g. ever be 2 sufficient causes for an eight-ball to move? If there could be 2 causes to an effect ot would be like e.g. saying that heat is caused by molecular movement AND god's will. Even accepting god's will how can both ever be the cause. It is hard to explain because it is so very very simple and fundamental(this is very often the case in logic)*. I dare very confidently say that this the very fundamental prinicip in modern science e.g. physics. A problem is presented e.g. why do we not "fall" of the eath as it spins? Science search for the cause e.g. because of gravitational forces "pulling" masses together. Image if natural science(or any science at all) came up with more causes(sufficient) for an effect. People do not "fall" of the earth because og gravity AND because of ??? AND because of ??? AND ???. All of the causes sufficient. How could anyone take science seriusly if this was the case. There must be one really important reason why people do not fall of the earth.


I don't mean to offend you at all definatly not this does not mean that it is easy to grasp at all but is is very fundamental and VERY difficult to explain. The problem with logic is that it can't really be explained by anything but itself. Logic is not dependant of anything but itself. Which BTW is the reason that this contrary to anything else for principal reasons cannot be refuted.

Logic is part of philosophy but it is also very connected to math. Anyone who got the expression that Philosophy is a humanistic "soft" education or science really ought to follow a course in logic. I remember using the same educational books as students of mathematics and computer science doing lots of calculative work. Also where I attend several students of mathematics read philosphy as secondary course for this reason among others.
I suggest reading Graeme Forbes "Modern Logic" this book should explain the difference between necessary and sufficient causes. Also explaing topics like: sentintiel logic, monadic predicate logic, modal logic and fuzzy logic. I really good educational book about modern logic.

John Page

What is the sufficient cause of logic, then?

Cheers, John

King's Indian

Hello, Frotiw. Nice to meet you.

You’ve certainly given me lots to think about!
(BTW, I have been away from the internet writing this, so I have only quickly glanced at the more recent posts. Please take this as a response to the original post only. I think I go over some of the subsequent points, but I’ll have more leisure tomorrow).
I’ll start with your note on metaphysics. I tend to agree, but I need clarification on one point. . I wonder whether the “necessary and independent being” is to be thought as some way prior to “what is”: that horses, etc are to be analogous in some way to shadows cast by a strong light. I happen to think that, once one has found generalizations for aspects of reality, it is not necessary (or even parsimonious, in a way) to then start looking for those same generalizations as facts anterior to that reality (By generalizations, of course, I include the most rigorous mathematical descriptions, as their point is that they can be applied over a wide range of appropriate situations). “What is”, isn’t just where we live: room can also be made for our generalizations as beings interacting with the world. As I seem to be moving towards Plato’s cave, I’ll move on, clearing the way for any spelunkers who happen to be reading.Again, I’d like your clarification on a few points:
1) “Explanatory Layers”. As you say, one shouldn’t mix them up: however, to say that because on the explanatory layer of “Physics” there is one sufficient cause (see below), then this may be universally extended to all explanatory layers may seem an example of this very confusion. The example of rainfall will not just go away by the mention of Physics (quite the reverse). I find it hard on what you base your rebuttal on: you yourself discount an argument from quantum gravity, and if there are strong philosophical reasons to believe in determinism (again, see below), that does not compel one to accept the transformation “one cause >> one effect”. To make the point again: to notice that there is significantly more rainfall pa on one side of the mountain range than another is to acknowledge that it is a fact that needs explaining. One can’t merely do this by reference to adiabatic lapse rates: although perfectly accurate, they can only describe by themselves air rising by warming, and are calculated at a standard rate (don’t ask me, by the way: this is A-Level Geog I’m dredging up, and that was a while ago) they take no account of the geographical features of a particular location. This is done by the environmental lapse rate, which is calculated using empirical methods, and by putting them together (as in calculating the intersection of the two lines): there you go! Brollies and Gene Kelly and whatnot. Again, I ask: at what point is it necessary (sufficient?) for the explanatory layer of (particle) physics to enter this description? I’m not sure that this would be a case of “confusing the levels”, either: evidently mountain and atmosphere interact directly.
2) “Sufficient Cause”. I would be interested to hear your reasons why sufficient must imply “singular”. I can’t think of any, and the wet example above further leads me to think the opposite. To say that one cannot imagine otherwise would leave one open to the counter-example of wave/particle duality, or of measuring a particle’s location or velocity, but not both. I don’t discount the possibility that I’ve missed something, however.
3) “A Physical view”. On one level, your statement seems to need no rebuttal: if we stick to the explanatory level of physics, then it would be clear that non-Physical explanations will be superfluous. The problem, to me, seems to be that if gross effects have an explanation, you would prefer it to be continued all the way down to fundamental particles. But don’t forget, Physics does not just concern itself at that level: rainfall, even the formation of mountain ranges, are normal physical mechanisms. However successful the particle research brand of physics is (and it evidently is), there is no reason within physics why such techniques may be applied throughout the world as we know it. The argument from present ignorance may help us to avoid complacency, but it can do no more than that. A belief may be a useful guide in selecting which approach to take to a problem, but it must always make room for the “ugly little fact” that will force re-appraisal. (speaking from experience hem hem)
4) “Determinism/Indeterminism”. Again, recalling our agreement on mixing levels up, it’s as well to remember that indeterminacy is a concept we apply at the normal, everyday level: I don’t mean that it doesn’t signify something precise when applying it to particle physics. I do mean that our difficulties in understanding how a particle’s properties can only be treated statistically leads one to think that in trying to define such particles rigorously one had better not use such distinctions as determinate and its opposite.
Well, I’m pooped. Any thoughts welcome.
Take care,
KI

Frotiw

Very briefly(it's late here sorry)

Logic does not participate in causal chains but is a condition for a causual chain actually taking place. The view that logic would participate in causality would be idealism. Some kinds idealism are easier to defend than others. -This- kind of idealism is very difficult to defend. The main reason being that you would end up in an eternal regress. In this view(that is that logic has a sufficient cause) logic is treated as a logical component. Then you will still need something in which logic is a component and this continues so on eternally. Logic does not participate in causal chains but is condition for the causal ever taking place. The view that logic is a condition for causality is proberly what some might call epistemological idealism and to great anoyance for empirist, positivist and others(including me) VERY difficult to refute. I am very reluctant to idealism generally but this very kind is almost purely attacked by redicules religious views. Religious in that they attempt to refute it by bringing in mystical or very crude views that thought through does not make sense. Interesting enough the foremost attackers happens to be logical positivist and empirists. Very disturbing.
It should be notet however that epistemological idealism though idealism should not be confused with onthological idealism. kant and Husserl can reasonable be considered epistemological idealists.
Summed up: King's question indicate the onthological idealism or at least an idealism where logic participate in causality as a individuated component. This view I would never wish to defend. I consider it a difficult position to defend philosophical. The second type, epistemological idealism, is a far stronger position and claims that logic is the structure or pattern of the world. I have strong difficulties accepting idealisme in any form(being a materialst) but at the same time I must admit I have yet to actually see a serious opposition to this view.
Completly refuting logic and mathematics often seem to require one forcing upon one self a certain intellectual blindness far too reminiscent of religious fanatism too be taking seriously scientifically and philosophically. Harsh words for some, my apologies.

reflecting on the question again. Let me put it this way.
Searching for an cause(sufficient) for logic and thereby accepting logic in causality will be the equivalent of accepting the following error in math:
Image that in a mathematical calculation(e.g. 2+x=y) MATH is inserted in x's place. Yes I am serius MATH as a sysem(or whatever it is) is really inserted in the equation. This is obviosly not possible. The problem is proberly more significant in logic since logic is more fundamental than math. Math can be reduced to logic but logic cannot be reduced to math. Much more can be said about but this should be enough to prove the impossibility.

Sorry maybe I got a little too far away from the original question rambling late late night.

BTW. what i actually meant by saying that logic is dependant on itself is that logic can only be explained by it self. An explanation or support for logic will always be circular. This is a problem in all other cases but logic. A support of logic cannot possibly not be circular. Philosophers do not wan't a theory to be circular, that is the premises are included in the conclusion. However logic is as earlier said not a theory but a condition for a theory to be expressed and understood. There can be no theory without logic.
An explanation of logic must inevitable be circular and even the refutation of logic seem only too support logic. Noone can actually understand and comprehend a refutation of logic without accepting logic. Affirmation and refutation are logical concepts hence a refutation of logic is absurd. As soon as an expression poses meaning it can reasonably be considered a logical expression. If one has to attempt to refute logic one has to attempt to express something without actually expressing anything(that is without being meaninfull). As soon as an expression poses the properties of a logical judgement one has failed to defy logic.
Now just for the record some might say that it is possible to express "something" without it being a logical judgement. Thismight be true BUT even so we are certainly not within the domain of philosophy, science or rational thinking but true mystiticm. Then we are out of rational thinking and there is no point at all in discussing.

hmmm not so briefly after all I guess

Cheers.

Frotiw

Hello King's Indian
I just read you reply(must have been written while I wrote too) great to see another well written intelligent reply. Right now it's 2.31 in the morning(or very late night) hopefully I will write a worthy reply hopefully tomorow but now is definatly too late. zzzzzzzzzzzz

Cheers.

John Page

Frotiw:

I'm still confused. I'm taking the position that the system of logic is a product of the human mind, a distillation of how things can be considered tru or false. I just don;t see how this man-made system participates in causal chains - we might rationalize it as an unseen or undetected cause but in reality its just a tool we use to explain how things are.

Unlike you, I don't think "logic can only be explained by itself". Logic can be explained as a system that allows us to agree what is true or false according to the facts. A fact is generally something we agree upon relative to the material world, when a fact is accepted we say that it is true. Logic does not cause the fact.

Cheers, John

Frotiw

Concerning metaphysics I just meant that metaphysics must be about that which existance depends on nothing. I am a materialist meaning that i claim is that which existance depends on nothing. There is matter and nothing precedes this. Now what I do find difficult is that in reality there is not just matter. What really appears to -be- is matter structured. There is not just matter but matter organized. Im not sure about the status of the organizing principels.

Now about the sufficuent causes:
I it important to imphasize that when I speak of sufficient and necessary causes I speak of logic. My point is that a sufficient reason or condition is logical concept and will count despiteless of metaphysical stance. I say that in a causul chain there is one cause that does the difference between effect or no effect for materialists and dualist alike. There is no problem that there might be several competing causes to create an effect. The point is that there will be one effect(the sufficent one) that will make the big difference. I can easily imagine several causes having an effect on something but I cannot imagine several suffucient causes. It's completly cruzial to note that I am speaking of sufficient causes in oppsition to necessary causes. You can image an elephant pushing a tree and also the wind pushing the tree. Both will effect the tree allright bot one of them will do the "final blow" knocking over the tree.
When I mention physics it is because this logical principel in completly embedded in physics and all other natural sciences for that matter. Claiming that the can be more than one -sufficient- cause to an effect is equally problematic as saying there are effects with not cause at all. It will pose the same problem for science in either case.
Also it is important to differentitiate between potential and actual causes. The can be several -potential- causes to e.g. a persons death but in reality(actualized) there will always be just one final cause of death.
BTW concerning wave/particle duality and "Heisenbergs relations of uncertainty" this is not that problematic for determism. Determism still has quite strong support for the following. Particle duality depends on the method of observation. In some experiments photons will appear and others particles. But the important part is that they can never be both at same time. You pick from the start(choosing method of experimentation) either wave or particle and during the experient there will consequently be either wave or particle but never both at the same time. The same goes for heisenbergs relations of uncertainty. They are by no means a proof of indetermism. They just prove epistemologically that you cannot measure velocity and positin at the same time, this does not mean that the particle does not -exist- at one place at certain velocity and a certain position. When I cannot see the sun it doesn't mean that it is gone it just mean that I can't see it right now.

I completly out of time now.

Cheers Frotiw

King's Indian

Hello again, Frotiw! Hope you’re OK.

This place just sucks up one’s time, doesn’t it? As for your compliment, I think well-edited would be closer to it, considering the bilge I delete from my replies that you never see. But ta anyway. Credit must go to you, for defining your position clearly enough for me to pinpoint my difficulties with it.
And I still have difficulties, I’m afraid: I’m not sure that you can have unstructured, disorganized matter. All such matter on Earth would be definitely classified as “structured”. Even the great clouds of stuff between galaxies are organized enough to be recognizable elements. On this level, we do know the organizing principles, concerning things lile outer electron shells of atoms. That they are loose agglomerations of swirling clouds does not put them outside the realms of organized matter. They behave exactly as Physics would expect such phenomena to behave. One may say that structure and organization help to define matter.This seems to point to the crux of our disagreement: whether our concepts are tools that we have fashioned historically, or guidelines for a search for a layer anterior to reality. I notice John (peace be upon him) also raised a similar point (in about half the time that it took me), so I’ll take your response to him as your position. I will accept the distinction if you apply it to my example above (at the risk of appearing a groupie for rainfall). The “elephant and the tree” example you mention is not really fair: In this case one or the other is superfluous as an agent, but what isn’t is that one has to take into account the condition of the tree itself in order to determine why this tree and not that tree. Also what this particular elephant has against trees, come to think of it. Four quick points, and I’ll cut down on the waffling:
1) I mentioned “uncertainty” and “wave/particles” as examples of things difficult to comprehend: these were meant as counter-examples to your point, ” It is simply not comprehensible to imagine an effect with more that one sufficient cause”. Should’ve made that point more clearly.
2) I find it difficult to square “determinism” with the fact that a particle’s property can only be defined statistically; also that at some levels, particles seem to lose any particular qualities in themselves, and can only be defined with their interaction with other particles. I rather think you'll find that particle physicists do not think much in terms of "this causes that". I also gather that you use determinism in a stronger sense than "three points determine a line".
3) I always thought that the observation of a particle was a demonstration of uncertainty, but not the explanatory mechanism for it: at some levels, a particle just doesn’t possess both qualities at once, hard as that is for us to understand it using everyday concepts. Our observation is just a way of saying that we force it to interact with other particles. (e.g. photons). I’ll admit I’m treading water a bit here, so any light thrown on the matter would be appreciated.
4) Why is more than one sufficient (pending your application to my example) cause as problematic as no cause at all? Where is the analogy, other than a privileging of “one (suff.) cause>>one effect”?
Sorry to keep you so busy!
Take care,
KI.

MyKell

I don't think the uncertainity principle at the quantum level affects the determinicy of the world at any level. Our inability to precisely figure out the position and the velocity of a particle at a certain time is a function of observation. Our ignorance of the previous histories of the universe at that level affects our own predictions, however, it does not change the determinicy the universe is going through. I tend to agree with Frotiw on that one.
Now regarding metaphysics, I don't think the matrix hypothesis can be logically ruled out. Epiphenominism, which is the branch of dualism taken by philosophers like David Chalmers, is very close to non-reductive materialism, yet not identical. Although I tend to be a very strong reductive materialist, I still can't provide enough evidence to refute a BIV hypothesis. I tend to disagree with KI on that one.
For logic, I still cannot understand what is being suggested in this thread. To say that a cause is sufficient for an effect is to say that there can be no other. Otherwise, it would be a logical contradiction since it cannot possibly be sufficient. I think John is trying to say that logic is something we humans can notice, but the universe does not necessarily operate on our version of logic. Frotiw, are you saying that the laws of physics can be reduced to logic??