Witt

McHugh's Ontological Argument
Chris McHugh has developed a sophisticated modal ontological argument that attempts to avoid classic problems with modal ontological arguments[1]. In this post, I describe the major problem I have with accepting his argument.

Here's a statement of McHugh's argument in pseudosyllogism:

quote:
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1) Either the existence of something Godlike* is logically necessary or logically impossible.
2) It is not the case that the existence of something Godlike* is logically impossible.
3) The existence of something Godlike* is logically necessary.... [2]
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Where G= God exists, []= it is necessary that, <>=it is possible that:

1) <>G -> []G
2) <>G
therefore,
3) []G

Theists like this one.

This is a valid argument, it follows by modus ponens, but, so is the following:

1a) <>G -> []G
2a) <>~G
therefore,
3a) []~G

1a) <>~G -> []~G
2a) <>~G
therefore,
3a) []~G

Atheist like this one.

If we maintain that: God exists is possible and God exists is analytic then, God exists is true.
If we maintain that: God does not exist is possible and God exists is analytic then, God exists is false.

If G is analytic then: G <-> []G, <>G <-> []G, <>G <-> G, are each valid, and ~G <-> []~G, <>~G <-> []~G, <>~G <-> ~G, are valid.

Evidently we cannot claim: <>G & <>~G, because that is contradictory.

These arguments prove nothing at all, in spite of Hartshorne's claims.

They presume that 'possibily God exists' is easier to digest than 'God exists is true', and it is not easier, they are equivalent.

If God is described/defined by a contradictory predication, it cannot exist.

Witt